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In this thesis, I propose a radical reframing of the analytic scientific realism debate via 
the phenomenological concept of the life-world. I provide motivation for examining 
science’s situatedness by interrogating the observable aspects of the world. In so doing, I 
propose to drop any notions of ecumenical truth and reality in the frame of the debate. 
The case study of autism spectrum conditions (ASCs) is explored to demonstrate what this 
suggested reframing implies for scientific practice. 
I offer that the best construal of the observables is the concept of the life-world 
(Edmund Husserl’s lebenswelt) from continental phenomenology.  I perform a series of 
analytic tweaks on the concept and define it, for the frame of this dissertation, to be the 
world of immediate – yet theory-laden and prism-mediated – experience as cashed out by 
a subject’s perceiving capacities. The main improvement of the life-world to traditional 
analytic construals of the observables is that it captures extra-linguistic elements, allowing 
us to interrogate these crucial facets of science that are not language- and theory-based 
strictu sensu. 
Following I highlight the life-world’s pluralistic dimensions. Theoretically, I do this by 
defending conceptual scheme pluralism against certain tendencies in the analytic 
philosophy of language, and then apply this defence to life-worlds. Turning to extant cases 
of life-world difference, I investigate the case study of autism spectrum conditions. I argue 
that what this case brings to the fore is first our being compelled to recognise the autistic 
life-world as ‘real and true’ in the way we take the neurologically typical life-world to be 
and, second, that autism spectrum conditions treatment should be oriented towards this 
life-world, in the sense of attempting to maximize happiness and well-being in its own 
terms. Unfortunately, this is found to be in stark contrast with the extant ASC-related 
treatment situation.  
Finally, I claim that we should philosophically be haunted less by any claims of 
ecumenical Truth and Reality and related, somewhat stale metaphysical issues typically 
associated with the debate. Rather, it is both more philosophically interesting and 
humanitarianly urgent to interrogate how what a science takes to be true shapes the 
practice itself and how it affects human lives associated with it. 
Theoretically, my philosophical position abides first and foremost by life-world 
incorrigibility and pluralism and is thus appropriately named pluralistic incorrigible 
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realism (PIR). ‘True’ is here taken to cash out what is incorrigible for a perceiving subject, 
but whatever notion of truth may arise herein is only in the form of a (subjective or 















































In this dissertation, I propose a reframing of the analytic scientific realism debate. I 
argue that the debate, as it currently stands, focuses too much on whether unobservable 
entities postulated by scientific theories really exist, and insists on somewhat stale 
metaphysical questions such as whether science captures the ecumenical truth and a 
picture of reality ‘as it is’. I argue for a practical orientation of the philosophical 
examination of science’s truth and reality claim, and I explore the case of autism spectrum 
conditions (ASCs) to demonstrate how this may come about. Towards the above I employ 
the phenomenological concept of the life-world, through which I demonstrate that 
science’s truth and reality claim is always conditioned upon a subject or group of subjects. 
The contribution of this dissertation to the analytic literature of the philosophy of 
science revolves around two main philosophical points: the construal of the observable 
level of the sciences through the life world, which  incorporates all those elements of an 
‘inner core’ of the empirical that science crucially relies on, and the conceptualisation of 
differences between subjects through the life-world, rather than on the basis of unduly 
constraining language differences, as per the traditional analytic philosophy of language 
view. 
By focusing on autism spectrum conditions to bolster this theoretical framework, my 
thesis invites its own applicability. The argument that people with ASCs diagnoses should 
be construed as operators of different life-worlds stands in stark contrast to the 
contemporary, almost purely behavioural approach of the sovereign method of treatment, 
Applied Behaviour Analysis (ABA). I conduct a life-world analysis of the heated ethico-
political debate of ABA versus neurodiversity activists and show that we may reach a 
resolution by filtering ABA to the autistic life-world and by pursuing phenomenologically 
oriented treatments, which are currently unfortunately understudied. Through the ASCs 
case and by thinking philosophically about the orientation of treatment of people with 
neurological differences, I suggest that we should indeed pay more attention to the fact 
that what we take to be true within scientific practice shapes human lives. Plausibly, we 
should leave traditional questions of ecumenical truth and reality behind in favour of a 
more practical approach, which relates to scientific practice.  
No major change in medical practice came about without a subtext of rigorous 
research: I envision this thesis to be part of a bigger picture of the cross disciplinary 
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attention paid to ACSs conditions and possibly beyond, to other areas of interest to 
professions related to physical and mental health. This approach will add to challenging 
received notions of normativity, mental health, and well-being, and will attempt to 
substantially incorporate feedback from mental health patients in what the treatments that 
regard them should aim towards. Necessarily, this is impossible to achieve without 
disseminating the theoretical maxims to the related professionals, such as people with 
ASCs diagnoses themselves, their carers, educators, doctors, psychologists. Upon the 
completion of my doctoral project, I will first and foremost seek out collaborations with 
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The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity 
and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something — because it is always before one's 
eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has 
at some time struck him. 
-Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953), Philosophical Investigations, section 129 
 
Introduction 
The scientific realism versus scientific antirealism debate is one of the central issues 
within contemporary analytic philosophy of science. Abstractly, the central question of 
the debate is whether (certain kinds of) scientific statements are true and whether the 
(mature) sciences describe the world and its contents as they really are. Scientific realists 
defend science’s truthful description of reality as it is, while scientific realists deny it. In its 
received form, the contemporary debate circles around the unobservable entities 
populating scientific theories (e.g. the subatomic particles). Science’s relation to truth and 
reality is thought to be exhausted by its capacity to correctly map the unobservable entities 
that inhabit the world. If we have valid reasons to believe that science maps the 
unobservables as they are, it is thought, then we have valid reasons to believe that science 
articulates true statements about reality as it is. 
I begin this dissertation by surveying the scientific realism debate in chapter one. 
Therein, I argue that, besides being fixated with the unobservables, the contemporary 
debate seems to be governed by a certain dialectic pattern. After reviewing the central 
arguments for and against scientific realism, I argue that scientific realism seems to be 
taken as the self-evident position towards science unless a counter-example from the 
history of science prompts us to think otherwise. That is, a given (mature) scientific theory 
A is taken to deliver a true picture of reality unless a scientific theory B, of the same ambit 
and presumably exhibiting the same virtues as A – and usually a predecessor of A – is 
brought to the fore. This development is evidently unfavourable for the scientific realist, 
seeing as the virtues of A seem no longer a reliable basis from which to infer its truth and 
referring to reality. Following, the debate becomes one of the scientific realist arguing that 
either A did not exhibit the virtues allowing us to infer it delivering a true picture of the 
world as it really is to begin with, or that B is in fact less virtuous than A. The scientific 
realist argues to the opposite conclusions. 
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My purpose is neither to defend the scientific realist nor the scientific antirealist in the 
frame of this conflict. Rather, I argue that this comparative-historical dialectic, which 
begins with taking a successful theory to be true unless compared with another theory with 
the same kind of success in the history of that same science, is unduly limiting and calls 
for an urgent reframing of the scientific realism debate. I argue that even if a theory faced 
no evidential and historical hardships whatsoever, we would still have ample reasons to 
challenge the view that it delivers some tout court true picture of reality of the facet of the 
world it seeks to explain. I proffer that such a more ‘direct’, conceptual examination of 
science’s claim to truth and reality should prioritize the investigation of the situatedness 
of science as an activity conducted by specific beings and not from a God’s eye point of 
view. I state that I am going to embark on this project by examining science’s truth and 
reality claim to the observable aspects of the world, which the contemporary scientific 
realism debate typically glosses over. 
In chapter two I turn to those analytic philosophers who have discussed the observables 
in connection with the scientific realism debate, mainly philosophers of science of decades 
past and philosophers of language. I find that these scholars address mainly two issues. 
First, philosophers like Grover Maxwell and Bas van Fraassen inaugurated a debate about 
the legitimacy of the observables: of whether there is a valid separation to be made between 
the observable and the unobservable aspects of the world. Maxwell contends that things 
are always theoretically observed through a medium and thus the dichotomy makes no 
sense, and van Fraassen argues that, despite this, the dichotomy does make sense. What 
it takes to see this, per van Fraassen, is to realise that, still from within a theory and always 
through a medium, we always define a substratum of observables (read roughly: an 
empirical foundation) that science epistemically relies on. This debate was proliferated by 
numerous others arguing in favour or against the dichotomy. Second, philosophers like 
Hilary Putnam put forward the problem of what kind of thing the observables are (e.g. 
sense-data, phenomena) as well as what kind of access we, as humans, are legitimized in 
claiming we have to them. Putnam, being a philosopher of language, and others following 
in his footsteps, ask: how do we know what we refer to with our words is, and how do we 
know that we refer to it? These issues are evidently crucial for my dissertation’s project: if 
I am to investigate science’s relation to truth and reality via the observables then I must 
certainly establish that there is a valid dichotomy to be made between the observables and 
the unobservables and that there is a way for us to refer to the observables. 
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In chapter three I set out to find the best way to think about the observables, especially 
within the scientific endeavour. To this end, and after having considered the analytic 
insights of chapter two, I lay down some principles for the observables’ best construal. 
First and foremost, the observable level decidedly resists naïve construals: it may not be 
construed as a static image encapsulated by one or more of the naked senses, and it may 
under no circumstances be considered non-theoretical. While theoretical and not restricted 
to the human senses (but sometimes externalised to technological instruments), however, 
the observables’ proper construal should encapsulate the basic motivation behind pursuing 
an ‘inner sanctum’ of the empirical altogether: decoding an extant substratum of 
assumptions and tropes (which I will later group as admittances) that science departs from, 
returns for validation to, is conducted via, and is not challenging while being conducted. 
Even those analytic philosophers who are taken to argue against the observable-
unobservable dichotomy, I will show, do not deny this: what they deny is a simplistic 
conception of the observable, naïve in the way I have described just above. 
In this spirit, I proffer that an unlikely candidate, the concept of the life-world – a 
concept from Edmund Husserl’s continental phenomenology – is the best construal of the 
observables in science and beyond. To tailor it for the uses intended for it in this 
dissertation, I perform a series of analytic tweaks on the concept. In Husserl, the life-world 
is defined to be the world as it is reflexively (without conscious consideration) had by every 
being from its subjective point of view. In my version, the life-world is defined to be the 
realm of incorrigible admittances – those one finds oneself unable to ‘peel away’. Incorrigible 
admittances include whatever we seem unable to do away with while we are thinking, 
theorizing, and acting: they include a basic parsing-out of the world, a basic sense of the 
self and extend, as we will see in detail, even to our cognitive and bodily tropes and the 
relations we incorrigibly perceive between entities. A subject’s life-world is the world as it 
is filtered by its perceiving capacities and delivered to its consciousness incorrigibly. 
Incorrigibility, a concept I borrow from Hasok Chang, denotes that the life-world includes 
only those admittances one finds oneself unable to do without – in the strongest, metaphysical 
sense of the expression.  
This, I claim, is a viable solution for demonstrating philosophically that science both 
depends on an unquestioned substratum and that this substratum may not be simply, for 
known philosophical reasons, considered given, raw data of the world as is given by e.g. 
something as simple as a static image to consciousness. Moreover, I highlight that the life-
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world has an intersubjective dimension (it may be shared by similarly oriented subjects) 
and I delineate the life-world’s incorrigible admittances across four non-exhaustive, 
potentially overlapping categories: ontological (regarding what there is); metaphysical 
(regarding how it is and relates); semiotic (regarding what it means); emotional (regarding 
how it feels). One of the chief advantages of the life-world, I claim, is that it also transcends 
definitions of the observable level as a realm of observational statements. Going beyond 
the construal of science as a purely linguistic-theoretical endeavour, the life-world 
demonstrates both the situatedness of the incorrigible substratum of science upon the 
subjects who conduct science, as well as the multifarious post-linguistic elements that 
shape the scientific process. This advantage of the life-world is to be fully developed in 
chapters five and six. 
In this chapter I also examine a famous case of a purported observation of the 
unobservable: that of the electron. By investigating the cloud chamber case, an experiment 
whereby the electron is supposedly observed, I showcase the ways in which the life-world 
is both crucial and necessary for science. I find irremovable, necessary for the experiment 
life-world elements seated not only in the beginning of the inferential-experimental chains 
that lead to the purported observation, but also along all of their links. I conclude by 
fighting off arguments seeking to diminish the importance of the life-world. Such 
arguments I take to claim that the life-world is of minimal importance for the sciences 
because, at the end of the day, the sciences may with their sophisticated means get to a 
deep-seated reality and truth about the world no matter what situated material they begin 
from. I argue that since the sciences find their justification exactly in the life-world, 
dismissing the life-world for a more deep-seated picture of reality immediately takes away 
our reasons for believing in the maxims pertaining to any such deep-seated realities. 
In chapter four I slowly start turning to the significance of the above phenomenological 
apparatus for the scientific realism debate. I dig into the subjective dimension of the life-
world and follow up on the claim that, as subjective, the life-world is a pluralistic concept. 
Recall now that I have defined the life-world to be the world as incorrigibly had, in which 
process perception plays a crucial role. In the analytic literature, there is a sizeable debate 
about whether the content of perception is conceptual and, if so, how much of it is 
conceptual. Evidently, I neither can nor wish to arbitrate this debate here, so I allow for 
all possible cases: that perception is wholly non-conceptual; that it is wholly conceptual; 
 16 
that it is part conceptual and part non-conceptual. I argue for extensive life-world 
differences in all cases. 
The case of perception being partly or wholly conceptual is complicated – and there 
are many reasons why we should think that subjects conducting science, a richly 
conceptual endeavour, perceive conceptually. A famous analytic philosopher of science, 
Donald Davidson, has influentially argued not only that there are no alternative 
conceptual schemes, but that the idea of a conceptual scheme is in and of itself nonsensical. 
Thus, to evince life-world plurality, in chapter four, following others, I take it upon myself 
to demolish Davidson’s arguments. I show that Davidson follows a faulty construal of 
conceptual schemes that identifies them with languages and thus constricts any way of 
exploring conceptual scheme difference within the confines of translation. Turning to 
conceptual schemes users, their behaviour, and related extra-linguistic elements goes way 
further to evince conceptual scheme difference. The life-world, not arrested by purely 
linguistic interpretations the way the observable level is thought of naively and 
traditionally is, I argue, just the tool we need to go past a linguistic- and Davidsonian-
flavoured understanding of how concepts may differ across perceiving agents. 
In chapters five and six I move from a theoretical defence of life-world plurality to a 
case, I will claim, of extant life-world plurality. I provide a case study of autism spectrum 
conditions (ASCs) and I argue that people with ASCs diagnoses are best understood as 
people of different life-worlds to the neurologically typical ones. Moreover, I map the 
ASCs-related differences, as evinced through the cognitive theories of ASCs and testimony 
from people with ASCs diagnoses, to the four categories of the life-world (ontology; 
metaphysics; semiotics; emotions). Following this, I turn to ASCs treatment. ASCs-
involved communities, I show, find themselves amidst a heated – and oftentimes bitter – 
conflict regarding the mainstream ASCs treatment method, Applied Behaviour Analysis 
(ABA). The pro-ABA camp claims that ABA helps people with ASCs diagnoses acquire 
skills necessary for the maximization of their well-being and autonomy, while the anti-
ABA, neurodiversity camp claims that ABA is plainly behaviourally disciplining people 
with ASCs diagnoses, seeking to normalise them. ABA, it is often argued, is in violation 
of consent ethics within treatment and, against the people with ASCs diagnoses’ will, seeks 
to instil in them behaviours that make minimal or no sense to them so that they behave in 
a manner that is socially acceptable. 
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I claim that the controversy at the heart of ASCs treatment is best understood as a 
controversy around the autistic life-worlds. The neurodiversity camp is effectively arguing, 
I claim, that the autistic life-world should be considered a valid mode of being and not a 
product of defect to be corrected through behavioural therapy. Their main claim, I argue, 
should be construed as highlighting autistic particularities of being and that ASCs are not 
plainly behavioural, inappropriate digressions from the neurologically typical state of 
affairs. This runs contrary to the purely behavioural correction as the treatment approach 
to ASCs – to which, I take occasion to highlight, not all ABA supporters necessarily 
subscribe. Employing the life-world analytical apparatus, I side with the neurodiversity 
activists: not only is the autistic mode of being plausibly characterised by significantly 
different ontology, metaphysics, semiotics, emotions compared to the neurologically 
typical mode of being; it is further the case that this mode of being appears to be 
incorrigible. People with ASCs diagnoses, I argue, can indeed acquire some practical skills 
through behavioural interventions but, for all we know, they continue to operate in life-
worlds markedly different to the neurologically typical ones. Thus, treatment should not 
seek to alter people with ASCs diagnoses behaviourally beyond very urgent situations – 
such as those where people with ASCs diagnoses conduct harm upon themselves or others. 
Instead, the life-world approach invites more phenomenologically oriented treatment 
approaches to ASCs, which would seek to maximize the well-being of people with ASCs 
diagnoses in their own life-worlds’ terms. I provide an example of such an approach by 
demonstrating the related work of one of the most famous neurologist in the world, Oliver 
Sacks. 
Last, in the conclusion of the chapter I mark some limits of applicability of the life-
world approach in ASCs-like cases, and I show how important moving beyond the 
linguistic-Davidson line has been in approaching ASCs. Markedly, had one gone looking 
for purely linguistic differences in the ASCs case, one would have found oneself failing 
tremendously to grasp the depth of difference running between the autistic and the 
neurologically typical modes of being. This, in turn, would plausibly have resulted in 
treatment analysis that would not have taken proper notice of how ASCs treatment 
impacts people with ASCs diagnoses – or at any rate a way more superficial notice than 
the life-world approach. Thus, as is also demonstrated in chapter seven, moving from 
observation statements and conceptual schemes as languages to the life-worlds toolkit is 
not only more philosophically interesting, but also more humane. 
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In chapter seven I summarise the overall philosophical picture of this dissertation by 
connecting chapters three to six back to where it all began from: the issue of scientific 
realism. I argue for a life-world based, pluralistic, incorrigible realism. Within its premises 
one is justified in speaking of a statement being true and of describing reality but only in 
the sense of this something being incorrigible for them and under given circumstances – 
which could be and probably are indeed otherwise for others. That said, within pluralistic 
incorrigible realism, one may also apportion their belief to the truth or real existence of a 
given thing or statement respectively to the available evidence – we are free to believe that 
a given thing is likely real or a statement likely true, given a life-world. I demonstrate how 
the case of ASCs attests to the above conclusions. Last, it is argued that settling the issue 
of truth by identifying it with ‘incorrigible-for-X-in-a-given-circumstance’ and passing the 
question of an ecumenical Truth alongside allows us to move past certain somewhat stale 
metaphysical debates the scientific realism debate is currently involved in. The space is 
then free to be occupied by practically oriented scientific realism – the credo in employing 
the insights of reality’s situatedness to real cases of scientific practice, seeking to benefit 






























The received way in which the contemporary scientific realism-antirealism debate is 
conducted overlooks the observable aspects of the world. This is the first claim of this 
chapter. By surveying the main nodes of the debate, I argue that observables seem today 
(with some notable exceptions, which I will discuss in later chapters) to comprise a 
straightforward case for the analytic philosophical examination of science: what is true of 
them, it is thought, has already been figured out. In turn, the unobservables make up the 
central problematic by an overwhelming majority. 
The second claim of this chapter, which will come to full fruition over the next couple 
of chapters, is that this has a very unfortunate depth-limiting impact on the inquiry into 
science and truth. In the second part of the chapter, I offer an argument for why this 
omission of observables is philosophically unjust and motivation for why it should be 
rectified. The importance of the observables, I claim in the following chapters, is revealed 
when we ask ‘who’ is conducting a given science as well as to whom it is tailored. Beyond 
being of interest to theoretical discussions about science, this issue bears the weight of 
crucial humanitarian consequences, especially so in fields like mental health. 
Overall, this dissertation comprises an inquiry into the importance of the observables 
for science’s claim to reality and truth. Chapters two and three seek a rigorous and 
philosophically sound definition of observability, and settle on Edmund Husserl’s ‘life-
world’ as the best fit (with a few analytic twists). Chapter four argues, mainly theoretically 
and contra Donald Davidson, that there is not one life-world but many. Chapters five and 
six evince this in scientific practice and argue for the importance of life-world difference 
therein. Chapter seven draws conclusions of the theoretical and practical discussion for 
the scientific realism debate. 
The present chapter is structured as follows. In section 1.1 I present the established 
definition of scientific realism and scientific antirealism. In section 1.2 I analyse the 
cornerstone argument in favour of scientific realism: the ‘no miracles’ argument (NMA). 
The ‘no miracles’ argument claims that scientific realism is the only philosophical attitude 
towards science that does not render its vast success a miracle. Following, I consider the 
counter-argument that wants NMA to be logically incoherent and find it not guilty of such 
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allegations. I thus conclude that the scientific antirealists need independent argument(s) 
in favour of their own position. Accordingly, in section 1.3 I interrogate the most 
accredited such argument: the pessimistic meta-induction (PMI). The pessimistic meta-
induction offers a multitude of historical counter-examples to the NMA: successful 
theories that are incompatible with other successful theories of the same ambit, thus 
divorcing success from truth in the scientific theories’ case. Subsequently, in section 1.4 I 
point to realist retaliations to the PMI, which all fall under the rubric of selective optimism: 
entity, structural, and preservative realism. I find that all three moves share the same 
method: essentially to restrict the ambit of the NMA to something more feasible than its 
original formulation. Furthermore, I find that all the above scientific antirealists’ moves 
also share the same method, namely the PMI, which is in turn to look for a historical 
counter-example to cancel out the new, more modest versions of the NMA. This is in 
keeping with other, influential overviews of the scientific realism debate such as John 
Worrall’s (1989) and Anjan Chakravartty’s (2011, especially paragraph 2). 
This is a crucial point: this two-fold pattern governing the scientific realism debate is 
all but innocuous, I argue in section 1.5. This is for two reasons. First, the pattern precludes 
any direct conceptual examination of science’s claim to the truth and what kind of claim 
this may be; it simply takes scientific realism for granted unless history makes us face 
difficulties by means of counter-examples. Second, and in close relation with the first 
point, it focuses exclusively on the unobservables since, within this pattern of argument 
exchange, the observables are taken for granted, as unproblematically settled. Over the 
span of the rest of my dissertation I attempt to show that the observables are not only 
enmeshed in delicate theoretical problematics regarding scientific realism but also that 
they and their pluralistic nature are crucially important for scientific practice and human 
well-being. 
 
1.1 An Outline of Scientific Realism and Scientific Antirealism 
In trying to provide an initial definition of scientific realism, the first matter for 
consideration is the multiplicity it comprises as well as the sizeable divergence between 
the philosophical theses subsumed under its rubric. Consequently, any contemporary 
definition of scientific realism will always be short-handed in the offing: it will unavoidably 
be to a nontrivial degree unfaithful to its numerous, multifaceted and fine-grained specific 
formulations (Chakravartty 2011, section 1.1). Abstractly speaking, however, most 
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influential and defining sources hold scientific realism to be concerned with three theses 
(Psillos 2000, 706; Chakravartty 2011, paragraph 1.2): 
 
• The Metaphysical Thesis: There is a mind-independent world, which has a mind-
independent structure. 
• The Semantic Thesis: Scientific theories should be interpreted literally and have a 
truth-value1. If a scientific theory is true then the terms regarding unobservables in 
it refer to actual things in the world. 
• The Epistemological Thesis: Mature (in some way predictively successful) 
scientific theories provide descriptions of the world that are at least approximately 
true. 
 
The first thesis stands in contrast with antirealist world conceptions of the idealist kind. 
The metaphysical thesis asserts that the world consists of things that inhabit a definite 
structure, the structure often understood in terms of interconnections between them and 
hierarchies they form. Whether one has a word for things, can see things, can manipulate 
things, can corroborate the idea of their existence via experiment or not is here irrelevant, 
for the things that inhabit the world exist nonetheless. The world, in other words, consists 
of natural kinds, independent of whether humans, or for that matter anyone else, 
discovers, defines and uses them. 
The second thesis aims at distinguishing scientific realism from antirealist claims that 
treat scientific theories (or at least the unobservables within them) merely as instruments 
that bear no reference to the actual world. According to such antirealists, scientific theories 
are instruments that either have no truth-value or whose truth-value is reducible to their 
discourse about the observables (Psillos 2000, 706-707). The semantic thesis denies most 
metaphorical interpretations of scientific claims even about the unobservables. According 
to it one should never interpret a scientific claim as an attempted systematization of its 
observable consequences. If science says that an unobservable structure populated by 
unobservable entities underlies observable reality then this is a claim that is either strictly 
true or strictly false.  
 
1 At least for the most part – see below for scientific theories as ‘approximately true’ 
according to scientific realism. 
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The third thesis is intended to ground the above two in the here and the now; to make 
scientific realism applicable to specific scientific theories. Notice that the above 
considerations do not particularly refer to any scientific theory: it is entirely possible to 
believe in the mind-independence of the structure of the world as well as to interpret 
scientific theories literally, and simultaneously deny that one can currently or at any 
specific time be cognizant of any scientific claim’s truth-value. That is, one may be 
sceptical towards pointing the finger at any one specific scientific claim, literally interpret 
it, and announce it as true or false. Such scepticism should be avoided or so the 
epistemological thesis contends. Mature scientific theories that are well corroborated and 
make successful novel predictions (for example, current such predominant theories in 
physics) are approximately true of the world.  
For an applied example of the three above theses consider what an electron is 
according to an electron realist. The metaphysical thesis prohibits the electron from being 
a social or a linguistic construct, an arbitrary categorization of the world, or anything 
besides literally extant. The structure it inhabits as a subatomic particle with specific 
function and interconnections with other entities is also every bit as real, both for those 
who know it and articulate it and for those who do not. The semantic thesis prohibits 
theoretical discourse about the electron being an instrument to manage the observable 
world. Either there are electrons as described or there are not. Either they function as 
described or they do not. Finally, the epistemological thesis demands that, being a mature 
and well corroborated scientific theory, the current theory of electrons is indeed 
approximately true of the world; its putative unobservable entities really do exist and 
function as described. 
The above is a list of commitments that scientific realists generally share. To repeat, 
delving deeper into specific scientific realists’ theses brings to the fore significant tensions 
between them (the realists). These tensions do not usually involve the first, metaphysical 
commitment; idealist approaches are almost non-existent in contemporary analytic 
philosophy of science (Chakravartty 2011, paragraph 1.2). The second, semantic 
commitment seems to be one that scientific realists are occasionally unfaithful towards. 
Several authors have advanced positions that allow for subscription to the (approximate) 
truth of (a certain type of) scientific theories independently of subscription to those 
theories’ fulfilling the criteria of the correspondence theory of truth regarding unobservable 
entities and structures (for the most modern articulation of which see Ellis 1988). 
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Chakravartty (2011, paragraph 1.2) characterizes such authors (for example, Giere 1988, 
82; Devitt 2005; Papineau 2010) as preferring ‘deflationary accounts of truth’2. Regarding 
the third, epistemological commitment, the most prominent brands of scientific realism 
today do not buy into it wholesale (that is, they withhold belief in the total truthfulness of 
mature scientific theories). Ian Hacking’s entity realism, for example, is a thesis that 
forbids belief in the whole truthfulness of scientific theories that fulfil certain criteria but 
encourages belief in the existence of (certain of) the entities they postulate. More 
specifically, entity realism purports that belief in the existence of an unobservable entity X 
should be apportioned to the causal ability to manipulate that X (Hacking 1982; 
Cartwright 1983, chapter 5). In opposition, Worrall’s (1989) structural realism and its 
derivatives prohibit belief in entities per se as metaphysics most likely to change over time 
but encourages belief in structures (mostly cashed out in terms of mathematical relations 
between entities) that are purportedly responsible for the novel predictive success of 
mature scientific theories. Finally, preservative realism as embraced by Philip Kitcher and 
Psillos motivates belief only in those structures and entities that are indispensable for a 
mature theory’s empirical success (Chakravartty 2011, paragraph 1.3). 
Scientific antirealism is an equally multi-faceted doctrine. To be a scientific antirealist 
one has first got to deny some or all the aforementioned scientific realist commitments 
powerfully enough in order to cross over to the other side. The latter remark is necessary 
because, as the above paragraph shows, it is possible to be partly exempt from the 
commitments that generally characterize scientific realism and still be considered a 
scientific realist. The most historically known ways of objecting to scientific realism are 
expectedly of the three same kinds as scientific realism is: metaphysical, semantic, and 
epistemological.  
To be a metaphysical antirealist means to deny that there is a mind-independent world. 
This of course amounts to much more than scientific antirealism: if there is no mind-
independent world, no scientific theory can refer to real entities that inhabit it, nor can it 
provide a description of it that is (approximately) true. There are, however, other ways of 
 
2 It should be noted that, in an article earlier than Chakravartty’s and most of the articles 
he cites, Stathis Psillos (2000, 707) confidently asserts that “theoretical discourse is taken 
to be irreducible and assertoric (contentful) by all sides of the debate”. However, this 
matter is not of particular importance to the present dissertation.  
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being more specifically a scientific antirealist metaphysically, the most famous one being 
adopting a neo-Kantian view about the structure of the world despite admitting the mind-
independence of the latter. That is to say that the world-in-itself (the world as it really is) 
is inaccessible to the cognition of humans and that the structures of the world that scientific 
theories pose are merely imposed, ‘projected’ onto it (Rohlf 2010, paragraph 2.2). Next, 
to be a semantic scientific antirealist amounts to rejecting literal interpretations of scientific 
claims regarding unobservables – to deny ascribing a truth-value to them. The most 
famous doctrines that spring out of this position are instrumentalist epistemologies of 
science, which contend that descriptions of everything unobservable in science function as 
instruments for having control over the observables and for subsuming various observable 
phenomena under concise systems of principles (see for example van Fraassen 1980). Last, 
to be an epistemological scientific antirealist is, expectedly, the complete negation of the 
epistemological thesis. An epistemological scientific antirealist may grant that there is a 
mind-independent world with a non-human-imposed structure and they may also agree to 
interpret scientific statements about unobservables literally. Nevertheless, they contend, 
no type of scientific theory does provide true descriptions of this world and its structure. 
This position does not even tolerate subscription to parts of mature scientific theories’ 
truthfulness as some positions described above do.  
This concludes the abstract overview of scientific realism and scientific antirealism in 
the analytic tradition. In the next section I will take up the task of exploring and critically 
discussing specific arguments for and against these philosophical doctrines starting with 
the ‘no miracles’ argument. 
 
1.2 The Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism (and the Base Rate 
Fallacy) 
I shall begin with an argument that is still thought to capture the most powerful 
intuition behind scientific realism, namely the ‘no miracles’ argument developed by Hilary 
Putnam (1978, 19) or, as it is otherwise known, ‘the ultimate argument for scientific 
realism’ (van Fraassen 1980, 39). In the course of the present section, and besides the 
argument itself, I will also examine two major positions against it that target its internal 
coherence. 
Putnam’s argument begins from the widely-accepted premise that the extant best 
scientific theories have been extremely successful, where success is cashed out in terms of 
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instrumentality in achieving various ends. These ends are typically thought to be the 
abilities to manipulate nature, make empirical predictions and retrodictions, and to 
produce experimental results of extraordinary precision. Clearly, there is a need to explain 
this success or so Putnam additionally premises. Finally, the only explanation of this 
success that does not render it a miracle is that such scientific theories are (at least for the 
most part) true descriptions of the world, and we should always prefer non-miraculous 
explanations to miraculous ones. This is Putnam’s conclusion, which others have since 
elaborated (for example Boyd 1989; Psillos 1999, chapter 4).  
The NMA has been internally contested in two important ways. Bas van Fraassen 
(1980, 40) has argued that what explains the proliferation of successful theories and the 
abandonment of others is that the antagonism of scientific theories is governed by an 
evolutionary ‘survival of the fittest’ principle, where the fittest are obviously the most 
successful. Thus, contends van Fraassen, one does not need to resort to truth to explain 
the success of contemporary theories. By virtue of this evolutionary principle it is no 
wonder that the most successful out of all theories ‘survive’ while those that have failed to 
achieve the ends specified for them become obsolete. This reply, however, seems to be 
irrelevant: van Fraassen’s account explains why the most successful out of the totality of 
scientific theories are selected ‘evolutionarily’, not why these theories are so successful in 
the first place. Chakravartty (2011, paragraph 2.1) expresses this idea in terms of asking 
why a particular theory is successful and suggesting that van Fraassen’s explanation is then 
inapplicable.  
Another attack on the NMA, one that is considered much more dangerous, originates 
in statistical probability with several authors asserting that its reasoning commits a logical 
fallacy famously known as the base rate fallacy (Lipton 1991/2004, 196-198; Howson 
2000; 2013; Magnus & Callender 2004). The base rate fallacy is a certain type of mistake 
individuals make in answering a probability question about groups when they ignore the 
relative sizes of these groups within a larger group relevant to the question (Tversky & 
Kahneman 1982; Spanos 2010). The most famous example of this fallacy consists of a 
question presented to sixty students and staff at the Harvard Medical School (Casscells et 
al. 1978). The question was: 
 
If a test to detect a disease whose prevalence is 1/1000 has a false positive rate of 5%, 
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what is the chance that a person found to have a positive result actually has the disease, 
assuming you know nothing about the person’s symptoms or signs? 
 
To this question, only eleven out of sixty participants ( 18.3%) gave the correct 




From Bayes’ Theorem we have that: 
 





From the articulation of the problem we have that: 
 
𝑝(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒|𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) =  1 
𝑝(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) =  0.001 
 
Which means that one needs only to calculate 𝑝(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒) in order to be able to 
calculate 𝑝(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒|𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒). From probabilistic calculus we have that: 
 
𝑝(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒) = 𝑝(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒|𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒)𝑝(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) + 𝑝(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒|𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒′)𝑝(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒′) 
 
From the articulation of the problem we have that: 
 
𝑝(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) = 0.001 
𝑝(𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) =  1 − 𝑝(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) =  0.999 
𝑝(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒|𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒′) =  0.05 
 
It is therefore calculated that:  
 
𝑝(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒) = 0.05095 and therefore that: 
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𝒑(𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆|𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆) =  𝟎. 𝟎𝟏𝟗𝟔𝟐𝟕 
 
The most common wrong answer that Harvard Medical School students and staff gave 
was 95%. An influential explanation of this is that the examined failed to take into account 
the probability that any given person suffers from the disease – the prior probability 
𝑝(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) – and thus instantiated the base rate fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman 1982).  
To get back on-topic, I do not believe that the NMA commits this fallacy. Consider 
the formula with which to calculate the probability that a given theory is true, given that 
it is successful. 
 





From the articulation of the problem, we have that theory is picked from the set of 
successful theories. Therefore, we have that 𝑝(𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙) = 1. Also, if a theory is true, 
one can surely take it that it will also be successful and so we have that 𝑝(𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙|𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒) 
= 1, therefore: 
 
𝑝(𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒|𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙) =   𝑝(𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒) 
 
The accuser will of course contend that it is impossible to know how many out of all 
scientific theories are true and therefore to ascribe a numerical value to 𝑝(𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒). However, 
the crucial consideration here is, I submit, that that the NMA is precisely about determining 
𝑝(𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒). The argument it makes is that it is a miracle if its numerical value is anything other 
than 1. What is more, this argument is not viciously circular since the conclusion is not 
included in the premises. One may dislike argumentation about miracles but having 
suspicious premises is not the same as including the conclusion in them. Whether this is a 
good argument is what the scientific realism debate is about, namely the question of 
whether it indeed is a miracle if (certain) scientific theories are not true, and whether there 
is an alternative explanation for their success.  
If I am right in claiming the above it seems that the NMA is not at internal fault. 
Moreover, in their recent paper Richard Dawid and Stephan Hartmann (2018) claim that 
the NMA may be construed to have three forms, only two of which commit the base rate 
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fallacy (thus the NMA can be shown to be base rate fallacy-free). The technical details of 
the latter will be spared here due to reasons of space. The overall moral is the following: 
since the NMA is not self-defeating, developing an independent argument against NMA 
denotes the baseline of a convincing scientific antirealist thesis. I will thus now proceed to 
investigate such independent arguments in favour of scientific antirealism, beginning with 
the most influential one. 
 
1.3 The Pessimistic Meta-Induction 
In 1981 Larry Laudan put forward an empirical argument, the pessimistic meta-
induction, favouring the history of science as the evidential basis from which to argue for 
a specific scientific antirealist position. He maintained that the historical record of the 
sciences forces the philosopher of science to side with the scientific antirealists, his 
rationale being the following. First, the history of science overflows with scientific theories 
that were amply successful and prominent but failed to refer3 and were more or less 
generally false (Laudan 1981, 33). Some such theories, for example, are the phlogiston 
theory and the caloric theory of heat in chemistry, and the vital force theory in physiology. 
These theories and numerous others enjoyed elaborate experimental confirmation, made 
possible successful engineering, and more generally equipped humanity with the ability to 
manipulate nature according to certain desired ends. Albeit displaying all these virtues, 
they ended up being false, and their postulated entities are now considered non-existent. 
It is then the case that, by inductive logic, one has no good reason to believe that our present 
successful scientific theories are any closer to the truth than those superseded theories, 
since they do not display some virtue the superseded, false theories did not themselves 
display. This is the answer that the PMI provides to the NMA. Miracle or no miracle, 
Laudan contends, no kind of success is a guarantor of truthfulness when it comes to 
scientific theories. 
The original articulation of the argument is wanting and we will need to tweak it a bit 
to avoid destructive pitfalls (similar tweaks can be found in Psillos 1996; Lewis 2001; 
Mizrahi 2012). First, the PMI needs not stay inductive, for inductive arguments have the 
 
3 ‘Refer’ is the term Laudan and others use to imply the ontological truthfulness of a 
scientific theory. When a theory ‘refers’, the unobservable entities it posits indeed exist 
and inhabit the mind-independent world. 
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known weaknesses of delivering dubious results (see Hume 1738-40/1888, 89 and Popper 
1963, 53 for more on the subject). Moreover, the argument, as is, is not even, strictly 
speaking, inductively sound. A hidden assumption hovers in Laudan’s original 
formulation: that we are indeed cognizant of whether a theory refers or not, at least 
concerning the empirical cases intended to back up the PMI. However, according to Karl 
Popper’s (1934/1959) falsificationism, this cannot ever be beyond doubt. Scientific 
statements are universal, the latter meaning that they are general and regard the past and 
the present as well as the future. Thus, scientific statements are in no way verifiable seeing 
as humanity does not possess a time machine with which to witness instances of the future. 
What it does possess, however, is the ability to observe circumstances which falsify 
universal statements. Thus, Popper concludes, the scientific endeavour should consist in 
conceiving of theories that make conjectures about how things are in conjunction with the 
best possible attempts to falsify these theories via experiment. The more a theory 
withstands the trials of attempted falsification, the more reason one should abide by it4.  
Compelling as this claim may sound, Imre Lakatos’ (1978) criticism of falsificationism 
showed that it is untenable. Lakatos pointed out that no single theory can ever be put to 
the test against the data in and of itself. What actually happens is that a bunch of scientific 
theories get tested against the data. Consider the example of a microbiological experiment, 
one that tests two competing scientific theories that purportedly describe a specific 
phenomenon at the microscopic level. This experiment would typically include looking 
closely at the phenomenon and, through the acquisition of empirical data, deciding which 
theory gets the story right. Suppose then that this experiment takes place and, as Popper 
would have it, one of the theories is falsified while the other one is corroborated. Popper 
as we saw him here would claim that, since the results of the test point towards the 
acceptance of one theory and the rejection of the other, scientists should accept the winner 
and abandon the loser. However, to conduct this very experiment one needs to use a 
specific instrument to look at the microscopic level: the microscope. The Lakatosian 
problem with the Popperian claim in this example lies with the fact that in order to hold 
the empirical data derived from this experiment to be reliable one has to additionally 
 
4 I have chosen the phrase ‘abide by it’ rather than ‘believe that it is true’ because the 
discussion of whether Popper meant the latter as interchangeable with the former in this 
statement is massive and may not be pursued here. 
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accept certain theories about how the microscope works and conclude that it indeed works 
properly – that it is an instrument that depicts with precision what goes on at the 
microscopic level.  
Consequently, what a scientist really does in this hypothetical experiment is, as 
Lakatos claims, to test a bunch of theories (the theory they want to test and the theories 
about how the microscope works – and others) against the data. Anyone, then, wishing to 
save the ‘falsified’ theory in this hypothetical experiment could claim that said theory is 
correct and that a certain other theory concerning the proper function of the microscope, 
a specific theory about light refraction for example, is wrong. This generalises: every 
theory needs auxiliary assumptions to be accepted before a test can be set up to evaluate 
it. At the same time, should the test results come back negative for the theory in question, 
one can always claim that what is in fact falsified is one or more of these auxiliary 
assumptions instead of the theory under test, unless one accepts those auxiliary 
assumptions as true beyond doubt. However, as has been noted above and as the failure 
of the verificationist criterion of science shows (for an elaborate discussion see Creath 
2011, paragraph 4.1), no theory can be verified beyond doubt and this of course includes 
the theories that accompany any theory we may wish to evaluate by experiment. Hence, 
this convention of regarding auxiliary assumptions as true could only be dogmatic. 
Lakatos is encapsulating his point in the following quote:  
 
It is not that we propose a theory and Nature may shout NO; rather, we propose a 
maze of theories, and nature may shout INCONSISTENT. (Lakatos 1978, 45) 
 
I have just demonstrated two problems of the PMI. Luckily for the argument, the most 
sophisticated version of the PMI gets around these problems. The trick is to turn it into a 
deductive argument. We can show that we may reach Laudan’s original argument without 
needing induction or assuming the definite truth or falsity of any theory. Specifically, what 
is required is to show that the success of a scientific theory says nothing about its referring 
and its truthfulness without premising this conclusion on an argument that is either 
inductive or ignorantly ascertains that any one scientific theory is doubtlessly false. The 
key consideration for reshaping the PMI is this: the history of science provides cases of 
successful scientific theories of the same ambit that are ontologically mutually 
incompatible and the truth of one implies the falsity of the other. If a set of such theories 
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includes n theories, then it is necessary that at least n-1 do not refer/are false. This allows 
the scientific antirealist to divorce success from referring and truthfulness without the need 
to assert the definite truth, falsity, referring and non-referring of any theory whatsoever.  
Take the example of two scientific theories from the 19th century optics, namely Isaac 
Newton’s and Augustin-Jean Fresnel’s theories of light. Both have exactly the same ambit, 
which is light and its function. Newton’s theory was the first to be articulated and it was 
largely successful. It was the dominant optical theory for more than a hundred years, it 
was used in technological achievements during its era such as Newtonian telescopes (Hall 
1996, 67) and it was even repeatedly experimentally confirmed (Worrall 2000, 47). 
Fresnel’s antagonistic theory of light displayed the same virtues. It was experimentally 
confirmed (the most impressive case being Arago’s bright spot) and it was employed in 
milestone achievements in technology, such as the Fresnel lens (Watson 2005), as well as 
in certain computer graphics applications that are used even today such as applications for 
the rendering of water (Hu et al. 2006). Yet these two theories are mutually exclusive5. If 
the corpuscular theory of light (Newton’s) tells a true story about the nature of light the 
wave-theory of light (Fresnel’s) does not and vice versa. If Newton’s theory is true then 
Fresnel’s is false and vice versa. Certainly, the possibility of none of the above theories to 
refer or to be true is always open. The crucial point here, however, is that we have a case 
of at least one successful theory that does not refer and is not true. We do not know which 
one and it does not matter for Laudan’s original conclusion has proven to be tenable: the 
success of a theory does not entail its referring nor does it entail its truthfulness. The 
necessary connection between success and referring/truthfulness that the NMA (at least 
as we saw it above) attempts to establish is shown to be groundless through this counter-
example. 
A closing note before moving on. An immediate, well-known move to save the NMA 
from the sophisticated version of the PMI would be to restrict its ambit so as it defends 
 
5 One can claim that by a quantum account of light, Newton’s and Fresnel’s ontologies 
are not mutually exclusive; light is sometimes a particle and sometimes a wave. Going 
into such detail regarding this matter is beyond the scope of this paper. I believe, however, 
that the same cannot be said about numerous other pairs of successful theories, such as 




only mature scientific theories. Such a move is achieved by refining the notion of ‘success’ 
in the NMA so as it points to scientific theories that successfully predict novel phenomena. 
This is because such ‘mature’ theories do motivate belief in them whereas those that simply 
accommodate the phenomena do not; their success can be explained by their having been 
tailored exactly to accommodate the phenomena. Unfortunately this will still not do: the 
pair of Fresnel’s and James Maxwell’s theories of light, both mature scientific theories, 
seeing as they are mutually exclusive, will force us to the same conclusion in favour of the 
PMI. 
Has, then, the PMI won? Surely not yet. Allow me to examine the retorts available to 
the realist’s hand. 
 
1.4 Answers to the Pessimistic Meta-Induction: Selective Optimism 
Post-PMI the scientific realists face a difficult question: how to do away with the 
apparent incompatibility of two or more theories displaying the right kind of success? This, 
however, is hardly yet a dead-end. In the preceding discussion ‘success’ was at best a 
definition of maturity. While the sweeping claim “Science is successful; therefore, science 
is true” as it was put forward may have been proven untenable, a refinement in the 
meaning of ‘success’ and a specification of what kind of success motivates belief in a 
scientific theory’s truth could perhaps put this scientific theory’s truth on a philosophically 
convincing track. In this section I am going to examine the sovereign scientific realist 
answers to the PMI. I will claim, following others, that these answers essentially share the 
same form: they all restrict the ambit of the NMA to a specific kind of scientific theories 
or specific things within scientific theories. After every such restricting move the scientific 
realists’ hope is that the PMI will be inapplicable as an answer to the ‘new’, restricted 
NMA by virtue of the latter excluding certain scientific theories from those that have a 
genuine truth claim. 
Take the last example falsifying the NMA mentioned in the previous section, namely 
the pair of Fresnel’s and Maxwell’s theories of light. Suppose now that one gives a new 
definition to what a successful scientific theory is, one that forbids Fresnel’s theory of light 
from being included in the set of scientific theories or at any rate in the set of scientific 
theories that have a claim to the truth. It is then the case that the PMI proponent will have 
to draw a new pair of theories from the ambit of the new, success-specified, NMA to falsify 
it. What is left to be seen, then, is if any one of these restricting moves, provided that it 
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remains sufficiently realist, is able to rob the PMI of its evidential basis; to restrict the scope 
of Laudan’s ‘historical gambit’ to the point of making it non-feasible. 
I will now examine the three most influential answers to the pessimistic meta-
induction, all characterized by the umbrella term ‘selective optimism’ (Chakravartty 2007, 
paragraph 2.3). Each of them makes for a specific strand of scientific realism: structural, 
entity, and preservative realism. Besides highlighting their similarity in form, which will 
be very crucial in the meta-discussion of the debate soon to follow, I will occasionally 
(where space and complexity permit) offer my own arguments on the matter of whether 
these realisms are internally coherent and on whether a crushing counter-example against 
them can indeed be raised. Granted, this discussion will remain partial as the aim here is 
to present the main arguments for and against certain nodal positions within the scientific 
realism-antirealism spectrum and not to exhaust the matter of whether these positions are 
actually to be adopted. With this material in hand, I will then proceed, in section 1.5, to 
give critical remarks on the debate regarding mainly the observables and their lack of 
feature within. 
The departure point of selective optimism is observing that something in science gets 
some things right about the world and that this ‘something’ is that which one ought to be 
a realist about. We may even think that, despite science being packaged in theories, what 
gets novel things about the world right is not. Above, we saw that non-mature theories 
were excluded from the NMA’s ambit but that this was not enough to philosophically 
support scientific realism. Once again, I claim, all the scientific realist’s next moves consist 
in ‘cutting out’ more theories from the NMA’s ambit: if the NMA has less (and the correct) 
theories to defend it will, hopefully for the realist, offer more resistance to defeat by PMI 
counter-example. Alternatively, the scientific realist will apply the NMA not to whole 
theories but to things within theories such as certain structures or entities, arguing that 
certain ‘elite’ parts of scientific theories are in fact responsible for science’s latching onto 
the truth about the world. In this line of argument one would have to excavate these elite 
parts from a pit of unnecessary metaphysics, excess content et cetera and then, when they 
are excavated, show that among them no two pieces are mutually incompatible (once 
again in an attempt to resist the PMI). Or, better yet for the scientific realists, the scientific 
antirealists would then be encumbered with the burden of proof: to show that they can 
find two such mutually incompatible pieces. Let me note here again, as I did in the 
introduction, that framing the scientific realism debate in the contemporary analytic 
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literature as largely an issue of NMA versus PMI follows and is in keeping with Worrall’s 
(1989) and Chakravartty’s (2011, especially paragraph 2) related works. 
Each thesis I will present will be followed by three questions: first, how is it a restriction 
of the original NMA? Second, is the thesis internally coherent? Third, can the PMI shine 
anew by bringing a counter-example against the more modest NMA instantiated by this 
given strand of selective optimism? 
 
Entity Realism 
The first attempt in the way of selective optimism that I will examine is Hacking’s 
entity realism. Hacking argues that the scientific realism debate has focused unjustifiably 
much on scientific representation rather than on scientific experimentation. However, the 
first is, according to Hacking (1982), in and of itself just a means of organising the 
phenomena into systems, to make models, which, as Hacking has it, “make our minds 
feel good” (as quoted in Lycan 1988 155). As he claims, these models aim exactly at 
‘saving the phenomena’ and thus should have no truth claim past them. What does have 
a claim to fame, according to entity realism, is scientific intervention. An unobservable 
hypothetical entity should get upgraded to the status of an unobservable theoretical (real) 
entity insofar as it is employed in intervening in the world, changing it in ways that one 
wishes to change it in. As Hacking puts it: 
 
Reality has to do with causation and our notions of reality are formed from our ability 
to change the world... We shall count as real what we can use to intervene in the world 
to affect something else, or what the world can use to affect us. (Hacking 1982, 46) 
 
Or, as he vividly puts it in his iconic phrase: “So far as I’m concerned, if you can spray 
them, then they are real” (1982, 23). As for all these unobservable entities that have not 
yet been used in manipulating the world (as are, for example, neutral bosons), they should 
not be considered a part of its causal structure and should therefore be regarded as 
‘convenient constructs’ (Hacking 1983, 272). 
My first task should be to argue that entity realism indeed consists essentially in 
‘chopping away’ at the original ambit of the NMA. This is not difficult. David Resnik 
(1994, 404-405) has convincingly argued that Hacking’s argument is an argument for the 
success of science. As he points out, Hacking makes no sustained argument for the 
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opposite being the case. Indeed, Hacking plainly states, without deeper philosophical 
argument, that since scientists succeed in using such and such entities in experimentation 
then these entities must be real. Surely, it would not be much of a leap to construe this 
statement as saying “Well, it would be a miracle if they were not real!”. Entity realism’s 
philosophical thrust does not consist so much in including theoretical entities in the 
scientific realist approach but in excluding hypothetical entities from it, and in so doing 
showing what was wrong with the initial, full-blown, ‘no miracles’ scientific realism. In 
other words it is to, as noted above, excavate from within scientific theories that which one has 
reasons to believe has latched onto the structure of the world. Thus, Hacking’s argument is one 
for the success of science. Additionally, that his argument’s ambit is less than the original 
NMA should be readily evident. 
Before proceeding to further interrogating entity realism, it should be noted that 
Hacking (1983, 202; 271) has strongly protested that his argument is an argument for the 
success of science. The reason that Hacking so protests is, I think, that he indeed does not 
argue for the wholesale success of science. That is, he does not argue for the success of 
‘scientific theories’ or ‘science-in-general’. As he himself notes, “[my] argument is much 
more localized” (Hacking 1983, 202). Localized, however, does not mean importantly 
different in form; it does not even mean at all different in form. Arguing for the success of 
scientific experimentation is, after what was presented, I think, enough to classify this 
argument as one for the success of (something in) science. 
Onto the argument’s content: entity realism, I believe, immediately raises two 
important questions. The first concerns its coherence. To be sure the abundant and famous 
causal theories of reference (see Reimer & Michaelson 2003, paragraph 2.2 for a 
comprehensive summary), which Hacking leans on, provide him with the conceptual 
ground to claim that one can keep referring to the same entity throughout different 
theories. This, however, does absolutely not mean that one can refer to theoretical entities 
of interest without the use of any theory. Reznik (1994, 407-408) argues that a causal 
theory of meaning renders entity realism metaphysically consistent since it shows that we 
can refer to an entity without believing the theory that describes it. For Reznik, the 
problem starts when one is asked the question of whether they are justified in believing in 
the entity they believe in without the support of any one theory – thus the problem is 
epistemological. Metaphysical or other, this problem apparently amounts to a pretty 
 36 
sizeable one for Hacking: for him to be consistent what would be needed is a theory-less 
referring to an entity, something quite distinct from dependence on a particular theory.  
I will illustrate this through an example. Specifically, I want to consider the 1977 
Stanford University experiment, which Hacking (1983, 23) himself holds to be the main 
motivation behind entity realism. In this experiment, George LaRue, William Fairbank, 
and Arthur Hebard (1977) were looking for ‘free’ (ungrouped) quarks using a niobium 
ball. Quarks are entities that are alleged to have one third of an electron’s charge. The 
electron’s charge is itself derived from a 1909 experiment by Robert Millikan (1911)6. Here 
is how Hacking himself describes the experiment: 
 
The initial charge placed on the ball is gradually changed. … Now how does one alter 
the charge on the niobium ball? ‘Well, at that stage,’ said my friend, ‘we spray it with 
positrons to increase the charge or with electrons to decrease the charge.’ From that 
day forth I've been a scientific realist. So far as I’m concerned, if you can spray them then 
they are real. (Hacking 1983, 22-23) 
 
If “How do we know that electrons exist?” is the question, “Because we can spray a 
niobium ball with them and detect quarks!” is Hacking’s answer. Further, according to 
him, this answer is compatible with scepticism about scientific theories so long as this 
scepticism stops at scientific claims postulating the existence of unobservable entities 
scientists can causally manipulate. So far so good? I do not believe so. The scientific 
definition of the electron is that it is a subatomic particle with a negative charge. Subatomic 
particles are defined as the indivisible components of all matter, while negative charge is 
one of three types of electric charge. In turn, electric charge is defined as the physical 
property of matter that causes it to become subject to a special kind of force when placed 
in an electromagnetic field. The behaviour of charged matter is purportedly governed by 
the famous Charles-Augustin Coulomb’s principle: two positive charges or two negative 
 
6 At least that is the only Millikan I know of that conducted any relevant experiments 
around that time; Hacking refers to a “J.A. Millikan” but given the unfavourable 
possibility of such a coincidence – it would be a miracle if this was someone else – I 
conclude that this is rather due to a typographical mistake or Hacking getting Millikan’s 
first name wrong. 
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charges repel each other and a positive charge and a negative charge attract each other 
(Young, Freedman, & Ford 2012, 688).  
So what? So, these claims are all clearly theoretical and all of them involve the electron. 
Of course, they are not the only such claims. Electrons are, for example, further thought 
to have a spin of a half-integer values of the Planck constant, which classifies them as 
fermions. Consequently, two or more electrons, qua fermions, are thought to never occupy 
the same quantum state (Curtis 2003). All the above statements can be divided into two 
important categories: those that attribute defining properties to the electron and those that 
attribute additional properties to it. Within contemporary physics one could contest, for 
example, the type of spin that electrons have but not that they have negative charge or that 
they are subatomic particles, for then the word ‘electron’ would be deprived of its very 
meaning. Hacking is right to think that one is not obliged to buy into every theoretical claim 
that involves entity X wholesale upon admitting the existence of X. However, he is wrong 
to think that one can leave all theoretical claims to one side and unproblematically admit 
the existence of unobservables. That things in the world have electric charge is undeniably 
both a theoretical and a necessary claim to know what one is talking about when one is 
talking about the electron. The importance of this problem cannot be overstated. 
Admitting some theoretical claims is necessary in admitting the existence of unobservable 
entities. Avoiding to answer questions along the lines of “Where is this electron?”, “What 
is it?”, “What does it do?” will make a ‘no theory’ electron realist seem, by Alan 
Musgrave’s metaphor, like someone who asserts that there are hobgoblins, but that they 
do nothing: 
 
This is incoherent. To believe in an entity, while believing nothing further about that 
entity, is to believe nothing, I tell you that I believe in hobgoblins (believe that the term 
'hobgoblin' is a referring term). So, you reply, you think there are little people who 
creep into houses at night and do the housework. Oh no, say I, I do not believe that 
hobgoblins do that. Actually, I have no beliefs at all about what hobgoblins do or what 
they are like. I just believe in them. (Compare contemporary believers in God.) 
(Musgrave 1996, 20) 
 
Now, then, for the final question. How does this, entity realism-borne NMA fare 
against PMI? As Hasok Chang (2012, chapter 1) has pointed out, and even if we turn a 
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blind eye to all the previous, internal entity realism’s problems, Hacking’s doctrine still 
appears to be untenable. That is, Chang holds that there is still a version of the PMI to 
which entity realism falls prey to, seeing as there are multiple mutually-exclusive entities 
which displayed the right, Hacking-kind kind of success in the history of their science. 
Chemists in the 1700s were performing the kind of interventions Hacking advocates by 
employing phlogiston, a postulated chemical entity superseded by, and mutually exclusive 
with, oxygen, to achieve various ends. There are thus two incompatible entities that 
scientists were able to use in causally manipulating the world. Therefore, if Chang is right 
on this count, it appears that we need not discuss entity realism further. 
 
Structural Realism 
Structural realism was proffered by Worrall in 1989 as what I will claim is another way 
to restrict the NMA’s ambit to make it impervious against the notorious PMI. Worrall 
contends that it is the structure of scientific theories that is responsible for its empirical 
success, and this structure is maintained across theories. In his presenting paper, Worrall 
explores the antagonism between two specific theories from physics. In fact, these are the 
two same theories with which I provided the crucial counter-example in favour of the PMI 
regarding novel prediction realism: Fresnel’s and Maxwell’s theories of nineteenth century 
optics. After investigating the transition from the former to the latter, Worrall states: 
 
There was an important element of continuity in the shift from Fresnel to Maxwell – 
and this was much more than a simple question of carrying over the successful 
empirical content into the new theory. At the same time, it was rather less than a 
carrying over of the full theoretical content or full theoretical mechanisms (even in 
‘approximate’ form) … There was continuity or accumulation in the shift, but the 
continuity is one of form or structure, not of content. (Worrall 1989, 17) 
 
First things first: is Worrall’s doctrine a restricted NMA? Worrall does not contend 
that either of Fresnel’s and Maxwell’s theories is in fact non-mature. He does not reduce 
the ambit of the NMA theory-wise. He, too, like Hacking, focuses on a particular 
component within theories: structure. It is by this virtue that it is certainly a miracle if 
structures are not true, and thus one should adopt a realist treatment of such structures. 
To this effect, the history of science is encouraging, Worrall claims: mature structures 
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persist through theory change. Besides the case Worrall discusses in the original paper 
proffering structural realism, a number of scientific changes that preserve some structural 
content across them have been highlighted. To give two examples, Newton’s laws have 
been preserved as limiting cases in Einstein’s special theory of relativity and the second 
law of thermodynamics was preserved intact in the switch from Carnot’s to Clausius’ 
thermodynamics despite significant ontological changes (Ladyman 2014, paragraph 3.1).  
The question of the essence now is whether Worrall’s move can in any form indeed 
save scientific realism from the claws of the PMI. This question dissolves into two others, 
much like with entity realism. The first question pertains to its internal coherence, the 
second to whether the PMI can rise anew, providing a counter-example of two or more 
mutually incompatible mature structures of the same ambit. To take up the first question, 
Psillos (1995, 31-32) argues that it does not make sense to speak of two separate 
components of an entity, its nature and its structure. The laws of which an entity partakes, 
argues Psillos, are necessary definitional components of said entity, and that is especially true 
after the scientific revolution. Psillos (1995, 32) illustrates this view with the example of 
mass: “[Knowing] what mass is involves knowing what laws it obeys, and in particular, 
what equations it satisfies within a scientific theory.”. Others (Papineau 1996, 12; Stanford 
2003, 570) have followed suit, while scholars like Ladyman stand in stark contrast by 
proclaiming that structural realism is still the most defensible form of scientific realism. 
The details of this debate are too sizeable and technical to be accommodated here, 
however we luckily do not dig deep into it, as the point here, it is reminded, is to present 
the scientific realism debate enough to then conduct a meta-study of it. 
Onward, then, to the second critical question about structural realism, namely whether 
the scientific antirealist can find a counter-example with which to divorce structure from 
truthfulness in mature theories. Kyle Stanford claims to provide such a counter-example: 
 
Francis Galton's ancestral law of inheritance, for instance, was the central 
mathematical formalism and the most predictively successful aspect (see below) of his 
‘stirp’ theory of inheritance: it claimed that the germinal materials received by each 
individual (and determining her characteristics) are composed of fractional 
contributions made directly from each ancestor, in the proportion 1/4p + 1/8pp + 
1/16ppp… where p is the contribution from the parental generation (on each side), pp 
from the grandparental, and so on. ... But contemporary genetics does not recognize 
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the fractional relationships expressed in Galton's law of ancestral heredity (that is, 1/4 
from the parental generation (on each side), 1/8 from the grandparental, 1/16 from 
the great-grandparental, and so on, ad infinitum) as describing any fundamental or 
even especially significant aspect of the mathematical structure of inheritance. By 
present lights, it would be extremely misleading, if not outright mistaken, to say that 
even the mathematical structure expressed by Galton's Ancestral Law is preserved in 
contemporary genetics. (Stanford 2003, 570-572) 
 
Again, unfortunately, to what extent this model satisfies the criterion of having been 
used in genuinely successful novel predictions is a matter of dispute. Of much more dispute 
is the matter of whether genetics qualifies as a branch of science one should be a realist 
about, and if not whether similar counter-examples can be found in branches of science 
that traditionally have been the objects of scientific realism such as physics and chemistry. 
Again, pushing these questions further would necessitate a doctoral project in its own right 
(for an example of such a comprehensive study see Frigg & Votsis 2011). 
 
Preservative Realism 
The last topic of the present section is, as anticipated, preservative realism or, as it is 
otherwise known in the literature, explanationism (Chakravartty 2011, paragraph 2.3). 
This time, the restriction of the NMA is not provided in terms of postulated entities or 
structures but in terms of ‘working posits’ within mature scientific theories. Kitcher (1993, 
140-149) calls the posits that do not carry out any genuine predictive work within a 
scientific theory ‘presuppositional posits’ or ‘idle parts’ of this theory. Psillos (1999, 
chapters 5 and 6) argues that one does not have to buy into a mature scientific theory 
wholesale; the absence of any unpreserved mature parts across theory change will do just 
fine in putting scientific realism back on track in the face of the pessimistic meta-induction, 
be them entities or structures.  
The method by which to identify which parts are actually indispensable in making any 
given successful novel prediction is not a simple matter but, especially since it is unlikely 
that this selection is not very case-specific, it is an issue I will not press further here. 
Turning now to the usual question of how the PMI fares against preservative realism in 
terms of counter-examples, Chang (2003, 909) claims that, regarding the case of caloric 
and its counterpart of the mechanical theory of heat, assumptions about the material 
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nature of caloric were working posits in making successful novel predictions (e.g. the 
adiabatic gas law). Moreover, these are strictly incompatible with their mature 
counterparts in the mechanical theory of heat, which superseded that of caloric. If Chang 
is right this is a perfectly admissible counter-example for the PMI against preservative 
realism.  
Whether Chang is indeed right, whether the theory of caloric was mature in the right 
way, whether the mature parts cancel each other out in the right way, and whether this 
example warrants the same conclusion about significantly many or all fields of science are 
still open debates in the analytic philosophy of science. As might be expected, these are 
also issues that cannot be pressed further here, nor will such an elaboration be necessary. 
What has been discussed so far is enough to allow me to proceed to the next session, 
regarding having the whole debate in view, and highlighting and discussing the pattern 
that runs through it. 
 
1.5 The Form of the Debate 
The goal of this chapter is not to stand by any specific scientific realist or scientific 
antirealist thesis. Indeed, after purportedly shooting down novel prediction realism at large 
and entity realism, the issues of structural and preservative realism were left open. 
Arguably, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to close them here and now. After 
having the whole debate in view and the arguments lined up, it is now time to highlight 
the pattern that the argument displays and the hidden assumptions it gives out. As 
programmatically announced, I will arrive at the conclusion that the observables have 
been unfairly assigned a secondary role within the debate. 
Let us run through the pattern. The cornerstone of the whole debate is the NMA. As 
iterated a few times by now, it contends that it is simply a miracle if science, being so 
successful, is not also true regarding unobservables. Along comes the PMI: miracle or no 
miracle, two or more mutually incompatible, mature scientific theories can be found. At 
this point, the scientific realist starts thinking more carefully. What is it that motivated the 
NMA in the first place? The putative answer is, of course, the success of science. But is 
everything in science responsible and indispensable for the kind of success that motivates 
belief in its truthfulness? Evidently, this is not the case, or the scientific antirealist would 
not be able to find a PMI kind of counter-example in the first place. So how does one start 
thinking about what to do away with? There seems to be no better way other than 
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analysing scientific theories into their composing parts, namely entities and structures. 
Which of the two should one pick to defend? Different philosophers have given different 
answers, which give rise to different strands of selective optimism. “Entities!” Hacking 
contends. “No, structures!”, Worrall disagrees. “Neither set in and of itself! One should 
pick those entities and structures in particular that are necessarily operative in making 
successful novel predictions!” Psillos and Kitcher maintain. Each of these philosophers 
makes a compelling case for their choice. They all, as I believe to have shown extensively 
in section 1.4, share a method, whether they admit it (Worrall, Psillos) or not (Hacking): 
essentially to restrict the NMA to their own set of choice. Thus, three smaller heads spawn 
for the hydra of scientific realism where its large head was chopped off by the PMI. How 
is the scientific antirealist to answer, given that these three ‘heads’, these three brands of 
selective optimism, are internally coherent? Again, with the same weapon. They are now 
called to find a new pair of entities, structures, or working posits in mature scientific 
theories that are mutually incompatible, and in so doing to successfully apply the PMI to 
each of the three strands of scientific realism. This is the one single play here. Despite its 
vastness and complexity, I claim that this is how the scientific realism debate is conducted 
within the sovereign analytic literature today. 
The main problem with this business, in my view, lies with the fact that, as it were, 
scientific realism is initially taken to be self-evidently true; as evidently right: it is a miracle 
if the enterprise of science is not true while being so successful. The scientific realist falls 
back to this premise under different guises: what else can explain science’s (or parts of 
science’s) success if not its (their) being true? The NMA is, I believe, not so much an 
argument as much as it is a contention that no argument is really needed to warrant belief in 
the truth of such a wildly successful enterprise as science is. It is essentially an appeal to 
intuition – an appeal to something that does not need to be argued for. Take the basic 
premise: if success does not imply truth then we certainly have a miracle going on amidst 
us. Or: scientific realism is not something that the realists need to argue for – the opposite 
camp should have to make their case. This, I claim, is a typical case of appealing to the 
court of philosophical axioms to favour the realists rather than an argument strictu sensu. 
Consider philosophical argumentation very generally; that a philosopher wants to argue 
for point A. A popular argumentative strategy within at least analytic philosophy is, I 
believe, to show that point A is directly derived from self-evident principles; to, perhaps 
by utilizing some sets of intermediary principles, reduce point A to these principles. When 
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these principles have been reached, it seems that the argument made is always the no 
miracles argument: point A can be faithfully reconstructed as if it were saying that it is a 
miracle if these, purportedly self-evident principles do not actually hold. This seems 
perhaps like a very sweeping claim but I cannot think a reason that this recast is not in 
principle applicable. If I am right on this count, then, this amounts to the whole ‘no 
miracles’ move being more about recasting the ‘success implies truth’ relation as 
something self-evident rather than being an argument itself. 
This is not a problem in and of itself. Every philosophy needs axiomatic departure 
points. I do, however, believe that this particular departure point is problematic. This 
problem becomes impressively evident when we consider that most of the discussion has 
been limited to unobservable entities and structures. What science says about the 
observables is, the problem of induction notwithstanding, quite easily taken to be right. 
This is at least until a given law faces empirical hardships, having observational 
consequences disagree with it; until empirical discrepancies start piling on the pressure for 
a new theory – a paradigm shift as Thomas Kuhn would have it. Leaving the observables 
side-lined, I claim, is to blame for a very important omission pertinent to the contemporary 
scientific realism debate. The problem here is that posing (parts of) science as basically 
true unless strongly proven otherwise shuts down any philosophical discussion examining 
directly the kind of inquiry that science is, as well as the truth-bringing claim it may have. 
Specifically, casting the debate in such a way leaves untouched the issues of the 
situatedness of science as an enterprise conducted by specific beings with specific features 
(perhaps even differing among them). Indeed, if we follow the received way in which the 
analytic scientific realism debate is conducted today, it astonishingly seems like empirical 
or historical hardships are the only reason to start challenging scientific realism’s claims. 
Conceptual philosophical inquiries have here shined in their absence.  
To be more specific, imagine the improbable case that a scientific theory comes along 
which faces no empirical counter-instances, which has no significant problems 
accommodating the data and thrives at making successful novel predictions; a theory that 
is not mutually incompatible with any other displaying any of its virtues in its field. It is 
then the case that, according to how the mainstream scientific realism debate is conducted, 
little philosophical discussion about its claim to the truth could be conducted. In the 
upcoming chapters, I will claim that this hypothetical theory, same as any other, departs 
from a certain point (the observable realm widely construed) and is conducted in certain 
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ways (cognitive and other) that are predicated upon a certain condition – in the case of 
typical human science, the typical human condition. For example, if this theory was a 
theory about light’s nature and function it would take its cue for scientific investigation 
from the thing in the world (some/a particular kind of?) humans separate from all others 
and call ‘light’. In turn, this theory would presumably divide the parts of the world subject 
to its ambit in further categories in the process of investigating light. Following, the 
investigation into light would be directed and limited, minimally, by the cognitive 
capacities and tropes of the people conducting the investigation. 
This former consideration seems to be completely amiss in the analytic conversation 
between scientific realism and scientific antirealism. To start introducing some terms we 
will often meet in the upcoming chapters, the typical conceptual universe human scientists 
operate in, it seems in what we have seen thus far, is not thought to be contingent and 
specific but the universal, uncontested point of departure for inquiry. What is left for 
science is to get the subsequent categories right, the unobservable categories that underlie 
the observable ones, as well as their interaction and ways of function. The ‘first-level’ 
ontology which denotes areas for scientific research is not touched upon in what we 
surveyed above. In other words, the phenomenology – human phenomenology and its 
conceptual contents – that unavoidably underlies the scientific enterprise seeing as it is 
conducted by human scientists, is not discussed. 
This phenomenology is not one. We may imagine projects of knowledge stemming 
from other phenomenologies. Perhaps even more importantly, as I will claim throughout 
this dissertation, this phenomenology is not even one among extant humans. How would 
science be, for example, if science was conducted by beings like us but importantly 
different in certain sections of their brain biochemistry and cognition? How would science 
be if science was conducted by beings not sharing an organization and navigation of the 
world in categories and entities such as the one most humans possess (time, space, et 
cetera)? Can we even speak of such a divergence in concepts, are we able to represent it 
using our own? Most importantly, what practical consequences should this have for 
science, if any? Should science about humans that are seemingly committed to importantly 
different conceptual schemes be informed by those schemes? And finally, to get closer to 
the topic of discussion, what does it mean for a situated enterprise, having its beginnings 
in certain ‘axiomatic’ categories in organising the world, to be ‘true’? Is it possible for such 
an enterprise to claim any kind of universal truth or is it the case that the best it can hope 
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for is to elaborate these initial categories by posing other ones within them, and to be 
instrumental in achieving certain ends in the context of these axiomatic categories?  
Over the span of the rest of this dissertation I aim to discuss these questions in depth 
and to provide further motivation for taking them seriously in thinking what kind of truth 
claim science is supposed to have. To get, that is, beyond supposing science’s truth until 
solid, mathematical-like proof emerges to motivate antirealist considerations. Of course, 
discussing alternative conceptual schemes, as well as the importance of phenomenological 
categories in acquiring understanding of the world and our ‘truth-grip’ on it, are not new 
ideas that belong to me; they have rather been important themes in both analytic and 
continental philosophy for decades. It seems, however, rather unfairly to me, that they 
have been bracketed in the contemporary analytic debate regarding scientific realism. To 
get the conversation about observables started, then, I will, in chapter two, interrogate the 
analytic philosophers of science, from Grover Maxwell to van Frassen and from Putnam 
to Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty, who have discussed observables in the realism 
frame. To this mix and in the hunt of the best conceptualization of the observable level 
and its tropes, I will later add phenomenologists like Edmund Husserl and his conception 
of the life-world. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have surveyed the received contemporary way of conducting the 
scientific realism debate. First, and within the limits of a certain abstraction, I gave an 
initial definition to scientific realism and scientific antirealism. Then, I introduced the ‘no 
miracles’ argument and the pessimistic meta-induction, the cornerstone arguments of 
scientific realists and scientific antirealists respectively. The former argues that science’s 
truth is an unavoidable implication of its instrumentality, while the latter uses the history 
of science to divorce the two notions. After having all the main lines that scientific realists 
and scientific antirealists follow in view, I claimed that they can all be subsumed under 
the form of a ‘restricted NMA’ versus ‘restricted PMI’ sort of chase game. Each time the 
two main issues are: is the new NMA internally coherent? If so, can it, free of the weight 
of unnecessary volatile metaphysics, escape the historical grasp of the PMI? Who knows 
– there is voluminous literature that argues for positive and negative answers pertaining to 
the different doctrines of selective optimism. My point was, rather, to point out that, very 
importantly, this way of conducting the debate turns a blind eye to some very interesting 
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direct, philosophical, conceptual discussion on science’s truth claim that may be had 
beyond examples and counter-examples. Further, it is my belief that this discussion has 
the observables, and not the unobservables, aspects of the world at its heart. To orientate 
things in this spirit in the remaining chapters of this dissertation, I will, in chapter two, 





































In the previous chapter I surveyed the most influential literature in the scientific realism 
debate as it is conducted within the analytic philosophy of science today. The major 
conclusion drawn was that scientific realism is self-evidently taken as the correct 
philosophical position towards science until a series of crucial counter-examples from the 
history of science arise to challenge it. From then on scientific realism adapts to survive 
and assumes more modest versions, and the question becomes one of these new versions’ 
internal coherence and of whether the case of historical counter-examples that apply 
against these modest versions can still be made. I argued that this pattern is philosophically 
limited in that it prevents a direct examination of science’s claim to the truth. It was further 
suggested that the place to start such an examination from is the observable aspects of the 
world, which have been overlooked in the literature examined in chapter one. 
Accordingly, this chapter and the next are dedicated to the complex and problematic issue 
of demarcating the realm of the observables. 
Specifically, the present chapter surveys the work of those analytic philosophers (of 
science and language) who have discussed the observable level in connection to the realism 
debate. I find that their work addresses two questions: whether there is a legitimate 
dichotomy to be made between the observables and the unobservables and what the 
intricate connections between theorizing, conceptualising, and access to the world’s 
observables precisely are. This scholarly work is found to be largely divergent with one 
point, however, largely conceded: even those philosophers who argue against the 
legitimacy of the observable level admit that some kind of a ‘directly empirical’ realm is 
necessary for science. That is, these philosophers challenge more observability as 
traditionally construed rather than the idea of a privileged empirical realm which science 
importantly refers to altogether. In the end of the chapter we are going to have in hand a 
few appealing intuitions about what this realm must be, but no clear definition of it yet. 
In chapter three I proffer that Edmund Husserl’s ‘life-world’ (lebenswelt), a notion from 
continental philosophy can, with certain tweaks, very much accommodate the most 
attractive intuitions and avoid the biggest pitfalls pertinent to observables from the analytic 
literature. In chapter four I argue that, despite often intersubjective, the life-world is not 
singular, but plural, and contingent on a variety of factors. In chapters five and six I move 
to such extant examples by exploring the case of autism spectrum conditions, a purported 
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case of such difference. In chapter seven I take stock of the philosophical picture painted 
throughout this dissertation and I connect it back to the scientific realism debate.  
The present chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.1 I examine one of the most 
influential movements in the history of the analytic philosophy of science, that of logical 
positivism. Within it I locate the idea that the observable level is important for science in 
the sense that all scientific statements should acquire their validation in relation to the 
observable level, and suggest that this idea is tenable as well as not organically tied to the 
larger enterprise of logical positivism, which has famously been met with collapse. In 
section 2.2 I interrogate the beginnings of the dialogue on observability in connection with 
scientific realism within the analytic framework, starting with the influential and 
conflicting views of Grover Maxwell and Bas van Fraassen. Maxwell argues that all the 
world’s entities are more or less directly observed and that drawing a line in this 
continuum, separating the observables from the unobservables, may only be arbitrary. 
Moreover, he argues that what is observable is contingent on the current human 
technological apparatus, which can only absurdly assume the role of an ontological 
criterion. Van Fraassen attempts to resist these conclusions by maintaining that observing 
is a different thing than observing that and by claiming that observability, though a vague 
predicate, is not a faulty concept. Further, he adds that observability is (should be) not an 
ontological criterion but a proper epistemic stance. 
In sections 2.3 and 2.4 I initially examine Alan Musgrave’s, Paul Dicken’s and Peter 
Lipton’s, and Hasok Chang’s attempts to adjudicate the Maxwell-van Fraassen debate and 
solve the observability mystery. Dicken-Lipton and Chang seem to side more with van 
Fraassen, while Musgrave joins Maxwell’s ranks. Chang tries to sidestep van Fraassen’s 
problems by making observability quality- and incorrigibility-based rather than object- and 
certainty-based. Musgrave points out that van Fraassen’s doctrine may be logically 
incoherent and tries to push him to admit that unobservables must be considered 
observables too based on the inference to the best explanation, thus collapsing the 
dichotomy. Dicken and Lipton proffer arguments to the effect of shutting down 
Musgrave’s most powerful protestations against van Fraassen. Last, I present the causal 
account of observability through one of its main proponents, Peter Kosso who, despite his 
doctrine’s name, seems to also sit comfortably with the Maxwell side of things, arguing 
that observability is a multi-dimensional issue and also a matter of degree. 
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In sections 2.5 and 2.6 I explore an angle of the problem of observables which regards 
what kind of access we may have to them. Are the observables sense-data, phenomena, 
qualities, objects, a veil of flux, or something else? For the answer to this question I turn 
to the analytic philosophy of language and to Hilary Putnam’s multi-faceted internal 
realism. Putnam and others have extensively discussed what form of access we may have 
to the world via the observable level and have offered many important arguments, both 
extremely optimistic (we have direct access to the world as is) and extremely sceptical (the 
world hopelessly deceives us). Their insights will prove invaluable in providing a tenable 
notion of observability in chapter three. I introduce the topic here, but much of what I say 
in the following chapters is necessary to elaborate my own position on it. Thus, the 
presentation of my own position on the matter will have to await the last section of chapter 
seven. 
To sum up, I repeat that two questions are going to occupy us in this chapter: is there 
a legitimate realm for the observables and, if yes, what kind of things are the observables? 
In this chapter I gather the analytic insights on the matter and survey the scene. In chapter 
three, I provide my own notion of observability through Husserl’s life-world. 
 
2.1 Observability in Logical Positivism 
If the observables can, for now, be roughly cashed out in terms of human experience 
of the world, then to argue for the importance of the observable level for science is just 
about reinventing the analytic philosophical wheel. Indeed, the idea that the natural 
sciences somehow importantly depend on experience and the observables exists since 
antiquity (Creath 2011, paragraph 4.1). Simultaneously, it is also the case, especially with 
the explosion in the advancement of microscopic and other related technology in modern 
times, that scientific theories have become increasingly populated with entities that are not 
directly observable. In the analytic tradition, the first movement that systematically 
discussed the relation and the balance of importance, so to speak, between statements 
about the observables and statements about the unobservables, was that of logical 
positivism, established by scholars like Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap and Carl Hempel 
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of the Vienna Circle, having the empiricists John Locke and David Hume as their 
forefathers. Three out of logical positivism’s most basic tenets7 are of relevance here: 
 
• The Verifiability Criterion of Meaning: A statement is meaningful insofar as 
it is verifiable in experience. 
• By extension, a scientific statement is meaningful insofar as it is verifiable in 
experience. 
• All unobservable terms should be translatable to terms in an observation 
language in order to be meaningful. 
 
Let us now examine these statements and what they precisely claim about 
observability. First, as an overarching comment, all the above statements are to be 
distinguished from two scientific antirealist positions: that unobservable entities do not 
exist and that statements pertaining to the unobservables comprise useless, excess content 
in science that should be eliminated (Maxwell 1962/2012, 1054). Some logical empiricists 
gave due credit to statements about the unobservables in science as a means of organising 
and systematizing observation statements while remaining agnostic about the actual 
existence of the unobservables. Granted, others simply dismissed the existence of such 
entities and such content (Chakravartty 2011, paragraph 4.1)8. Moving now to the actual 
statements, I will start from the bottom. The third statement – that all unobservable terms 
should be translatable to terms in an observation language in order to be meaningful – was 
first advanced by Carnap in his paper Testability and Meaning (1936-37). The motivation 
for it stemmed from one of logical positivism’s flagship projects, a reductionism pursuing 
the unity of science. Carnap, however, retracted this statement in his paper The 
Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts (1956). Therein, Carnap shifted his 
 
7 Any and all claims about logical positivism made in this section should be read as “most 
or some important logical positivists argued that X”. Logical positivism is a movement, 
not a doctrine and, therefore, to try and find even a few commitments shared by all of its 
members throughout their philosophical careers in order to define it would leave the set 
of logical positivists vacuous. 
8 For a detailed discussion on what various logical empiricists believed about the 
unobservables see Giere & Richardson (1997), and Richardson & Uebel (2007). 
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reductionist demand to whole statements rather than terms, thus falling back to statement 
two of the above list (Friedman 1987; Richardson 1998). What prompted Carnap to do so 
was Karl Popper’s critique of the third statement in his The Logic of Scientific Discovery 
(1935/2005). What Popper showed was that most unobservable terms in a scientific theory 
included in their definition other unobservable terms, which partake of the same scientific 
theory, and that this situation was ineliminable. This is to say that it is impossible to 
perform a one-to-one reduction of unobservable terms in scientific theory to categories of 
a public observation language: unobservable terms most often acquire their meaning only 
when viewed in the context of a general scientific theory. Thus, Carnap retreated to the 
more modest position.  
I turn now to the second statement, which contends that a scientific statement is 
meaningful insofar as it is verifiable in experience. I would like to particularly highlight 
the forceful intuition behind this position by pointing out that it does not amount to more 
than the standard argument against God, the occult, and other suchlike entities and 
concepts: it is simply the demand that one should not take seriously statements about the 
world that are not confirmable in experience, for which there is no evidence, and with 
which one does not seem to be able to change the world one perceives. As illustrated in 
the first chapter, a large discussion is required to address the question of just which, out of 
the statements that are translatable into the observable, one should adopt or take literally, 
but the present will do as an adequate cornerstone: eliminate those that are not. 
Unfortunately, however, this powerful intuition would not serve to seal the discussion and 
establish the legitimacy and primacy of the observables. The picture would be substantially 
complicated following the infamous logical positivism’s demise. 
Indeed, the philosophical movement to which Carnap himself subscribed did not fare 
well in philosophical history. Despite its being baptized as the ‘Received View’ (Putnam 
1962; Hempel 1970) and its still being called the ‘Once Received View’ (Craver 2002), 
logical positivism’s view of scientific theories was largely abandoned. There are several 
forceful reasons behind this development, the most decisive being the failure of the 
verifiability criterion of meaning, which is centrally relevant here9. Recall that what the 
 
9 Another group of reasons why logical positivism was abandoned are presented in Willard 
Quine’s Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951), one of the most important papers in the analytic 
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criterion holds is that statements are meaningful insofar as they are verifiable by 
experience. Succinctly put, the problem with it is that it renders the set of scientific theories 
vacuous. As we saw in chapter one, scientific statements are of a general form that extends 
to, besides the present, the past and future. Since one does not find time machines aplenty, 
and one cannot travel to the future or the past to test this statement for all possible objects, 
Newton’s first law of motion, for example, is rendered, per logical positivism’s verifiability 
criterion of meaning, meaningless. This generalises: all scientific laws are of this form, and 
they are all rendered meaningless by the same token. Expectedly, philosophers of science 
chose to leave the criterion, rather than the meaningfulness of science, behind. 
It is now time to ask: does this mean that the second statement, namely that all 
scientific statements should be verifiable in experience, must go? As it is put, and for the 
reasons pertaining to the untenability of the verifiability criterion of meaning, on which it 
(the second statement) crucially depends, the answer is clearly yes. The stress of the failure, 
however, is put on the word verifiable rather than on the phrase in experience. The crisis we 
explored above had broadly to do with being sure that something holds across time (and space, 
it could be argued), not with the position that experience should apply the material for 
theory and belief acceptance. Analytic philosophers of science responded to the crisis of 
verification by advancing alternative doctrines of comparing scientific theory with 
experience, based on the weaker notion of confirmation – of apportioning belief to 
experiential evidence, not of abolishing the notion of experience and its utility in science. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Popper (1963) devised the doctrine of falsificationism 
and Imre Lakatos (1978) pointed out the problems of this doctrine (a bunch of theories 
faces experience). Following, Lakatos devised the more complicated notion of progressive 
and degenerating research programmes: bunches of theories that either progress (are of 
adequate scope and solve novel problems) or degenerate (can only accommodate the data 
ad hoc). These doctrines do not demote the centrality of experience in science; they are just 
attempts to cash out how the two are wedded in ways that are philosophically sound. 
None of the theories of science that inherited logical positivism’s crown in analytic 
philosophy did away with the notion of statements about unobservables referring to 
experience to get their validation: what changed is that they were considered, in some way 
 
philosophy of the twentieth century. I discuss this paper later in this dissertation, in the 
frame of chapter four. 
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or other, confirmed instead of verified, and that what was confirmed was held to be bunch 
of statements rather than isolated statements or terms.  
It is now clear that logical positivism’s holding the observable level to the standard of 
being a distinct and indispensable level for science echoes loudly through the analytic 
tradition even today. This, however, will again not be the end of the discussion. 
Simultaneously with Popper’s and Lakatos’ above writings, Maxwell, an analytic 
philosopher of respectable stature, was attempting to undermine the observables by killing 
the observables-unobservables dichotomy in principle. It is to this attempt that I will 
momentarily turn.  
 
2.2 Observability in the Late Analytic Tradition: Grover Maxwell and Bas 
van Fraassen 
In his influential paper, The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities, Maxwell 
(1962/2012) launches an all-out attack on the ‘observational-theoretical dichotomy’. The 
bulk of his attack is that if one is to hold that unobservables, for example microbes, are not 
observed through microscopes but only shadows of their images are observed instead, then 
one may only arbitrarily claim that observables, for example birds, are directly observed 
through a fogged window or any other medium except a vacuum. This is to say that, per 
Maxwell, entities are in the clear majority of cases observed through a mediating prism, 
whether that is the microscope or the atmosphere or the pouring rain or something else. 
Unless one wants to claim that things are only seen when seen in a vacuum, and there is 
likely no philosopher that would want to claim this, then one must admit that there exists 
a continuum in which things are more or less directly observed, and that drawing a line 
dividing this continuum in actual observations and quasi-observations could only ever be 
arbitrary. It may be objected, adds Maxwell, that it is theory that says that microbes exist, 
not mere observation, and thus that microbes are in a worse ontological fate than birds. 
This position, however, appears to directly contradict the generally agreed-upon thesis on 
the theory-ladenness of observation: the philosophical maxim that there is no observation 
statement made without theory involved10.  
 
10 For the basic works on the issue refer to Norwood Hanson (1958) and Thomas Kuhn 
(1962). 
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This argumentation regards the impossibility of drawing a non-arbitrary dichotomy 
between the observables and the unobservables. Moreover, Maxwell argues that, even if 
this possibility was granted, the ontological significance that empiricists want to ascribe to 
it would be unfounded. To illustrate this regarding the example at hand, consider the 
position that microbes were never actually posed as unobservables in principle; that the 
possibility was ever present that humankind would one day develop an apparatus by which 
to observe microbes, which was in turn indeed materialised in the form of the microscope. 
This, maintains Maxwell, would ascribe to humanity’s contingent occasional 
technological apparatus the significance of an ontological criterion, which may only be 
absurd. In a hypothetical world of blind people who infer that tables exist because they 
stumble upon them, it would be entirely unfortunate if tables started being considered 
extant insofar as these people developed functioning eyes11.  
Last among the objections to his position that Maxwell considers is the Lockean 
(Locke 1690/1894) idea, later proliferated by Hume as well as by Bertrand Russell’s and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s logical atomism (which they later abandoned), that there is no 
conception of anything without a preceding impression of it12. Even if the tenability of this 
position is granted, says Maxwell, one is then immediately led to phenomenalism, the 
view that physical things cannot be said to exist in themselves but only as perceptual 
phenomena or sensory stimuli. Phenomenalism, continues Maxwell, is surely out of 
fashion, but even if it was not, it is the case that phenomenalists themselves would surely 
grant that what are normally thought of as the observables are no better off than the 
unobservables in the sense discussed here. By the phenomenalist approach they both exist 
as sensory stimuli: the ball outside the window is as much an impression as the microbe 
looked at through the microscope. In phenomenalism, if one wants to admit the 
independent existence of one, then one would want to admit the independent existence of 
the other, which is effectively the summary of Maxwell’s own position.  
Finally, Maxwell makes a remark that I want to particularly highlight, as it will prove 
of extreme importance for the purposes of the next chapter. I have italicised the parts 
 
11 The example is mine but I believe it readily encapsulates Maxwell’s spirit. 
12 For the purpose of following the present argument one may freely swap the term 
‘impression’ with observation. 
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where he admits the necessity of an immediate empirical level seeing as it will soon prove 
crucial to my defence of the observables. 
 
Although I have contended that the line between the observable and the unobservable 
is diffuse, that it shifts from one scientific problem to another, and that it is constantly 
being pushed toward the ‘unobservable’ end of the spectrum as we develop better 
means of observation – better instruments – it would, nevertheless, be fatuous to 
minimize the importance of the observation base, for it is absolutely necessary as a 
confirmation base for statements which do refer to entities which are unobservable at a given time. 
... But we should take as its basis and its unit not the ‘observational term’ but, rather, 
the quickly decidable sentence. ... A quickly decidable sentence (in the technical sense 
employed here) may be defined as a singular, nonanalytic sentence such that a reliable, 
reasonably sophisticated language user can very quickly decide whether to assert it or deny it when 
he is reporting an occurrent situation. ‘Observation term’ may now be defined as a 
‘descriptive (non-logical) term which may occur in quickly decidable sentence, and 
‘observation sentence’ as a sentence whose only descriptive term are observation terms. 
(Maxwell 1962/2012, 1057) 
 
We may take these points home from Maxwell: first, there is purportedly a continuum 
of observation, seeing as observation is always prism-and-theory mediated. Second, even 
if it was not, observation is unable to perform the ontological heavy lifting friends of the 
observables want it to perform. Third, there is nevertheless a realm of quickly decidable 
sentences that bootstrap our empirical considerations – that act as the basis of our 
empirical evaluations. Hold these points in mind. In chapter three, where I advance the 
notion of the life-world as a proper construal of the observables, I will argue that, indeed, 
observability should come to capture much more than certain senses (e.g. sight) 
momentarily meet. Nevertheless, this should not be taken to mark the demise of the 
observables. That observability is always-already multifariously mediated and no certain 
guarantor to existence are points that must be conceded but, I will claim, the life-world 
notion takes very good notice of both arguments. In fact, van Fraassen will now lend us a 
helping hand relating to these points. 
A few years later than Maxwell’s paper, van Fraassen (1980) published The Scientific 
Image, a book advancing a specific scientific antirealist position, namely and famously 
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constructive empiricism. Chief among the tasks to achieve was, unsurprisingly, to halt 
Maxwell’s attempted collapse of the observable-unobservable dichotomy. For van 
Fraassen (1980, 8) scientific realism is the position that “science aims to give us a literally 
true story about what is going in the world, and that holding a theory involves the belief 
that it is true”. By contrast, constructive empiricism is the position that “science aims to 
give us an empirically adequate story about what is going on in the world, and adopting a 
theory involves the belief that it is empirically adequate” (1980, 12). ‘Empirically 
adequate’ is here cashed out in terms of a theory’s ‘saving the phenomena’, where the 
realm of the phenomena is delineated by means of observation statements, regarding of 
course only observable entities. Thus, van Fraassen goes on to defend the genuineness of 
observables, evidently necessary for him as for any empiricist.  
Van Fraassen’s first move is to point out a purported ‘category mistake’ that Maxwell 
commits, namely conflating theoretical concepts with (un)observable entities. Concepts, 
says van Fraassen (1980, 12) are theoretical; entities are either observable or unobservable. 
This separates the dichotomy question into two sub-questions. The first question is 
whether language can be separated into a theoretical and non-theoretical part, and the 
second question is whether entities can be classified into observable and unobservable. 
Maxwell, following scholars like Paul Feyerabend and Wilfrid Sellars, answers the first 
question negatively: language is unavoidably theory-laden. Van Fraassen agrees with him, 
but notes that the place where the philosophical juice of Maxwell’s paper lies is in the quite 
distinct and in his view independent second question (observable-unobservable 
dichotomy), which Maxwell answers negatively as well. According to van Fraassen (1980, 
15), in doing so Maxwell commits the important mistake of conflating observing with 
observing that. Observing that something or other is the case that putatively indicates the 
presence of an entity, he says, is not the same as observing the entity itself: observing the 
tracks of a bear in the snow is not observing the bear itself. Observing the tracks that an 
electron putatively leaves in a cloud chamber is not the same as observing the electron. I 
understand this point as saying that, although, per Maxwell, an image produced on the 
retina through a medium mediates ontological inference, in the case of the unobservables 
in science this image is not of the entities themselves but of undulations in the environment 
in which the latter purportedly at some point existed13. Van Fraassen’s point, I submit, is 
 
13 Importantly, this would be granted, I think, by the scientific realists as well. 
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effectively this: while indications and (theoretical) mediations abound, not all indications 
and mediations are equal and of the same kind. 
Moreover, van Fraassen (1980, 16) holds that Maxwell’s continuum does not 
correspond to the observability of a given X: the fact that Jupiter’s moons can be observed 
through a telescope does not cancel out the fact that they can be observed with the naked 
eye if looked at from adequately closely. Per van Fraassen, the definition for when 
something is observable is that it is observable under the right circumstances. Maxwell’s 
argument against (un)observability in principle is a trick, he submits: if one has a mortar 
and pestle made out of copper and weighing about a kilo, should one call it breakable 
because a giant or a suchlike being could break it? Hardly – what Maxwell’s argument 
shows, he argues, is that ‘observable’ is a vague predicate. There is, however, no need to 
panic about this. The existence of a vague predicate is fine if the predicate has clear-cut 
cases: looking at the moon through a telescope is such a case of observation, looking at 
tracks of a supposed electron through a microscope is definitely not.  
Finally, regarding Maxwell’s contestations to the importance of the dichotomy even if 
it could be drawn, van Fraassen admits that the predicates ‘is observable’ and ‘exists’ are 
not linked together by any necessary means. They are, however, surely bound together in 
a sense regarding the proper epistemic attitude toward an X’s existence (1980, 19): someone 
at time T has no reason to believe that something exists unless that something has been 
registered in the registry of observables by humans at time T. This of course does not 
alleviate Maxwell’s pressure regarding the contingency of the observing apparatus but it is 
a bullet that van Fraassen is willing to bite, seeing as he considers it not much of a bullet: 
if in the future humankind develops electron-seeing (not electron track-seeing) means, then 
electrons can be freely admitted as extant. If, in the future, humankind develops God-
seeing means, the same would hold for God, but this does not imply that one should 
believe in God right here right now. This conclusion sits well with van Fraassen’s, not 
explicitly negatively antirealist, but rather agnostic attitude towards the unobservables.  
In summary, Maxwell contends that there is a continuum of observation. Observation 
is mediated by theory and matter, thus the continuum may only arbitrarily be separated 
into genuine and non-genuine observations. Moreover, he challenges the role of the 
ontological adjudicator on behalf of observation. Van Fraassen attempts to resist these 
conclusions in the way we just saw: separating observing from observing that and 
defending observability qua vague notion and proper epistemic stance. In chapter three, 
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where I utilise the notion of the life-world as observability proper, I will make elaborate 
use of van Fraassen’s arguments. The life-world will be defined as a vague predicate 
indeed, admitting its theory-mediated character as no sin. Moreover, it will be argued, 
besides the proper epistemic stance, it is the only epistemic stance science may rely on: it 
(non-exhaustively) denotes the areas of science’s points of departure, mode of conduction, 
evidential evaluation.  
 
2.3 Analytic Arbitration of the Observability Debate: Alan Musgrave and 
Hasok Chang 
We have a bulk of material in hand for chapter three where we will try to find the most 
proper way to define observability. There is a series of notions turned headaches already: 
mediation, ontological adjudication, proper epistemic stance. As is to be expected, 
however, others have tried to come between Musgrave and van Frassen ever since the 
debate’s inauguration, offering valuable insights. In this section I will address the work of 
Musgrave and van Fraassen. In his Constructive Empiricism Versus Scientific Realism (1982) 
Musgrave attacks van Fraassen’s antirealist prohibitions using inference to the best 
explanation. Musgrave contends that the best explanations in scientific theories are 
couched in terms of the unobservables and argues that van Fraassen’s is a curious sort of 
empiricism that sets the available evidence aside for a false cause. He borrows van 
Fraassen’s own example to demonstrate the supposed absurdity of his case: 
 
I hear scratching in the wall, the patter of little feet at midnight, my cheese disappears 
– and I infer that a mouse has come to live with me. Not merely that these apparent 
signs of mousely presence will continue, not merely that all the observable phenomena 
will be as if there is a mouse; but that there really is a mouse. (Van Fraassen 1980, 19-
20) 
 
“Will not the same pattern of inference lead us to believe in unobservable entities?” 
asks Musgrave (1982, 265). What sort of absurd empiricism is that which permits someone 
to believe in yetis and mice in hope of their one day seeing them, but does not permit the 
physicist to believe in their electrons? 
Bracketing the answer to the above question until the next chapter, I now turn to 
Chang’s view. As the title of his paper A Case for Old-Fashioned Observability, and a 
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Reconstructed Constructive Empiricism (2005) indicates, Chang makes a case for the 
dichotomy in the van Fraassen side of things and reformulates constructive empiricism in 
a manner that purportedly deals better with the chief scientific realist objections to it. 
Chang’s observability pertains to qualities (reports of sensation) rather than objects (Chang 
2005, 876). This is in line with logical positivism’s conception of experience (Carnap 1995, 
225) and also in sharp contrast with the predominant object-centred conception of terms 
of experience – see for example van Fraassen (1980, 15) and Kosso (1988, 451), the latter 
arguing directly that qualities can only be perceived as belonging to a certain object. 
Against this contention, Chang (2005, 878-879) presents an array of examples from both 
scientific and everyday observation such as the instances of measuring the gravitational or 
Planck’s constant or noticing a smell of rot in the air, which clearly do not pertain to any 
particular object. Here, observation “consists in registering a quality, and ... observations 
are perfectly meaningful and coherent without any knowledge or presumption of an object 
to which the quality belongs, or even an object which causes the quality to be present”. 
Per Chang’s formulation, an entity is observable if, and only if, it has any observable 
properties and is unobservable if, and only if, it does not. This is where Chang partially 
crosses over to the Maxwell side of things by stressing that this primacy of qualities over 
objects urges us to believe that entities traditionally thought of as unobservable are 
observable via their manifest qualities. It is high time, argues Chang, that we stop 
privileging vision over other means of access to the world and the entities that inhabit it: 
 
We need to recognise that a sufficient number of chlorine molecules sprayed in the air 
are just as observable as a rock that hits my head ... Vollmer (2000, 361; 365) says that 
caffeine is an observable entity because we can discern its molecular structure though 
X-Ray crystallography. I say caffeine is observable through the buzz I feel after I ingest 
it (and indirectly observable through the unimaginable number of people who stay 
awake at philosophy conferences). (Chang 2005, 879) 
 
As recognised by himself, Chang’s thesis should find several objectors in its offing, first 
among them being the one logical positivists faced themselves in replacing objects with 
sense-data as the terms of experience: that no system of knowledge could ever be 
constructed on predicates like “white here now” and “round shape” without additional 
theoretical assumptions that synthesize them into statements interesting for any kind of 
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knowledge: theories. Notably, this is a point conceded by one of the leading figures of 
logical positivism, Schlick (1934/1979, 382) himself. So, is there any hope for this 
substitution of objects by qualities in the place of observables to serve as a tool to finally 
get around the problem of theory-ladenness of observation? In other words, are the 
qualities one perceives finally non-theoretical and will they serve as the objective building 
blocks with which to build objective knowledge – is this a signal for a return to non-theory 
plagued phenomenalism? Absolutely not, says Chang: the bulk of our sense-data is 
separated out into individual qualities in exactly the same theory-laden way that the bulk 
of our vision is separated into individual entities. This much is true, admits Chang, but he 
turns now to a new notion: that of incorrigibility. What separates the ‘launching pads’ of 
inquiry from the rest of observation is not non-theory mediation but the fact that we seem 
to be quite unavoidably stuck with them; they “provide the starting points and some 
crucial later ingredients for our evolving interpretation” (Chang 2005, 882). By this, he 
only means that “we have no way of changing them at will” (ibid., 880), not that they are 
constituted of truth and fact (same as incorrigible people, who may often be wrong). It is 
on this basis that Chang draws his dichotomy, and claims that sense can be made of it, 
even if statements pertaining to the observables and statements pertaining to the 
unobservables are both interpretations. 
Finally, Chang argues that this status of the incorrigible sense-data can be contingently 
externalised to instruments. This is what happens when I wear my glasses and accept the 
instrument-mediated input as sensation input itself unless I have a reason to doubt this 
incorrigibility (the instrument independently shown to be unreliable). Moreover, Chang 
holds, it is the case that instruments create new observable qualities via operational 
definitions: the length of a mercury column is incorrigibly supposed to be a medium for 
the registration of the quality of temperature (Chang 2005, 881). It is further the case, he 
adds, that even with long-learned and embodied interpretations, one can by reflection peel 
them away if they can in principle be peeled away (Chang 2005, 882-883). But does this 
not, as Maxwell would interject, privilege human accessibility to various things as an 
unwarranted ontological criterion? Only if observations are taken to be true, correct and 
objective in any way claims Chang, something from which he takes distance. Again, he 
turns to incorrigibility and repeats that “... the incorrigibility of observations only means 
that we are stuck with them, not that they are correct”, a statement which he is quick to 
complement with the admission: “Still, we are pretty well stuck with taking the testimony 
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of human senses on the whole as a starting point of our empirical knowledge. ... there is 
... here only ... humanism in the form of a recognition that we cannot, and should not try 
to, get away from ourselves” (Chang 2005, 883). 
So, what is Chang’s gift to van Fraassen and constructive empiricism? According to 
Chang (2005, 884) it is van Fraassen’s object-based definition of observability that 
“continually drags him towards realism”. As has already been showcased, one influential 
objection to van Fraassen’s line of argument is that there is no necessary correlation 
between what humans have access to and what exists, something which van Fraassen gets 
around by highlighting that he talks epistemology, not ontology. However, interjects 
Chang brilliantly, “[W]e can dispense with the difficulty completely by insisting that 
observability really has nothing at all to do with the existence of objects, rather than trying 
to hold on to the idea that observable things must exist”. By his definition, all entities 
belong in the realm of interpretations, rather than observations, as “we do not have thing-
perceivers in our sensory apparatus” (Chang 2005, 884). This move from object-based 
observability to quality observability, per Chang, serves to do away with various other 
problems associated with van Fraassen’s account, such as asserting that medium-sized 
members of the kind X exist while their small, undetectable by the eye counterparts, do 
not – a certain absurdity. If qualities take the place of entities in observation then the above 
problem automatically dissolves. This, per Chang, emphasizes the ‘constructive’ element 
of constructive empiricism by showing that interpretations (entities among them) are 
constructed, not discovered: “they need to fit with observations, but they cannot be proven 
by observations” (Chang 2005, 885). In other words this move unshackles van Fraassen’s 
constructive empiricism from having to admit that science possesses some kind of truth 
about observable entities, which, by the same token can then easily be extrapolated to the 
unobservables. Chang does not argue that there is a dichotomy between unobservable and 
observable objects: he restricts observation to the realm of qualities and argues that a 
dichotomy between qualities and objects can much more easily be drawn. This, of course, 
as he notes, comes at the price of giving up all absolute certainty one may have regarding 
scientific knowledge pertaining to the observables, which is (wrongly, per Chang) affirmed 
in van Fraassen’s original version of constructive empiricism. 
Let us take stock. First, Maxwell gave us the mediation and ontological adjudication 
problems. Van Fraassen retorted with the position that observability is a vague predicate 
that denotes a proper epistemic stance towards the empirical. Musgrave came to hit back: 
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what sort of empiricism casts aside inference to the best explanation? In turn, Chang 
proffered an incorrigibility-and-quality-based definition of observability. This serves to 
give additional force to the argument for observability as proper epistemic stance, 
untangling van Fraassen from realist commitments that continually drag him down: it is 
not that what we observe decidedly exists, it is that it constitutes the basis of inquiry, and 
also has a feedback relation with it: products of inquiry may come to inform what is 
incorrigibly observed (as with the case of eyeglasses). In this picture, the continuum of 
observation, relating to objects, disappears along with the disappearance of objects from 
observation. Incorrigible qualities are all equally incorrigibly observable.  
Overall, in the above picture, van Fraassen and Chang pull towards observability, and 
Maxwell and Musgrave try to resist the related dichotomy. Evidently, seeing as my whole 
argument is predicated upon the importance of observability, in the next chapter I am 
going to side with the former camp, addressing the problems the latter brings to the fore. 
Via the life-world, the realm of incorrigible (the term now evidently taken from Chang) 
admittances, I will claim that observability needs indeed to be seen as the sum total of 
things we are stuck with, not things that exist in any transcendental, self-evident way. It is 
(or should be), following van Frassen, indeed a vague predicate. We can dispense, I will 
claim, with the continuum worries by referring to incorrigibility but I will also part ways 
with Chang: to do all that he rightly wants us to do with observability, I will argue, we 
need not erase objects from the picture; object-ness is, after all, most often an incorrigible 
quality. Moreover, it is not that what is incorrigibly present only helps launch science and 
feeds back into it: it also affects the tropes of science conduction. Nor is it the case that 
observability should only relate to the world: it should also relate to the perceiving subject; 
it is the faculties of a subject that actively represent the observable world in synergy with 
material from the world. Last, regarding Musgrave, I will argue that the mouse in the 
wainscoting, qua mouse in the wainscoting is no incorrigible admittance (the sound it 
makes does). 
 
2.4 The Dicken–Lipton Intervention and Causal Accounts of 
Observability 
In their paper entitled What Can Bas Believe? Musgrave and Van Fraassen on Observability 
(2006), Dicken and Lipton explore yet another objection raised against van Fraassen by 
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Musgrave in the same paper cited above14. As we saw, van Fraassen’s contention is that, 
being within a theory when observing as we may, we can still very well let this theory tell 
us what is observable and what is not (call this theory T). However, Musgrave begins his 
argument, van Fraassen is a constructive empiricist: this means that he is only allowed to 
believe statements about the observables. Thus, he needs to know which statements of T 
are about observables and he only has T at his disposal for this task, thus T must be applied 
to itself. This is not an immediate cause of alarm for van Fraassen. One who sets out to 
prove him incoherent will now have to show that this does not only denote a circularity 
but a vicious one at that (Dicken & Lipton 2006, 227). Unfortunately, says Musgrave, the 
statements of T on observability are not themselves statements about the observables and 
thus a constructive empiricist is not philosophically legitimized to believe them. Why? 
Because some of T’s statements will necessarily be of the form “X is unobservable.”, which 
is clearly not a statement about observables.  
There are a few ways in which we can answer this, Dicken and Lipton claim: we can 
hold that statements about unobservables may be tentatively accepted rather than believed 
or, more naturally, that we can believe those statements of T that are about observables. 
However, they continue, since T is not complete, we are in the dark about what to do with 
its remaining consequences: are they about observables or are they not? Towards this, 
Dicken and Lipton (2006, 228-229) reply, agnosticism is fine: so long as we know what is 
observable, a line separating the observables from the unobservables and the maybe-
observables can be finely drawn15.  
This, however, Dicken and Lipton note, is not the line van Fraassen actually takes. 
The line he takes, as they understand it, is this. Suppose that T entails that a certain X is 
unobservable. Further, suppose that this X is in fact observable. Then, T entails something 
 
14 Albeit the two being part of the same paper and argumentative line, I consider this 
objection by Musgrave here, along with Lipton’s and Dicken’s work. This is because 
Lipton and Dicken exhaustively raise and explore it before finally rejecting it, and thus I 
will not be taking it with me in the next chapter. 
15 To this I must add that I think van Fraassen’s base is covered from his original paper: 
when he talks about the proper epistemic stance rather than a guaranteed ontology, I believe 
he has exactly this in mind: we may legitimately remain agnostic toward that which we 
have no sufficient evidence of.  
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false about an observable entity. However, if we, as constructive empiricists, take T to be 
empirically adequate, then we believe that what T says about observables is true. So, we 
would never take T to hold something false about an observable and be empirically 
adequate. What does this mean? Dicken and Lipton explain: we can only be agnostic 
about a statement of T insofar as it does not have any false empirical consequences. Thus, 
statements about unobservables do actually function as statements about observables since it is 
only by means of observation that we can derive the existence of a certain thing. If we 
have another scientific theory, call it T’, under examination and believe that T is 
empirically adequate then we are legitimized to believe T, by means of observation, in 
saying that a certain X is unobservable. With one qualification: if and only if X exists, as 
Dicken and Lipton hasten to add, for there is always the possibility that T may be asserting 
something not, strictly speaking, false but empirically ‘irrelevant’ about an X: this X may 
not exist. Thus, the constructive empiricist is entitled to believe all statements of the form 
“X is unobservable (iff X exists).” because, by means of observation, they know that X is 
not observable. 
Even after this long course Lipton and Dicken rest unsatisfied for they now start 
generating possible retaliations on behalf of Musgrave to van Fraassen’s answer. This 
objection is based on a different understanding of observability, which allows for the falsity 
of “X is unobservable (iff X exists).” even if T is empirically adequate. How so? In the case 
where what is observable is only a property attributed to an entity contra the entity itself 
being observable. For, then, even if the statement “X is unobservable.” were false, T would 
not be making a false contention about an observable entity, but about a property instead 
(Dicken & Lipton 2006, 231). For this they have a rebuttal as well, which is to take the 
claim that a theory is empirically adequate to already presuppose a demarcation between 
what is observable and what is not (ibid.). Dicken and Lipton proceed to note that it is not 
immediately clear whether this solves Musgrave’s objection but I will not pursue this 
issue’s technicalities here for they will start taking me off track. The discussion that the 
present chapter prepares us for involves neither an adoption of a property-centric notion 
of observability nor is it resulting in some version of constructive empiricism to begin with. 
After I survey the notions of observables that have populated the literature in analytic 
philosophy I will, in the following chapter, adopt my own notion that, contra constructive 
empiricism among others, argues fiercely that the observables should anything but be 
taken for granted. 
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Finally, an account of observability that surfaced in connection with the scientific 
realism debate is the causal account of observability (information-interaction account). In 
the causal accounts of observability, the concept is analysed in terms of information passed 
onto an observer apparatus (and eventually to the human scientist) on behalf of the world. 
This clause is put there to ensure that cases of information acquired through machines are 
not dropped out of the observation picture. One of the most central and characteristic 
proponents of this stance, Kosso, in Dimensions of Observability (1988) argues for a multi-
dimensional definition of observability, the main advantage of which is, allegedly, that it 
ascribes to science itself the role of the most appropriate adjudicator of observability 
(Kosso 1988, 450). Moreover, Kosso raises a clause of the information being new, ‘non-
redundant’, conveying something about the object the observer did not know beforehand. 
Kosso analyses observability along four dimensions: immediacy, directedness, amount 
of interpretation, and dependence of interpretation. The first one, immediacy, points to 
the neighbourliness of the observed state to the human observer. By this Kosso (1988, 454) 
means observability in principle – a “description of the object’s potential to interact in an 
informationally correlated way”. If this object cannot reach the human organs at all it is 
called unobservable in principle (such as the colour of quarks); if it can interact with the 
human organs only via a machine it is called unobservable in fact (such as electrons, which 
can allegedly be observed in cloud and bubble chambers); if it can interact with the human 
organs with no prisms necessary, this object is called perceivable. The second dimension, 
directedness, points to the number of ‘intermediate messengers’ that are needed to carry 
the message to the human organ – it is a measure of the number of interactions needed for 
some information to reach us. For example, information acquired with the aid of a 
magnifying glass is less direct than information acquired with the naked eye. Third, the 
dimension of the amount of interpretation is different to directedness in that it does not 
measure the prisms needed for information to pass through, but the number of laws we need 
to believe in so as to also believe that such and such information has been accurately 
conveyed in such and such ways. The last dimension, that of independence of 
interpretation, refers to how independently the observation of the putatively observed object 
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may be corroborated: how many theories that confirm its observation are not theories of 
the object itself16. 
Besides delegating the role of the observability referee to science, Kosso (1988, 457) 
claims that he asks the right question instead of the wrong one, the wrong question being 
whether something is observable or not. Observability, he maintains, comes in degrees, and 
it is (in the spirit of Maxwell) a continuum, albeit a multi-dimensional one. Moreover, 
after exploring a few case studies, Kosso (1988, 458-463), somewhat tentatively, argues 
that the dimensions of immediacy, directedness, and amount of interpretation are 
relatively less important to evaluating observability compared to the dependence of 
interpretation. This is an analogy with the epistemological evaluation of scientific theories, 
which we take to be less or more corroborated by measure of their independent 
confirmation than of how complex they are in and of themselves. Last, Kosso draws a 
related implication for the scientific realism-antirealism debate: the inference to the source 
of information. This principle suggests that we should proportionate our belief to 
observing an X according to how well it fulfils the four dimensions of observability, 
weighed for their epistemic significance (dependence of interpretation weighing more than 
the others). Just like Nancy Cartwright’s (1983) inference to the best explanation principle 
suggests, the inference to the source of information urges us to look at the reliability of the 
information-conveying process: if we decide how reliably a piece of information from an 
X has been conveyed qua information from an X, and in so doing evaluating the X’s 
corresponding existential claim. Kosso (1988, 466) closes with a remark I will comment 
extensively on in the next chapter. Without the word of God or prior information about 
what exists in the world regarding the epistemology of science, he maintains, 
“independence in the interaction-information account is the surest epistemological 
foothold”. 
 
16 As an overarching comment on this paragraph: one may raise that the quantifications 
Kosso calls for are worrisome: it is not immediately clear how one would individuate and 
quantify things as intermediate messengers and the number of interactions needed for 
observation. I am sympathetic to this counter-argument. The reason I do not explore this 
objection here is that I will, for reasons that overlap with it, reject Kosso’s notion of 
observability altogether in chapter three. 
 67 
With Musgrave’s second objection decidedly defeated by Dicken and Lipton, the 
situation regarding what we are to take with us in the next chapter is pretty much the same 
as it was at the end of the previous section: Maxwell’s continuum, mediation, and 
ontology adjudicator issues, van Fraassen’s vague predicate and proper epistemic stance, 
Musgrave’s call to maintain the inference to the best explanation about the empirical, 
Chang’s attempt to rejuvenate constructive empiricism via turning to qualities and 
incorrigibility. As I said in the end of the previous section, so I do now: the life-world, I 
programmatically announce, will address all these issues in the next chapter and 
synthesize them in a rich and philosophically competent definition of observability, taking 
care to avoid the pitfalls rightly highlighted by the analytics. This observability will include 
all the things we are ‘stuck with’, which are crucial within conducting science. It will also 
relate to the perceiving subject, and it will feature objects as one of its components. 
This concludes the analytic discussion on the observable level’s legitimacy; the matter 
of whether it makes sense to talk about the observables as a distinct realm of reality. I will 
now turn to an issue that is not entirely separate to what I have discussed above but that 
needs to be unfolded along a length that would be forbidding to accommodate above. This 
is how observability relates broadly to theorising and conceptualising – a matter 
traditionally situated in the philosophy of language. Have we, ask the philosophers whose 
positions I will momentarily explore, any right to claim that we have access to the world’s 
observables? If so, what kind of access is that? This issue directly relates to this 
dissertation’s theme: if I am to claim that the observables are so crucial for science, then it 
is only fair that I address worries that meaning grounded in the observables may be merely 
a façade, perhaps even radically at that. I will begin this story by showcasing Putnam’s 
internal realism and make the connection with the above material as I go. 
 
2.5 Putnam and Internal Realism 
Internal realism is a multifaceted doctrine, which touches upon realism versus 
antirealism issues at large. It has corollaries for, but is not limited to, matters scientific. 
Seeing as its range is broader and as it discusses more abstractly the kind of access humans 
may have to the world (mainly via the observables) compared to the doctrines explored in 
chapter one, I am discussing it here. I will first provide a general outline of internal realism 
and then spell out how it relates to the observables and to the general issue of the present 
chapter. Let us then begin the tale of the question that essentially asks: have we any reason 
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to ever believe that we have ascribed the correct meaning to the world’s observables and 
latched onto them? 
Internal realism’s story begins in 1977, when Putnam published the book Realism and 
Reason, soon followed by Reason, Truth and History (1981) and the paper Models and Reality 
(1980). Putnam’s target here is external17 realism construed as the position that the world 
is in a certain way, utterly independently of us18. Across these works, Putnam’s attacks 
develop mainly two angles: the model-theoretic arguments, and the brain in a vat 
argument. There are two model-theoretic arguments: one indeterministic and one 
infallibilistic. The former goes as follows: if we messed up our current classifications of the 
world however we liked nobody would be logically authorized to tell us off. Imagine, for 
example, that we have a very small system of classification. It is comprised of three things 
that we would currently recognise as a basking shark, a trout, and a whale, named X, Y, 
and Z respectively. Add a predicate “X and Y are fish”. Should we swap the trout with 
the whale and keep the names Y and Z in place (the name does not follow the creature 
when the creature moves), we would still have “X and Y are fish”, albeit a different system 
of classification. This new system may not be as useful as ours for certain purposes (it may, 
however, be more useful for others) but there is, strictly speaking, nothing prohibiting us 
from devising what we like. The infallibilism argument states that if a theory is ideal then 
it is at the very least consistent. If a theory is consistent, there is certainly a way of making 
it true: nothing could ever be brought to the fore as definite evidence for its falsity. 
Thus, two points surface here: that reference is radically indeterminate and that truth 
does not outrun the notion of idealized justification. The former immediately amounts to 
a problem for the external realist: if reference is radically indeterminate, if things in the 
world do not ‘cry out’ for a determinate classification, Putnam says, if they do not possess 
innate qualities calling for their structuration in only one way, it is hard to see how the 
 
17 Putnam’s original term is ‘metaphysical realism’, aligning with my chapter one’s 
terminology. I will nevertheless be following the term ‘external’ here for reasons I will 
explain soon below. 
18 This statement is meant here with all appropriate qualifications and specifications: that 
the world is comprised of some determinate entities and structures which we may either 
pick out or fail to pick out, and that of course some things are minimally dependent on us 
humans, e.g. the things we build and maintain. 
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world may ‘be’ independently of us in a certain way. If we can successfully lay out many 
correspondence relations then it is wholly under-determined which one is the one true 
relation that characterizes the world, says the first model-theoretic argument. Thus, we 
may develop here, words refer to observables constructively: there are no fixed items which 
are words ‘catch’. As for how the infallibilist argument amounts to a problem for the 
external realist, we must note that metaphysical realism in the philosophy of language, 
unlike the scientific realism debate in philosophy of science today, comes tied to the 
additional principle of what Tim Button (2013, 10) names, in The Limits of Realism, a book 
offering an exhaustive interrogation of internal realism, Cartesian angst. Cartesian angst is 
the uncomfortable credo by which, if the world is in a certain way utterly independently 
of us, then we may be perpetually fooled in thinking we have gotten things (read: chiefly 
the observables) right; even an ideal theory may be radically false. In effect, the infallibilist 
argument argues that there is hardly any way to make sense of this claim for nothing could 
be brought to the fore for the falsity of an ideal theory. 
These arguments did naturally raise a heap of objections from the camp of external 
realists. A clear majority of them centred on somehow constraining reference, prohibiting 
it from flying around freely as it does in the picture of the first model-theoretic argument. 
Appeals for this purpose have been made to causality (as in Devitt 1983), eliteness (as in 
Lewis 1984), and to the more technical notions of fullness and modality (as in Shapiro 
1997; McGee 2005 respectively). The content follows the label: causalists claim that the 
causal relations running through the world constrain reference. Elitists claim that there 
may be pseudo-relations that we are free to determine arbitrarily in the world but that there 
are also elite, genuine classes of things that are typically revealed to us through advanced 
science, which elite classes dictate reference. Fullists claim that a second-order theory, 
somehow exempt of the confusing vices of the first-order theory, may come in to fix the 
indeterminate reference of the latter. Modalists carry out what is probably the most 
interesting attempt to constrain reference. Suppose we have a theory: this theory denotes 
not only what is true, but what would be true in every possible world characterised by this 
theory. Modalists then introduce rigid designators: those that denote the same object in all 
such possible worlds, thus purportedly pinning down reference. 
Putnam’s retaliation to these moves is the notoriously famous just-more-theory 
manoeuvre. He treats all the above (and any other possible) attempts to constrain reference 
as ‘just more theory’ susceptible to the original arguments. If the answer to what fixes 
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reference is, for example, ‘causation’, then Putnam asks: and what fixes causation? What 
ties the word ‘causation’ to actual causation? If it is theory that does this work – and what 
else could it ever be – then what prohibits us from devising a total theory in which 
causation simply does not exist, a classification of things worldly among which causation 
does not feature? Nothing, Putnam maintains. There are many interpretations available 
for the word ‘causation’ as the indeterminacy model-theoretic argument shows. This 
obviously generalises to eliteness, fullness, modality, which are theories themselves and are 
thus susceptible to the original first model-theoretic argument. To this, the external realists 
have a ready reply, as Putnam notices in both the original trio of works and in Realism with 
a Human Face (1990): it is not the word causation that fixes reference but causation itself. 
Button (2013, 29) agrees with this argument: Putnam has indeed only discussed the word 
causation and not the property itself. Seeing as the external realist can only phrase their 
defence with words, to say that nothing can fix reference because everything is mediated 
via a word is here to beg the question against the external realist – the thesis presupposes 
what it wants to demonstrate. To ask of someone an answer and then demand this answer 
be word-less: this is an unfair demand to make.  
Button (2013, 32-52) takes the baton from Putnam at this point, trying to rescue him 
from begging the question. He thus starts examining theories of experience to see how 
experience may link up with the world to pin down reference. Naturally for an analytic 
philosopher, he starts with the aforementioned logical empiricists and Carnap’s 
methodological solipsism, whereby the building blocks of experience are sense-data. 
Unfortunately, says Button, this picture, in which our world is ‘constructed’ out of sense-
data, is still vulnerable: we may shuffle the constructions of these sense-data around in 
many equally valid ways according to the indeterminacy model-theoretic argument. Nor 
will introducing causation as a ‘posit word’ (which helps us to navigate our way around 
experience) help: any claim about it is still enmeshed in experience (crafted inescapably 
out of sense-data) and thus susceptible to the just-more-theory manoeuvre. This 
generalises: whatever we think experience is crafted out of senses, phenomena, some kind 
of flux et cetera we can always run the first model-theoretic argument and the just-more-
theory manoeuvre against the constructions and classifications we derive, because they 
are themselves empirical theories. I should note here that Putnam and Button do not speak 
strictly about full-blown scientific theories. These empirical theories relate broadly to what 
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it is to observe and to theorise, not to scientific theories strictu sensu but to the widest 
possible sense which we may give to observing and theorising. 
An important point surfaces. Following Button, meaning is now again shaky. We are 
faced with an inability to refer to things in the world (read for the purposes of this chapter: 
observables) that threatens to cut very deeply: we may not be able to refer to anything at 
all. Appeals to these things being of a certain kind (sense-data, phenomena et cetera) will 
not do the trick either, a predicament owed to the just-more-theory manoeuvre. Moreover, 
as Button has it, this dead-end is solely the result of bracketed empiricism, i.e. the way of 
construing experience that closes the world behind some kind of veil (of sense-data, 
phenomena et cetera) that does not make it directly available to the observer. This is of 
course a sine qua non-position for the Cartesian angst upholder, who strictly prohibits a 
direct connection between observers and the world. However, this principle will prove to 
be external realism’s undoing: once an interface has been established between the user and 
the world, screening off the world behind sensations et cetera, then the user unavoidably 
loses the world. The active agents that bring this to the fore are, again, indeterminate 
reference, and the inability of truth to outrun justification. Thus, summarily so far: to be 
an external realist means claiming that we may not refer to anything at all (or so the 
Putnam-Button line argues). Quite dislikeable. 
One may here imagine another escape for the external realist. They may admit that 
they have no way of pinning down reference and try to turn the tables and claim that this 
is so much worse for their opponent. If nothing pins down reference then this amounts to 
even more reason to think the world may be radically fooling us. A famous argument by 
Igor Douven (1999), however, shows that this is not so. The trick here is to emphasize 
how deeply the model-theoretic arguments cut. If reference is underdetermined then this 
applied to the whole of language. This text included, every text included, but more 
importantly, the external realist’s piece of language when uttering their scepticism included. With 
this ingenious argument, Putnam’s camp concludes that the Cartesian angst of external 
realism must go for it forces us into a wholly incoherent sceptic position. Can we then cast 
it away, and if so, how? The next section explores this theme. 
 
2.6 Brains, Vats, and the Observables 
It is now time to connect the above matter explicitly with the observables. First, let us 
take stock. We have followed Cartesian angst to its logical conclusion and we are found 
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in a desperate position. Meaning appears to be in shambles and we feel the urgent need to 
drop any notion that the world may be radically fooling us (and thus external realism). 
However, how may we be justified in doing so? Sure enough, we have seen that if we close 
the world behind a veil of any kind we are led into a radically incoherent position. Thus, 
we must pursue accounts of experience – in other words accounts of observables – that do 
not fall under the rubric of bracketed empiricism. From here on, Putnam’s grappling with 
realism becomes largely to find a satisfying such account; effectively to pin down what 
kind of thing observables are and what human access to them may be. 
In his original trio of works Putnam proffered a picture centred on a verificationist 
theory of understanding. This is most commonly introduced in the literature by the name 
of internal realism. However, Putnam (1994, 461-465) has claimed that this was a result 
of a combination of his readers’ sloppy reading along with his possibly confusing writing. 
Internal realism, he writes, is a name he intended for the much broader idea that realism 
is compatible with conceptual relativism, a claim that I will explore thoroughly in later 
chapters of this dissertation. Putnam’s understanding-based realism claims that fixing 
reference comes from understanding, not from a correspondence relation of terms to the 
world. To know the reference of something is to understand it and to understand it is to 
know the conditions for its being verified (or, more modestly, confirmed). However, 
Putnam soon moved away from this position. He did so because, purportedly, this 
doctrine is hardly any different from bracketed empiricism. Since it makes no mention of 
the world and refers only to what is going on inside the mind, the veil is not lifted – or 
rather is lifted only to be replaced by a radical Cartesian scepticism. If there are no outer 
objects then we may be able to pin down reference by virtue of its conditions of 
verification, but we are condemned to roll back to subjective idealism and solipsism, an 
anathema in Putnam’s view. 
Putnam’s second attempt at dodging Cartesian angst tackles the core tenet of bracketed 
empiricism directly. This position is called natural realism and was developed much later 
than the doctrines discussed above, in Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses (1994). Here, Putnam 
departs from his previous positions and suggests a ‘naivete’, as he calls it, about perception. 
According to Putnams naivete, objects appear directly to perception – we are in direct 
touch with the world. There is no Kantian veil of phenomena hiding the noumena, or any 
veil of any other sort. Simply put, we can speak about trees, our ‘tree’ word refers to trees 
because we perceive trees directly. Following Wittgenstein, his thinking is that, if we have 
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a philosophy of perception that can convincingly do away with the notion of a human-
world mediating interface, then we need not worry about Cartesian angst. Philosophers 
like Michael Dummett (2007), however, objected to this position: I may have direct 
perception myself but how do I interpret the speaker of a language I do not know since, in 
this case, I obviously do not have the relation of ‘direct access’ which Putnam presents us 
with? John McDowell (1994) came to Putnam’s rescue. I obviously interpret the speaker 
using my own concepts. This may limit interpretation in that it makes it a projection of 
my own conceptual array (we will take occasion to explore this issue thoroughly in chapter 
four) but to demand of someone to interpret without concepts is patently absurd; it is like 
demanding of someone to ground syllogisms without using thoughts or to speak without 
using words. Of course I must use words and concepts of my own to translate the other and, 
more generally, of course I must use words and concepts to articulate that I have direct 
perception. One could surely ask in turn “What grounds the meaning of the words you 
are using to explain your position?”, and I could use other words to ground the meaning 
of them, and then the sceptic could ask the same question to infinite regress. McDowell 
suggests that this is an unfair demand to make of the direct-perceptionist; it is a demand 
that in its articulation precludes all possible answers (since all possible answers must be 
articulated with their own words and concepts). We are thus justified, McDowell suggests, 
to claim that our thoughts are already hooked onto the world (Button 2013, 85-86). This is 
meant to soothe the sharp contradiction befalling us at the end of the previous section 
threatening to undercut all meaning. Effectively, it is to say that the demand that language 
should vindicate itself (and much more so, extra-linguistically) is an absurd demand. We 
must reinstate a ‘blind trust’ in our senses and words: this is the natural realism of Putnam 
and McDowell. 
Can we then seal the deal here and postulate direct access to the world? Unfortunately, 
no. The problem, according at least to Putnam, is that our senses, and the words we attach 
to them, very often deceive us. Therefore, the natural realist must also be a disjunctivist about 
perception: they must regard seeing a cat and hallucinating a cat as two genuinely different 
experiences. This division, however, is enough to bring back the Cartesian angst in a 
manner we are already familiar with: we obviously do not know when we are hallucinating 
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and when we are not and thus meaning reference is up for grabs again19. Further, any 
attempt to settle the issue of hallucinations at the level of evidence is a stillbirth: how can 
we ever take meaning as fixed at the epistemological level? Its indeterminacy owed to 
hallucinations and deceptive perceptions would apply here again: our evidence could be 
contaminated by hallucinations and deceptive perceptions. 
Throughout the 1980s Putnam tried another way to tackle Cartesian angst: 
justificationism. Here, Putnam tries to fix truth via idealized justification: whatever is true 
is whatever is justified under ideal conditions. However, we may ask: how do we know 
that we are now in conditions ideal for a given justification? This question is enough to 
reintroduce Cartesian angst and lose the world, for it is impossible to know. It really is 
impossible: save for a time machine, how do we know that new methods of justification 
will not emerge in the future? Moreover, and this point I have curiously never seen rise in 
the relevant literature, even if all this were not the case, I still do not see how meaning, as 
in individual term meaning, would be fixed in this way. It seems to be supposed here that 
meaning is fixed and that then, somehow, we can speak about the truth of statements, but 
tying truth to idealized justification does not fix meaning: it presupposes its fixity. To test 
a given statement for truth or falsity presupposes that we know what the terms in this 
statement refer to. So, if justification is what is supposed to anchor meaning, how can we 
apply it to individual terms before testing whole statements comprised of individual terms? 
It seems to me that we cannot. 
These are Putnam’s attempts at certain specific pictures of realism – his attempts to 
show how we may have knowledge of the world. They all seemingly fail. For someone 
who has followed the argumentative line here positively, the severity of the situation 
cannot be overstated. First, we kicked meaning in the teeth with indeterminacy and 
infallibilism, and decided that we needed to urgently find a way out of Cartesian angst if 
our words are to mean anything at all. We then turned to various forms of realism but we 
 
19 Putnam does here and there imply that there is a genuine difference between 
hallucination and non-hallucination that we can perceive by citing stories of people who 
recount hallucinations of an X as not identical with the experience of seeing that X. I will 
not pursue this line here: what would solve the problem would be knowing that one is 
hallucinating at the time of the hallucination which is evidently not always the case: thus, 
reference is swimming freely again. 
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were not (or rather Putnam was not) able to reinstate the missing plank via which to access 
the world. Philosophical chaos in meaning looms in the bushes. Luckily, Putnam has 
another ace up his sleeve, and it comes from his (in)famous brain in a vat argument. 
Putnam calls us to imagine the following scenario: suppose that all sentient beings in this 
world are nothing but brains in vats. By the works of an evil scientist the brains are hooked 
onto a super-computer, which, via electronic stimulation, makes the poor brains think that 
they are experiencing an outer world while in fact they only ever experience images, 
sensations et cetera produced for themselves by their interactions with the super-computer. 
This is effectively an extreme form of Cartesian angst, Cartesian nihilism. We, the 
supposed brains, are radically deceived by the world, for our words and theories and 
projects of knowledge radically fail to refer to anything that is actually out there. 
Emphatically, holds Putnam, any scenario such as the above that I can conceive is not 
my own predicament. For suppose that Brian, an envatted brain, articulates their own 
predicament. Brian has only ever had an experience of images, sensations et cetera 
underlying which are only electronic signals. The point is that Brian’s words can only refer 
to these images, sensations et cetera. As Button (2013, 119) puts it, Brian’s relation to the world 
is so causally messed up that his semantics cannot maintain any hope of referring to actual 
things. As a corollary of this, Brian has no intentions that would allow him to refer to 
actual brains, and therefore cannot articulate his own scenario of doom. Similarly, Putnam 
continues, we cannot even articulate such a scenario for us; only the evil scientist watching 
us poor envatted brains could ever articulate our predicament: we and everyone else that 
is a brain in a vat are causally excluded from making such claims. For, the problem Brian 
has with brains, he also has with causation, and by extension with any ‘bridge’ attempt we 
may postulate to allow him to refer to brains: he cannot talk about genuine causal relations, 
only pseudo- such relations brought about by computer-produced stimuli. 
It seems, then, that we have managed to abolish Cartesian nihilism: the world may not 
be radically fooling us for, if it were, like the in the brain in a vat scenario, we would be 
unable to articulate this scenario. We can evidently articulate this scenario; therefore, we 
are not in it – or so Putnam’s brain in a vat argument goes. There are however, as Button 
(2013, chapter 16) explains, two flip sides to this method. First, it provides us with no 
specific philosophical picture – it fails to answer the question of just what things observables 
are. We do not know whether the world is composed by sense-data, phenomena, 
observables, all the versions of experience Putnam went through while trying to examine 
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the claim that something could fix reference. Any proponent of sense-data may employ the 
semantic argument involved in the anti-brain in a vat scenario argument and claim that 
we cannot articulate a scenario where sense-data radically deceive us, but that is also true 
of the proponent of phenomena, observables, et cetera. Second, the preceding 
argumentation is only enough to cast away extreme Cartesian angst/nihilism. Button 
(2013, chapter 15) offers several arguments for this, in the vein of supposing that a brain 
has only recently become envatted, and therefore that it can actually refer to ‘actual’ things. 
Moreover, I would add a third point, the anti-brain in a vat scenario argument does not 
tell us much in the way of scientific realism debate, neither regarding the observables nor 
the unobservables. Should we accept the brain in a vat argument, we are merely assured 
we are not radically deceived, but we cannot derive much more from that. 
Finally, Button underlines, the move of admitting inability to refer to the ‘real’ world 
and postulating it as something ineffable cannot reinstate Cartesian angst. For it is then 
the case that the ‘sense’ in which I may be deluded falls nothing short of the magical: it 
has no empirical content whatsoever. The ineffability argument only conveys a feeling of 
anxiety upon us in the worst metaphysical sense there is, and must therefore be ignored.  
I ask the reader to keep all this in mind, especially the last point concerning the 
ineffable, for it will be one of the most relevant when I compare internal realism(s) with 
my own position later. Although the material presented above evidently pertains to the 
analytic discussion of the observables, it is far too early in this dissertation to provide my 
own suggestion of how meaning regarding the observables may be grounded. Thus, I ask 
the reader to suspend their curiosity on the matter until chapter seven.  
To sum up these past two sections: pondering the indeterminacy of reference and the 
infallibility of ideal theories Putnam argued that reference is radically underdetermined 
and Cartesian angst threatens to belie all meaning. This was shown to be an incoherent 
position, so Cartesian angst had to go. Unfortunately, attempts to make it go only bore the 
fruit of casting away Cartesian nihilism: neither was Cartesian angst cast away to a more 
satisfying degree, nor did we conclude regarding the means by which humans have access 





In the course of the preceding chapter we have been through the main nodes of the 
analytic discussion of the observables in the context of scientific realism-scientific 
antirealism debate. There are two big questions that run through here: whether there is a 
legitimate realm for the observables and, if so, what kind of things the observables are. 
Sections 2.1-2.4 examine the former question, while sections 2.5 and 2.6 examine the 
latter. 
Regarding the first question, the material we surveyed is sizeable, and the arguments 
presented not always converging toward the same conclusion. In fact, many of the main 
maxims seem to be in direct conflict: Maxwell argues against the traditional observable-
unobservable distinction based on his argument from the continuum of observation and 
the impossibility of observing apparatuses to legitimately receive the status of ontological 
adjudicator. With him sides Musgrave calling for a proper empiricism which seems to 
admit electrons and, though utilising the notion of observability, it is probably the case 
that Kosso should be counted in their camp. After all he makes an argument that runs 
close to Maxwell’s (or, as I will show in the next chapter, too closely to Maxwell’s for its 
own sake), albeit from a multi-dimensional standpoint. It is not, however, clear how this 
camp wants to construe the empirical level, whether under the label of observability or 
another. Maxwell leaves us with the rather enigmatic notion of ‘quickly decidable 
sentences’ and Kosso does not say much about which part of his continuum we are 
legitimized in regarding as genuinely observable; about whether or not a quantitative 
difference in degree of observation should also play a qualitative role. 
On the other camp, we have van Fraassen, Dicken and Lipton, and Chang. Van 
Fraassen argues contra Maxwell that the continuum is fine as long as the theory we are 
working within clearly defines what is observable, even as a vague predicate. Moreover, 
he argues that observability denotes the proper epistemic stance towards science, and not 
genuine ontology. Dicken and Lipton engage with freeing him of Musgrave-inspired 
contradictions, and Chang proffers that a quality-and-incorrigibility-based notion of 
observability should make constructive empiricism, or for the same matter observability, 
a much more defensible concept, which is, in the final analysis, necessary and central to 
science. We do rely on observation, and the humanness of observation, claims Chang, and 
this should be philosophically recognised. 
Regarding now the second question, that of what kind of thing observables are, we also 
made many remarks. First, there was the issue of the model-theoretic arguments and 
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Cartesian angst, which prompted worries that we may have no access to the observables 
at all – that the world may be radically fooling us. By seeing how Cartesian angst becomes 
its own demise, with Putnam, we embarked on a quest to reinstate human access to the 
world. There, we found that every kind of bracketed empiricism (whether that was of 
sense-data, phenomena, observables, a veil of flux et cetera) was ultimately, at least 
according to Putnam and his commentators, a Trojan horse of Cartesian angst. Other 
attempts included justificationism, verificationist semantics and direct access to the world. 
The first was found, per Putnam, to be untenable, the second too private and solipsistic, 
while the third one went bankrupt for the purpose because of the problem of perception 
deception. At this moment of desperation, the anti-brain in a vat argument came in, which 
served to relieve us from Cartesian nihilism, though the victory was pyrrhic: we ended up 
with a significant amount of angst, as well as with an unclear picture of observables. 
 It is readily evident that the two basic questions, of whether there is a legitimate realm 
of the observables, and what kind of thing they are and what our access to them may be, 
still loom open. After this extensive literature review, I will take up the task of answering 
them myself in the next chapter. My answer will be that phenomenology’s life-world does 






















In chapter one I argued that the contemporary scientific realism debate is governed by 
a pattern: presupposing science’s truth unless suggested otherwise by means of historical 
counter-examples. I suggested that limiting the philosophical investigation of the science-
truth relation to this facet is a philosophical injustice that should be rectified. Science, I 
claimed, is an endeavour conducted by specific agents with certain dispositions in a variety 
of contexts (one of which – the neurologically typical – I aim to discuss extensively later 
in this dissertation). This situatedness of science calls for an examination of what kind of 
truth it may bring – and for whom – beyond the limit of incompatibility of scientific 
theories. I further suggested that pushing this limit would necessitate a discussion of the 
observables contra the contemporary debate’s obsession with the unobservables. 
Accordingly, in chapter two, I surveyed the work of analytic philosophers who have 
discussed the observables in the frame of the (scientific) realism debate. Their work 
addressed mainly two questions: whether there is a legitimate dichotomy to be made 
between the observables and the unobservables and, if so, what kind of access we may 
have to the observables. The end of the discussion was rather inconclusive and consisting 
of strong divergent arguments. 
In this chapter I argue that Edmund Husserl’s ‘life-world’ (lebenswelt) is the best 
construal of the observable level. Regarding the legitimacy of the observables I claim that 
the life-world can, with some tweaks, very much accommodate the most attractive 
intuitions and avoid the biggest pitfalls pertinent to observables from the analytic 
literature. Moreover, I argue that science is inextricably bound to the life-world since it 
invariantly takes its investigative cues from there, is conducted in it, and returns to it for 
validation. Regarding the kind of things the life-world is comprised of, I maintain that it 
is the world of ordinary experience as incorrigibly and reflexively had through perception. 
In chapter seven, when I take stock of the thesis developed herein, I claim that the life-
world is compatible with various accounts of experience (sense-data, phenomena et 
cetera). 
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In chapter four I argue that the life-world is not singular but plural, and contingent on 
a variety of factors that could be otherwise. In chapters five and six I explore the case of 
autism spectrum conditions, a case of such difference of life-worlds. I find that the weight 
this difference must have in navigating the related scientific practice is rather significant, 
and I make a related proposal regarding autism spectrum conditions treatment. In chapter 
seven I take stock of the philosophical picture painted throughout this dissertation and 
show how it helps us overcome somewhat stale metaphysical debates that have occupied 
the scientific realism debate for far too long (such as the quest for Truth and the denial of 
radical scepticism). I motivate focusing on more interesting, practical issues that severely 
affect human lives. 
The present chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.1 I offer a guided tour of the 
philosophical neighbourhood in which the life-world concept arises. I specify the historical 
moment of its appearance in philosophy as well as its intended philosophical uses within 
a larger polemic that the late Husserl advanced against a reductionist conception of the 
sciences. This will be of crucial instrumentality in adding to the motivation behind 
pursuing an observable level, and when the issues of which entities feature into the life-
world, and how, are discussed. In section 3.2 I offer a definition of the life-world, which is 
that it is a substratum of assumptions and tropes (admittances), incorrigibly delivered to 
perception, upon which all human behaviour is based. In section 3.3 I offer a further 
specification of what the life-world is via an example from actual scientific practice (the 
observation, or purported observation, of the electron in a cloud chamber). In section 3.4 
I show how the life-world combines the best analytic insights from the previous chapters 
(except Putnam’s, the exploration of which I postpone until chapter seven when a more 
complete picture of my thesis is at hand). Further, I diagnose a problem in attempting to 
use the life-world as a substitute for the observable level. This problem is that the life-
world, in its original formulation, is subjective (each of us has their own life-world) while 
the observable level is traditionally construed as if it were unique and universal. To bridge 
the two concepts, following Husserl and others, I show how the life-world has an 
intersubjective dimension, and how this dimension can be instrumental as a connective 
bridge between the two concepts. In section 3.5 I offer an in-principle argument for why 
the intersubjective life-world is indispensable for the sciences as a point of departure, 
conduction, and validation. Moreover, I explore arguments to the opposite effect and I 
argue that anti-life-world reductionism is incoherent. 
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Some methodological considerations are in order before launching this sizeable 
endeavour. First, as is very often the case in continental philosophy, so the concept of the 
life-world is deeply entangled in and defined as a node in a certain philosopher’s work – 
Husserl’s for case in point. Extracting it from there to use in an analytic context requires 
some delicacy. It is, however, far from an impossible task as recent work in, for example, 
the philosophy of cognitive neuroscience, a branch of analytic philosophy which in fact 
makes an elaborate use of concepts from continental phenomenology, shows (I provide 
an example of this in section 3.5). There is, however, a prerequisite for such transplants to 
work, and this is to give up on harvesting the whole organ. The life-world, that is, as a 
central point in Husserl’s later work, is also a point of some contestation regarding which 
reading of it is the most valid and whether the concept is continuous with his earlier work. 
However, the aspiration of the present project is to examine the hidden corners of the 
realism debate pertinent to the sciences under the prism of the life-world, and thus the 
exegetic aspects of Husserl’s texts and scholarship are beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Therefore, I employ a construal of the life-world that suffices for this task without 
performing an exhaustive historical and conceptual examination of the concept. 
Whenever I diverge from or add to Husserl I will be informing the reader that I do so. 
Last, I will be pointing out various interpretations when a particular construal is especially 
contested or debated in the literature. 
 
3.1 The Life-World: Historical and Philosophical Context 
The life-world is a concept simple at a certain level of abstraction, which gets amply 
complicated as one is pushing for more details pertinent to what it engulfs. For this reason, 
I provide a bootstrap definition now, adequate for purposes of starting to explore this 
chapter’s content: the life-world is the world of ordinary experience as it is reflexively had 
by every being from their subjective point of view (this is also faithful to the original 
definition). Beyond that, I will weave the concept throughout the chapter, adding to 
Husserl’s definition and specifying it by adjusting to challenges of defining the observable 
that I will face along the way (some of which we have already explored in chapter two).  
The life-world is doubtlessly Husserl’s most widely known concept, with the term 
appearing in others before him (e.g. Simmel 1912). It first appears in his last major work, 
The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Husserl 1936/1970) 
and serves as a cornerstone to a larger line of attack on what Husserl calls the ‘Galilean 
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science’. For Husserl, Galileo was the first to secure an analysis of the world purged of 
prejudice and theology. This feat was achieved by disposing of metaphysics of the divine 
ilk, and by employing methods of inquiry like the measurement of physical quantities and 
mathematics to ground Galileo’s project in objectivity (Friedman 2010, 100-102). This was 
a good thing but only insofar as this method remained oriented towards acquiring 
knowledge about the common-sense world, the world of phenomena, “the only real world, 
the one that is actually given through perception, that is ever experienced and 
experienceable” (Husserl as quoted in Majer 2010, 49).  
This position is opposed to the sciences (and mathematics) giving their own conceptual 
apparatus any kind of exclusive ontological authority. What Husserl opposes here is the 
(supposed) Galilean and modern-scientific mathematical description of the world as the 
only true description of it, that which aims to render descriptions of the world in an 
everyday, common-sense manner false, misleading, and epiphenomenal to those of the 
positive sciences. The claim that only the idealized nature as described by mathematics 
and physics is real: this is what Husserl took Galilean and modern science to state and 
took issue with20 (Friedman 2010, 103). For Husserl, and for most phenomenologists, each 
scientific and mathematical concept acquires its meaning and validation from the world 
of ordinary perception, otherwise it is merely an empty symbolism. 
Besides realising that inquiry may under no circumstances dispose of ordinary 
descriptions of the world and replace them with idealized-mathematical ones, Michael 
Friedman (2010, 104) notes that phenomenology does not seek to admit appearances 
unreflectively either. He quotes Husserl (1936/1970, 48-50; 103) who warns us against 
“the surrounding world of life, taken for granted as valid” which is likely to lead us “to 
then construct mythical inventions for describing the conditions of possibility for the 
mind’s experience of it” (here denoting a parting of ways with Immanuel Kant). Instead, 
Husserl proposes a reflection, an ‘inquiring-back’ (rückfragen) into the ‘pre-given’ world of 
 
20 Some Husserl scholars such as Ulrich Majer (2010, 60) have argued that it is dubious 
whether a significant number of scientists indeed held this view at the time and whether 
one can legitimately speak of such a crisis. Majer (2010, 51) proffers that Husserl did not 
care much about the actual history of science and that he was merely putting his ideas in 
a ‘historical dressing’ to advance his own normative programme about science with 
additional force. 
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perception to uncover the ‘how of its givenness’: to delineate its entities, structures, logics, 
laws, mechanisms et cetera. 
Further, an imperative is provided to systematically study different subjective perspectives 
and different ways of experiencing reality (Føllesdal 2010, 28); the concrete reality in all 
its richness and as experienced by a multiplicity of agents. Husserl urges us to study, that 
is, how what we perceive is structured, besides the world, also by us. To illustrate this 
statement I borrow an excellent example from Dagfinn Føllesdal (2010): Joseph Jastrow’s 
duck-rabbit, popularised in philosophy by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953/1958, 165-166): 
 
 
Fig. 3.1: Jastrow’s duck-rabbit (Jastrow 1899, 312) 
  
One looks at this image and one typically sees either a duck (horizontally) or a rabbit 
(vertically). When the complementary option is made available the observer may switch 
between the two perceptions, synthesizing the same lines as representing a duck at one 
instance and a rabbit at another. This synthesis is what Husserl calls the noema, the 
bringing-together of stimuli to constitute units, entities, meaningful things. The example 
of the duck-rabbit is illuminating precisely because of the moment when the alternative 
option becomes available: the point of realization of the possibility for another kind of 
synthesis and that what was reflexively seen before was also a product of synthesis, albeit 
unconscious. This is to say that whatever is experienced does not delineate itself into 
coherent shapes of entities: there is a process of parsing reality at play and this process 
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resides within us. Some see a rabbit and some see a duck, and solely referring to the lines 
in the shape itself will never solve disagreement. Just what plays the role of input in the 
mechanism of this synthesis is a discussion forbiddingly vast to be accommodated here 
but there have to be minimally some biological and historical components to it (Føllesdal 
2010, 29): one who does not see the lines cannot synthesize them into anything, and one 
who has never seen a duck or heard of the concept cannot synthesize the lines into the 
representation of a duck. 
There are several additional central concepts to Husserl’s phenomenology which the 
life-world houses that will be of interest to us when defining the observable level of the 
sciences. As Husserl and others from a variety of philosophical traditions contend 
(Føllesdal 2010, 30; Gabriel 2015, 33-34) human consciousness is, besides noematic, 
normally intentional: humans often experience full-fledged objects, not merely scattered 
qualities and properties. Under conditions that are the usual for most humans what is in 
front of me right now is not perceived as a diffuse brown-ness and silver-ness and 
concreteness; it is rather perceived as a table. But does human perception stop satisfied at 
the point of initial impression? Hardly so. As numerous authors (Belousek 1998, 82-83; 
Friedman 2010, 105; Føllesdal 2010, 31; Vallor 2009, 5) have highlighted, to admit an 
entity as real requires the presentation of said entity in a persistent and consistent manner. 
Perception, that is, escapes a naïve empiricist conception of it as including whatever the 
eyes (or even more generally the senses) meets momentarily. Imagine that we are sitting 
somewhere together and I ask you what you perceive. If I have just pinched your eyeball 
before asking and you are seeing double or if you know that the black spots in your field 
of vision are products of a migraine, you will not admit that there are two of me in world 
or that there is dark ball-like thing on the horizon. Rather, you will describe these 
experiences as produced endogenously by you. It is indeed a phenomenological 
commonplace, underlines Shannon Vallor (2009, 4-5), that perception includes an 
anticipatory dimension (filling in phenomenological terminology). Husserl himself 
characterizes the idea of a physical thing as a ‘limitless progression of harmonious 
intuitions’ and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1964/1968, 206-209), another renowned 
phenomenologist, uses the term ‘empirical pregnancy’ to describe the way in which 
physical things manifest themselves. Indeed, it is mounting confirmation of anticipation 
that warrants a thing’s existence and perceptual experiences are counted real because, 
unlike hallucinations, they are never exhausted in the present sensibilia: they have 
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invariant manifestations. “Rather than asking whether the thing’s impact on our unaided 
senses produces some definite set of qualia, we must ask whether the thing can manifest 
itself to us in a perceptual style, that is, in a coherent and pregnant manifold of kinaesthetic 
relations explorable within our spatiotemporal horizon”, puts it Vallor (2009, 8). In the 
above senses of humans synthesizing what they perceive and then filtering out the ‘debris’ 
to decide what they will treat as real and as Husserl would have it, an object constitutes itself 
within our consciousness: 
 
An object ‘constitutes’ itself – ‘whether or not it is actual’ – in certain concatenations 
of consciousness which in themselves bear a discernible unity in so far as they, by virtue 
of their essence, carry with themselves the consciousness of an identical X. (Husserl 
1913/1983, 69-73) 
 
Let us leave essentialist talk to one side, for it is not of immediate interest here, and 
focus on the constitution of an object in consciousness. Why does Husserl prefer to say 
that an object constitutes itself over saying that consciousness constitutes it? Such a choice 
of words is important. As Føllesdal notes, and this is the point where phenomenology goes 
beyond the traditional realism-idealism polarity, Husserl writes that: 
 
[P]henomenological idealism does not deny the factual existence of the real world (and 
in the first instance nature) as if it deemed it an illusion … Its only task and 
accomplishment is to clarify the sense of this world, just that sense in which we all 
regard it as really existing and as really valid. That the world exists … is quite 
indubitable. Another matter is to understand this indubitability which is the basis for 
life and science and clarify the basis for its claim. (Husserl cited in Føllesdal 2010, 32-
33) 
 
In modern analytic philosophy terms one may put it that Husserl is doubtlessly a 
metaphysical realist: he believes, and the concept of the life-world is inextricable from this 
belief, that a world exists ‘out there’ – that the human mind does not constitute the world. 
However, as we saw above, it is not that a given thing is straightforwardly grasped by 
consciousness or any other faculty ‘as is’ either; there is work being done on the perceiver’s 
end. 
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Objects (widely construed, including people, properties, relations et cetera) are usually 
perceived embedded within a framework of relations and dressed in a historical character. 
For example, when I perceive a refrigerator I also perceive it as being in front of or behind 
me, and I also perceive its history with it: judging from how rusted or new it looks, I infer 
its age; from its style, I can infer where it was manufactured; I always assume that it has a 
past. Reversely, if I realise that the refrigerator was merely a hallucination, I also 
reconstruct the past of the room I ‘found’ it in as containing no refrigerator at any moment. 
I do not perceive the refrigerator as having spontaneously emerged or submerged 
(Føllesdal 2010, 33). 
In Husserlian phenomenology, when we speak of perceiving something as embedded 
in a world, we make a distinction between the context we focus our immediate attention 
on, and the related context we tacitly take for granted. For example, I firmly step onto the 
floor in order to move away from my chair, but I do not normally hold the explicit belief 
“There is a floor” in my mind when I perform this action. In turn, this ‘silent horizon’ can 
be separated into an inner and an outer horizon. The inner horizon refers to the silent 
background of the object we are intending our perception towards (e.g. a person’s past 
when we are having a conversation with them), and the outer horizon refers to the silent 
background of the world within which that object is constituted (e.g. a person’s 
surroundings and their relation to these surroundings when we are having a conversation 
with them). As Husserl puts it in Føllesdal (2010, 34): 
 
[This] aiming-beyond [Hinausmeinen] is not only the anticipation of determinations 
which, insofar as they pertain to this object of experience, are now expected; in another 
respect it is also an aiming-beyond the thing itself … to other objects of which we are 
aware at the same time, although at first they are merely in the background. This means 
that everything given in experience has not only an internal horizon, but also an 
infinite, open, external horizon of objects cogiven … 
 
Those silent expectations and beliefs are dispositional notions, and are difficult to, so 
to speak, ‘gather on paper’, especially seeing as they are most often tacitly held or, in some 
cases, denied (as Freud teaches us, according to Føllsedal 2010, 35). This need not trouble 
us here, but we do need to know that while Husserl started out with a cognitivist 
conception of the aforementioned notions (i.e. as if comprised solely of hidden beliefs) he 
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slowly came to acknowledge that the practical and the body play a crucial role in our 
constitution of the world (Føllesdal 2010, 36). For example, the way in which we ride our 
bicycle or sign our name without much thought or effort cannot be simply attributed to 
implicit beliefs about our action, in exactly the same way that Roberto Carlos’ notorious 
free-kicks cannot be attributed to his knowledge of wind-and-kicking physics! There is 
more to constituting and navigating the world, is the point here, than cognition and neatly 
categorized articulated statements. The importance of this will become increasingly 
obvious as the dissertation unfolds. 
So, after presenting all these phenomenological notions, we may ask: what is the life-
world in the phenomenological tradition? Attempting to answer this question resolutely 
in a few pages is a fool’s errand. Arbitrating the voluminous and often conflicting literature 
on the issue both from the analytic21 and the continental22 side of things would certainly 
require its own doctoral dissertation. However, I can now provide an answer that is 
adequate for the purposes of this dissertation without much controversy: the life-world is 
the world constituted in our consciousness and perception, from our subjective point of 
view, curated by all the above characteristics and dimensions. It is the world as we produce 
it, synthesizing the stimuli around us to form a coherent picture and ascribe meaning to 
things; as we expect it to be when we navigate it; as it comes in and out of focus when we 
direct our attention to a specific object, in all its temporal dimensions that accompany our 
perception (past, present, future). 
According to the phenomenological tradition, the life-world is also the precondition 
for every kind of thought and action (this is a view that I will also adopt in this dissertation, 
providing extensive argumentation later in this chapter). The world of science is part of 
the life-world (Føllesdal 2010, 43) in that science delineates phenomena for study from the 
world of common sense, and is continuous with the reflexive world of our perception in 
that it must produce empirical results immediately available to life and not foreclosed 
within an idiomatic universe. Moreover, the life-world is meant by Husserl as 
intersubjective, despite being the world viewed from each being’s subjective point of view. 
Husserl puts it, that is, that we all get versions of the ‘same’ world through our filters and 
 
21 For a comprehensive example from the analytic literature on perception see Nöe (2004). 
22 For one of the continental flagship treatises of perception see Merleau-Ponty 
(1945/2002). 
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perceiving from our individual positions (Føllesdal 2010, 41-43). Our ability to imagine 
the world from a third-person point of view, which we encountered as the filling-curated 
noema above, means that we can produce a picture of the world that transcends our mere 
subjectivity. I see a ball standing in front of me, and I infer it has a back side. Someone sits 
diametrically opposed to me in relation to the ball, and they infer the ball has the side that 
is facing me. Thus, we both produce the same image of the ball by our perception’s virtues. 
This image may be shared between us, and it indeed does get shared, as many fascinating 
collective endeavours of humanity, based on such intersubjectively shared pictures of the 
world, demonstrate (think of engineering or pedagogics). Besides this, phenomenology 
incorporates an additional sense into its notion of intersubjectivity. Our basic perception, 
many phenomenologists hold, is permeated by the presence of others in our world through 
and through. It is not just that we see the same things: how we see these things, what 
opinions we have of them, what physical and symbolic background the things we see are 
embedded in, is deeply affected by others’ perceptions, opinions et cetera. For example, 
what I perceive when I face the sun is not simply a physical body; my perception is infused 
with the physical theories, the historical mythologies, the religious rituals of the past. Or 
simpler still, I may see someone as shorter than they are if the general opinion of my peers 
is that they are short. From these two kinds of intersubjectivity, and for reasons that I will 
explain in section 3.4, I will engage only with the former. As a general note, I should note 
again that the discussion on intersubjectivity within phenomenology (see e.g. Zahavi 2001) 
is vast, and thus I do not pretend to cover any grounds more significant than to advance 
my own version of the life-world as the observable level. 
In the above section, I provided an initial succinct picture of the life-world as it is 
intended by Husserl. The life-world makes a series of points about perception. Where these 
points are important for my own purposes (e.g. regarding the life-world’s primacy for 
science), I will provide more extensive argument below. For now, let me signpost what I 
will, and what I will not be taking from Husserl’s version of the life-world. First off, very 
important for my own definition of the observable will be the constitution of the world 
that is owed to the perceiving subject, seeing as this dissertation argues that there are many 
ways to constitute the world, and that this does and should matter for science. Second, the 
life-world primacy to and grounding of all human activities is also crucial for me here, as 
it is precisely this ‘proto-’, life-world sphere of the empirical that I examine in this 
dissertation and in connection with the scientific realism-antirealism debate. Third, 
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complementary to the primacy of the life-world to science, the ‘return-to-for-validation’- 
of science to the life-world as Husserl means it will be extremely instrumental when I 
discuss why we should allow for science pluralism based on life-world pluralism. 
 
3.2 The Life-World: A More Analytic Definition 
It is now time to further specify what the life-world is, to give it a more in-depth and 
analytic definition than above. I will begin with Husserl’s own idea, specifically with a 
quote from his late work that touches upon all three themes of the sections to follow – 
what the life-world is, why it is intersubjective and why it should be treated as the 
observable level of science and, more generally, as the primitive basis for every human 
activity. 
 
In whatever way we may be conscious of the world … as coherent universe of existing 
objects, we, each ‘I-the-man’ and all of us together, belong to the world as living with 
one another in the world … We … are constantly active on the basis of our passive 
having of the world … (Husserl 1936/1970, 108-109) 
 
It is sometimes held (e.g. Friedman 2010, 104) that the life-world includes only 
whatever physical bodies one admits as extant. As one can see in the above quote as well as 
in other extracts from Husserl (1905-20/1973, section 196, 22-34) and secondary literature 
on the life-world (Hampe 2010, 152) the life-world is often referred to as the world passively 
had or the realm of sense, by which it is reasonable to infer, I believe, all senses. It is worth 
citing Husserl directly here: 
 
Moreover, this world is there for me not only as a world of mere things, but also with 
the same immediacy as ... a practical world. (Husserl 1913/1983, 51-53) 
 
Moving somewhat beyond Husserl – as here I do not seek to contribute to the 
continental philosophy literature but rather to examine the scientific realism debate 
through the prism of the life-world – I define the life-world henceforth as one’s sum of 
incorrigible admittances. Here, remaining still somewhat abstract until further demonstration 
via a scientific practice example, an admittance is whatever we take to be or to hold (simple 
example to get the conversation going: I take a match to be in front of me, and I take of it 
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to hold that I can light it on fire). Incorrigible admittances are those that are forced upon us; 
those which we find reflexively adopting and those whose denial is felt with great 
resistance from the world,23 – we may not ‘un-see’, ‘un-hear’, ‘un-feel’ et cetera something 
incorrigible unless a great force acts upon us. Incorrigible admittances constitute a 
substratum of assumptions and tropes that are left unquestioned while we conduct any 
theoretical or practical task. Such admittances are both owed to something external to us 
and to us. For example, if I walked into a burning woods fire would appear to me 
incorrigibly. I do not force it into being by my sheer will and imagination but I would 
perhaps be able to ignore it if I was blind, did not absorb its heat, and had biological 
capacities by which I would not be suffocated by the smoke due to it. Moreover, these 
admittances, when reflected upon, may not at any rate be theory-free or pure data: beyond 
situated to a perceiver’s set-up, incorrigible admittances fall under the theory-laden 
character of observation for the exact same reasons observation statements do. Qualities; 
entities; relations; meaning systems; emotions, and the way we think about them and put 
them in language make them always-already fused with a theoretical interpretation as the 
collapse of the myth of the given has shown us, and thus the theory-ladeness principle 
applies here too (for more see last chapter and Bogen 2014). Last, the life-world’s 
incorrigible admittances should be understood as ‘surface stuff’ – e.g. the table my laptop 
is sitting on features as an entity in my life-world but not whichever cognitive process and 
perceiving capacity is at play by virtue of which I perceive it (because I do not incorrigible 
admit them). 
Let us now turn to the most crucial issue. Does the life-world succeed as the best 
construal of the observable level? Answering this question will help us define the life-world 
in even greater detail. First, the concept should address worries about us being only 
arbitrarily legitimized to separate the observables from the unobservables across the 
continuum of observability (Maxwell 1962/2012). Even if always from within a 
theoretical and conceptual standpoint (as admitted in van Fraassen 1980) it should be 
clear, and equally importantly also non-arbitrary, what is observable and what is not, what 
is included in the life-world and what is not. Even as a vague predicate without necessary 
 
23 Chang (2017) has developed a similar idea before me, whereby he develops the 
operational definition of reality as partly a resistance to our will. He is not using Husserl 
literature towards this purpose. 
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and sufficient conditions delimiting it, the life-world should non-arbitrarily state ample 
clear cut cases specifying observability. On this front, I believe that the life-world fares 
well: the predicate ‘what is incorrigible for me’ is a vague, non-arbitrary predicate for 
delimiting my life-world. I have a pretty clear idea of what is incorrigibly present for me 
right now: myself, the chair I am sitting on, my laptop, and so on. I also have a pretty clear 
idea of what is not incorrigible for me right now (despite of whether I display confidence 
in its validity): string theory, the theoretical predicates of psychoanalysis, God. As for the 
clear-cut cases and paradigmatic examples, I ask the reader to expect them in the 
upcoming section and chapters five and six. 
Second, defining the observable should not be so much about what is observable with 
the naked eye or, for that matter, the unaided senses. The motivation behind pursuing an 
observable level altogether lies in that science often refers to an individuated realm, of 
crucial importance for it, from which it draws investigative cues and empirical evidence. 
As we saw in the last chapter, we do not get this information with the naked eye (or any 
other organ) through no medium at all. Echoing Chang and the phenomenologists we 
surveyed above, the observable level should pay tribute to “the richness of our physical 
experience” (Chang 2005, 880), including even things like the sensation of temperature, 
pain, and sleepiness (‘qualities best described as feelings’ as Chang would have it). My 
definition of the life-world reflects exactly this point: I incorrigibly admit that my 
eyeglasses are correcting my sight, and that the room I am writing in feels just right 
temperature-wise. 
Should we, then, pose the observable level of the sciences as the whole of their 
empirical basis? Certainly not. First and foremost, that would be tantamount to giving up 
on observability. What is special about observability is that it comprises the ‘inner 
sanctum’ of the empirical level: that it is somehow the foundation on which the empirical 
building rests. Observability is not meant to include a metric from a given instrument 
which points to a certain highly theoretical conclusion. Rather, it aims more at the level 
which gives us the certainty that this instrument works reliably; the correlation of the 
numbers it gives us with the intense presence of an incorrigible state of affairs. In Husserl’s 
terms, it would be the level from which ‘inquiring-back-behind’ to find further evidence 
for any kind of reliability would be absurd: it should be the ‘given’ (yet theoretical, yet 
fallible) from which we start. Let me make this contention clearer with an example and 
advance a point relating to quantitative approaches to science in general. Suppose that I 
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hold a digital Geiger counter for detecting ionizing radiation. Suppose also that I see the 
number ‘8’ (clicks per minute) coming up on its panel when I operate it in a hospital room. 
The life-world does not include the interpretative manoeuvres by which I infer how much 
alpha or beta radiation this room is curated with (again, no matter how evidentially 
legitimized these inferences may be). Rather, the life-world as I use it in this dissertation, 
includes the ‘reflexive data’ that is to be found in this encounter: the delineation of the tool 
as a separate object in my perception; the seven lines that form the digital eight on its 
panel; its panel as a discernible part of the tool; the number eight as embedded in a 
numerical semantics. Moreover, regarding quantitative scientific endeavours, especially 
automated ones, we should not be fooled to think that the immediate absence of the 
human factor implies that no life-world is at play. A machine can take an environment’s 
temperature, sure. However, it is only through human construction, and the correlation of 
the machine’s function with human senses of hot and cold that this process is rendered 
both possible and meaningful. If the reader is interested in a more thoroughgoing study of 
how the life-world comes into play regarding the quantitative elements of science, I refer 
them to works by contemporary phenomenologists on the issue – for example Carusi 
(2012) and Hoel & Carusi (2017). 
Third, the life-world should address the main problem relating to the ‘given’. It should 
neither be comprised of non-theoretical blocks from which to build science and then 
confirm it (because this is, for known reasons, impossible) nor of any kind of immediate 
sense-data (we have again seen why this, too, is either possible or useful). What it should 
do is capture the idea that science stands on some kind of ground which it takes for granted 
and does not question while being conducted. From a similar kind of ground it draws its 
empirical evidence, and there are certain tropes of inquiry which are not questioned while it 
is ongoing. (I will be much more specific about all these notions in the second half of this 
section and in the section to follow). Thus, I have chosen incorrigible admittances as a 
viable solution for observability: admittances we are uncertain of, are likely conditioned 
to us, but which are nevertheless sine qua nons for the scientific endeavour. Incorrigibility 
is all we have left, but we should be careful with how we treat the notion. The life-world’s 
incorrigibility should be neither strict nor too loose: it should allow the basis of empirical 
confirmation (and thus some relative, minimally short-term immutability) but it should 
also recognise that this evidential substratum may very well change, as all the scholars we 
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have surveyed in the previous chapter have noted. Luckily, the notion of incorrigibility is 
a concept to which such flexibility comes naturally. 
With these main four goals (capturing the ‘core’ empirical level; clarity and non-
arbitrariness; avoiding non-theoretical definitions; including subject-and-world synergy 
definitions) achieved, it is time to dig deeper into the contents of the life-world. I will now 
offer a classification of the life-world’s admittances, which I ask the reader to presuppose 
along with me, pending demonstration of the usefulness of this classification for engaging 
philosophically with science – especially science in practice – in later chapters. 
Importantly, let me note that here I do not seek to work out a fine-grained definition of 
the life-world qua observable level. The scope of the present dissertation and the limited 
space I can devote to this task make such a sophisticated account forbidding. Doubtlessly, 
my notion of the life-world and the mechanisms that shape it may be deepened 
substantially by phenomenological and empirical work, and therefore I submit it here as a 
working formulation of the observable level. After I have motivated a ‘rich’ conception of 
the observable level according to phenomenological tools, I now wish to show how a 
classificatory system of this conception could look like. 
Here are then the four axes along which I organise the life-world’s contents: 
ontological, metaphysical, semiotic, and emotional. I will give a brief characterisation of 
the more familiar (traditional) categories of the observable (ontological and metaphysical) 
and a more elaborate one of the semiotic and the emotional axes. Following, I will provide 
the rationale behind this classification. The contents of all axes are demonstrated in detail 
and in practice in the next section. 
 
• Ontological 
The ontological dimension includes, out of the entities which we take to inhabit the 
world, those the existence of which we incorrigibly admit. They may range from material 
objects such as tables and chairs to other people (and the self, probably the most 
incorrigible of all entities) to prima facie immaterial entities such as smells and sounds. Note 
that in, for example, full-fledged objects, what is admitted are those of their properties 
(here running close to Changian ‘qualities’) that, again, appear incorrigibly to us – besides 
of course, their object-ness, which is incorrigibly admitted here by definition. For example, 
a table features in the life-world as sturdy but not as described in a reductionist manner 
such as ‘entity ultimately consisting of electrons’. This amounts to no more than repeating 
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the incorrigibility principle: no ‘entity ultimately consisted of electrons’ features in the life-
world incorrigibly – we may operate as if this is not the case. 
 
• Metaphysical 
The metaphysical dimension includes the ways in which the world appears incorrigibly to 
be or, more specifically, the worldly relations that appear to hold (granted, often between 
entities). It includes that fire burns trees in certain circumstances. It includes that objects 
move towards the Earth when they are let go of mid-air on the surface of the Earth. It does 
not, however, include, for example, any theory explaining gravity such as general 
relativity. This is again a corollary of the incorrigibility principle: that things (sometimes) 
fall is something that appears incorrigibly. This does not hold for that the physical entities 
described in the Einstein field equations exist or behave as described in the Einstein field 
equations. The energy-momentum tensor, for example, is far from appearing incorrigibly 
to us. Reminder: this has absolutely nothing to do with how warranted we are in espousing 
the notion and utilising it in achieving various ends, as well as with how warranted we are 
in apportioning our belief in its existence to the available evidence. At the risk of repetition: 
we are here only specifying the dimensions of incorrigible admittances.   
 
• Semiotic 
The semiotic dimension may be construed as the noematic dimension of the life-world 
demonstrated via Wittgenstein and Jastrow’s duck-rabbit in section one: the way in which 
the subject synthesizes the world-material. Despite Wittgenstein’s major general influence 
this dimension of the observable level is something not normally considered in the analytic 
literature. I suspect that this is because the analytic literature tends to focus, as we had 
occasion to see in chapter two, more on the world outside of the perceiving subject than 
on the subject itself. There is an uneven (perhaps even unfair) dichotomy: Maxwell; van 
Fraassen; Musgrave; Chang; Dicken and Lipton; Kosso; they all discuss the appearance 
of things but not the appearance and tropes of perception itself. Phenomenology, our 
mending tool from continental philosophy in this chapter, investigates equally the subject, 
which, other than perceiving, is also itself situated in the world, and may itself be the focus 
of life-world production analysis. It is therefore the time to ask not only what appears 
incorrigibly to us, but also what in our perception appears to be incorrigible. Highlighting 
this dimension of the life-world, thus, is an advantage of bringing phenomenology in 
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conversation with the related philosophical analytic literature on the observables, opening 
a crucial new field to investigation24. 
Admittedly, as stated above, a large part of perception is the subject matter of sciences 
that I am neither equipped nor wish to touch upon here like medicine, psychology, and 
cognitive neuroscience. However, view it as a happy coincidence if you will, this is exactly 
the part of perception which does not appear incorrigible to us: its ‘inner workings’ and 
‘hidden mechanisms’, if any and whichever they may be are thus, by definition, not part 
of the life-world. What is, then, the part in our perception that appears as incorrigibly so 
and so? It is, I believe, the way in which we synthesize and communicate meaning. For 
example, we are equipped, it appears incorrigibly to us, with some capacities to hold 
information in the ‘front’ of our minds and to combine it, forming meaningful observations 
or coherent (and incoherent) narratives and systems of communication. Upon re-reading 
this chapter for edits it is incorrigibly apparent to me that I can hold some data in the fore 
of my thinking, signifiers such as letters, words, and paragraphs, and to have them in view 
to reflect on the chapter. Similarly, we can invent languages, make and perceive 
metaphors, et cetera. This is not limited to items of language strictly construed: we can 
follow signs, make up numbers and devise a vocabulary for describing relations between 
them, and so on and so forth. 
Here, too, the incorrigibility principle, naturally, applies. Solving a mathematical 
equation for X is not something we are incorrigibly bound to. On the other hand, 
perceiving the passage of time is, as is also, more broadly, causality: my seeing, for 
example, you drop the plate, and my perceiving the plate breaking because you dropped 
it from a height adequate to bring about its shattering. In chapters five and six, in the case 
study of autism spectrum conditions, I will show how autism literature and testimony 
from people with autism spectrum conditions diagnosis compels us to see the latter as 
experiencing, among others, a different incorrigible system of meaning synthesis. This case 




24 Besides phenomenology, this idea is favourable within circles of semiotics associated 
with Charles Sanders Peirce. For literature on and a comprehensive summary of Perceian 
semiotics see Albert Atkin’s (2006) related thorough article. 
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• Emotional 
We have already seen Chang (2005, 880) pointing to the richness of our physical 
experience and even mentioning feelings directly as incorrigible observations. There is 
currently plenty of literature surfacing explaining how emotions are irremovably entangled 
with our perception (see for example Zadra & Clore 2011). This pertains to the ‘inner 
workings’ of perception and thus need not trouble us here. This, I suspect, is not what 
Chang refers to in his paper. What I refer to when I talk about the incorrigible presence of 
emotions, in the same self-examination vein of the semiotic dimension, is the 
incorrigibility with which our own and others’ emotions (like in the presence of a 
distressed child screaming) appear to us. As mentioned above when discussing the 
example of psychology this is sharply differentiated from theories of psychology and 
psychiatry with respect to the life-world: emotions appear incorrigible to our 
consciousness; not any particular theory of them (besides the theory individuating them 
into happiness, sadness, anger, and whatever else of course).  
It is contentious how relevant this aspect of the life-world is to science. 
Anthropological work on scientists and science argues that the emotional (and other) 
predisposition(s) of scientists are unavoidably reflected in their work (see for example 
Siegel et al. 2018) while other, more traditionally positivist approaches deny any 
involvement of emotion in proper scientific work. Understandably, this is not the place to 
settle this issue. There is however, another way in which the incorrigibility of emotions is 
of interest to science, and that is for the sciences of emotions, primarily psychology. As I 
will argue later in this chapter, the incorrigibility of emotions means that they constitute 
psychology’s primary explananda, something which attests to the indispensability of the 
life-world for the science. 
 
This concludes the four facets of the life-world. To recapitulate, we now have in 
theoretical view, in adequate detail, what the life-world is: a, van Fraassen-style vague 
predicate including what is there to stay for us under normal circumstances and without 
considerable force present to change it25 by means of affecting the constitution of the 
 
25 I am adding this qualification having in mind that in principle, everything is corrigible. 
My perception of tables may be what it is now, but if someone hits me in the head with a 
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perceiving subject. Let me now offer some additional methodological considerations on 
the classification system provided above. First, I should note that the categories I have 
chosen to unfold the life-world along are overlapping. This is expectedly so – naturally, I 
do not aspire to solve long-standing philosophical questions such as, e.g., how one’s 
semiotics may be disentangled from one’s ontology and metaphysics, and how they both 
come to inhabit perception. A quick example: when asked to describe what a match is, I 
may answer that it is a flammable, largely wooden object. Obviously, beyond ontological, 
this also pinpoints metaphysical conviction: not only do things such as matches and fire 
appear incorrigibly to me as entities in their own right but also the world is (again, appears 
incorrigibly to be) in such a way that things can be set on fire via a certain such and such 
interaction. This extends: the incorrigible presence of an emotion is also a matter 
ontological: this emotion incorrigibly exists for me right here right now. So it goes. 
Second, as noted above, these four categories are not meant to provide an exhaustive 
list of the life-world. For example, it may be plausibly defended that the life-world 
admittances are also shaped by one’s values and socio-historical context. Granted, but I 
choose to put it here – mostly as convention – that these sorts of influences are embedded 
into one’s perception. That is, a historical influence is not present in one’s life-world qua 
historical influence, but reflected in one’s, for example, cognitive tropes and emotional 
reactions to given situations (my ‘historical’ life-world is, for example, to be found in my 
blushing and embarrassment if I find myself in the street naked, because ours is an age of 
clothing in public). Despite the argument I have just provided, one may still, if one is put 
to it, add more categories to this system, or likely come up with a different categorization. 
Why then, despite these issues, have I chosen to categorise the life-world’s admittances in 
this way? This is because this system holds two crucially important advantages for the 
purposes of the present dissertation. First, it deploys the life-world along philosophically 
interesting dimensions – ontology, metaphysics, semiotics, and emotions have been, I 
believe, diachronically of chief interest to philosophy. Second, this classification system 
will prove crucial for examining science in practice, especially in the case of autism 
spectrum conditions that I intend to explore in the later chapters of this dissertation. As 
we will see, people with autism spectrum conditions often populate life-worlds 
 
hammer, causing extensive brain damage, I may stop recognising around me objects that 
are now familiar to me and appear to be incorrigible. More on this in the next chapter. 
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significantly different to the neurologically typical life-worlds from the perspective of 
meaning and emotions. As for ontology and metaphysics, there are several reasons for 
giving each a life-world category. First of all, parsing-out reality into entities and having a 
sense of how these entities will behave and interrelate is a huge part of our sense of the 
world, something necessary in order to navigate it. Second, the philosophy of science has 
long been interested in issues of ontology and metaphysics of scientific theories: what, if 
any, ontological and metaphysical presuppositions certain theories hold, how and in what 
form ontology and metaphysics of a paradigmatic era survive in a post-paradigmatic era, 
et cetera. Not surprisingly, my own claim regarding the scientific realism debate will be 
that with an alternative life-world may come an alternative ontology and metaphysics, and 
with them an alternative kind of science, sometimes for a good reason. This is a claim I 
will explore thoroughly in chapters five through to seven. Third, and in close relation with 
the second point, intersubjective ontology and metaphysics are of special weight as the 
building blocks of science. Think about a laboratory populated by many scientists, as is 
the received form of laboratories today: the absolute first thing we need for an experiment 
to obtain is for people to have roughly the same idea of what there is in the room and how 
it functions. Not that the importance of the meaning of experimental results or the 
emotional state of scientists may be demoted on this consideration – but it is true that 
ontology and metaphysics, and in particular an intersubjective commitment to specific 
ontologies and metaphysics, is ‘absolutely where we start from’. There is more room for 
subjective semantic and emotional discrepancy in the lab, let us put it so, than for 
ontological and metaphysical discrepancy. Semantics and emotions, as it were, 
importantly shape science, while intersubjective ontology and metaphysics appear perhaps 
to be ‘more pre-conditions’ for its being carried out. 
Thus, they consist an analysis of the life-world via which the analytic reader can grasp 
the concept while simultaneously highlighting terms particularly important to the 
scientific realism debate. This is a claim that I will explore thoroughly in chapters five 
through to seven. 
The defining theoretical work is now done. However, as noted above, the life-world is 
a predicate illuminated in its uses. Let me now then turn to the best way of demonstrating 
the concept: an example from scientific practice. 
 
3.3 The Life-World in Action: Electrons in the Cloud Chamber 
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In this section, I investigate one of the most famous examples of ‘unobservable 
observation’ in the history of science, namely the electron in a cloud chamber. In what 
follows I will pick apart the main (owing to space limitations) scientific notions involved 
in this observation (or ‘observation’26) until I reach the incorrigible admittances involved. 
Following, I will pinpoint the locations of the life-world elements that I will have met 
along the way and I will explain how the four dimensions of the life-world work 
complementarily to form the observable, a level upon which the overall endeavour is 
founded. During the below argumentation, I will be speaking about the scientific notions 
and entities I meet along the analysis of the cloud chamber experiment as if they are 
certainly real. For example, I will not be saying “Purported entities called electrons are 
purportedly much lighter than purported entities called protons” but “Electrons are much 
lighter than protons” instead. This is for reasons of literary economy and not, of course, a 
result of adopting a scientific realist position on the issue all of a sudden. 
A cloud chamber is a sealed glass container cooled to a temperature of -40 degrees 
Celsius. During the electron observation experiment, a radioactive material, e.g. uranium, 
is placed at its centre. Following, the container gets filled with vapour emitted from 
alcohol. Some of the vapour condenses on the glass surfaces while the rest of it forms a 




26 The quotes are to expect disagreement that what is observed in the electron observation 
experiment is actually the electron. 
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Fig. 3.2: ‘A Diffusion Type Cloud Chamber’ by Wikipedia is licensed under CC BY 2.0. 
Retrieved December 28, 2018 from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cloud_chamber 
 
The idea is that the various charged particles emanating from the radioactive material 
crossing this vapour knock electrons off molecules thus forming ions. This causes the 
droplets of alcohol to condense around the new-born ions thus leaving tracks of the 
‘culprits’: ionizing particles. These tracks are visibly individuated between them. Judging 
from the shape one may conclude that it is an electron, and not a proton, that has carved 
a particular trajectory (electrons are much lighter), much in the same way that one looks 
at a footprint in the snow and infers that it was a goat that traversed a mountain passage 
and not a bear. Cloud chambers were among the most important particle-researching tools 
from the 1920s to the 1950s, later superseded by Donald Glaser’s bubble chambers27  (plus, 
theoretically, by the quantum field theory of electrons28). 
Let us further inquire into this description starting with the more complex concepts. 
First, I spoke of materials that are in the process of radioactive decay by which an unstable 
atomic nucleus loses energy and emits radiation: radioactive materials. How have we 
come to adopt the notion of such a process in modern physics? In 1896, the French 
physicist Henri Becquerel noticed that uranium and metallic uranium salts placed on a 
photographic plate wrapped in black paper caused a blackening on said plate over time. 
Following this observation, it was suggested that a form of invisible radiation that could 
pass through the paper was present. Marie Curie and Pierre Curie led subsequent research 
into this radiation, using it in 1898 to isolate two new elements: polonium and radium. 
This was decidedly the point of the scientific community’s conviction of the existence of 
this radiation, and the term ‘radioactivity’ was coined for it (Curie 1904). 
 
27 For a more thorough scientific presentation of cloud and bubble chambers see Cyril 
Henderson’s (1970) monograph. 
28 Roughly, this is that particles are localised excitations of a field (like a localised wave). 
Even what we count as a particle can depend on our situation, e.g. whether we are 
accelerating or not. Perhaps ironically enough this could be shown to give more credo in 
the subject-world synthesis thesis I have abided by. For the classic quantum theory of the 
electron see the monumental study by Paul Dirac (1928). 
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Isolating a new element mandates recording the number of protons in its atomic 
nucleus to be a unique number. But why were scientists convinced of the atomic structure 
of the world in 1898? To answer this, we must regress once more, further back to 1827 and 
the Scottish botanist Robert Brown. Brown observed that pollen grains, seen through a 
microscope, released tiny particles dancing around in a seemingly random manner29. Not 
until almost another century had passed (1905), a young physicist named Albert Einstein 
put forward a paper investigating the statistics of this dance. He showed that his formula 
gave a good account of it assuming that said motion was owed to the collision of individual 
atoms with the particles. We may now ask, arriving at the human organ: why were 
Brown’s observations taken to be valid? Because they were made via the microscope, an 
instrument thought to be reliable by its correlation of what it showed from afar with what 
the human eyes saw from up close30. 
What, then, about the structure of the atom and most importantly for our case in point, 
the nucleus? Building on the Curies’ work, Ernest Rutherford (1911) performed a series of 
experiments in Joseph John Thomson’s laboratory. Initially, Thomson proposed that the 
atom was a uniform mass that contained both positive and negative charges (seeing as its 
total charge was neutral). In a glorious experiment, however, Rutherford observed that 
when he aimed a stream of α particles (a particular kind of radiation) at a very thin gold 
foil target, a number of them came back at him or were even deflected at large angles on 
a photographic film around the foil. Given that similar charges repel one another, this 




29 Admittedly the motion must have been observed much before Brown, at least as far back 
as Jan Ingenhousz’s (1785) time and perhaps even from antiquity. I will stick with one and 
arguably the simplest version here since historical justice bears no significance for the 
points raised herein. For a more comprehensive and accurate summary of the story see 
American Physical Society 2016 and Nye 1994.  
30 A thorough exploration of the matter in a scientific realism versus scientific antirealism 
manner can be found in the dialogue between van Fraassen’s (2009) article on Perrin and 




Fig 3.3: Untitled illustration of Rutherford’s experiment. Retrieved December 28, 2018 
from http://www.radioactivity.eu.com/site/pages/Rutherford_Experiment.htm 
 
The form of the electron31 was conjectured in 1897, also by Thomson, who was 
experimenting with currents of electricity inside empty glass tubes. What he was 
considering was the puzzle of ‘cathode rays’: the phenomenon whereby a glass tube, after 
most air had been pumped out of it and was run with voltage, would illuminate in various 
patterns. His proposal was that these rays were composed of small particles: ‘corpuscles’. 
This was a radical proposal at the time: the consensus then was that the atom was 
something that could not be further divided. To turn the opinion tide, Thomson (1897) 
argued in favour of his conclusion via a series of crucial experiments – the cathode ray 
experiments. I could push the experimental-inferential chain more, interrogating cathode 
rays and electricity, tracing them back to Benjamin Franklin or the ancient Greeks, but 
this will not be necessary. We already have more than enough material in our hands for 
life-world purposes. 
So, let us recall the purpose of the present section, and spell it out three-fold. First, to 
show what is included in the life-world and what is not in a case of actual scientific 
observation – or ‘observation’. Second, to show there is a distinctive level, that of 
incorrigible admittances, which science unavoidably begins from, is conducted via, and 
 
31 For an extensive history of the electron’s discovery (or ‘discovery’) refer to Theodore 
Arabatzis’ (1996) elaborate study. 
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turns to for ultimate validation, and thus that there is a reason to terminologically and 
conceptually preserve this level as a ‘special place’ within the empirical (via the life-world). 
Should we achieve this end, then it will be clear that a distinction of observables and 
unobservables needs to be preserved, though not without adopting a richer and more 
sophisticated construal of the observables. Third, to show how the four dimensions of the 
life-world work together to produce this special level of the empirical; the observable level 
defined anew. Let me now turn to these tasks.  
Carving the above trajectory of scientific discoveries, we met numerous definitions, 
experiments, observations taken to be evidence conclusive to different ends and degrees 
and in different ways. Nevertheless, we can find the life-world elements nested in two main 
areas having the criterion of incorrigibility in hand. First, in what the first ‘link’ of every 
experimental-inferential chain includes. Second, in certain elements of every link of the 
experimental-inferential chain. Let me start with the first area. We saw how Brown’s 
observations leading to the Einstein formula convinced the scientific community of the 
atom’s existence. The validity of these observations themselves, however, was based on 
the validity of the microscope. In turn, the validity of the microscope was derived via its 
production of images approximating those of the naked eye when looking from up close. 
This matching of the images sets the evidential sequence in motion, establishing a 
theoretical discourse from the ground up: the microscope (rather, Brown through the 
microscope) watches particles from the pollen grains dance away, Einstein calculates their 
motion and encapsulates it in formulas that corroborate the atom assumption, Rutherford 
uses this work as a basis for his nucleus work, and so on and so forth. Of course, it is not 
that we could have watched the tiny particles dancing away from the pollen grains with 
the naked eye. Rather, we see that the microscope works as intended in cases where its 
effect is the same as looking from really close at something, and then induce that it should 
work as intended even with stuff we cannot observe with the naked eye.  
Is the eye image, then, certainly a part of the life-world? Not without qualifications. In 
the beginning of this chapter we saw how admitting things as extant is not simply a matter 
of momentary sight and of things external to the observer (noematic synthesis). Things 
must present themselves in a ‘real profile’ to get ontological legitimacy. Moreover, this, is 
emphatically, not non-theoretical: so much should by now be out of the question. The 
incorrigible ‘image’ (rather: perceptual intake) we get from the microscope is incorrigibly 
individuated into separate entities, which we incorrigibly perceive as having distinct 
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qualities (by which point we are already well into theory). Similarly, to take another issue 
from the above example, the natural properties of elements with different atomic weight 
are registered and correlated with this weight via senses or via ways which are judged 
reliable due to the correlation of their maxims with our sensory input.  
Take for another example the ‘founding link’ of the second of our experimental-
inferential chains leading together to the observation of the electron; electricity (the other 
being the atom). Taking Benjamin Franklin’s story at face value for the economy of the 
present discussion, let us try to – partially, non-exhaustively – recreate some admittances 
necessary to the Franklin experiment from Franklin’s point of view and in statement form. 
Pre-experiment, Franklin obviously perceived himself as a separate entity from his 
surroundings: the ground he stood on; the kite; the wind. He utilised his body’s capabilities 
and his incorrigibly perceived metaphysics (the wind blows) to navigate the kite-cum-
metallic-key in the raging storm – which he in turn understood to be a phenomenon 
distinct from the calm weather. There is a lot more: his incorrigible time sequencing of 
events; the cognition with which he synthesized these events to arrive at the conclusion 
that “Electricity exists”; the metaphysics pertaining to the continuity of himself first and 
foremost before and after the experiment; the shocking sensation received to his body after 
the thunder. After the experiment, he reported his findings via writing them down, 
utilising certain signifiers he knew others would incorrigibly extract a certain meaning 
from. 
Could Franklin perform Husserl’s rückfragen, inquiring back from any of his life-
world’s admittances in the frame of the experiment without running into the absurd? 
Could Franklin have behaved as if they were not the case? I hardly think so. Not only is it 
the case, for example, that the experiment cannot be performed without an experimenter; 
it is also the case that Franklin cannot but behave like he is himself an entity – the same 
entity before and after the experiment – an observer different to, for example, the kite, 
which is in turn different to the thunderstorm. These are all delineations of the world 
handed to him (and in the delineation of which, per phenomenology, he plays a 
constitutive role), and for that matter to the scientific life-world of the experiment in 
question. Generally, there is a certain primitive form of the world given to science 
whenever it is conducted, which acts as a precondition of its being conducted. It cannot 
be otherwise – we must start from somewhere and hold a stratum steady to stand on and 
do science. 
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In fact, it is here worth to depart from the eyeglasses example to comment on the 
mutability and the dynamic nature of the life-world more generally. As neurological 
studies on perception reveal, one does quite literally ‘learn to see’32 in the most basic sense 
of the expression, moving from an ‘indeterminate blur’ to an (often) pretty well-parsed out 
reality in one’s early years of existence. More evidence for this is that people who gain 
sight at an old age take some time, often years, to sort the ‘world soup’ they find themselves 
swimming in (see e.g. Sacks 1995/2012). What all this shows is that incorrigible 
admittances are anything but set in stone, even for a given individual, and are in fact quite 
prone to elasticity during certain periods in one’s life or special conditions. Nevertheless, 
I submit, the incorrigible admittances that one finds oneself with during most moments in 
one’s life and for the foreseeable future are pretty much the same. Considering that science 
is most often conducted by adults in more or less stable perceptual conditions, the scientific 
life-world still denotes something relatively stable as the empirical basis of science. Here, 
a historically-minded scholar of science may interject that historical and social contexts 
also affect how we see. Granted, but this influence on perception has, I feel, more to do 
with our corrigible admittances: values, social antagonisms, historical meanings, they 
generally shape perceptive elements which we can perform rückfragen on even as we are 
having them. I do not have the space to expand on this here, but I will definitely concede 
that if the socio-historical training and situatedness is ever in a position of placing 
incorrigible admittances upon one, then one’s life-world is also shaped by this training and 
situatedness. 
This was the first area of the life-world’s scientific locus, the, so to speak, ‘first links’ of 
any experimental-inferential chain. Let me now take up the second area of the life-world 
elements, which is, I submit, every other step. Let us ask: can we speak of life-world 
elements at the cloud chamber level? How about the isolation of radium level, or the 
atomic nucleus and the electron experimental levels? Here we must draw a very delicate 
line. It is of course not incorrigibly present to us that an electron is being observed in a 
cloud chamber: we may leave that theory to one side and we have already seen how much 
mediating thinking is needed to infer this conclusion in the first place. What excludes 
things from the incorrigible, it is reminded, is our inability, in Chang’s terms, to ‘peel them 
 
32 See for example Glaserfeld (1989) and Damasio (1994), also on the influence of 
emotions on perception and cognition. 
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away’, to act as if a certain admittance is not part of our life-world – compare a table in 
front of us with the quark or the shocking sense of touching power cables with a metallic 
item with the electron. Thus, many things are incorrigible in the ‘final’ cloud chamber 
setup, e.g. the individuation of the container and the materials in it as separate entities; 
‘white here now’ that we later interpret as electron tracks; the passage of time and ourselves 
as the same entities pre- and post-experiment. It is not that we should be looking for life-
world elements only in founding links of experimental-inferential chains and organs 
closely related to the senses like the microscope and the thermometer. Quite on the 
contrary, it is the case that if the life-world was not present in levels ‘higher up’ in theory 
and experimentation we would not be able to draw scientific conclusions at all. 
Take the uppermost level of the present case, the cloud chamber itself: that we are 
seeing ‘white here now’ and in a sequence forming a straight line, reminiscent here of 
Chang’s quality-centred incorrigibility, is certainly an admittance of the life-world. 
Similarly, we take the glass surfaces to constitute a container, in which we may place 
things. Equally importantly we hold this information to the fore of our minds while 
conducting this experiment and drawing conclusions: we do not start seeing a particular 
area of one glass side of the container as separate from the others or suddenly start 
wondering what this weird apparatus sitting in front of us is and what has just happened 
before. We, typically, to get things done, have an – incorrigible – ability to synthesize all 
of this into continuous thought. Moreover, we may not stop seeing white in a straight line 
unless a force majeure acts upon us, and it is readily evident that this incorrigibility 
constitutes the basis for asking questions but also for interpretation and conclusion: the 
white is there, but what is it? To make an analogy with pharmacology, I, a doctor, may 
administer paracetamol and let a time interval pass, by which passing the patient’s pain 
ceases to be. Is the ceasing of pain due to paracetamol part of mine and the patient’s life-
world? Certainly not, not least because that is exactly the kind of thing researchers in 
medicine are trying to causally disambiguate when they are researching, which is proof 
that they are not stuck with a certain causal assumption in a life-world sense. However, 
the ceasing of pain is the basis on which inquiry proceeds in a life-world sense: the 
sensation either is or is not incorrigibly present and, when it is not, drawing a line from 
this fact to the agent causally effecting the change is more or less what coming up with a 
cure is. Similar examples can be found all along the scientific chains I have presented. The 
blackening of Becquerel’s plate: that I see ‘black here now’ and ‘plate here now’ are 
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incorrigible versus that the blackening comes from radiation, which is not. That my train 
of thought is not disrupted or fragmented (or does not have further capabilities than the 
present, to not only speak of possible disaster) while thinking about things and that I am 
able to hold them in mind straight through are all integral to the process. 
This generalises to the Curies’ elements, Becquerel’s plate, Thomson’s rays. Something 
was always incorrigibly present within their experiments: that these things are uranium 
salts, this other thing a photographic plate, that this other thing is uraninite (then 
pitchblende, the Curies were researching this material when they isolated polonium). I 
will spare the reader another lengthy description of the life-world. The point is this: every 
high theoretical conclusion steps on life-world admittances – but it is not itself (usually) a 
life-world admittance. Of course, we must stress here, this fully applies to the electron, which 
does not present itself incorrigibly during the cloud chamber experiment – ‘white spots 
here now’ that are putatively electrons’ tracks do. “How so?” one may now interject. “Is 
it not the case that highly theoretical conclusions appear incorrigibly to us? If there is heavy 
radiation somewhere can I just pretend that there is not? Can I walk through there without 
having my DNA altered, suffering all the unfortunate consequences of radiation?”. The 
way we answer this question is of critical importance. The immediate answer is that of 
course you cannot. However, it is not the case that radiation or the DNA in this case appear 
(incorrigibly) under the theoretical profile of physics or of medicine. They appear as pain 
and deformation: these are the incorrigible elements here. Further explanations from 
physics and medicine may be very good explanations but they are not incorrigible in 
appearance. This generalises to, for example, psychology. The emotion of anger, appears 
incorrigibly in and to us. Issues of suppression notwithstanding, it is not something that 
we can take away the same way we can decide to go for one theory of psychology or the 
other. There is a qualitative difference between going from happy to sad and between 
moving from being a proponent of psychoanalysis to one of cognitive psychology. The 
impossible to do without, what we are unable to un-see, un-know, behave differently 
towards (the effect of a force majeure notwithstanding), the tropes of thought with which 
we think about things and synthesize them into narratives: these are prime examples of 
what the life-world consists of. 
This concludes the ‘life-world in practice’ demonstration. In the next section I will take 
stock of how the life-world convincingly incorporates most of the analytic intuitions of the 
previous chapter and pinpoint its intersubjective character, which is of special importance 
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to science, seeing as science always comprises, to some extent, a collective endeavour 
(even scientists who work alone publish their results and are evaluated by peers). In section 
3.5 I will add to the arguments presented in the scientific example above regarding how 
crucial a science’s life-world is for it, providing more general argumentation. 
 
3.4 The Scientific Life-World: Relation to the Analytics and 
Intersubjective Character 
Let us now see what we have made above of the analytic insights showcased in the 
previous chapter and settle what has been left undiscussed. Regarding Maxwell: his 
answers to quickly decidable ontological questions coincide with the life-world cashed out 
in statements33. Regarding Chang: first, the expansion of perception beyond concrete 
objects and the visual that comes with the life-world concept would surely find him in 
agreement. Second, note the ways in which perceptual reports must be manifest to be 
registered as indicating genuine things of one’s life-world (versus, for example, an internal 
experience) of section one. Chang would certainly agree with the first move. The second 
may be seen as a further explication of his incorrigibility. It is here hard to resist quoting a 
passage from Husserl (1936/1970, 186-191) talking about the realm from which scientific 
evidence is ultimately derived (an issue I will discuss extensively in the next section). 
 
Having arrived at the ego, one becomes aware of standing within a sphere of evidence 
of such a nature that any attempt to inquire-back behind it would be absurd. 
 
The parallels, I think, between unable to peel away (Chang 2005, 883) and absurd to 
inquire-back behind are striking. Unfortunately, not all things fall harmoniously into place 
and there is a point at which the life-world, both as advanced by phenomenologists as well 
as in how I construe it here, decisively breaks with Chang’s quality-centred observability. 
This point is precisely Chang’s insistence on qualities: the ‘world reflexively had’ in the 
life-world consists of concrete entities as well as the unbound qualities that he describes. I 
submit, in defence of the phenomenologists, that Chang’s resorting to qualities to defend 
 
33 This is not to be confused with the contention that the life-world is comprised of 
statements; emphatically, it is not. We can however describe what it is comprised of in 
statement form, exactly as we did with Franklin above. 
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his kind of observability is ‘philosophical overkill’. It is the case, I think, that I can stop 
perceiving certain objects and behaving as I am seeing objects just as much as I can stop 
perceiving certain qualities and behaving as if they exist. Or, to put object-ness as an 
incorrigible quality, ‘object-ness here now’ like ‘black here now’, is a quality report I 
cannot help but ontologically admit regarding, for example, the coffee mug in front of me. 
Nevertheless, we may still be faithful to Chang’s spirit and hold that these entities may fall 
short of right and true (or may have alternatives as I will show in the upcoming chapters) 
in the exact same way that Chang holds the perceived incorrigible qualities open to falling 
short of right and true. Chang wants to untie constructive empiricism and observability 
from admitting the doubtless reality of objects when he resorts to qualities but I can see no 
reason why he (we) cannot do this at the level of objects, especially since he does not seek 
to redeem qualities as free of being theory laden. Which of Chang’s desired effects does 
one need to do away with should one refer to object-ness as an incorrigible yet fallible 
quality? None, I claim. It does, then, seem to me unreasonable to reject what appears to 
be a quality of maximum incorrigibility. 
Regarding Dicken and Lipton, I take them, as I explained in the last chapter, to have 
adequately answered all of Musgrave’s extant and hypothesized contentions to the 
observable except the one mentioned above here, save for the pathway they leave open in 
a case of a property-based definition of observability (as I have explained, I follow no such 
notion here). Moving on to Musgrave, I believe that his point has been amply answered: 
one is not able to infer electrons as belonging to the observable. They do not appear as an 
incorrigible entity (something that is putatively their tracks does) in one’s life-world. To 
put the same point in other words, van Fraassen is right when he holds that observing 
something that something else has putatively left behind does not equal observing that very 
something. To address Musgrave’s objection more directly, the chief difference between the 
mouse, the yeti, and the electron which he discusses is the following. I (or members of the 
human race) have had phenomenological experience of the mouse (or members of its kind) 
adequate to admit it as a potential member of my (our) life-world. Inferring the mouse’s 
existence in the wainscoting does not occur solely from the available evidence pointing to 
it when I hear the noise but also, crucially, from these previous phenomenological 
experiences. This kind of experience is available neither with the yeti nor with the electron. 
Last, it is hard to overstate the importance of declaring that van Fraassen’s and Musgrave’s 
mouse is not a part of my life-world upon hearing noise in the wainscoting either. I may 
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reasonably infer the existence of the mouse as well as the existence of the electron and 
whether the latter inference is reasonable is the question of scientific realism. What 
separates the two is not the certainty or impossibility of existence in the world but, rather, 
the mouse’s previous existence in one’s life-world and the electron’s lack thereof. 
Coming to the causal (interaction-information) account of observability, though 
important in the literature, I will not be taking it into account. Here is why. Kosso gives 
us a set of reasons to conclude that a certain entity ‘has been observed’ that, in my view, 
conflate belief that something has been observed with belief that something exists. In so 
doing, the causal account of observability fails to pay adequate attention to the ‘inner 
sanctum’ of the empirical level; it fails to separate those admittances which are necessary 
to conduct science versus those for which we may have ample evidence but are still there 
for the optional taking (I will expand on this in the next section). That observation and 
existence are conflated in the causal account of observability is evident from several angles, 
the most striking being that Kosso’s continuum of observability includes things that are 
unobservable in principle, the prime example of these being the colour of quarks. Admittedly, 
Kosso acknowledges this and finds that it need not trouble him much; after all he wishes 
to work out a notion of observability that has to do more with epistemic reliability rather 
than observation itself. However, one cannot help but wonder: what, in this notion of 
probable observability, its probability increasing by the fulfilment of Kosso’s four 
dimensions of a putative observable, is not already covered by the notion of probable 
existence? I think Kosso does not realise how close the two predicates run, and this 
becomes evident in his contention that one can even draw out some conclusions about the 
scientific realism debate based on his notion of observability: if I have indeed been passed 
information from something accurately, he tells us, it is almost a tautology to say that this 
something exists. This, however, only happens because his flagship observability criterion, 
(in)dependence of interpretation, is one and the same with the flagship criterion for the 
corroboration of a scientific theory or entity. There is no contradiction in wanting to run 
these notions in parallel. However, if we claim both electrons and tables observable by 
different degrees, how is this not repeating Maxwell’s argument about the continuum of 
observation? How can we draw a non-arbitrary line along this continuum, which Kosso 
himself does not see the need for drawing, thus completely circumventing Maxwell’s 
cornerstone objection? If we cannot, then Kosso’s argument can be subsumed under 
Maxwell’s, and the replies to the Maxwell argument, including van Fraassen’s, Chang’s, 
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and mine to be presented below apply to Kosso’s argument as well. Finally, and very 
importantly, Kosso (1988, 466) states that his account of observability is the best 
epistemological foothold should we consider that we have no ‘prior information on the 
ontology of the physical world’. This I find entirely inadmissible: if we had no such 
information, science, and indeed any project of theory and praxis, would not have an 
object of occupation to begin with. Echoing Husserl cited above, and pending further 
demonstration in section 3.5, I claim that it is not the case that one may hope to dispose 
with this ‘prior ontology’, and that this is precisely the central point of the life-world. 
Thus, it is shown, I claim, that the life-world elegantly combines what we want to 
consider from the analytic account of the observables, the worthy material we were left 
with the task to handle at the end of chapter two. It incorporates the best intuitions 
(observation continuum, observability as vague predicate, incorrigibility as the chief 
shaping factor) and it answers the most powerful protestations (arbitrary separation of the 
observables from the unobservables, inference to the best explanation) on behalf of the 
analytic literature regarding observability. Emphatically, however, the life-world does 
more than just combine, for it also expands. As I noted above, the dynamic nature of 
perception and its part owed to the perceiving subject are mentioned rarely and in passing 
in the analytic literature. Further, the analytic discussion remains oriented towards 
observability as some or other direct contact with the world. The life-world, as I have 
defined it here, casts its net wide to capture all that partakes of doing science which is seemingly 
irremovable from the process. Elements falling under this principle are perceived as34 of many 
kinds: world entities, world qualities, world metaphysics, subject cognition, subject 
proprioception. All the above, the dynamic, subjective, wide dimensions of perception 
reflected in the life-world, are going to be precisely the points of observability’s featuring in 
the scientific realism debate from angles practical and theoretical in the upcoming 
chapters. This is an unfortunate omission on the analytic literature’s behalf, a prime 
example of which is, perhaps ironically, the title of van Fraassen’s (1980) work on realism 
and empiricism, The Scientific Image (notice the image part). Even he, a philosopher who 
fights on the observables’ side and upholds their importance, nonchalantly dismisses their 
 
34 I am saying ‘perceived as’ rather than ‘are’ to indicate the phenomenological principle 
that even what seems as an external item in fact ‘constitutes itself in our perception’ in the 
way we explored above. 
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complexity in a single period when discussing issues of realism and antirealism. “When 
the hypothesis is solely about what is observable ... empirical adequacy coincides with 
truth” van Fraassen (1980, 72) tells us, without offering much argument for the contention. 
I want now to turn to an important obstacle that stands in the way of connecting the 
observable level to the life-world and offer a final criterion for what constitutes the scientific 
life-world. Should one pay close attention to the discussion in chapter two one will notice 
that the observable level has been treated as unproblematically unique, that is as one and 
the same for all involved with it. This treatment of the observable level as having no 
situatedness, as ‘the view from nowhere’ to employ Thomas Nagel’s terminology, 
juxtaposed with the myriad life-worlds of which there are at least as many as there are 
people35, amounts to a problem: how can a concept pluralistic by nature such as the life-
world possibly specify a concept so monistic as the observable level in the analytic 
philosophy of science? What sense does such a substitute make?  
To answer this question, I will employ a strategy of bringing both concepts, which 
prima facie stand in stark contrast, towards the middle. First, I will demonstrate that the 
life-world has an intersubjective character: it may be the same, or shared, across subjects, 
and it very often is. Second, in chapter four, I will argue, via the avenue of alternative 
conceptual schemes, that the observable level, taking a cue from the life-world, should not 
be construed as the unique ‘view from nowhere’ but as a view of the world brought about 
and filtered by specific capacities (be these capacities biological, cognitive, social, socially 
contextual et cetera). 
Let me now, for purposes of the first pull, turn to Husserl (1913/1983, 55-56) himself 
on the issue of the presence of others in one’s life-world: 
 
I take their surrounding world and mine Objectively as one and the same world of 
which we are conscious, only in different modes ... For all that, we come to an 
understanding with our fellow human beings and together with them posit an 
Objective spatiotemporal actuality. 
 
 
35 Or people (or possibly organic beings) with consciousness. This follows from the prior 
definition of the life-world. 
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This is an early statement, which Husserl maintained more or less loosely throughout 
his philosophical career, as Føllesdal (2010, 40) shows. As he writes in a later work 
(Husserl 1936/1970, 161-165), “Thus in general the world exists not only for isolated men 
but for the community of men; and this is due to the fact that even what is 
straightforwardly perceptual is communal.”36. How can one then make peace between the 
life-world as has thus far been described and its intersubjective dimension ushering in, 
between the previous plural and the now proffered singular dimension? Føllesdal 
crystallises the antithesis by putting together two of Husserl’s quotes (Føllesdal 2010, 41-
42): 
 
We do not share the same life-world with all people, not all people ‘in the world’ have 
in common with us all objects which make up our life-world and which determine our 
personal activity and striving, even when they come into actual association with us, as 
they always can (to the extent that, if they are not present, we come to them and they 
to us). 
 
The world, on the other hand, does not exist as an entity, as an object, but exists with 
such uniqueness that the plural makes no sense when applied to it. Every plural, and 
every singular drawn from it, presupposes the world-horizon. 
 
Føllesdal claims that this prima facie contradiction is in fact no contradiction at all. In 
his reading, there is indeed one world which causes37 all life-worlds to come into existence 
(metaphysical realism). You and I are standing next to one another and are similarly 
directing our attention but may still be seeing substantially different things because of our 
biological capacities (I may have cataracts) and social training (you may not have the 
 
36 There is some philosophical debate about whether Husserl meant for the life-world to 
have a truly intersubjective dimension, to admit the external world and other beings in it 
as real and not a manifestation of consciousness or, in terms of phenomenology, the 
‘transcendental ego’. I remind the reader that since this is not a Husserl studies 
dissertation, it is also not my purpose to settle this debate here. 
37 Or, to be more precise, goes into the causal relation. This qualification is needed to 
account for the observer’s input in the shaping of a given life-world. 
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social training to conceptualize what you are seeing in a similar way as I) but this does not 
mean there is nothing where we look. “Our conceptions of the world may differ, and in 
this sense we all live in different life-worlds” writes Føllesdal (2010, 42). Thus, on the one 
hand, the existence of the external world and the possibility of overlap between our life-
worlds are affirmed. On the other hand, our life-worlds can be shared if we share the same, 
e.g., ontology, metaphysics, semiotics, or emotions. You and I look in this room and 
incorrigibly see tables and chairs which give out a cosy feeling. We sit down and read the 
same text, we discuss it even. On the basis of this external world, and if we are also 
similarly inclined in our perceiving capacities, we may share the life-worlds ‘constructed’ 
out of the world – sharing incorrigible admittances. Further, it is not the case that another’s 
life-world must align a hundred percent with ours for us to ‘follow’ it, establish some 
common ground and work in collaboration. These last issues are issues I will press in the 
upcoming chapters. 
Two final notes: first, the above is Husserl’s position (where indicated as elaborated by 
Føllesdal) and mine. The issue, however, of whether it may withstand philosophical 
scrutiny is vast. Among others, Putnam and the internal realism scholars, and Donald 
Davidson have offered invaluable and complex positions on the matter. Along with the 
internal realism material I postpone this discussion until chapters four and seven. This is 
both due to space limitations here and because these matters necessitate, as I have already 
noted, a more concrete elaboration of my own position. Second, as I noted in section 3.1, 
there is within phenomenology another, and deeper, sense of intersubjectivity, which 
denotes that our perception and world-experience is deeply fused with the perception and 
experience of others. How we view and navigate the world is a collective endeavour. 
Beyond seeing the same things, having similar patterns of thinking, ascribing to the same 
semiotics et cetera, the way in which we perceive is shaped by the way others perceive. In 
section 3.1 I brought the example of the sun, and how we may perceive the sun through 
the collective history of humanity: as a tool of navigation, as fused with religious and 
mythological meanings. Or simpler still, how we may view someone as taller than they 
are or more handsome than they would normally appear to us due to peer opinion about 
that said someone. Now, this notion of intersubjectivity has been discussed at length both 
by Husserl that can be found in various volumes of the Husserliana (especially 1905-
20/1973). It has also been discussed by contemporary phenomenologists and even analytic 
philosophers and sociologists (see Zerubavel 1997), who appreciate the notion as holding 
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metaphysical and epistemological weight, in for example constituting the objectivity of 
objects. While the topic is fascinating in and of itself, and could enhance this dissertation 
both here and in the case-study of autism spectrum conditions that follows in later 
chapters, I will restrict myself to the more ‘shallow’ level of intersubjectivity. This is 
because the topic itself is vast, and figuring out how intersubjectivity would feature both 
into the constitution of the observable level and in a clinical environment are two subjects 
that cannot, even individually, be accommodated in the range of this dissertation. I will 
leave these topics on the side for a future work, and I will restrict myself to the simpler 
sense of intersubjectivity (simply sharing perceptions), enough to establish the life-world 
as the observable level of the sciences. 
 
3.5 The Significance of the Intersubjective Life-World for the Sciences 
A vital task, the last of this chapter, now remains to be completed: that of explicating 
how the intersubjective life-word is indispensable for the sciences. Above, in reviewing the 
cloud chamber experiment, we singled out several life-worlds elements, both in the 
beginning of the experimental-inferential chains leading to the conclusion that the electron 
has been observed (electricity, pollen grain dance), as well as in every subsequent link 
(radioactivity et cetera). These elements are sine qua non for observing the electron (or 
‘observing’ it per the life-world approach) in the cloud chamber case as we conduct and 
understand it. Obviously, we would not, for example, be able to infer that the ‘white here 
now’ marks the trajectory an electron has carved if were not at all able to see the ‘white 
here now’! Of course, it is not that these particular life-world elements we surveyed above 
are the only possible way to the electron. We could, for example, for some evolutionary 
peculiarity, have been unable to witness the colour white incorrigibly, and have developed 
the ability to ‘see’ it with other, technical means – much in the way we capture colours 
beyond the infrared and the ultraviolet light wavelengths with special glasses. However, 
our confidence in these technical means would again be able to be traced back to the life-
world, like our confidence in radioactivity was able to be traced back to the life-world in 
section three above. Repeating this particular tracing back task here would not have much 
merit, for my point is that, generally speaking, we always need an incorrigible substratum 
to lean on to while conducting science. 
To strengthen this point, following others from several fields and traditions, I will here 
argue that the intersubjective life-world from which a certain scientific practice is launched 
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and in which it is verified may not be regarded as illusory, erroneous or fictitious within that same 
practice. To ‘take away’ a certain scientific practice’s intersubjective life-world, that is, 
would be to take away the reasons for believing in its maxims, and if its maxims include 
that this life-world is a fiction, then they themselves crumble. Thus, per the original spirit 
of Husserl, I will argue, we are stuck with the concrete quality of the life-world regardless 
of how many layers of reality we pose below, within, or on top of it. 
Let me once again turn to Husserl as a departure point: 
 
The life-world, for us who wakingly live in it, is always there, existing in advance for 
us, the ‘ground’ of all praxis, whether theoretical or extratheoretical. The world is 
pregiven to us, the waking, always somehow practically interested subjects, not 
occasionally but always and necessarily as the universal field of all actual and possible 
praxis, as horizon. To live is always to live-in-the-certainty-of-the-world. (Husserl 
1936/1970, 142-143) 
 
All opinions, justified or unjustified, popular, superstitious, scientific, all relate to the 
already pre-given world… All theory relates to this immediate givenness and can have 
a legitimate sense only when it forms thoughts which do not offend against the general 
sense of the immediately given. No theorizing may offend against this sense. (Husserl 
1905-20/1973, section 196, 22-34) 
 
What Husserl tells us here I believe is, and here I am just making explicit and concise 
what I have demonstrated above, three things. First, that science does not begin in a 
vacuum: it is always looking at, theorizing about, and acting on the basis of some 
phenomena given to it by life itself. It should be evident now that the admittances of these 
phenomena are a matter of the incorrigible admittances of the scientific life-world. I perceive an 
apple falling, a plate being clumsily thrown off the edge of the table and breaking. I have 
intuitive and as far as I can see inescapable grasp of these concepts: the apple, the plate, 
the falling. I perceive the phenomena they pertain to as similar and then begin to speculate 
and experiment about gravity scientifically. 
Second, per the original logical empiricist spirit, that scientific statements are 
meaningless without minimally impinging upon the edges of the life-world. This should 
be far from a heretic point. If scientific entities, mechanisms, narratives do not connect to 
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the pre-scientific world somehow then they become idle, if not completely meaningless. 
What would a story of electrons be without any application of electricity in experiments 
and from there to home and industrial equipment? It would have no explanatory value, it 
would bring to the fore no purported causal relations, it could not be utilised to bring about 
desired results.  
Third, that scientific theories are, in more or less direct ways, justified in the life-world, 
as we saw in great detail in section 3.4. Here is where phenomenology aligns with Ian 
Hacking’s (1982) experimental realism, which we were familiarised with in the first 
chapter. One has, however, to tread carefully to sidestep the pitfalls entity realism initially 
fell in. What phenomenology claims, and what I claim here, is not that there are certain 
entities that can be detached from their surrounding theoretical context and be given 
ontological credence because of their instrumentality in a non-theoretical environment. 
What is claimed is that scientific practices and theories get their validation in terms of the 
incorrigible admittances from which they begin. In the words of Husserl (1936/1970, 123-
125) “an opinion is justified by being brought into ‘reflective equilibrium’ with the doxa of 
our life-world”. Some of his analytic commentators such as Føllesdal (2010, 45) hold this 
level to be the level of beliefs, expectations and acceptances that “we ultimately fall back 
on [that] are unthematized, and in most cases, have never been thematised”. Non-
thematised is here to be understood in the way of a ‘silent horizon’: as these assumptions 
and convictions one does not think about while one is engaged in a certain practice due to 
their incorrigibility – tacit assumptions. Is it the case, however, asks Føllesdal that an 
appeal to such an unsophisticated and non-reflective court is reasonable? To which he 
replies by providing a quote from Husserl (The Crisis of the European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology, paragraph 34e), echoing the spirit of Chang, that this is all 
one has: 
 
What we accept, and the phenomenon of acceptance itself, are integral to our life-
world, and there is no way of starting from scratch, or to evade the issue here through 
a preoccupation with aporia and argumentation nourished by Kant or Hegel, Aristotle 
or Thomas [Aquinas]. 
 
This is all there is, “there is nothing more that can be sensefully inquired for, nothing 
more to understand” (Husserl 1929/1969, section 96b). There are contentions against this 
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trio of necessities. Simply put, objectors of the ilk that interests us here claim that if one 
does science correctly then one will arrive at the same destination no matter where they 
start from. If this is indeed so then the difference between the apparent worlds (the 
significance of which is to be explored in the next chapter) is merely epiphenomenal. It 
does not matter how different the apparent world/observable level/life-world may be 
between subjects, cultures, and practices, our hypothetical objector would maintain: the 
apparent world is a veil hiding the real, to be pierced through by scientific means.  
My reply to this objection is that taking away the life-world immediately implies taking 
away all reasons to believe in maxims about any ‘deeper reality’ about some level of reality 
‘realer’ than the observable. The moment one admits a deeper level of reality, not as an 
elaboration but as a displacement of the life-world, I claim, is precisely the moment when 
one pulls the rug under the life-world displacement argument’s feet. I turn to The Fantasy 
of Third-Person Science, a paper by Vallor (2008), which brings the present point to the fore 
very elegantly. Vallor begins her paper by criticising Daniel Dennett (2007), a philosopher 
of cognitive neuroscience who holds that, at least in his field, first-person reports should 
be entirely discarded as empty fictions, favoring an ontology of neurological and chemical 
processes instead. His project is as reductionist as they come: Dennett takes first-person 
reports to be an attempt at theorizing and telling the truth about the phenomena, only with 
extremely handicapped and unsophisticated means. Of course, one cannot hope to get to 
the matter of fact via such means. Dennett is wrong, Vallor holds. His tenet is based on 
the conflation of two distinct kinds of claim: a subject’s claim about what is going on in her, 
and a subject claim about what it is like to be her. Vallor calls upon Husserl (1913/1976, 
213) for whom first and foremost these are two completely different things, referring to 
two quite distinct types of conscious experience. The first relates to the reale; the factual 
psychological state of an individual (e.g. infused with this much adrenaline and 
endorphins), while the second relates to the reell, which is the subject’s conscious 
experience from a first-person point of view. One should expect the reale – the factual 
psychological state – of the matter at hand to be subsumed exactly under the kind of 
inquiry that science is. The reell, however, is entirely a matter of phenomenology.  
Vallor bolsters this point by employing a causal account against common-sense 
displacement. She notes that an individual’s phenomenal states are the explananda of 
neuroscience, while the theoretical stories neuroscience provides are attempted accounts 
(causal stories) of the explananda on a more micro-level than the phenomenal. Note that 
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the micro-macro level does not presuppose a dual reality, only one where neurochemical 
brain states are manifest in individuals as mental states. To generalize this point, it is not 
the case that one needs dualist metaphysics if one wants to maintain that there are 
electrons within things.  
How the present case study reinforces the point even further should be readily evident: 
if neuroscience is about explaining the explananda (and changing them – changing one’s 
life-world – I would add, as it does, for example, in taking away the pain), and the 
explananda are first-person states, then if one takes away the explananda the causal story 
becomes useless, for there is nothing to explain and change! I put it directly and somewhat 
crudely: scientists believe in neurochemistry because they correlate what they observe via 
its means with how their test subjects feel. If how we feel is to have no epistemic 
significance then the correlations responsible for believing in neurochemistry correlate the 
latter with nothing significant, and neurochemistry immediately becomes nonsense itself. 
Take away the life-world, and you end up with no subject matter for science, we may put it 
succinctly. We see now that the demand for displacing our ‘unsophisticated’, ‘naïve’, 
immediate grasp of the world via means scientific gives out more of an unwarranted 
obsession with ‘ultimate anchors’ rather than a goal epistemically sound to strive towards. 
I will come back to this point in chapter seven, where I discuss precisely Putnam’s urging 
us to embrace this so-called naïvete. 
I will come back to the life-world’s necessity and, beyond necessity, instrumentality in 
conducting good science in chapters five and six in much more depth. There, I will 
investigate the autism spectrum conditions case and the life-world of people with autism 
spectrum conditions diagnoses. For now, let me conclude this chapter and move to the 




In this chapter I have conducted the following work. First, I presented the 
philosophical backdrop against which the notion of the life-world arose as well as the 
phenomenological conceptions which it sought to encapsulate (e.g. noema/synthesis and 
filling/anticipation) and the larger theoretical project in which it was embedded (common 
experience-preserving science). Following, I defined one’s life-world as the realm of 
incorrigible admittances one adopts regarding the world at a given time and suggested that 
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the life-world serves as the best construal of the observable level of the sciences. I organised 
the life-world’s contents along four axes (ontological, metaphysical, semiotic, emotional) 
and I showed how these elements come together to form a special empirical realm for the 
sciences. This realm is special in the sense that it sets the scientific ‘point zero’: that which, 
while not real, true, certain, non-theoretical or given, serves as the basis for launching, 
conducting, and confirming the scientific endeavour. It is comprised of these things we 
cannot ‘un-see’, ‘un-hear’, ‘un-feel’, and all the incorrigible ways in which we function to 
combine information, to pass it on to others, more generally to ascribe meaning to things, 
of all the incorrigible ways we are stuck with according to which we extract meaning from 
the world and act towards it. 
All this was demonstrated in practice via the example of the putative observation of 
the electron in the cloud chamber. I showed how the elements of the life-world are situated 
at the bottom level of every inferential chain leading up to the inference of the electron’s 
existence and, moreover, along every step of the way (albeit not as synthesized final 
information – e.g. the electron is not part of the life-world). Following, I addressed the 
problem of how the life-world, a subjective concept, can play the role of the observable 
level’s specification, which is by default an ‘outer’ view of the world, a view from no 
particular set of eyes or other perceiving apparatus. I solved this problem by highlighting 
the intersubjective level of the life-world and by promising to challenge the monistic and 
unique status of the observable level in the following chapters. Last, I offered an in-
principle for why the intersubjective life-world is indispensable for the sciences and I 
explored reductionist arguments to the opposite conclusion, which I found to be 
incoherent. The sciences, I argued following Husserl, must be based on an incorrigible 
ground that is treated as true to get off the ground and be conducted, and any attempts to 
take this ground away will also belie the reductionist conclusions themselves. 
In the next chapter I am going to discuss issues of the life-world’s alterability as well 
as the possibility of (radically) different life-worlds (or, as I will show, in the language of 
analytic philosophy, conceptual schemes). I am then going to argue that, because one’s 
(and one’s species) life-world is dependent on several factors that are contingent 
(biological, social, et cetera) and because science irreducibly depends on the life-world, a 
different kind of science follows a different life-world. The case study of autism spectrum 
conditions will help to demonstrate this in practice. In the last chapter I will tie this whole 
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4. Alternative Conceptual Schemes and Life-Worlds 
 
Introduction 
This dissertation began with a call to examine the observable aspects of the world as a 
crucial point of interest for the scientific realism debate. Following, we set out to find the 
best construal of the observable level. I proffered that Edmund Husserl’s life-world, 
construed as the realm of incorrigible admittances that science launches from, is conducted 
via, and returns to for validation, is the best way to treat the observables. The life-world 
was shown to play this role via its intersubjective dimension – the life-world-sharing 
capacity of subjects. 
In this chapter, I plunge into the subjective character of the life-world. I argue that, 
beyond intersubjective, the life-world may also be plural and that life-worlds may be 
radically different from each other. I address this mainly by presenting radically different 
life-worlds in opposition to Davidson’s influential attack on the very idea of a conceptual 
scheme. Davidson, adopting a purely linguistic construal of conceptual schemes, took the 
possible extent of conceptual scheme difference to be rather minimal. In this chapter, I 
argue against this conclusion. Further, I claim that acquiring a wider understanding of 
concepts and conceptual schemes beyond their linguistic facet, i.e. as embodied by 
conceptual scheme users, enables us both understand the extent and importance of possible 
conceptual scheme difference for science, and to extend the conclusions drawn from their 
investigation to life-worlds. 
Thus, the present chapter is dedicated to arguing for life-world pluralism. However, as 
noted, for most of its course I will be discussing whether there can be more than one – and 
radically different from each other – conceptual schemes. This may strike as odd to the more 
continentally-oriented reader, plausibly unfamiliar with work on the matter (Davidson’s 
included). In this dissertation, however, I try to walk a fine line between the analytic and 
the continental philosophies (mostly of science – though this chapter’s material is leaning 
more towards the philosophy of language). In this vein, any analytic crowd will be 
rightfully bewildered if, in the frame of arguing for any pluralism related to science’s 
central points of reference, I do not mention the related work on conceptual schemes. 
Indeed, Davidson’s arguments may require some work to be mapped onto life-worlds. 
However they certainly, and to the extent that the scientific life-world is conceptual, may 
not be ignored in discussing science-related life-world pluralism. Thus, carefully and 
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methodically lifting Davidson’s prohibitions regarding conceptual scheme plurality will 
counter-act the negative-theoretical arguments that could arise against life-world 
pluralism. 
To make the above contention more explicit: as we saw in the last chapter, a life-world 
is much more than a set of concepts, a sum of linguistic repositories for capturing things 
in the world. It may be argued (as I will show in section 4.3), that a life-world may be 
entirely vacant of concepts. Thus, it is prima facie not entirely clear why I should engage 
with conceptual schemes here, or that the arguments against conceptual scheme pluralism 
should apply as arguments against life-world pluralism. However, as I discuss below, we 
should minimally cover the case of conceptual life-worlds, especially seeing as science is, 
indubitably, one of the most concept-heavy endeavours ever known to humanity. Thus, 
in section 4.3, I take care to cover three cases: conceptual life-worlds, non-conceptual life-
worlds, life-worlds that are part conceptual and part not (this is, in my view, the most 
ordinary life-world case).  In the conceptual life-worlds, Davidson’s arguments apply, and 
thus apply my counter-arguments developed herein. In the non-conceptual life-worlds one 
has to look at empirical non-conceptual cases, I argue, and this is what I do in some of the 
upcoming chapters regarding autism spectrum conditions. I find that life-worlds can there 
vary wildly too. Last, in the mixed case, I argue that since both conceptual and non-
conceptual life-worlds vary, so can mixed-parts life-worlds, by virtue of their containing 
parts that may vary. 
The present chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.1 I present the historical and 
conceptual backdrop against which the notion of a conceptual scheme surfaces and I give 
it a rough initial definition. Further, I examine Davidson’s paper On the Very Idea of a 
Conceptual Scheme, widely cited and considered the most important contribution to the 
relevant literature, which claims that the notion of alternative conceptual schemes is 
vacuous. Davidson, in a verificationist manner, contends that the very idea of a conceptual 
scheme does not make sense because of the impossibility of providing a neutral content 
necessary to support it, and also because of the impossibility of recognising an alien 
conceptual scheme as such – these I call Davidson’s two structural points. In section 4.2 I 
give conceptual schemes a clearer and more detailed definition by arguing for a specific 
Neo-Kantian construal of them. 
In section 4.3 I conduct a literature review of empirical and conceptual arguments 
against the prohibition of conceptual scheme pluralism. First among them is applied 
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relativism, based mainly on ethnography documenting cultural differences. Following, I 
put forward arguments from internal realism, this time in favour of a particular version of 
conceptual relativity – conceptual cosmopolitanism. After this I examine two more crucial 
conceptual arguments against prohibiting conceptual scheme pluralism; the argument 
from extrapolation and the pragmatic argument. I find, often following others, that these 
attacks are modest in that they do not defeat both of Davidson’s structural points. 
In section 4.4 I deal with the first of the two structural pillars of Davidson’s attack 
against conceptual schemes, the one claiming the impossibility of the existence of neutral 
content. I submit that the notion of neutral content in the way Davidson means it – effable 
and theory-neutral – is indeed nonsense but that alternative conceptual schemes do not 
need such a strict notion of neutral content to support their existence. Further, following 
and extrapolating from all the above material, I make my case for the very idea of a 
conceptual scheme and of alternative conceptual schemes. I concede conceptual 
cosmopolitanism’s point against extreme conceptual relativism, a point which I will revisit 
in chapter seven. 
In section 4.5, I connect conceptual schemes to life-worlds by using the Neo-Kantian 
conception of conceptual schemes of section 4.2. I submit that, the above material in hand, 
we may argue for life-world pluralism no matter how much conceptual content is involved 
in life-worlds. 
 
4.1 (Alternative) Conceptual Schemes: Backdrop and Davidson’s Attack 
Immanuel Kant and Willard Van Orman Quine have offered the most influential, and 
quite divergent, approaches regarding what a conceptual scheme is. For reasons of 
simplicity, the discussion of the structure and content of a conceptual scheme will be 
withheld until a more detailed analysis in section 4.2. I will, for the moment, abstract from 
the extant definitions and offer one which is adequate both to get the conversation of this 
chapter off the ground, as well as acceptable for common-sense and philosophy alike: a 
conceptual scheme is a set of concepts which we use to categorise things in the world (by 
whichever interpretation of ‘the world’ we abide). 
The subject that has sparked the most interest and controversy within analytic 
philosophy regarding conceptual schemes is whether there can be more than one; the 
question, that is, of whether there can be alternative conceptual schemes. Lynch (1997, 408) 
puts it that “the history of conceptual schemes begins with Kant” and Rorty (1972, 649-
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650) adds that Kant put forward the two distinctions necessary to promote the idea of 
alternative conceptual schemes: that between a neutral content and a conceptual apparatus 
which shapes it, and that between a concept which the mind cannot do without and a 
concept which is there for the optional taking. These two distinctions are putatively (as in 
Brons 2011, 223) necessary for advancing the doctrine of alternative conceptual schemes. 
The first distinction is thought to be sine qua non because of its introducing a neutral, pre-
conceptual notion of reality: if we are to pose alternative schemes then there must be a 
common material which they all carve differently. The second distinction, between 
conceptual necessity and optionality, introduces the possibility that many important 
concepts along the lines of which our life unfolds could have been – indeed could be – 
different. In analytic philosophy of science two competing scientific theories before and 
after a scientific revolution, such as those of phlogiston and oxygen, are most often thought 
to comprise alternative conceptual schemes, with several scholars such as Thomas Kuhn 
(1962) and Paul Feyerabend (1975/2010) often insisting that these theories compare as 
radically different conceptual schemes. In this view, the truth value of a statement becomes 
relevant to the context of its articulation: from the point of view of the theory of oxygen, 
the maxims of the theory of phlogiston are neither true nor false: they are nonsensical 
because of deviations in meaning. In this way, conceptual schemes become immune from 
external criticism since criticism can only be articulated within their own environment of 
meaning. Thus, conceptual schemes have come to be regarded as of chief relevance for the 
relativism discussion, and the case in their favour is often read as a foundation doctrine 
for relativism (Baghramian & Carter 2003/2016, paragraph 1). 
In his On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme (1974) Davidson launches an attack not 
on the view that there can be many alternative conceptual schemes per se, but rather on the 
very idea of a conceptual scheme as one should be careful to distinguish. The difference is 
that between disputing the claim that the animal goat exists and disputing that there are 
different kinds of goat. Those two kinds of claim are not quite the same thing, and as 
Davidson (1974, 5) writes himself, his endeavour goes past the attack on alternative 
schemes: “Even those thinkers who are certain there is only one conceptual scheme are in 
the sway of the scheme concept; even monotheists have religion”. Davidson’s line begins 
with an endorsement of Quine’s now predominant assumption, which identifies 
conceptual schemes with languages. Davidson’s thinking is the following: if two 
conceptual schemes are different, so must be the languages that accompany them. 
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However, speakers of different languages can ascertain their shared ontological 
commitments by translating their languages into one another. Therefore, inquiring into 
the criteria of translation (of when another language is translatable) is a way of knowing 
when a conceptual scheme (another language) is the same as ours in an ontological 
respect. If translation is possible then the conceptual schemes have the same underlying 
ontology; if not, they are in conceptual disagreement. Conceptual disagreement does 
supposedly come in degrees and Davidson sets out to explore two possible cases of such 
disagreement: partial and full. A full conceptual disagreement (and thus total failure of 
translation) occurs when there is no or no significant conceptual overlap between two 
schemes, while partial disagreement occurs when a significant range of concepts is the 
same and another significant range is different38. 
Davidson makes a series of interrelated points, starting with the case of possible full 
failure of translation. Speech, he writes, minimally requires beliefs and intentions. 
However, to ascribe to someone complex beliefs and intentions is hardly at all achievable 
without translating their words into ours. To even interpret something as speech behaviour 
requires translation; if we cannot translate it, Davidson contends, then we do not recognise 
it as speech behaviour. Remember now that, if such translation is at all possible, then the 
conceptual schemes involved have been shown to be in fact one and the same. Thus, 
Davidson contends, the same ontology underlies all possible speech behaviour and 
languages that we can recognise as such.  
Subsequently, Davidson discusses Kuhn’s view that scientists operating in different 
paradigms use conceptual schemes that carve the world so differently as to be living ‘in 
different worlds’ and finds little force to it. This is so because the claim requires the 
Kantian distinction already discussed here: that between a neutral content and a 
conceptual apparatus which shapes it. However, ever since Quine, Feyerabend, and even 
Kuhn himself, Davidson tells us, we ought to give up all hope of such a distinction. In his 
Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Quine (1951) famously argued that analytic truths, truths solely 
in virtue of meaning, are just those truths that are harder to give up than the synthetic 
 
38 The question of exactly how much range is a significant range, while largely untouched 
by Davidson, has been discussed quite extensively, mainly by his critics and friends of 
conceptual schemes. It will be explored in section three of the present chapter and over the 
three following chapters. 
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ones, not qualitatively different ones. In other words, there are no analytic truths in the 
traditional sense, and thus there is no given apparatus with which to neutrally construct 
the empirical scene. It is contradictory that the same Kuhn who talks about ‘different 
worlds’ also urges us not to think that this neutrality is attainable, for there is no way to 
stay out of entanglements of meaning that each language comes with and still be able to 
speak, Davidson says. Not only that but, most often, Kuhn writes in a quote that caught 
Davidson’s eye, a theory we are used to working within may differ wildly from their 
competitors: 
 
Philosophers have now abandoned hope of finding a pure sense-datum language ... but 
many of them continue to assume that theories can be compared by recourse to a basic 
vocabulary consisting entirely of words which are attached to nature in ways that are 
unproblematic and, to the extent necessary independent of theory. Feyerabend and I 
have argued at length that no such vocabulary is available. … Successive theories are 
thus, we say, incommensurable. (Kuhn 1970, 266-267) 
 
Thus, Davidson infers, it seems that neither analytic truths as a reservoir of meanings 
nor a theory-neutral reality can provide an adequate ground for recognising two 
conceptual schemes as alien to one another (Davidson 1974, 17).  
The case of extreme conceptual disagreement has been approached by Tim Button 
(2013, 197-208) whom we may remember from chapter two. Button starts by offering the 





How many conceptual ways are there to cut this line/world in? Infinitely many, 
Putnam answers. Are there any grounds on which we may claim that some are tout court 
better than others? Evidently not: since the line is a stand-in for pre-conceptual reality there 
is no way to argue – in the absence of concepts – for a certain conceptual distribution of 
the world over others: arguments are dependent on concepts and may come about only 
after a basic conceptual array has been provided with which to articulate them (we are 
here reminded of the life-world’s primacy). If the metaphor works, then, have we 
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established extreme relativism? No, for this is too quick Button (2013, chapter 18) notes. 
One object is here not relativized: that of the single line, or the single world. For, however 
we may cut the line, the parts we end up with are parts of the line. To be is to be a part of 
this line, to be is to be a part of the world. This is the famous ‘behind the schemes’ 
argument. We survey the scene of schemes; we see a line and different ways to organise 
it, thus the line is always there. This runs very close to one of Davidson’s own arguments 
against extreme conceptual relativism: 
 
We cannot attach a clear meaning to the notion of organizing a single object (the 
world, nature etc.) unless that object is understood to contain or consist in other 
objects. Someone who sets out to organize a closet arranges the things in it. (Davidson 
1974, 14) 
 
Recall now that all the above regards extreme conceptual disagreement. Perhaps, then, 
there is hope for a more modest difference. Alas, Davidson contends, if we are to translate 
this sentence into a belief that differs from ours, this must happen against a background of 
general agreement. He advances an example like this: suppose you and your friend are 
sitting on a porch and a dog passes by. Your friend exclaims: “What a beautiful cat!”. If 
the conditions for their having seen the cat under a sober mind obtain then you will most 
likely conclude that they use a language very much like yours, in which they name the 
animal you know as a dog with the word ‘cat’, and not that they believe that what passes 
by is (what you know as) a cat. “We do this sort of off the cuff interpretation all the time, 
deciding in favour of reinterpretation of words in order to preserve a reasonable theory of 
belief” Davidson (1974, 18) writes. His thinking runs along familiar lines: to ascribe 
languagehood one needs to ascribe beliefs and to ascribe beliefs is to interpret words. The 
only way to get out of the underdetermination that comes with interpreting words is to 
anchor them in the speaker’s largely true (from our point of view) beliefs. This is called 
the Davidsonian principle of charity in interpretation. Should translation fail, even with this 
principle, we conclude that what we have in front of us is not a language at all rather than 
ascribing significant conceptual disagreement or false beliefs. “We make maximum sense 
of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimizes agreement 
(this includes room, as we said, for explicable error, i.e. differences of opinion)”, Davidson 
(1974, 19) writes, highlighting that, in his view, the heap of agreement in beliefs and 
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concepts that is needed to establish local disagreement is as big as to leave no room for 
serious talk of importantly differing conceptual schemes, even partially. 
To sum up, there are two rhetorical lines for Davidson. The first is that alternative 
conceptual schemes, and the very idea of a conceptual scheme, are inextricably bound to 
the idea of the content-concept distinction, which is in turn largely untenable. The second 
line has broadly to do with the claim that it’s impossible to recognise something alien as 
such, be that something a conceptual scheme or a true belief. To be able to complete 
translation a translator is compelled to concede two points: that there is significant 
conceptual overlap between the two languages of translation and that the foreign speaker 
holds mostly true beliefs.  
One must be careful here. While Davidson has been amply clear in restricting the scope 
of his argumentation to the indescribability of a neutral content and to non-recognisability of 
alternative conceptual schemes, the relevant literature very often overestimates this scope. 
Many of Davidson’s readers, even those who prove to be his critics, tend to describe him 
as having proven that there are no conceptual schemes (as in Edward 2015), as having 
proven that conceptual schemes alien to ours do not exist (as in Nevo 2004, 318), and so 
on, if his argument works. This much should be clear from the preceding: abolishing the 
possibility of recognising as such for X (from within a Y) is quite a different thing than 
abolishing the possibility of existence for X, which is something that some of Davidson’s 
most careful readers such as Rorty (1972, 654-655) take very good notice of when 
commenting on him. Of course, if one is a verificationist/empiricist, one (maybe rightly) 
can infer that arguments against recognition are also arguments against belief in existence. 
In any case, my point is that an admissible form of argument against Davidson’s is, besides 
bringing to the table an admissible X (neutral content, alternative conceptual scheme), also 
arguing that that X is, after all, describable. 
I will now move to evaluating the Davidsonian arguments. This will require some 
preliminary steps. First among them is to address the question of what conceptual schemes 
exactly are. Are they indeed to be associated with languages? If not, what is their content 
and structure? 
 
4.2 Models of Conceptual Schemes 
To pose the question of whether conceptual schemes are indeed to be identified with 
languages, and if not how exactly we are to think about them, I will draw on post-
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Davidsonian literature on conceptual schemes. My main reference in this section will be 
the work of Michael Lynch (1997). Lynch distinguishes different models of conceptual 
schemes according to how they answer the questions below: 
 
1. What are the primary components of a conceptual scheme? 
2. What are the criteria of identity for a conceptual scheme? 
3. Are conceptual schemes committed to an analytic/synthetic distinction? 
4. Do conceptual schemes have a foundational structure? 
 
The first notion of conceptual schemes answering these questions is Kant’s (Lynch 
(1997, 409-410). Put briefly, Kant contends that concepts are products of the faculty of 
understanding, which organize raw experience, and that the reflections of these concepts 
are to be found in language; concepts are not themselves linguistic components. Further, 
for Kant, two conceptual schemes are identical if they share the same fundamental 
concepts (the necessary ones), and there is of course a distinction to be made between 
analytic and synthetic truths; truths which are true by virtue of the concepts alone, and 
those which are true by virtue of the world. Finally, the Kantian conception of schemes 
has a foundationalist structure: at its heart sit necessary concepts and analytic truths as 
preconditions for any other conceptual activity (1997, 410).  
Influential as it has been, the Kantian picture is now overcome by that of Quine, Lynch 
(1997, 411) writes. Lynch says that the catalyst for this development was that ideas as 
expressed in language are public and may be dissected and analysed, contrary to the 
mystical inner workings of the human mind. Further, the more and more pervasive idea 
that thought is one and the same with language. “By 1950 we find Carnap, for example, 
talking naturally and reflexively about linguistic frameworks or languages, in much the same 
way an earlier philosopher (or a later one) might discuss conceptual frameworks”, he 
(Lynch 1997, 412) writes. In Quine’s (1980, 42) picture, conceptual schemes are webs of 
sentences that mutually support one another. None are more central to the scheme than 
others intrinsically; being more central is reducible merely to ‘harder to give up’. Thus the 
Quinean picture answers Lynch’s four questions: first, conceptual schemes are languages, 
composed of sentences accepted as true; they are totalities of systems of beliefs. Second, 
the criterion for scheme identity is intertranslatability like we have already seen in 
Davidson. Third, the idea of a conceptual scheme is in no way committed to the 
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analytic/synthetic distinction, as per Quine’s famous attack on the latter. Meaning is 
inevitably contaminated with theory and a conceptual scheme is a language relating to the 
world as a whole. Finally, the structure of conceptual schemes is coherentist as per Quine’s 
(Quine & Ullian 1970/2009) famous coherence theory of truth. Davidson’s attack on the 
very idea of a conceptual scheme, Lynch (1997, 413) writes, targets exactly this Quinean 
picture. This should be unsurprising seeing as many of Quine’s assumptions are 
Davidson’s own, most centrally those of conceptual schemes being identified with 
languages and of collapsing the analytic-synthetic distinction.  
Lynch (1997, 415) expresses doubt about how well Davidson’s arguments work in 
devastating schemes in their Quinean conception but agrees with his conclusion: the 
Quinean notion must go. Put succinctly, the reasons are the following. First, a language 
is not a list of sentences; a language is way richer and more ambivalent. Second, a language 
consists of, beyond declarative sentences, also of sentences used, for example, to question 
and command. Given that concepts are associated with declarative sentences in the 
Quinean picture, a language exceeds a conceptual scheme, although a conceptual scheme 
is part of a language. Third, Lynch, continues, declarative sentences are used in expressing 
propositions structured by a conceptual scheme, but they are not one and the same with 
them; concepts are, so to speak, the building blocks of declarative sentences and 
propositions but not declarative sentences and propositions themselves. Fourth, it does 
not obtain that people who speak the same language share the same scheme. Lynch puts 
it that “A Hinduist and myself may ‘assign the same extension’ to the term ‘cow’ and yet 
have radically different concepts of a cow” (Lynch 1997, 415). Last, a language contains 
many contradicting sentences, and by extrapolation Quine’s equivocation dooms 
conceptual schemes to be riddled with contradictions as well.  
For an alternative to the two defective pictures, Kant’s and Quine’s, Lynch turns to 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1969) and Putnam (1981), who try to strike a balance between the 
idea that there is a distinction to be made between the concept of X and beliefs about X. 
Wittgenstein parallels analytic truths (and necessary – now ‘basic’ – concepts) with the 
bed of a river here, which gives shape to and contains the flow of water but is nonetheless 




... the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the 
waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp 
division between one or the other. (Wittgenstein 1969, 15) 
 
The point, Lynch (1997, 417) explains, is that, at any given time, we make an operative 
distinction between those concepts we are firm believers in and those we are on the fence 
about. We can distinguish between what something is and what we believe about it, not on 
the basis that every description is not a belief but on the basis that we treat some 
descriptions as widely, intersubjectively shared, established beliefs (bells pointing to the 
life-world’s incorrigible admittances have already began to ring). We need not think of this 
difference as innate and built into the language – just as in Quine, these better anchored 
concepts and beliefs are the ones that inquiry is leaving presently alone. Lynch (1997, 418) 
then presents his own, ‘Neo-Kantian, broadly Wittgensteinian’ model of conceptual 
schemes, which gives the below answers to the four defining questions: 
 
1. A conceptual scheme is a web of concepts “used in the propositions we accept in 
language and thought” (Lynch 1997, 418). To have a concept is to be able to use a 
concept; “to be able to pick out trees from non-trees” (Lynch 1997, 418). This 
functional view does not come bound to any particular ontology of what concepts 
are and is compatible with many (concepts may be abstract entities, dispositions, 
general terms et cetera).  
2. Schemes are identical if, and only if, they share the same basic concepts – with the 
same extensions – those that function as the bed of the river in the metaphor above. 
3. A fuzzy analytic-synthetic distinction is maintained, which is based on how deeply 
given concepts are entrenched in a conceptual scheme. Analytic truths, in this 
picture, are truths in virtue of the aforementioned basic concepts.  
4. Conceptual schemes are ‘contextually foundationalist’ (Lynch 1997, 419). Some 
concepts (basic) play the role of the foundation but this foundation is contextual 
and may be altered.  
 
I will adopt this conception of conceptual schemes for the rest of this chapter, and 
employ it to criticize Davidson. This is for two reasons. First, I think Lynch’s arguments 
make sense. Languages have, indeed, way more content than concepts and the categories 
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with which we approach the world are not necessarily systems of declarative sentences. 
To be sure, this disentanglement of concept from conception will need to be made on the 
tentative basis that Lynch puts forward, but this is still an operative distinction, necessary 
for many important operations such as translation. The second reason for adopting this 
framework, quite independent from the first, is that, as has already been declared, I aim 
to use conclusions from the discussion on basic conceptual schemes and apply them to 
life-worlds. Lynch’s treatment of basic conceptual schemes and the riverbed metaphor 
bears a striking similarity to my proposed treatment of the observable level, depending on 
a distinction that has more to do with incorrigibility and the instrumentality of concepts 
than an innate, essential or analytic, clear-cut distinction. This fortunate coincidence of 
orientation will prove indispensable in building the bridge across from a life-world to a 
(basic) conceptual scheme. Last before we move onto the next section, a warning, which 
I will elaborate into a full-fledged argument in the coming sections: life-worlds will turn 
out to go far beyond conceptual schemes. Although I will apply the arguments from 
conceptual scheme difference to defend life-world difference, this does not mean that the 
two notions are interchangeable. 
 
4.3 Literature Review: Empirical and Conceptual Critics of Davidson 
We are now moving into allied, pro-conceptual pluralism territory. This section 
explores three angles of attack against Davidson: applied relativism, Buttonian 
cosmopolitanism, and Rortian lines. As we will see momentarily, applied relativism is an 
empirical critique of the Davidsonian argument; Buttonian cosmopolitanism argues that 
some difference between schemes is plausible and tries to explore the kind and extent of 
this difference, while Richard Rorty attempts to reintroduce all-out extreme conceptual 
relativism to the discussion. These three theses become progressively less modest. Applied 
relativism pertains more to partial conceptual relativism (which, it argues, may often be 
anything but unimportant as Davidson would have it); Button concedes the world at large 
as a non-relativizable object (due to the behind-the-schemes argument we showcased 
above); Rorty concedes nothing (or perhaps just a little something – this issue will be 
resolved in chapter seven). 
Applied relativism (term found in Brons 2011) is an empirical critique to the 
Davidsonian arguments. That is, applied relativism examines two or more candidates of 
what are thought to be alternative conceptual schemes, finds that they indeed are 
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alternative conceptual schemes according to given criteria, and then proclaims that if 
Davidson’s theory argues against their existence then so much the worse for it. One 
suchlike argument I will examine comes from David Henderson (1994). Henderson begins 
by discussing the example that Davidson himself employs in his thesis, that of the 
conceptual scheme the Native American tribe Hopi uses and which he borrows from the 
American linguist Benjamin Whorf (1936/1956). Whorf extracts relativist conclusions 
from studying the Hopi: he concludes that the Hopi use a different conceptual scheme to 
the North Americans. We have already seen that, per Davidson, this would make 
translation impossible, and thus Davidson takes Whorf’s viewpoint to be that translation 
between Hopi and English is impossible. Henderson (1994, 3) challenges Davidson by 
noticing that Whorf never claimed the Hopi language to be untranslatable to English: in 
fact, he pointed out a few manoeuvres that, if properly executed, would bring about 
adequate translation. Thus: Whorf’s study works against rather than for Davidson, 
Henderson says, seeing as he evinces conceptual difference that is present despite 
translation being possible. 
Henderson also notices that Kuhn and Quine spoke of translation as a process during 
which conceptual differences come out, not as a mechanism by which to evince conceptual 
identification. Further, Quine argued that once we identify a system as giving out plausible 
messages, the extent to which we must make intricate reconstructions to make these messages 
intelligible is itself a measure of conceptual difference (Henderson 1994, 5). Thus, 
Henderson introduces the notion of reconstructive translation. Reconstructive translation 
necessitates coining new words or distorting the meaning of old ones to convey the content 
of a language across to another. Henderson also picks out an example parallel to that of 
the Hopi: translating the language of the Azande (plural of ‘Zande’) people, an ethnic 
group in North Central Africa, to English (as carried out in Evans-Pritchard 1937). There 
are many concepts in the Zande language that do not have a ready counterpart in English 
but can nonetheless be expressed periphrastically and even coined into a new word in 
English, slightly altering an English one. One-to-one translation, which is impossible in 
the above two cases, is the kind of translation that ensures ontological identification, not 
translation in general, Henderson contends. Further, this – one to one translation – does 
not obtain in the case of translating the Zande language into English. However, it is not 
that we cannot understand what the Azande say or that we cannot say it ourselves.  
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What should this tell us? First, in the spirit of applied relativism, Henderson proclaims 
that the above picture amounts to a problem for Davidson: we have in front of us a 
conceptual scheme that we readily recognise as such and can even translate into English 
with seemingly great results. Most importantly, this conceptual scheme is amply different to 
ours or at least different enough to be considered an alternative conceptual scheme, 
Henderson says. He hastens to add, however, that he is fully aware that friends of 
Davidson will proclaim this victory only a hollow one for the camp of alternative 
conceptual schemes. This is because of the wide translational background of agreement 
before we reach disagreement, which is wide enough in this case as well. Davidson would 
thus insist that the differences showcased are (and in principle can be) only very partial 
and uninteresting.  
It is true that by Davidson’s definition of partiality in disagreement, that is by judging 
the significance of the disagreement only proportionally to the related agreement, this case 
seems, too, to produce only differences of minimal importance. Davidson’s definition, 
however, argues Henderson, is unduly constraining and, what is more, flies in the face of 
empirical ethnographic work. Indeed, we are not bound to any disagreement evaluation 
that is proportional to the agreement if we want to make sense of conceptual schemes. 
According to Henderson, Davidson unjustly makes it look like proof of deep and extensive 
differences between conceptual schemes is needed if one is to speak about alternative 
conceptual schemes at all. Further, wrongly again, Davidson portrays friends of 
conceptual schemes as arguing for such deep and extensive differences, which he then 
finds cannot in principle exist, thus allegedly demolishing the ‘alternative conceptual 
schemes’ camp. However, it is not only that many friends of conceptual schemes never 
argue for such a chasm in translation for their own purported theoretical version of 
different conceptual schemes. It is also the case that extant differences that are points of 
departure for friends of schemes make up a body of ethnographic work, which gives out 
conceptual differences deep and important in their own right, as well as equivalent 
differences in beliefs. Henderson, following Clifford Geertz (1973), notes that 
understanding a people’s culture exposes their normalness without reducing their 
particularity. That is, different groups of people may fail to share our theories and concepts, 
and when this comes out during translation it makes translation awkward, thus we must 
seek reconstructive methods of translating. This is all we need to make sense of alternative 
conceptual schemes and this just shows the redundancy of Davidson’s criterion, who has 
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overestimated the level of difference needed to make sense of alternative schemes. This is, 
in a nutshell, Henderson’s argument. 
There are a few other applied relativists who run close to this point. The 
aforementioned Brons (2011) contends that intertranslatable schemes may in fact be amply 
different. He states that no chemist, for example, from the early oxygen era would claim 
that the phlogiston theory is incomprehensible to them. They would perhaps claim that it 
is wrong and preposterous but this would be the most: they would be perfectly in a position 
to understand it. Isaac Nevo (2004) brings to the fore an example, purportedly characteristic 
of many others, of two conceptual schemes that are radically different but are nevertheless 
operating within the same language: mental and physical descriptions of the same events. 
We do not need to look as far as different languages, he says, for there are ample 
conceptual differences that run deep at home (2004, 317). 
A more abstract but even less concessive (to Davidson) line of relativism is conceptual 
cosmopolitanism, owed to the aforementioned Button. Here, Button (2013, 212) follows 
the Quinean construal of schemes. To this he hastens to add the qualification that, contra 
Davidson and following Putnam, two or more languages can express different conceptual 
content even though they may be intertranslatable (as the Whorf case above, per 
Henderson, purportedly shows). This happens when such languages appear to be 
contradictory to metaphysicians: when they make incompatible conceptual claims. Button 
gives an example involving two people, A and B. A recognises a pointillist ontology of the 
infamous line (recall the world metaphor above) that organises it in simple dots, while B 
recognises a summative ontology which organises the line in chunks of smaller lines that 
sometimes overlap. A metaphysician may, as we do now, be able to ‘zoom out’ and even 
translate statements between the two conceptual schemes but the opposition remains: if 
the basic units of an ontological system are non-reducible lines, then the basic units cannot 
also be dots. Someone, then, who is equally at home between two schemes of different 
ontology, is a conceptual cosmopolitan. Even if an overarching scheme may arise that has 
both schemes in view (in the ‘zoom-out’ sense), that someone can dig their feet in the 
ground and refuse to give up all or either schemes in favour of the overarching one. That 
is, the ‘behind the schemes’ argument may succeed in saving the world (from the point of 
view of metaphysicians) but not much more than that, for it has nothing on the conceptual 
cosmopolitan. A fleshier example can be made out of comparing Hopi and the English 
language or Euclidean and Lobachevskian geometries. One can ‘zoom out’ and conclude 
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that two given Hopi and English speakers are conceptually carving the same world-
material but one cannot, by utilising this metaphysical observation, extinguish the 
differences that arise therein. Similarly for two geometries, realising that two 
mathematicians are analysing the same surfaces with different geometries does not make 
such geometries incompatible – in such a hypothetical case, Euclidean and Lobachevskian 
geometries would remain strictly incompatible. 
Before I give the third line, let us take stock. With this analysis in hand we have now 
arrived, I believe, at a point where Davidson is at least partially forced to retreat: 
alternative conceptual schemes abound, although they are not (yet) cashed out in terms of 
radically different languages. It is now time to venture forth to a more radical critique of 
Davidson’s contentions. For this, I will follow Rorty’s 1972 battleship paper The World 
Well Lost. Initially, Rorty suggests that the anti-Davidsonians may conjure an image of 
alternative schemes without getting too caught up in experimental results and details – 
without, that is, describing the alien scheme ‘from within’ or translating it, thus ending up 
in self-defeat. In this vein, he puts forward the argument from extrapolation. Consider the 
past two thousand years – an infinitesimally small drop in the ocean of human history. 
However small, this interval has accommodated enough change to put us in doubt about 
whether we, the moderns, are translating the Ancient Greeks correctly. We may 
extrapolate, Rorty’s argument is, and see how hypothetical conceptual universes may 
change radically without us being able to know them ‘internally’. Thus, the skeptic’s 
Rorty-reconstructed argument goes, even though we may never read literature produced 
by a Galactic civilization’s one billion years into the future, we are legitimized in 
concluding that they must have concepts completely alien to ours. As regards beliefs, 
Rorty (1972, 657) writes, a Galactic traveller may come along and enthusiastically try to 
translate our language only to be frustrated by the subsequent failure of translation due to 
the purported ‘falsity’ (for them) of our beliefs, upon which they will conclude, per 
Davidson, that we are not speaking a language at all. We are now in a further predicament, 
argues Rorty, for we realise that the current world may be filled with persons we do not 
recognise as such, who emit and receive signs of full-fledged languages. Perhaps “the 




… however, I see nothing wrong with the proposed extrapolation and I do not see 
what ‘known in advance not to be a person’ could mean when applied to the butterfly 
save that the butterfly does not seem human. But there is no particular reason to think 
that our remote ancestors or descendants would seem human right off the bat either 
(Rorty 1972, 657).  
 
To put the argument in more fleshy terms, Rorty gives the hypothetical example of the 
Patagonians recognising only half of our poets as poets, the aborigines recognising some 
of our astronomy as astronomy, and the inhabitants of the planet Mongo recognising only 
some of our ethical principles39. Can we ever decide whether these people possess some 
poetry, astronomy, ethics, albeit different ones, or none of them at all? More radically we 
may ask, says Rorty, after which point of loss of overlap are they starting to be considered 
not persons at all? For Rorty these questions, as well as the question “Can there be 
alternative conceptual schemes?” are not the important ones to ask, for they cannot, in 
principle, be answered. On the one hand the skeptic’s extrapolation is held to be valid but 
on the other hand it is true that no evidence can be brought to the fore for the existence of 
a particular scheme. The question that matters, the question that we can indeed answer is, 
for Rorty, the one pertaining to the capacity of our own creation (translation) to control and 
predict the behaviour of the beings who use a putatively alien scheme. This is a question that 
pertains to us (the translators) and not so much to the possibly alien scheme. There is really 
no other stone to base our translation and conceptual scheme recognition upon, says 
Rorty, except the pragmatic coping of translation with its objects and aims delineated by 
our own conceptual scheme. This is all we have when examining a particular scheme and 
trying to decide if it is a scheme indeed and if it can be brought to our own level.  
Rorty’s critique of Davidson may be summarised in the three following points. First, 
a way to show that alternative conceptual schemes can materialise is to advance one 
possible story of how this can happen. Second, this story can be provided by an argument 
from extrapolation from known piecemeal differences between conceptual schemes. 
 
39 Rorty, like others, is here problematically supposing that ‘our’ ethical principles are 
somehow the same for all who are ‘we’. As I did above, I will also let this slide for purposes 
of the economy of the present conversation. I will pick the thread up and develop it along 
the course of the following two chapters. 
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Third, translation may only be judged as a pragmatic tool for the translator, and cannot 
play the role of a guarantor to the truth and ontological commonality between the inter-
translated languages. 
 
4.4 Neutral Content and the Case for Alternative Conceptual Schemes 
We have now seen three ways to resist Davidson: applied relativism, conceptual 
cosmopolitanism, and the angle from Rortian extrapolation. Victories attained through 
applied relativism may seem pyrrhic since they concede Davidson’s structural points – and 
argue that, within them, there is ample space for conceptual difference. Button’s and 
Rorty’s lines cut deeper, arguing that a story of alternative conceptual schemes may indeed 
be provided, but they still left untouched the first of Davidson’s two argumentative 
cornerstones: that of neutral content and its supposed non-existence, which is also 
purportedly a necessary precondition for the existence of alternative conceptual schemes. 
I will now tackle this cornerstone myself and, following, I will make my own case for 
alternative conceptual schemes. 
The hunt for neutral content gives a sense of despair in the offing. Quine, Kuhn, and 
others are seen to have demolished the notion of raw data. I have also, following Husserl, 
argued for the noematic (non-given) dimension of the life-world in the previous chapter. 
Add to this that raw data is perceived to be the material that alternative conceptual 
schemes fit and/or organise. If there is nothing to be organised, or more precisely if the 
something untouched by theory to be organised cannot be made any intelligible sense of, then 
neither, it is thought, can there be made anything intelligible out of the idea of conceptual 
schemes that organise this very something. On this front, things look grim for friends of 
schemes. 
Once again, the argument is not so much about difference qua difference, but about the 
ascertainment of difference. We must know that we are cutting the same thing with our 
(each with their own) concepts to know that we are cutting it differently, but that ‘same 
thing’ can only be neutral content, since it is pre-conceptual. Sadly, neutral content is 
kaput, therefore we cannot know we are ever cutting the same thing differently – thus no 
alternative conceptual schemes. This is the gist of Davidson’s argument. The lingering 
metaphor here is a surgical one: concept users with different concepts enter the operating 
theatre and cut up a neutral, indeterminate ‘thing’, which is then held to not exist, therefore 
the whole operation is shown to be a false fantasy à la reductio ad absurdum. 
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(Un)fortunately, Davidson is too caught up in his own metaphor, for we do not need a 
ready-made ‘thing’, in the way theory-ladeness would prohibit, in order to ascertain 
conceptual difference. I explain: imagine that we are in a room, having consumed 
psychoactive drugs. Imagine that we are hallucinating40 about wildly different things that 
our brain is projecting at the same spatiotemporal co-ordinates. What do we need to 
ascertain difference? Much less than a given ‘thing’ or entity of any sort, we need: a basic 
sense of subjectivity (mine and yours); a similar sense of time and space; a way to 
communicate that what we are seeing and hearing is different (not a way to tell each other 
what we are seeing and hearing). One may now ask: are not these commitments communal 
theoretical commitments? Do they not preclude conceptual difference? To which the 
answer should be emphatically: yes and no, respectively. I think the imaginable extent of 
our hallucinations’ variety in the above example demonstrates amply the capacity for 
conceptual difference that the above preconditions leave open. A sense of subjectivity, a 
sense of orientation, and a sense of communication are very much theoretically imbued, 
but they do not at any rate bank on any important sense of commonality about things in 
the world. I ask the reader to lean on this thought experiment for now to observe the 
theoretical point I am going to develop regarding neutral content. In the next couple of 
chapters, while elaborating the autism spectrum conditions case study, I am going to 
provide applied examples to the same effect. 
We may extend from this and claim that Davidson’s comments on neutral content do 
not have his desired effect. The point should bring to mind Bas van Frassen’s point from 
chapter two regarding observability from within a theory: from that theory is always 
present when we organise the world, from that the effort to find raw data is futile, it does 
not follow that there is no material which alternative conceptual schemes organise. From 
the fact that we cannot perceive or articulate it without mediation, from the fact that we 
are well within a theory the moment we utter anything whatsoever (Rorty 1972, 663) it 
does not follow that there is nothing or not an intelligible something there before us. Not, at 
least, intelligible in the sense of supposing its existence, which is the minimal notion of 
neutral content needed to support the putative existence of alternative conceptual schemes. 
 
40 Note that by hallucinations here I do not necessarily mean made up, concrete stuff, but 
also different ways to fuse together stimuli from the environment that are already there, 
accentuate some and ignore others, thus creating a unique sense of reality. 
 141 
This is crucial: to suppose that alternative conceptual schemes ‘sit’ on something we 
merely need to have plausible reasons to suggest that this something exists. These reasons 
do not, I submit, need to include us being its impartial and direct witnesses and delineators, 
exactly like the people in the room of my hypothetical experiment need not take off their 
glasses to hold that there is something in the middle of the room (which they perceive as 
such and such on different occasions). Admittedly, we cannot ‘rise above’ our own 
concepts and see what the world might be like without any concepts at all. However, this 
amounts to little more than saying that we cannot conceptualize the world except with 
concepts – a point which hardly justifies thinking that there is nothing in the world besides 
concepts. That would be analogous to saying that nothing exists since there is no way to 
experience the world concept-less. That would be saying that only words exist because we 
cannot describe without them. 
The move I have carried out above has been described as ‘posing the ineffable’ for the 
notion of neutral content. There is a known philosophical problem with utilising the 
ineffable, which Button (2013, 137-139 for example) takes very good notice of. This is that 
utilising the ineffable sounds a lot like a metaphysical article of faith. The use of the 
ineffable, argues Button, usually comes with dropping all empirical arguments on behalf 
of the one who is utilising it, and thus runs them into unacceptable philosophical territory. 
I deny that this – the wholly non-empirical – is the only definition of the ineffable we may 
operate under. The ineffable is not necessarily what we can never reach. I submit that it 
may also be something which we may reach in equally good ways. In chapters five and six I 
will provide a case study of different ways of accessing reality, none of which may be 
regarded as a more privileged means than the other. For the present abstract theoretical 
purposes, the above observers-glasses-rock example will do. We now understand how we 
may give an empirical sense to the notion of ineffable by over-determining it; by giving it too 
many empirical senses. 
After investigating Davidson’s attack itself (there are no conceptual schemes), the 
defence against this attack on behalf of applied relativism (empirical work gives out 
conceptual differences), Button’s conceptual cosmopolitanism (that one can bring into 
view two competing conceptual systems does not imply that one may eradicate these 
differences), and Rorty’s line (extrapolating from piecemeal conceptual differences can 
bring about extreme conceptual relativism), we have just hopefully shown that the notion 
of neutral content does not present such a big problem for alternative conceptual schemes.  
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I will now complete my attack on Davidson’s attack by attempting to demolish the 
second of Davidson’s pillars, namely the one purporting that recognition of a conceptual 
scheme as such requires vast concept and true belief overlap with the home scheme. I will 
do so by advancing the three following claims in the remainder of this section: 
 
1. There are untranslated languages, which we take to be languages anyway. Thus, 
translation is not necessary to evince a conceptual scheme as such (even if we 
construe a conceptual scheme as a language). 
2. Following William Berriman (1978): most of us acquire at least one conceptual 
scheme, namely our first, not via translation but via other means. This shows, too, 
that translation is neither the only way into, nor is it necessary for access to, a 
scheme. 
3. There are at least two possible stories that satisfy Rorty’s criterion for showing 
Davidson wrong and showing how (radically) alternative conceptual schemes can 
come about: one from the angle of extrapolation, another from the angle of 
reconstructive translation. 
 
To substantiate the first claim, I cite a few examples of untranslated language: Linear 
A of ancient Athens, Cretan Hieroglyphics, Mexican Olmec writing, Rongorongo of the 
Rapanui, the language in which the Rohonc Codex of Hungary is written. There are two 
things these all have in common. The first is that they remain undeciphered and the second 
is that they are all regarded to be (instances of) full-fledged languages. Right in the offing, 
then, we have five counterexamples to Davidson’s claim: it is not the case that for 
something to be recognised as a language, it needs to be translated41. There are, I submit, 
ample external cues to languages, things that humans take to be evidence that what they are 
looking at is a language. One is the knowledge that beings importantly like us wrote it in 
a language-seeming way (words divided by spaces or what appear to be representational 
symbols) and were probably using it in such a way as well. The details of what comes into 
 
41 This is also the reason why these languages were not included in the applied relativism 
section: unlike the ones mentioned in the previous section, this set of languages remains 
without translation to English. 
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languagehood are not important here: what is important is that, clearly, as human practice 
shows, translation is not a necessary condition for languagehood. 
Maybe the Davidsonians would now like to claim that these five languages are wrongly 
considered languages, but for that they would have to present an independent argument. 
Davidson’s original argument is clear: nothing could be brought to the fore as evidence of 
language except concept-and-truth-overlap translation they tell us; how else are we 
supposed to know languagehood, they ask. The above, I believe, shows exactly how else. 
However, this argument from history and human practice is enough to force the 
Davidsonians to, at minimum, reshape their claims and adjust to the attack, but it is not 
quite decisive. For one, the Davidsonians could present an argument for why these five 
above languages are not in fact languages at all, and make their descriptive argument into 
a normative one by claiming that only translation should be taken as evidence of 
languagehood instead of that only language is taken to be so.  
To bolster my argument that no translation is necessary for the recognition (and as I 
will show now, the acquisition) of a language as such, I will borrow an argument from 
Berriman (1978). Berriman tackles the problem directly. He asks: does intelligibility 
depend on translation? Most definitely not, he answers (1978, 230), for humans routinely 
learn their first language without any translation involved whatsoever. It is not the case 
that to learn a language one needs to translate it into English (or another home one). What 
one needs to do is to temporarily shed one’s own language and observe the other one in 
practice. From that one cannot obtain a vantage point where all conceptual universes have 
been abolished it does not follow that one cannot temporarily shed one’s own language, 
Berriman (1978, 231) contends. To put the same point in other terms and in a 
Wittgensteinian spirit, he offers that translation is observing in use and using correctly 
much more than sentence-for-sentence translation. This much should be enough to create 
immense problems for Davidson’s camp, for it clearly shows how languagehood is not 
wedded to translation. Nor would any normative argument work: to argue that languages 
not acquired through translation should not be considered languages would here amount 
to saying that, for example, when an infant is speaking English some years after their birth 
they are not in fact speaking English because they did not acquire the scheme through 
translation. This would be patently absurd. 
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I will now finish my attack against Davidson Rorty-style and tell a story of how two 
conceptual schemes can come about, have the same ambit, and differ wildly42. For this I 
ask the reader to bring the mechanism of extrapolation, again from Rorty, back to mind. 
Imagine a conceptual scheme (N1) very similar to ours (N0) but with some piecemeal 
differences to it. Subsequently, imagine another conceptual scheme (N2) with equally 
considerable local differences to N1. Then imagine another one (N3) with equally 
considerable local differences to N2. Furthermore, imagine that with each step the 
conceptual scheme we get moves further and further away from our home conceptual 
scheme, the one we began from. It is then possible that at some point Nn we will be met 
with a conceptual scheme that will be completely different to ours. Little by little, local by 
local, hypothetically, an all too familiar conceptual scheme can turn into a completely alien 
one. What is surprising about this hypothesis is that Davidson had considered it himself 
in his original paper: 
 
It is sometimes thought that translatability into a familiar language, say English, 
cannot be a criterion of languagehood on the grounds that the relation of translatability 
is not transitive. The idea is that some language, say Saturnian, may be translatable 
into English, and some further language, like Plutonian, may be translatable into 
Saturnian, while Plutonian is not translatable into English. ... This exercise does not, 
I think, introduce any new element into the discussion. For we should have to ask how 
we recognized that what the Saturnian was doing was translating Plutonian (or 
anything else). (Davidson 1974, 8) 
 
Davidson contends that we would hasten to conclude that our translation of “I am 
translating Plutonian into my language” is in fact erroneous because of our inability to 
recognise Plutonian as a language. This sentence, he says, would not make sense to us, for 
there would be nothing we would recognise as Plutonian in the absence of a translation of 
Plutonian into English. Davidson, I think, is being quite inattentive here, and his statement 
is decisively wrong. First of all, as we saw not too far above, we can have external cues to 
a language: the Plutonians could be like us and their language could look like a language 
 
42 This is still theoretical for it is abstract argumentation that concerns me here; the extant 
example of autism spectrum conditions is to follow in the upcoming chapters 
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from the outside despite our total inability to translate it due to zero conceptual overlap. 
However, we need not go that far: by Davidson’s own measure this surprising utterance 
(“I am translating Saturnian”) would (and should) be very far from prompting us to 
abandon a whole system of translation. It could very well be a local difference in an 
otherwise pragmatically pristine system of translation. The discrepancy presented, which, 
as we saw, we can explain away as a non-discrepancy with the help of external cues to a 
language, is in and of itself a disagreement even Davidson himself would allow if 
everything else fit. Thus, we know that the Saturnian is indeed translating Plutonian if 
everything else is in place. This goes to show, then, that the argument from extrapolation, 
in which a small crack becomes a deep and unabridged conceptual chasm is, in fact, 
valid43.  
Before bringing this section to a close I would like to offer an overarching comment 
serving as an explanation of why Davidson makes the mistakes his critics and I have held 
him to make. The root of the problem, I think, lies with the analytic, broadly Quinean 
tradition Davidson writes within, and which blinds him to certain features of conceptual 
schemes or rather of their bearers. Recall Lynch’s three models of conceptual schemes and 
that our era is characterised by the transition from the more Kantian idea of conceptual 
schemes to a more linguistic one, which takes statements to be the simple units of a 
conceptual scheme. This is a transition that characterises analytic philosophy of science 
more broadly ever since the advent of logical empiricism: the unit of analysis for science 
is thought to be the scientific theory and the statements included therein as if they were 
 
43 The observant reader will now ask: hold on, what becomes of the Buttonian credo in 
non-world relativization in the extrapolation story? Are we indeed theoretically free to 
relativize everything per Rorty? To address this issue properly necessitates elaborate 
metaphysical development, which will take place in chapter seven. The short answer is: 
we, who are evincing this difference, are not free to relativize everything (for the Buttonian 
reasons shown above). Subjects partaking of the conceptual schemes we examine are 
conceptually free to roam, but if cease to recognise them as subjects and their language as 
a language we (always we) will fail to detect their conceptual scheme qua conceptual 
scheme. Davidson’s arguments do not here regain full strength because we have a tellable 
story of how a completely alien scheme may come about, though we will most probably 
never recognise it qua scheme. 
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disembodied, articulated from no-where and by no-one. This fantasy has been shaken a 
significant bit from a range of thinkers from Kuhn to Bruno Latour to Steven Shapin both 
in philosophy of science and science and technology studies. Shapin’s 2010 book title Never 
Pure: Historical Studies of Science as if It Was Produced by People with Bodies, Situated in Time, 
Space, Culture, and Society, and Struggling for Credibility and Authority is abundantly 
characteristic of the direction less statement-centred views take: to examine science as a 
(largely practical) endeavour undertaken by humans for humans, from certain positions 
and with certain goals. 
I advocate for a similar turn in the discussion about conceptual schemes (the move 
from schemes to life-worlds is itself in this direction, as I will show in the next section and 
chapters). Davidson, writing in the 1970s and adopting a Quinean view, only goes into 
sentential relations; the relations that must obtain between sentences for them to constitute 
alternative conceptual schemes, constitute a language for one another et cetera. Of course, 
the latter statement may only be metaphorical: a bunch of sentences does not constitute a 
language for another bunch of sentences but only for a subject who may employ the latter 
bunch. Davidson, that is, examines language recognition, translation, and schemes as if 
human beings were blind to anything else but pieces of language. Davidson fails to see everything 
else that is relevant to conceptual schemes but is not, strictly speaking, language. This is 
the reason that he fails to see, for example, that, even in the model that wants conceptual 
schemes to be languages, the main cues to a conceptual scheme are not pieces of language. 
To put the point in more fleshy and theoretical terms: if we follow Davidson’s thinking 
literally and to its logical extreme then we will never be able to learn any other language 
than our own. For, before we begin translation, we have, of course, zero translated 
utterances. From zero translated utterances, Davidson tells us, only the conclusion that 
the object under investigation does not constitute a language can follow. We would thus 
need… translation to achieve translation, which is quite obviously a demand impossible 
to meet! The fact that we do break out of this vicious circle and learn foreign languages 
attests to the conclusion I have pushed for above: there is more to conceptual schemes 
than language. 
 
4.5 Conceptual Schemes and Life-Worlds 
It is now time to execute the last and arguably most crucial task of this chapter. I will 
take the conclusions of the discussion on alternative conceptual schemes and apply them 
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to the discussion on the theoretical difference between two or more life-worlds – the 
practical difference pending the next chapters. A tricky question sits at the foundation of 
such a task: how are life-worlds interconnected with conceptual schemes? To ask 
differently, given the central role of perception within the life-world, is the content of 
perception conceptual? This question has been amply discussed in the philosophy of mind 
(e.g. Byrne 2005; Crane 1992). Here, I will claim that life-worlds may very importantly 
differ between them no matter the extent to which they involve concepts. 
Let us take the one extreme: that perception does not involve concepts at all. Take the 
case of, for example, people who speak no language.  In this case, the position that life-
worlds may radically differ requires very little argumentation. Evidently, people with no 
language have a life-world; they act within a horizon of things they take for granted. This 
life-world of theirs is also dependent on something, i.e. their biological capacities. Should 
these capacities be different, so would their life-world. On a general note, what is 
‘blocking’ a life-world difference is Davidsonian arguments in case that life-worlds are 
conceptual schemes. This is evidently inapplicable here: Davidson’s argument and all its 
possible derivatives are inescapably based on the assumption that conceptual schemes are 
languages, or minimally something language-like. Beyond this theoretical argumentation, 
and for a positive case of non-conceptual life-world scheme difference, I ask the reader to 
await until the next two following chapters. 
Take now the second extreme, in which life-worlds are without remainder cashed out in 
terms of concepts. In this case, life-worlds align with the Wittgenstein-Lynch model of 
conceptual schemes I am adopting in this chapter. Life-worlds (incorrigible admittances) 
are in fact basic conceptual schemes, those that form the foundation and horizon of all 
other conceptual activity. They comprise in this case, if you will, the ‘inner core’ of a 
conceptual scheme since a life-world a) can be shared, b) is incorrigible and c) acts as the 
founding stratum and as the final stop of every practice and inquiry. Regarding the 
analytic-synthetic distinction and the contextually foundationalist character of conceptual 
schemes in the Lynchean-Wittgensteinian model, the connections are here also readily 
available. The life-world was shown to be alterable so long as the incorrigible admittances 
which comprise it change. In the big picture, however, they typically remain fairly the 
same for a given subject, and considerable force would be required to alter them. Thus, 
the life-world is contextually foundationalist as well. 
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We have seen the two extremes, a life-world being not conceptual at all and utterly 
conceptual. Regarding the ‘mixed case’ scenario whereby life-worlds include concepts and 
non-concepts, the answer is ready for the taking. Their non-conceptual part may 
importantly differ and their conceptual part may importantly differ for the reasons 
showcased above. Thus, life-worlds may importantly differ here too. 
A last point: while life-worlds may (in some reading that is not mine) be conceptual 
schemes, conceptual schemes are certainly not life-worlds. This is because many concepts 
in conceptual schemes are generally far from incorrigible. They may include things the 
idea of existence of which we can easily do away with, both observable and unobservable, 
material and immaterial. Lavoisier’s conceptual scheme including oxygen and other 
postulates and Einstein’s conceptual scheme pertinent to the general theory of relativity 
are, as discussed in the previous chapter, far from incorrigible. The situation gets worse for 
conceptual schemes that are tentatively put forward like the conceptual scheme centred 
around supersymmetry in particle physics, so it goes. 
Summarily, we have now made the case for conceptual scheme pluralism and 
extrapolated from it to life-world pluralism. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have covered the following ground. In section 4.1 I presented the 
historical and conceptual background amidst which the notion of conceptual scheme 
surfaced and gave the notion an initial definition, thus familiarising the reader with the 
concept and its (mainly relativistic) uses. In this section, I also presented Davidson’s attack 
on the very idea of a conceptual scheme. Davidson was found to contend that the notion 
of conceptual schemes is nonsense due to two reasons. First, because a working notion of 
neutral content is necessary to support it and no such notion can be found ever since the 
work of scholars like Kuhn and Feyerabend (Button was also shown to attest to this). 
Second, because to recognise a conceptual scheme as such we would first need to be able 
to translate it, and translation presupposes concept and true belief overlap between the 
home scheme and the alien one, thus rendering the latter not alien at all. This argument 
was highlighted to be a verificationist one. 
In section 4.2 I started setting the ground for launching the attack on Davidson’s point. 
I explored the extant proffered models of conceptual schemes and I concluded that the 
Neo-Kantian, broadly Wittgensteinian one proffered by Lynch is both the one that makes 
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the most sense and that helps the most with connecting conceptual schemes to life-worlds. 
This is because Lynch’s model allows for treating a conceptual scheme as something 
having a foundation that is not a priori true, valid, and objective, but one that is hard to do 
away with (incorrigible), and the basis for any further conceptual activity. This is 
homoeomorphic with how I defined the life-world to be the observable level, comprised 
of similarly incorrigible ontological assumptions from which science launches, is 
conducted via, and to which it returns.  
In section 4.3 I surveyed the main empirical and conceptual counter-attacks to 
Davidson from the extant literature. I presented applied relativism: examples of 
conceptual schemes from empirical work that show striking and important discrepancies 
between them. This attack was called moderate because it still grants Davidson his two 
structural points: the conceptual disagreement was indeed found to take place in front of 
wide agreement of concept and true belief overlap. It was argued that, even having 
conceded these points, ample space remains for important conceptual discrepancy. I 
proceeded to examine Button’s point in favour of conceptual cosmopolitanism, which is 
conceptual relativism minus world relativization. I completed the literature review of 
Davidson’s rivals with Rorty. Rorty was seen to argue that a working argument against 
Davidson can be provided and that the only criterion of evaluation for a given translation 
is pragmatic – whether it enables the translators to predict and control the behaviour of 
those who bear it or not. 
The rest of the chapter was devoted to making my own case that there can be 
alternative conceptual schemes. In section 4.4 I initially argued that alternative conceptual 
schemes do not need the notion of a neutral content to stand on that Davidson suggests 
but merely the notion of the existence of a non-conceptual one, which can be easily 
provided via utilising the concept of the over-determined ineffable, which has empirical 
content. Subsequently, I made the following claims. First, that there are untranslated 
languages, which we take to be languages anyway. Thus, translation is not necessary to 
evince a conceptual scheme as such. Second, that most of us acquire at least one 
conceptual scheme, namely our first, not via translation but via other means. This shows 
too that translation is neither the only, nor necessary for access to a scheme. Third, that 
there is indeed one possible story that satisfies Rorty’s criterion for showing Davidson 
wrong and showing how alternative conceptual schemes can come about from the angle 
of extrapolation. Combining these claims, I established that the very idea of a conceptual 
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scheme and of alternative conceptual schemes is valid. Finally, in section 4.5 I linked 
conceptual schemes with life-worlds, arguing that life-worlds may radically differ (the case 
of the Buttonian extreme-prohibiting proviso pending) no matter whether perception is 
wholly conceptual, not conceptual at all, or part conceptual and part non-conceptual. 
For a comprehensive view, below follows a table mapping Davidson’s claims and what 
became of them during my argumentation. In the next chapter, a practical examination of 
life-world difference via the case autism spectrum conditions awaits. 
 
Points Davidson’s claim My claim 
i. We need a notion of neutral content 
to support the idea of alternative 
conceptual schemes. This notion 
cannot be provided. 
The notion of the over-determined ineffable 
can be provided as the notion of neutral 
content able to support the notion of 
alternative conceptual schemes. This notion 
has an empirical sense. 
ii. Conceptual schemes are languages. Conceptual schemes are Wittgensteinian 
webs of concepts. A language contains much 
more than concepts. 
iii. For language recognition, we need 
concept and true belief overlap. 
 
For language recognition, we need behavior 
codifiable in our own scheme (following 
Rorty). 
v. For language recognition, we need 
translation. 
For language recognition, we need external 
to translation cues to conceptual schemes: we 
recognize a language before we translate it. 
vi. No story is tellable regarding how 
alternative conceptual schemes may 
come about. 
Such stories are tellable. Applied relativism 
points to extant piecemeal but important 
differences between conceptual schemes, and 
the story from extrapolation are convincing 
stories of deep differences between 
conceptual schemes. 
vii. (Synthesizing the above) the very 
idea of a conceptual scheme, and of 
alternative conceptual schemes, are 
all untenable. 
(Synthesizing the above) the very idea of a 
conceptual scheme, and of radically 
alternative (minus world relativization) 
conceptual schemes, are tenable. 
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5. Different Life-Worlds in Autism Spectrum Conditions 
 
Temple Grandin ... spoke not only for herself, but for thousands of other, often highly 
gifted, autistic adults in our midst. She provided a glimpse, and indeed a revelation, that 
there might be people, no less human than ourselves, who constructed their worlds, lived 
their lives, in almost unimaginably different ways. 
-Oliver Sacks (Grandin 1995/2006, xiii) 
 
Introduction 
We are by now far into the open sea, having completed two major theoretical circles. 
First, we conducted an inquiry into the relevance of observables for the scientific realism 
debate and set out to find the best construal of observability. Second, we defined the 
observable level to be phenomenology’s life-world and we carved an extensive trajectory, 
cutting through the field of conceptual schemes, to show that, theoretically and to an 
extent practically (applied relativism), and despite the life-world’s intersubjective 
dimension, there can be different life-worlds.  
In this chapter and the next I investigate the subjective situatedness of the life-world as 
evinced through scientific practice. I conduct a historical and conceptual survey of 
cognitive theories of autism spectrum conditions (ASCs), treatment approaches, and 
testimony from people with ASCs diagnoses44. Based on this material I argue that people 
with ASCs diagnoses are generally best seen as people operating in life-worlds45 
importantly different to the typical ones – though some of them might be quite 
 
44 I will be using the term ‘people with ASCs diagnoses’ versus the term ‘autistics’ or 
‘people with ASCs’ for two reasons. First, to indicate that there is, as will be demonstrated 
below and even in the mainstream medical approach, a diffuse confusion about what 
autism is, if it consists a unitary thing at all. Second, to observe the ASCs-related activist 
community’s doubts with how autism is diagnosed and if the extant diagnoses indeed 
correspond validly to an individuated human condition. 
45 I will be using the term life-worlds (plural) since, as will be demonstrated below we have 
strong reasons to believe that people with ASCs diagnoses do not all share a life-world. 
That the typical life-world is in fact plural I take to be self-evident; ‘typicality’ is to be 
characterised by a variation in emotional reactions and meaning synthesis at the very least. 
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neighbouring the neurotypicals, or even more neighbouring the neurotypicals than other 
autistic life-worlds. I claim that the idea of the life-world most adequately captures the 
nature of this difference contra conceptually and empirically more austere approaches such 
as the plainly behavioural one. 
This chapter aims to present a case of applied life-world relativism – that of autism 
spectrum conditions – in detail and recognise it as such. The purpose of this is two-fold. 
First, it will serve to show that, far from being a purely analytical and theoretical exercise, 
the case of different life-worlds presents itself in many real subjects in the here and now. 
How we should think of science’s truth claim under the prism of different life-worlds is, I 
argue, not merely via very limited extant cases, projections and hypotheticals but exists in 
the flesh and is pertinent to human beings around us. Second, more importantly, chapter 
five serves as a prerequisite for chapter six. There, I turn to the clash between the 
mainstream ASCs treatment approach (Applied Behaviour Analysis – ABA) and the 
political movements, consisting of people with ASCs diagnoses and allied activists that 
protest behavioural treatment, claiming that ABA is in serious breach of human rights and 
therapy consent ethics. I will argue that examining the debate through the life-world lens 
and treating the autistic46 life-worlds as ‘real’, as valid modes of experiencing the world, 
necessitates planning therapy in their terms and opting for increasing happiness of ASCs 
‘patients’ likewise. Finally, in chapter seven I will tie the overall conversation conducted 
in this dissertation back to the scientific realism debate. 
The present chapter is structured as follows. In section 5.1 I present the historical and 
conceptual backdrop of ASCs and I give the reader a sustained overview of them. I explain 
that the condition is behaviourally diagnosed and defined as a spectrum. I highlight 
researchers’ doubts that the spectrum is a unitary disease and I particularly stress the yet 
unknown causes behind the spectrum, its many facets and manifestations. In section 5.2 I 
go into the cognitive theories of ASCs, which are, I will argue, the royal road to how 
people with ASCs diagnoses perceive and experience the world. I present the Mind Deficit 
(MD) theory, which contends that people with ASCs diagnoses have difficulties 
 
46 I will be using the term ‘autistic life worlds’ versus the term ‘the life-worlds of people 
with ASCs’ diagnoses’ both for reasons of literary economy and because the autistic life-
world is not necessarily to be had by all those who are diagnosed with an ASC (see the 
unreliability of diagnosing below and in the next chapter).  
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attributing mental states to themselves and others properly; the Executive Function (EF) 
theory, which contends that people with ASCs diagnoses have trouble maintaining 
appropriate problem-solving behaviour towards certain goals; and the Weak Central 
Coherence (WCC) theory, which suggests that people with ASCs diagnoses’ cognition is 
much more ‘neighbourly’ than the typical cognition. In section 5.3, based on the life-world 
definition, an analysis of the preceding cognitive section, and testimony from people with 
ASCs diagnoses (and sometimes their peers such as caretakers and family), I establish that 
people with ASCs diagnoses can indeed be seen as operators of different life-worlds. 
Before I proceed to the content of the chapter, a disclaimer. In this chapter and 
throughout this dissertation, I use the word ‘condition(s)’ rather than the most often used 
‘disorder(s)’ when referring to autism. This is to observe the related political movements’ 
objections and to indicate a resistance in characterising autism as something necessarily 
and exhaustively defective. Arguments for this will be provided throughout the next 
chapter. 
 
5.1 Autism and Autism Spectrum Conditions 
The history of the concept of autism begins in 1943 when, almost simultaneously, Leo 
Kanner (1943) and Hans Asperger (1944) described certain patterns of behaviour they 
observed in children patients. They both used the word ‘autism’ to describe the condition, 
taking a cue from the Greek word αυτός (self) to emphasize the obsession with the self. 
The two accounts were different in their details but displayed large general overlap (Wing 
1997, 13). Kanner described a group of young children who were either mute or displayed 
echolalia (senseless repeating of heard words and phrases) and idiosyncratic speech, and 
were extremely resistant to change in their surroundings and routines. Asperger presented 
observations on a group of older children or adolescents, who did not comply with the 
social standards of interaction, had poor intonation and body language, and were fixated 
on a narrow collection of interests47. The people studied were of every intelligence group 
(though Kanner’s were mostly of low intelligence) and were in possession of good speech, 
although they used it for monologues or for their own special interests. Following these 
 
47 Here, and for the rest of my brief historical expeditions in sections one and two of the 
present chapter, I am and will be writing from the perspective of scientists at the time, to 
accurately convey the development of autism and theories around it.  
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and similar studies numerous attempts were made at defining subgroups. The acclaimed 
British psychoanalyst James Anthony commented that, though there were substantial 
differences, the conditions overlapped to a great extent and that “there were not enough 
symptoms to go ‘round among all the authors who wanted to name a syndrome” (as 
quoted in Wing 1997, 15). Disagreement in classification and confusion about what 
autism actually abounds from the beginning. 
Today, autism is understood as a spectrum of conditions48. The spectrum is considered 
a family of neurodevelopmental disorders disrupting fundamental processes of 
socialization, communication, and learning (Klin 2006, 3; Rapin and Tuchman 2008, 
1129-1130; Wolff 2004, 201). ASCs diagnoses appear in 1 every 200 or so individuals 
(Dover & Le Couteur 2007, 540) with a male to female ratio close to 3:1 (Loomes et al. 
2017). They have the strongest genetic component out of any developmental condition 
(Klin 2006, 9; Rapin and Tuchman 2008, 1130-1131; also see next paragraph of this 
section). Beyond limited sociability, communication, and learning abilities, people with 
ASCs diagnoses display restricted or stereotypical patterns of behaviour and interests (Klin 
2006, 9). Most people with ASCs diagnoses score low in the IQ range although this 
percentage is diminishing due to the widening of the definition of ASCs to include more 
individuals, greater awareness of the condition and better detection of cases with high IQ 
(Klin 2006, 5). There is no epidemiological crisis as it is often suggested in public opinion 
(Baird et al., 2003). It is well documented that the increase in ASCs diagnoses is owed to 
the aforementioned factors (Baird et al. 2003, 489; Klin 2006, 5). Further, contrary to a 
recently spread myth, there is no correlation of ASCs diagnoses with measles, mumps, 
and rubella (MMR) vaccines (Chaste & Leboyer 2012, 287; Freitag 2007, 5; Rutter 2005, 
8-13). Finally, ASCs have a high comorbidity rate with developmental disorders and 
mental health disorders (Baird et al. 2003, 492; Dover & Le Couteur 2007, 541). 
In ASCs symptomatology is used as a means for diagnosis, which is to say that no one 
is sure what the underlying causes of the conditions are. In medical terms ASCs are thus 
 
48 Asperger Syndrome was a slot along this spectrum, commonly used as a replacement to 
autism in individuals with normal or superior IQ scores (Klin 2006, 9). For reasons that 
fall beyond the scope of the present dissertation the diagnosis is no longer listed in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (since 2013) and thus not officially 
used anymore. 
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behaviourally defined (Baird et al. 2003, 488; Rapin & Tuchman 2008, 1129) with a specific 
medical cause being found in as low as 6-10%49 of the population. Epilepsy occurs more 
commonly than usual in people with ASCs diagnoses, which, together with the probability 
of concordance ASCs being 60% in monozygotic twins, are the main known markers for 
ASCs being neurobiological conditions first and foremost (Baird et al. 2003, 488; Wolff 
2004, 204). No specific gene candidates have yet been confirmed although ASCs are 
associated with mutations in chromosomes 2q, 7q, 16p, and 19p (Baird et al. 2003, 488). 
Beyond genetics, ASCs cannot be detected via brain scans (Rapin & Tuchman 2008, 1135-
1137) for no consistency of diagnostic markers has been shown in the field. This situation 
means that, as noted above, although the disorder is widely agreed to have an organic and 
genetic basis, the diagnostic criteria have been derived through symptom examination 
rather than being organically based: there exists no biological test for ASCs (Baird et al. 
2003, 489; Rapin and Tuchman 2008, 1139) and there does not exist any pharmacological 
way of ‘reversing’ the condition50. In addition to being behaviourally defined, there is no 
standard behaviour or set of behaviours that can be used as an ASC diagnostic criterion, and 
whether a person is diagnosed with an ASC or not is based largely on consensus and expert 
opinion (Baird et al. 2003, 491; Dover & Le Couteur 2007, 540). When attempting to reach 
a diagnosis professionals utilise, among others, a multiagency assessment, the purpose of 
which is to undertake a thorough assessment of the child’s and the family’s functioning, 
and to indicate the number of symptoms associated with ASCs an ASC-candidate 
displays. These symptoms include, but are not limited to, delay of development, a lack of 
pointing, poor eye contact, failure to follow gaze, poor use of gestures, repetitive play, 
oversensitivity to household noises, and motor mannerisms (Dover & Le Couteur 2007, 
541). Again, there is not much that is standard and mechanistic here: academic and 
medical experts emphasize that no one component is to be used in isolation to reach a diagnosis 
and that the multi-agency assessment should not be carried out by non-professionals 
(Dover & Le Couteur, 541-542). 
 
49 Depending on the study (Baird et al. 2003, 488). 
50 Many children with ASCs take pharmacological supplements such as vitamins (Wolff 
2004, 205), especially in the U.S., but this is for symptom management rather than 
condition reversal. 
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The main reason why there can be no standard cause identified or standardized process 
of diagnosis for ASCs is thought to be that many aspects of ASCs are continuous with 
neuro-typicality51 and likely have differentiated causes. Isabelle Rapin and Roberto 
Tuchman (2008, 129) write that ASCs have “fuzzy borders that overlap normality at one 
extreme and profound intellectual impairment with other evidence of severe brain 
malfunction at the other”. One or more ASCs symptoms can be found in an individual 
that is not considered a person with an ASC. It is only upon several symptoms befalling 
an individual that they qualify for having an ASC, though it is underdetermined what this 
set of symptoms must be. Generally speaking it suffices for a positive diagnosis that the 
symptoms induce severe difficulties in learning, communicating, and socializing, and that 
a tendency for adherence to strict routines is displayed. Francesca Happé et al. (2006) have 
argued that the different facets of ASCs may in fact have no single unitary (genetic or 
cognitive) explanation but be stemming from different sources: the triplet of ASCs-related 
behaviours (learning, communicating, socializing) may each have its own root in the brain 
and cognition. “Twin data suggest largely nonoverlapping genes acting on each of these 
traits. At the cognitive level, too, attempts at a single explanation for the symptoms of 
autism have failed”, Happé et al. (2006, 1218) write. Their recent work suggests very little 
indication of ASCs traits clustering in the general population. It was found that children 
who displayed one of the three key aspects of ASCs were of relatively low risk of displaying 
another or the two others, emphasizing the separability of the traits and thus increasing 
the possibility of differentiated causes. This separability was backed up at the genetic and 
neurocognitive level as well52. The implication is that what we call ASCs may be the 
presentation of all three traits (limited sociability and communication, learning disabilities, 
restricted or stereotypical patterns of behaviour and interests) in an individual, likely 
because that is when an individual is the most ‘cut off’ from society and they and their 
caretakers face severe difficulties owing to the condition. However, it remains an open 
 
51 This and its derivatives are ‘playful’ terms used by the ASCs community to characterise 
people with standard neurological function and stress its typical, rather than its ‘normal’, 
dimension, much in the same way much of the LGBTQI+ community uses the word cis- 
to characterise non-trans people. 
52 For a more detailed analysis see next section, and for a thorough presentation of related 
evidence see Happé et al. 2006, 1219. 
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question why the three features of ASCs co-occur at an above-chance rate (Happé et al., 
1219). 
 
5.2 Cognitive Theories of Autism Spectrum Conditions 
Whatever the biological manifestations and aetiologies of ASCs may be, they are both 
unclear at this point and certainly beyond the scope of the present dissertation. As stated 
in the introduction I intend to focus on how people with ASCs diagnoses perceive the 
world: on what the world of their immediate experience is like and how it differs from a 
standard neurotypical one. I will examine, that is, whether people with ASCs diagnoses 
can be understood as operating in a different life-world, and how this difference is and 
should be navigated in scientific practice.  
Cognitive theories of ASCs seem to be the prime medium for attaining this goal seeing 
as they engage precisely with how people with ASCs diagnoses perceive the world, both 
in terms of basic perceptions and their synthesis – as opposed, for example, to genetic and 
brain ones, which do not go into the phenomenological experience of people with ASCs 
diagnoses. This refers to the four components of incorrigible admittances: what the basic 
objects of perception are, how they ‘hang together’, what they mean and how they feel53. 
As will be shown, in every related scientific approach people with ASCs diagnoses are 
held to perceive a world quite different to that of the neurotypicals, not so much in basic 
object perception (most people with ASCs diagnoses presumably see and recognise chairs, 
tables, and other things neurotypicals see and recognise et cetera), but in how they 
synthesize these perceptual parts as coherent wholes, and how they sensually and 
emotionally relate to these wholes. As we will see momentarily, people with ASCs 
diagnoses are likely to be living in a world much more ‘fragmented’ than the standard 
neurotypical one and may possess basic functions to navigate this world that are quite 
different to the homologous functions of the neurotypicals. 
There are three basic cognitive theories of ASCs predominant in research: the theory 
of Mind Deficit, the Executive Dysfunction theory, and the Weak Central Coherence 
 
53 Reminder from previous chapters: this is not to promote a theory-free/theory-laden 
distinction, but only a distinction between objects of perception and how they combine to 
synthesize meaning. Both these aspects of incorrigible ontological admittances are theory-
laden. 
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theory (Rajendran & Mitchell 2007). Their history can be traced back to early perceptual 
research into ASCs, the working assumption of which was that people with ASCs 
diagnoses involve under- and/or oversensitivity to both visual and auditory stimuli. 
However, related empirical studies produced mixed findings (Prior et al. 1976), which shed 
doubts on this hypothesis. Further, pioneer researchers like Uta Frith pointed out that 
these sensitivities were not unique to ASCs (Wing 1969) and that they may stem from a 
more primary issue of selective attention. Memory related research at the time also 
suggested that children with ASCs diagnoses’ auditory memory was better than their 
visual one, but this was later shown to be owed to an individual’s intellectual ability rather 
than to ASCs per se (Rajendran & Mitchell 2007, 225). However, Beate Hermelin and Neil 
O’Connor (1967) also observed that children with ASCs diagnoses found recalling 
coherent sentences (like “The goat eats some grass”) no harder than recalling random 
word strings (like “Goat, goat, grass, pineapple, sea, horse”). As we will see below this 
points to a recurring explanatory theme around ASCs until today. The above elements 
and observations were to compose central parts of cognitive theories or of their 
explanatory ambits, beginning at approximately around 198554. I will now move to briefly 
present these theories and examine their evidential groundings to avoid theorizing on 
speculation. In this presentation, I will be following several studies, most closely among 
which Gnanathusharan Rajendran’s and Peter Mitchell’s comprehensive 2007 study 
Cognitive Theories of Autism. 
 
Theory of Mind Deficit 
The theory of Mind Deficit (MD), the first explicitly cognitive and largely influential 
theory of ASCs, surfaced in the mid-1980s. In summary, the theory conjectures that people 
with ASCs diagnoses fail to correctly attribute mental states to themselves and others. The 
most widely used relevant test is a story enacted through dolls, whereby two dolls are 
placed in an initial condition of knowing where a certain object is. Following, one doll 
leaves and the other moves the object to a different location. When asked where the first 
doll will look for the object when it returns, 80% of the participants with an ASC diagnosis 
failed to give the most likely correct answer (the first place), and said that the doll would 
 
54 Unsurprisingly, it was the dawn of the cognitive era that produced the first explicitly 
cognitive theories of ASCs (Rajendran & Mitchell 2007, 226). 
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look in the location where the object actually was instead (Wimmer & Perner 1983). MD’s 
biggest problem is its lack of universality (Happé 1994); the 20% that passed the test gave 
the theory a serious evidential challenge. This problem remained after adjusting the 
problem hypothesis from a mind deficit to a mind delay55. It was instead found that the 
deficit is highly related to verbal mental age rather than ASCs diagnoses per se (Rajendran 
& Mitchell 2007, 227). Subsequently, researchers devised tests specifically for this 
population and came up with a number of findings. Most important among them were: 
(a) that subjects with ASCs diagnoses, irrespective of verbal mental age and whether or 
not they correctly attribute a mental state, fail at giving a correct explanation for their 
attribution, (b) that even very high functioning people with ASCs diagnoses have difficulty 
comprehending nonliteral language, and (c) that any deficit in attributing mental states in 
people with ASCs diagnoses likely comes in degrees rather than being present or absent in 
an absolute sense (for all the above see Dennett 1978; Baron-Cohen et al. 1997; Jolliffe & 
Baron-Cohen 1997; Wimmer & Perner 1983, and for a summary of relevant research 
Rajendran & Mitchell 2007, 227-231).  
A recent reconceptualization of MD (Enactive Mind – Klin et al. 2003) argues that 
people with ASCs diagnoses, unlike those in a neurotypical cognition, to not be constantly 
prepared to interpret social meaning, and instead to look for meaning in terms of physical 
properties56. The many controversial empirical results and the inability to settle on a non-
vague definition and universal theoretical underpinning after twenty years of research 
implied that the theory is now largely waning as an explanatory mechanism (Rajendran 
& Mitchell 2007, 231). However, its legacy remains unquestionable in that it brought to 
the fore something we now take for granted about people with ASCs diagnoses: that they 
often face severe difficulties in understanding their own and others’ mental states as the 
neurotypicals understand them. Not only that, but it has recently been argued (see for 
example Milton 2012), quite convincingly, that this is a two-way street empathy deficit: 
like people with ASCs diagnoses cannot understand the neurotypicals’ minds, so the 
 
55 For a full-fledged presentation of the development of the theory against evidence see 
Rajendran & Mitchell 2007, 226-227. 
56 For neurotypicals, shapes often have ‘social meanings’ or associations, while people 
with ASCs look for meaning solely in terms of physical properties. For more on the issue 
see Klin et al. 2003. 
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neurotypicals cannot understand the minds of people with ASCs diagnoses, which have 
their own rationales and processes. To expect what is to come below, this should already 
provide a cue to life-world divergence regarding people with ASCs diagnoses as people 
with different life-worlds. The above, that is, gives us the opportunity to see how people 
with ASCs diagnoses may attribute meaning differently to the neurotypicals, which 
evidently pertains to the semiotics dimension of the life-world. 
 
Executive Dysfunction Theory (EF) 
The Executive Dysfunction (EF) theory was born out of the observation that many of 
the non-social symptoms of people with ASCs diagnoses, which could not be explained 
by the MD account, were similar to those associated with brain injury (Rajendran & 
Mitchell 2007, 231). These symptoms relate to the need for sameness and the lack of 
impulse control, which are, in people without ASCs diagnoses, associated with frontal 
lobe damage (Baddeley & Wilson 1988). Thus, compared to MD, EF is more neurological 
and function-centric (Denkla 1996), and refers to a potential inability to maintain “an 
appropriate problem-solving set for attainment of a future goal” including “behaviours 
such as planning, impulse control, inhibition of prepotent but irrelevant responses, set 
maintenance, organized search, and flexibility of thought and action” (Ozonoff et al. 1991, 
1083). Ulrich Müller and Philip Zelazo (2002) point out that definitions of EF are often 
compilations of symptoms rather than a theoretical story, which often circle around 
planning, decision-making, judgement and self-perception (Tranel et al. 1994). An 
investigation of ecological validity of EF (Burgess et al. 1998) labelled three dimensions 
for it: lack of inhibition (the ability to supress a habitual response), lack of intentionality 
(the ability to handle embedded rules), and lack of executive memory (the ability to shift 
attention between stimuli). As is hinted here, the subcategories systems of EF are many 
and diverse, and there is generally no wide consensus about them (Rajendran & Mitchell 
2007, 223). 
Despite some inconsistency in results and partial failure to replicate findings 
(Pennington & Ozonoff 1996), EF generally fares well evidence-wise. Many of its traits 
(deficits in EF tasks performance) appear to be present in very high percentages of people 
with ASCs diagnoses (96% in, for example, Ozonoff et al. 1991). In another sense, 
however, challenges are present: EF appears to be neither universal, nor unique to ASCs. 
That is, in studies reporting individual variations rather than group differences, the 
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prevalence of EF has been as low as 50% (Rajendran & Mitchell 2007, 233). Studies 
attempting to differentiate disorders based on performance on EF tasks have been largely 
unsuccessful, and ASCs do not present a distinct profile through EF (Rajendran & 
Mitchell 2007, 234). Moreover, it is hard to create tests for isolated aspects of EF owing 
to the theory being multifaceted and its aspects interwoven (Rajendran & Mitchell 2007, 
237). A last issue here is the Executive Dysfunction-Mind Deficit connection: the question 
of how one is to wed deficits apparently explained by MD to EF and vice versa, especially 
since the two are of different ambits. Some researchers (e.g. Russell et al. 1991) have 
proposed that people with ASCs diagnoses attribute mental states wrongly because they 
cannot resist going with an instinctual attribution, which in turn springs out of EF’s 
inhibition facet. Other researchers (e.g. Perner et al. 2002) have countered this argument 
and turned against EF by claiming that executive abilities related to EF are needed for 
MD to obtain. Finally, due to its great ambit, EF is the only theory that can in principle 
account for both the cognitive and motor, social and non-social characteristics of ASCs, 
the various criticisms levelled against it notwithstanding. As we saw above MD pertains 
mainly to the social dimension of ASCs (via postulating a particular attribution of mental 
states). As we will see below WCC regards mainly meaning ascription associated with 
ASCs, and not so much the motor profile ASCs present. 
 
Weak Central Coherence Theory (WCC) 
The Weak Central Coherence theory (WCC), originally put forward by Uta Frith, is 
the latest development in the cognitive theories of ASCs and is based on the premise that 
people with ASCs diagnoses are internally predisposed to process single bits of 
information rather than to synthesize them in larger wholes (Frith 1991; Frith & Happé 
1994). This obtains on both the physical and the social/linguistic levels. An alleged 
manifestation of this, for example, is that children with ASCs diagnoses appear to be able 
to detect small target shapes within a context of a larger shape composed of potentially 
confusing lines (Witkin et al. 1971). More generally, they are less susceptible to visual 
illusions that attempt to trick the viewer by virtue of the context of something making that 
something seem different than it actually is (Happé 1996). Complementarily, children with 
ASCs diagnoses also seem to be unable to take in context or non-immediately 
neighbouring elements to synthesize meaning in linguistic environments. Many more 
children with ASCs diagnoses than their neurotypical experimental counterparts failed to 
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take context into consideration to determine a certain word’s pronunciation and meaning 
(see for example Booth & Happé 2010; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen 1999). For example, when 
presented with the sentence “Hunting with a knife and…”, children with ASCs diagnoses 
tend to fill the gap with words like ‘fork’ or ‘spoon’ rather than, say, ‘rifle’. Interestingly, 
however, people with ASCs diagnoses seem also to be able to ‘go global’ in information 
processing when specifically instructed to do so (Milne et al. 2002), contrary to the 
neurotypicals, for whom the global mode appears mandatory57. This has led Happé (1999) 
and other proponents of WCC to argue for ASCs as a different ‘cognitive style’ rather than 
a de facto deficit58.  
WCC has a few variations purporting to explain ASCs cognitively in terms of either 
‘reduced generalisation’ or ‘hierarchization’. Reduced generalisation theory (Plaisted 
2001) argues that ASCs phenomena stem out of a reduced processing of the similarities 
between stimuli or situations and that people with ASCs diagnoses will indeed ‘go global’ 
if these differences are more salient (which would not be the case in the original WCC). 
Hierarchization theory (Mottron & Burack 2001) offers that both the ‘local’ and the 
‘global’ processing are intact in people with ASCs diagnoses, and what is in fact affected 
is the preference for the local (they do not know which mode to employ for a specific 
purpose on their own). Evidence-wise there is support as well as mixed results for all WCC 
and its main variations (Plaisted et al. 1998; Mottron & Belleville 1993; Rajendran & 
Mitchell 2007, 237-244) and the theory has not been crystallised in one or the other form. 
However, mainly negative results have forced WCC proponents to delineate the 
boundaries of the theory’s scope of explanation more carefully (Rajendran & Mitchell 
2007, 244). First, WCC is now viewed as superior local, rather than inferior global, 
processing. Second, WCC no longer seeks to explain all aspects of ASCs but only one 
cognitive side of them (ibid.). Last, considering its relation to other cognitive theories of 
ASCs, it has been concluded that WCC can be reduced neither to MD, nor to EF, and it 
 
57 This footnote is to highlight this phenomenon as a potential difference between life-
worlds. Following this observation, it may be argued that, in the neurotypical’s world, the 
‘global’ cognitive style appears as an incorrigible substratum. Suchlike differences and life-
world elements and their juxtapositions will be discussed later in this chapter. 
58 Save for the fact that central coherence is sometimes thought to be a non-unitary 
cognitive style, composed of multiple elements (Rajendran & Mitchell 2007, 243). 
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is also the case that it cannot explain what they purport to explain, which amounts to a 
restriction of the theory’s scope. This is because neither the MD and EF ASCs-related 
characteristics are explained via the tenets of WCC (e.g. altered motor skills may not be 
explained by postulating a weak central coherence), nor are the WCC ASCs-related 
characteristics explained via the tenets of MD or EF (for more on the matter see Rajendran 
& Mitchell 2007, 243). 
 
Multiple-Deficit Account, Summary, and Limits of Cognitive Approaches 
To recapitulate, Mind Deficit (MD) was the first major cognitive theory of ASCs to 
appear and is now considered sort of a legacy theory. Its two successors and main 
competitors between them, Executive Dysfunction (EF) and Weak Central Coherence 
(WCC) (or rather their many instantiations), explain different aspects of ASCs. They both 
run simultaneously due to the irreducibility of one to the other, their different explanatory 
ambits, and because evidence, as shown above, remains inconclusive regarding the 
prevalence of one over the other. Thus, the current cognitive picture of ASCs is 
differentiated, reflecting a multiple-deficit account of the condition (Rajendran and 
Mitchell 2007, 244-246). Liz Pellicano et al. (2006) make one of the strongest cases for 
such an account, arguing that the domains not only of EF and WCC but also of MD are 
distinct and unrelated to each other. Multiple-deficit accounts typically do not assume a 
hierarchal relationship between the explanatory mechanisms they engulf. They maintain 
the advantage of encompassing a wide range of explanatory mechanisms and of 
accounting for the fact that two individuals with the same ASC diagnosis may present 
different symptoms and require different treatment. As Rajendran and Mitchell (2007, 
247) write, each theory retains its distinct benefits and there is no fully integrated account 
of all, and this may be owed to ‘autism’ possibly being a non-unitary disorder. If this proves 
to be true theoreticians may have to withdraw any grand claims and unitary explanations 
seeking to explain autism in one fell swoop. As already mentioned in the beginning of this 
section and demonstrated by Happé et al. (2006) this position is also supported by recent 
genetic data. Thus, this multi-profile/multiple cause cognitive account is in keeping with 
the more general contemporary understanding of ASCs. 
This is, in compressed summary, what thirty years of cognitive exploration of ASCs 
have brought us. As a final word, it should be stressed that cognitive theories are, of course, 
neither a necessary nor the only guaranteed correct pathway into ASCs. As Rajendran and 
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Mitchell write (Happé et al. 2006, 248) theories of ASCs have been barometers of 
psychological trends: from psychoanalysis to behaviourism and then to the cognitive era, 
psychology has fed ASCs approaches accordingly, resulting in the current trend of 
cognitive theories: MD; EF; WCC; their variations. As a general rule, the way we think 
about ASCs is all but static. Various authors showcase changes in approaches to ASCs 
over time (Geschwind 2009; Rajendran & Mitchell 2007; Rutter 2005; Steyaert & Marche 
2008), with the most important ones having been mentioned above (not exclusively low 
IQ conditions, not necessarily disorders but conditions, not necessarily unitary). As I 
pointed out in the introduction, all these I mention not just as generic historical and 
conceptual information but as limits to my own work, which focuses on the cognitive 
theories of ASCs. Complementarily, I would like to remind the reader that the purpose of 
this case-study is not to uphold any one theory of ASCs but to argue that people with ASCs 
diagnoses can be seen as operating within a different life-world than the neurotypical one, 
and that this matters for scientific practice. I believe that the summary conducted herein 
will do for this purpose. 
Let us then now venture forth to the argument that, according to the prevalent 
cognitive theories of ASCs and ASC-related testimony, people with ASCs diagnoses 
indeed operate on a different life-world than the neurotypical one. 
 
5.3 People with ASCs Diagnoses as People in Different Life-Worlds 
In this section I argue that people with ASCs diagnoses can be convincingly 
understood as people operating in different, compared to the neurotypicals, life-worlds. In 
making this claim, besides the above material from science, I am also going to address 
testimony from people with ASCs diagnoses and their peers (mainly family, caretakers, 
and various therapists). In the next chapter, I will claim that actually viewing people with 
ASCs diagnoses as operators of different life-worlds – versus, for example, as bearers of 
plainly behavioural differences – would make for better ASCs-related treatment. As this 
whole line of argumentation is unfolded, more testimony corroborating the ‘different life-
worlds’ claim will be added. 
A reminder and a methodological consideration are in order before considering how 
the autistic life-worlds differ to those of the neurotypicals. The reminder is that the life-
world was, in chapter three, defined to be the realm of incorrigible admittances, cashed 
out as the produce of synergy between the perceiving subject and the world. The life-
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world’s contents were organised along four axes: the ontological (what the subject takes 
to exist); the metaphysical (the properties and relations of the world that the subject takes 
to hold); the semiotic (the way in which the subject synthesizes meaning out of various 
signifiers); the emotional (the way the subject perceives their own and others’ emotions). 
Thus, I will also map the ways the autistic life-world differs to the neurotypical life-world 
along these four axes. The methodological consideration is that we cannot assume that 
the autistic life-world is homogeneous. Below, I infer autistic life-worlds from certain 
elements from the cognitive theories of ASCs and testimony of people with ASCs 
diagnoses and their peers. Not all these elements obtain across the whole spectrum – e.g. 
not all people with ASCs diagnoses display a weak central coherence or receive auditory 
stimuli in a much more intense fashion than the neurotypicals. Granted, this obtains for 
the neurotypicals as well: given the life-world definition it would be patently absurd, for 
example, to claim that the neurotypicals all feel the same way towards other people and 
things and situations, or synthesize meaning in the same manner. I will, therefore, as noted 
above, be using the terms ‘autistic life-worlds’ and ‘neurotypical life-worlds’, plural. 
To begin the task of the present section, I would like to invite in an overarching and 
extremely vivid piece of testimony pertaining to what being one with an ASC diagnosis is 
like. What follows is an extract from David Mitchell’s introduction to Naoki Higashida’s 
first book (The Reason I Jump, 2013). Mitchell is an outspoken member within the ASCs 
community, himself the father of a child with an ASC diagnosis, while Higashida is 
probably the most famous and influential nonverbal author with an ASC diagnosis alive. 
The Reason I Jump, a work purporting to give a foray into the first-person experience of 
ASCs, is a New York Times bestseller and a Sunday Times bestseller in the United 
Kingdom, and has been translated to over thirty other languages (Best Sellers – The New 
York Times; Rosie 2013). In his text, which I will keep referring to throughout this section, 
Mitchell writes: 
 
The thirteen-year-old author of this book invites you, his reader, to imagine a daily life 
in which your faculty of speech is taken away. Explaining that you’re hungry, or tired, 
or in pain, is now as beyond your powers as a chat with a friend. I’d like to push the 
thought-experiment a little further. Now imagine that after you lose your ability to 
communicate, the editor-in-residence who orders your thoughts walks out without 
notice. The chances are that you never knew this mind-editor existed, but now that he 
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or she has gone, you realize too late how the editor allowed your mind to function for 
all these years. A dam-burst of ideas, memories, impulses and thoughts is cascading 
over you, unstoppably. Your editor controlled this flow, diverting the vast majority 
away, and recommending just a tiny number for your conscious consideration. But 
now you’re on your own. 
Now your mind is a room where twenty radios, all tuned to different stations, are 
blaring out voices and music. The radios have no off-switches or volume controls, the 
room you’re in has no door or window, and relief will come only when you’re too 
exhausted to stay awake. To make matters worse, another hitherto unrecognized editor 
has just quit without notice — your editor of the senses. Suddenly sensory input from 
your environment is flooding in too, unfiltered in quality and overwhelming in 
quantity. Colours and patterns swim and clamour for your attention. The fabric 
softener in your sweater smells as strong as air freshener fired up your nostrils. Your 
comfy jeans are now as scratchy as steel wool. Your vestibular and proprioceptive 
senses are also out of kilter, so the floor keeps tilting like a ferry in heavy seas, and 
you’re no longer sure where your hands and feet are in relation to the rest of you. You 
can feel the plates of your skull, plus your facial muscles and your jaw; your head feels 
trapped inside a motorcycle helmet three sizes too small which may or may not explain 
why the air conditioner is as deafening as an electric drill, but your father — who’s 
right here in front of you — sounds as if he’s speaking to you from a cell phone, on a 
train going through lots of short tunnels, in fluent Cantonese. You are no longer able 
to comprehend your mother tongue, or any tongue: from now on, all languages will 
be foreign languages. Even your sense of time has gone, rendering you unable to 
distinguish between a minute and an hour, as if you’ve been entombed in an Emily 
Dickinson poem about eternity, or locked into a time-bending SF film. Poems and 
films, however, come to an end, whereas this is your new ongoing reality. Autism is a 
lifelong condition. 
... [F]or those people born onto the autistic spectrum, this unedited, unfiltered and 
scary-as-all-hell reality is home. The functions that genetics bestows on the rest of us 
—the “editors” — as a birthright, people with autism must spend their lives learning 
how to simulate. (Higashida 2013, 1-3) 
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Our life-world detectors should have started beeping already. Let us then start mapping 
the above material from cognitive theories of ASCs and Mitchell’s testimony, as well as 
the material from testimony that is to follow, to specific life-world categories. The order 
will be: semiotics, emotions, metaphysics, ontology. This is because evidence for the 
semiotic and emotional differences of the autistic life-worlds stems directly from claims of 
scientific theories as well as from testimony itself. I will thus begin by showcasing 
differences along these two axes and then move to purported metaphysical and ontological 
differences, for which my claims will be more speculative, based more on reconstructions 
– rather than direct claims – of theory and testimony compared to the first two categories. 
 
Semiotics and Emotions 
As a general comment on semiotics, let us bring in Jim Sinclair, among other things 
an ASCs-involved activist, who, in his influential article Don’t Mourn for Us, which we will 
also get to explore thoroughly in the next chapter pertaining to ASCs treatment, calls us 
to imagine a parent trying to communicate with their child with an ASC diagnosis and 
not getting an ‘appropriate response’ back. He says: 
 
That does not mean the child is incapable of relating at all. It only means you’re 
assuming a shared system, a shared understanding of signals and meanings that the 
child in fact does not share. It’s as if you tried to have an intimate connection with 
someone who has no comprehension of our language ... You’re going to have to give 
up your assumptions about shared meanings ... each of us who manages to reach out 
and make a connection with you, is operating in alien territory, making contact with 
alien beings. (Sinclair 1993, n.p.) 
 
Indeed, evidence from both cognitive science and testimony is ample to infer that 
people with ASCs diagnoses synthesize meaning in a different manner to that of the 
neurotypicals. On the scientific end, Weak Central Coherence theory (Frith 1991; Frith & 
Happé 1994; Milne et al. 2002) may be shown to point in this direction via two 
observations. First, people with ASCs diagnoses are often perceiving objects and entities 
in a much more neighbourly fashion than the neurotypicals do – their perception is much 
more ‘zoomed in’ in whatever they are directing their attention towards. This is, the WCC 
theory argues, what explains empirical results such as people with ASCs diagnoses being 
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less susceptible to falling prey to visual illusions that exploit the more ‘zoomed out’ 
perceptual synthesis of the neurotypicals. Second, this localized coherence holds also for 
linguistic meaning synthesis. We saw how people with ASCs diagnoses often fail to take 
context into consideration when determining a certain word’s pronunciation and 
meaning, and how children with ASCs diagnoses tend to fill the ‘word gaps’ in quizzes by 
choosing words that are only relevant to elements immediately neighbouring to the gaps. 
Moreover, the reduced generalisation theory (variation of WCC – Plaisted 2001) suggests 
that people with ASCs diagnoses usually display a reduced processing of the similarities 
between stimuli or situations thus displaying ASCs-related phenomena. 
The Mind Deficit theory (Rajendran & Mitchell 2007, 226-231) also points to a 
different meaning synthesis on behalf of people with ASCs diagnoses. It does so via its 
purported explanations for empirical phenomena such as the reactions of people with 
ASCs diagnoses to the doll story situation59 (section two above). MD’s explanation is that 
people with ASCs diagnoses fail to synthesize a sequence of hypothetical events to arrive 
at a conclusion about the mental states of the people involved that would typically 
correspond to a neurotypical’s conclusion. Moreover, MD is the theoretical response to 
the fact that people with ASCs diagnoses very often fail to interpret nonliteral language 
qua nonliteral, ascribing a different meaning to it than the neurotypically intended. 
Further, work on the theory of Enactive Mind (variation of MD – Klin et al. 2003) 
generated a lot of empirical evidence that people with ASCs diagnoses often look for 
meaning in terms of physical rather than immaterial, symbolic, or metaphorical properties 
in their environment.  
Heidi LoStracco (2014), a speech language pathologist, augmentative and alternative 
communication consultant and co-owner of Speak for Yourself60, argues that it is often the 
case that the standard sets of words and expressions acquired through typical ASCs 
 
59 Recall the doll story scenario (Wimmer & Perner 1983): two people are sitting in a room, 
knowing a doll is at a certain place. One of them leaves the room, the other moves the doll 
to a different location. The question of this scenario is: where will the first person look for 
the doll when they come back in the room? In most cases, people with ASCs diagnoses 
claim that this person is going to look for the doll in the second place. 
60 Speak for Yourself is an application by speech-language pathologists that work 
exclusively with clients who are functionally nonverbal. 
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treatment have no function in the patient’s life, or feel insubstantial. In the next chapter, I will 
contend that much of the failure of the typical treatment for ASCs is due to not considering 
the differences of the autistic life-worlds to the neurotypical ones, one of the key aspects 
of this being that the mainstream treatment tries to enforce behaviour that makes no 
meaningful sense in the autistic life-worlds. 
Last on semiotics, Mitchell’s testimony puts it that the mind’s typical ‘editor in 
residence’, responsible for ordering one’s thoughts, has departed in the cases of people 
with ASCs diagnoses, thus resulting in a meaning-extraction environment that is much 
more chaotic to that of the neurotypical. Recall the passage: 
 
A dam-burst of ideas, memories, impulses and thoughts is cascading over you, 
unstoppably. Your editor controlled this flow, diverting the vast majority away, and 
recommending just a tiny number for your conscious consideration. But now you’re 
on your own. ... your mind is a room where twenty radios, all tuned to different 
stations, are blaring out voices and music ... (Higashida 2013, 1-2) 
 
In Mitchell’s account, a person with an ASC diagnosis is often bombarded with 
thoughts from their own brain, something which adds a layer of difficulty in filtering out 
and ordering some of these thoughts. No less important is Mitchell’s highlighting the case 
of nonverbal people, those who do not comprehend any language. As the neurotypicals 
extract meaning chiefly in linguistic terms this is also a massive difference in the process 
of ordering and signifying things between people with ASCs diagnoses and the 
neurotypical. 
Let us now move to emotional differences of the autistic life-worlds. We recall that 
Sinclair (1993, n.p.) states that “autism colours every emotion”. Indeed, it is very well 
documented that people with ASCs diagnoses feel very differently towards a multitude of 
situations compared to the neurotypicals. Higashida (2013) and numerous others such as 
the highly-acclaimed Mark Haddon (2003 – writer of The Curious Incident of the Dog in the 
Night-Time) explicate many of the emotional intricacies related to ASCs. For example, the 
protagonist of Haddon’s book feels very happy or very sad depending on what the colours 
of the cars he sees during his day are. This is amply evinced on the scientific side of things: 
EF, for example, highlights people with ASCs diagnoses’ need for sameness, for steady 
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routines and surrounding patterns, negative emotions befalling them whenever these are 
disrupted.  
Professionals in ASCs-specialized education often take notice of this aspect of the 
autistic life-worlds. Valerie Paradiz, founder of the School for Autistic Strength, Purpose 
and Independence in Education complains to The Guardian’s Emine Saner (2007, n.p.) 
that: 
 
In most schools, kids with Asperger syndrome are placed in settings that are either 
overwhelming in a social or sensory way, or underwhelming in an intellectual way and 
many adolescents end up struggling with profound isolation and depression.  
 
It is readily evident in Paradiz’s words that a difference in immediate world intake 
leads to emotional instability when matched with an inappropriate environment. Once 
again, we may add Mitchell’s testimony: people with ASCs diagnoses occasionally 
experience unpleasant emotions just from being in their own body, their organs feeling too 
big or otherwise causing discomfort: 
 
Relief will come only when you’re too exhausted to stay awake ... You can feel the 
plates of your skull, plus your facial muscles and your jaw; your head feels trapped 
inside a motorcycle helmet three sizes too small ... (Higashida 2013, 2) 
 
Moreover, relatedly, the below state of affairs is not framed as particularly pleasing: 
 
Your vestibular and proprioceptive senses are also out of kilter, so the floor keeps tilting 
like a ferry in heavy seas, and you’re no longer sure where your hands and feet are in 
relation to the rest of you. (Higashida 2013, 2) 
 
The above considerations establish a difference in reflexive emotions on behalf of 
people with ASCs diagnoses. However, it is purportedly not the case that these differences 
regard only unexpected – pleasant and unpleasant, happy and sad – emotions when faced 
with given situations. In the next chapter, particularly in the case of Oliver Sacks’ ‘twin 
savants’ we will move to see how people with ASCs diagnoses may relate differently to 
others, or to different things than the neurotypicals do, displaying a peculiar emotional 
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world the richness of which goes beyond the binary of being happy or sad with different 
things: presumably, for the case we will investigate, Sacks’ twins maintained a particular 
kind of companionship with numbers. 
 
Metaphysics and Ontology 
There is a manifold of other ASCs-related differences, many of which may be argued 
to be differences in life-world metaphysics. Here, I do not adopt the notion of analytic 
metaphysics but a broader and looser definition. The life-world dimension of metaphysics, 
recall, pertains to what the perceived properties of things are and to how various pieces of 
the life-world’s contents relate to one another – how the world appears to be and relates. The 
ASCs-related differences I list below can, I claim, be thus construed as different properties 
and relations in life-world content. However, since construing empirical data as life-world 
differences is weaker and more speculative here than it was for semiotics and emotions, 
my claim is also weaker: I do not assert a definitively different metaphysics for people with 
ASCs diagnoses; I simply argue that we have reason not to assume such a unitary 
metaphysics for them, shared with the neurotypicals. 
Since we were just on Mitchell, I would like to begin this section by referring to his 
pieces of testimony from above. Recall that Mitchell pinpointed issues of ‘thought 
bombardment’; out of kilter vestibular and proprioceptive senses; altered sense of time 
passage. Ideas, memories, impulses, and thoughts, he tells us, are hitting the autistic 
consciousness with much more intensity than in the neurotypical conditions, becoming 
intrusive. Further, people with ASCs diagnoses often lack a sense of balance and the sense 
of their body parts’ whereabouts – the vestibular and proprioceptive senses. These 
properties of the self are, if not absent, then surely different in their manifestation to their 
neurotypical counterparts. Last but of course not least is the issue of how time is perceived 
to flow, which is tilted in the way Mitchell describes, lacking the relative linearity it 
displays for the neurotypicals. These are perceived properties of thoughts, the body, time, I 
claim, which are different to the neurotypicals. They shape a different world for the people 
with ASCs diagnoses’ navigation, and thus can plausibly be construed as differences in 
life-world metaphysics. 
Further, it is well corroborated since early scientific research into ASCs that the 
spectrum involves under- or oversensitivity to both visual and auditory stimuli (Rajendran 
& Mitchell 2007, 225). That is, compared to the neurotypical perception, certain stimuli 
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of this kind may be overbearing or barely noticeable. There is a difference in the intensity 
of such perceptual intakes. Mitchell once again captures the phenomenology of this 
vividly: 
 
... your editor of the senses is also gone. Suddenly sensory input from your 
environment is flooding in too, unfiltered in quality and overwhelming in quantity. 
Colours and patterns swim and clamour for your attention. The fabric softener in your 
sweater smells as strong as air freshener fired up your nostrils. Your comfy jeans are 
now as scratchy as steel wool. (Higashida 2013, 2) 
 
People with ASCs diagnoses often have an auditory memory that is better than their 
visual one and an equal ability of recalling coherent sentences and random word strings 
(Hermelin & O’Connor 1967). This situation may be the result of auditory memories 
having a more vivid quality than the visual ones, and random word strings having an equal 
mnemonic vividness to what neurotypicals would perceive as coherent sentences (thought 
this is now my own speculation). More vivid quality and equal mnemonic vividness are 
plausibly construed, I suggest, as perceived differences in life-world metaphysics in that 
they denote, again, different perceived properties of memories and word strings. 
Let us now consider the Executive Function theory (Anderson et al. 1994; Denkla 
1996). Recall that people with ASCs diagnoses have a potential inability to maintain an 
appropriate problem-solving set for the attainment of a future goal including behaviours 
such as planning; impulse control; inhibition of prepotent but irrelevant responses; set 
maintenance; organized search. Following such processes does not ‘come naturally’ to 
them, as opposed to the neurotypical people, who normally find themselves maintaining 
problem-solving sets towards future goals before they even realise it. These are, again, 
different to the neurotypicals’ properties of the self, experienced phenomenologically. 
Moreover, according to EF, at least some people with ASCs diagnoses display a lack of 
flexibility of thought and action. Thought and action, that is, lack or have less of a property 
that normally obtains with the neurotypicals – thus underlining a plausible metaphysical 
difference. 
Last, a few words about ontology. According to WCC (Witkin et al. 1971), people with 
ASCs diagnoses process more distinct bits of information on the physical level. This can 
be argued to change their sense of what there is in the way that synthesizing perceptual 
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stimuli changes our sense of what there is in the Jastrow’s duck-rabbit case (see section 
3.1): organising a material differently produces different distinguishable units. My eye may 
be receiving the same lines and dots on a paper but, as we recall from the noematic 
dimension of the life-world, this is not enough to denote either a duck or a rabbit on the 
paper: entities are the production of active – albeit mostly unconscious – synthesis on 
behalf of the perceiving agent. This, it seems, is different in the people with ASCs 
diagnoses’ life-world. Michelle Dawson (2004, n.p. – for more on Dawson see below) 
speaks of people with ASCs diagnoses as operating under a different ‘organising idea’ 
compared to the neurotypicals. It is true, however, that science and testimony refer to 
differences in ‘what there is’ in the autistic life-world much more sparsely than ‘what 
obtains of what is’ and ‘what it feels like’. 
This concludes the demonstration of the differences between the autistic and the 
neurotypical life-worlds – at least for now, for the topic is to be taken up again in the next 
chapter when yet more relevant will be added. Before concluding this section, I would like 
to take the chance to make some summarizing comments on the differences between 
autistic and neurotypical life-worlds, and also comment on the inter-relatedness of 
elements of the autistic life-worlds. Upon reviewing the above findings, we may claim the 
following of the autistic life-worlds. Regarding semiotics: first, meaning in the autistic life-
worlds in at least many cases is synthesized in a much more local fashion than the 
neurotypical, both in physical and in linguistic terms. Second, the mental states of others 
are often misattributed or, if you will, attributed in a different manner than the 
neurotypical. Third, linguistic meaning seems to be extracted from a more chaotic 
environment to the neurotypical, characterised by a bombardment of thoughts. 
On the front of emotions, there is a well recorded wide difference of emotional 
response to a variety of situations. We may safely conclude, first, that most people with 
ASCs diagnoses display a consistent need for sameness in their surroundings and routine 
in their lives. Second people with ASCs diagnoses are often distressed when put in 
overloading environments and faced with auditory and visual stimuli that may not be a 
disturbance to the neurotypicals. Third, recalling Mitchell’s testimony, the bodies of those 
with ASCs diagnoses often feel overbearing or tiresome. Pending demonstration in the 
next chapter, I also noted that the autistic life-worlds are plausibly worlds of much richer 
emotional difference to the neurotypical than being happy and sad and uncomfortable 
with different things. 
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Metaphysics is also presumably the locus of important differences though the 
connection requires a charitable, wide construal of metaphysics to be made. First, thoughts 
appear to have a more intense quality and the self is lacking its proprioceptive and 
vestibular senses. Moreover, actions appear to have a reduced flexibility, impulses being 
harder to control. Second, there is an increased or decreased sensitivity to visual and 
auditory stimuli. Third, the sense of time is tilted, lacking the relative linearity it displays 
for the neurotypicals. Fourth, the processes of maintaining an appropriate problem-solving 
set for the attainment of a future goal and other EF-related characteristics do not as 
naturally come to an individual with an ASC diagnosis as a neurotypical one. 
The differences in ontology strictu sensu that we saw above appear to be very limited, 
relating mostly to the synthesis of different stimuli in larger wholes. We may, however, 
find ontologically-flavoured elements in many of the ASC-related differences we surveyed 
above and which we did not classify as ontological. Take, for example, the case of 
oversensitivity to visual or auditory stimuli: not even noticing such stimuli in the 
environment that the neurotypicals would normally notice, or noticing the existence of 
some that would be practically non-existent to the neurotypicals, may be argued to amount 
to a different ontological picture in an autistic life-worlds sense. Not even noticing 
something is in fact quite the perfect negation of it being an incorrigible admission in one’s 
life-world. Not that this point is only true of ontology: above, we amply understood that 
an ASCs-related difference may pertain to two or more elements of the autistic life-world 
(the bombardment of thoughts alters meaning extraction but also facilitates different, to 
the neurotypicals, emotions in different situations). 
One could at this point focus future work on disentangling the elements of the life-
world and finding a neat categorization system for the autistic life-worlds so that every 
observed difference falls in a distinct category. I think that would be mostly missing the 
life-world’s point. First, the life-world is an analytical tool tailored to encapsulate the 
world of ordinary experience as it is incorrigibly (the self included). It is true of experience 
that it often does not come neatly cut into categories: many experiences are packing 
organically entangled elements of different kinds. I see something in front of me that 
appears to be in such and such ways, and this makes me feel in a certain way, and I also 
extract a meaningful observation. For example, if I am lost and thirsty, roaming the desert, 
and I find a roughly made sign pointing me to the nearest oasis, I will at once perceive 
something, ascribe a meaning to it, and feel grateful that I probably will not die of thirst. 
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The four categories of the life-world are meant to pick elements of perception and 
experience apart towards certain theoretical (e.g. philosophical analysis towards locating 
science situatedness – I will expand on this in chapter seven) or practical purposes (here 
mainly ASCs treatment – see next chapter), not to provide an elegant solution to the 
problem of the classification of such phenomena as an end in itself. The life-world and its 
elements are not worked around necessary and sufficient definitions exactly to 
accommodate the intricacies of the multifarious, complex processes that experience and 
perception are. The material presented herein, even if the reader finds themselves objecting 
now and again to certain classificatory manoeuvres, should be able to demonstrate what 
is important: the autistic life-worlds differ to the neurotypical ones, importantly so at that. 
No sooner should we point out this conclusion than highlight that evidence is not 
always of the same strength in evincing this difference. I have noted this in the opening of 
this section but after reviewing the material in detail it is sensible to repeat it here mainly 
via two statements. First, for those conclusions derived from the cognitive theories of and 
empirical work on ASCs such as more localized meaning process, lack of impulse control, 
different attribution of mental states et cetera, we should note that the evidential hardships 
the theories face obviously and proportionately get in the way of our confidence in the 
conclusions we extract from them here. We should keep in mind, that is, that the 
theoretical conjectures of cognitive and other theories are one thing, and the evidence we 
rely on to evince life-world difference is another. For example, not all people with ASCs 
diagnoses display lack of impulse control, some of them do in fact fall prey to visual 
illusions, and of course it is not the case that only people with ASCs diagnoses display a 
below than typical ability to maintain a proper problem-solving attitude towards the 
attainment of a future goal. Second, regarding testimony included herein and in the next 
chapter, the obvious limitations apply: testimony does not consist sustained and rigorous 
scientific research, especially so in testimony presented in literary form (e.g. Mitchell’s), 
Further research on the testimony of people with ASCs diagnoses and their peers is likely 
to find further disagreements – but I have already denoted we should not expect a unitary 
autistic life-world. Arguably, however, excluding the people with ASCs diagnoses’ 
testimony is a far, far worse alternative. As we will see in the next chapter – especially in 
the Sacks-twins story – much of the attempted reconstruction of the autistic life-worlds 
remains speculative. I will underline, however, that, equally importantly, this is so because 
the ASCs treatment industry appears to not be interested in this process. This is wrongly so, 
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I will claim: the autistic life-worlds reconstruction process is in fact invaluable if we 
prioritize people with ASCs’ well-being and should be the cornerstone of treatment. 
Last, we must add the necessary life-world ingredient. If we are to enumerate a number 
of differences between people with ASCs diagnoses and the neurotypicals and proclaim 
that they operate in different life-worlds, then it is necessary that these differences be 
incorrigible. This will be work conducted mainly in the next chapter, where these 
differences are continually pinpointed as being the irreversible setting for people with 
ASCs diagnoses (see mainly Sinclair and Dawson in the next chapter). There, it will be 
shown that the ‘failure’ of ASCs treatment showcases precisely the immutability of the 
life-world differences I listed above. Expecting this development, allow me here to bring 
up Sinclair’s words once again: 
 
Autism isn't something a person has, or a ‘shell’ that a person is trapped inside. There's 
no normal child hidden behind the autism. Autism is a way of being. It is pervasive; it 
colors every experience, every sensation, perception, thought, emotion, and encounter, 
every aspect of existence. It is not possible to separate the autism from the person – 
and if it were possible, the person you'd have left would not be the same person you 
started with. ... Autism is a way of being. It is not possible to separate the person from 
the autism. (Sinclair 1993, n.p.) 
 
It is interesting to see how closely (and unwittingly) Sinclair’s account follows the 
definition of the life-world. Autism colours every sensation, perception, thought, emotion 
and encounter, every aspect of existence. What the person perceives, how it hangs together, 
the emotional relation to the world, how meaning is derived from it: ontology, 
metaphysics, semiotics, emotion: the four categories of one’s life-world. These things are 
different in people with ASCs diagnoses; their life-worlds are different. Further, these 
differences consist a way of being: they are so incorrigibly glued to the person that it is 
impossible to separate the person from the autism. 
Like Sinclair, Dawson has written quite extensively on ASCs. Having a diagnosis 
herself, Dawson is an academic researcher on ASCs, affiliated with a number of academic 
and medical institutions in Canada. In her famous, for reasons that we will explore 
thoroughly in the next chapter, 2004 article The Misbehaviour of Behaviourists Dawson 
argues that the problem with behavioural treatment relating to ASCs is that behaviourists 
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do appreciate how people with ASCs diagnoses are differently structured, what autistic 
intelligence is and how it functions. What is important presently is that, across her article, 
Dawson speaks of central differences and different ‘organizing ideas’ (see ontological 
differences above) in people with ASCs diagnoses that shape autistic intelligence and 
navigation of the world differently than the neurotypical, and argues that ASCs should be 
taken seriously as different ways of being rather than a collection of symptoms, something 
which is very much in accord with Sinclair’s account. As is perhaps to be expected, 
Mitchell is quick to agree with their account of the autistic ‘home setting’: 
 
... [F]or those people born onto the autistic spectrum, this unedited, unfiltered and 
scary-as-all-hell reality is home. The functions that genetics bestows on the rest of us 
—the “editors” — as a birthright, people with autism must spend their lives learning 
how to simulate. (Higashida 2013, 3) 
 
With this statement, I think, the conclusion is ripe for the taking: the immediate, 
incorrigible experience of the world for people with ASCs diagnoses is very different to 
that of the neurotypicals. As we saw and we will continue to be seeing in the next chapter, 
most theoreticians, clinicians, activists and outspoken agents in the ASCs community, 
whether they have an ASC diagnosis or not, may be shown to be in stellar agreement with 
this life-world account. This is admitted quite often in explicit language (‘their’ world and 
ours), which is nonetheless narrated by theoreticians and therapists who have not, 
presumably, engaged with German philosophers obscure in the English-speaking world 
and in the professions around ASCs, and equally obscure continental philosophy notions. 
Especially by the end of the next chapter there will remain, I believe, little doubt that 




In this chapter, I have covered the following ground. First, in section 5.1, I presented 
a historical and conceptual view of ASCs, and provided the reader with a, within space 
limits, comprehensive summary of the condition and concepts surrounding it. Second, in 
section 5.2, seeking to understand how people with ASCs diagnoses perceive the world, I 
explored all major cognitive theories of ASCs and their evidential backing in some detail, 
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and analysed their main varieties. Last, in section 5.3, I attempted to establish that people 
with ASCs diagnoses can be seen as operating in different life-worlds to the neurotypical 
ones. I did this by mapping conclusions from the cognitive research into ASCs and 
testimony from people with ASCs diagnoses and peers to the categories of the life-world 
as defined in chapter three. My claim of life-world differences is to find even further 
confirmation in the next chapter, where even more testimony and arguments from all 
ASCs-related camps (such as therapists and activists) will be reviewed.  
The larger subject of the next chapter is ASCs treatment. There, I will investigate the 
heated ethico-political controversy around the mainstream behavioural treatment for 
ASCs and argue that the life-world can provide directions for a resolution. Seeing people 
with ASCs diagnoses as operators of different life-worlds prompts us to see, I will claim, 
that treatment should be tailored to their life-worlds, thus reconsidering many key aspects 























6. Autism Spectrum Conditions Treatment and the Life-World 
 
Introduction 
In the first two chapters I called for a direct conceptual examination of science’s claim 
to the truth via the observables. Following this, I defined the observables as the incorrigible 
admittances of the life-world. After this, in chapter four, I argued, mostly theoretically, 
that the life-world is not unique and universal but pluralistic. In the previous chapter 
(section 5.3) I showed how people with autism spectrum conditions (ASCs) diagnoses are 
best understood as operators of life-worlds different to the neurologically typical ones. This 
shows that the issue of different life-worlds transcends the boundaries of philosophical 
speculation and special cases: if more than 1% of the population is shown to operate in 
life-worlds importantly different to the neurotypical ones from ASCs alone then my 
pluralistic life-world contentions are decidedly demonstrated. 
In this chapter I want to consider the significance that this life-world difference has and 
should have for scientific practice and its societal aims – specifically ASCs research and 
treatment. That is, it is not only the case that people with ASCs diagnoses occupy a 
different life-world: what treatment is to do with this life-world (try to alter it; discard it as 
problematic; attempt to recreate and navigate it in its own terms), I claim, proves to be an 
issue at the heart not only of which treatment method to follow and how, but also of 
political debates and activist claims around the issue of ASCs treatment. I argue that we 
should construe the political activists around ASCs as claiming that autistic life-worlds are 
different to the neurotypical ones, and that these life-worlds should be considered valid 
modes of being, not considered objects of attempted change or de facto problematic. In this 
way, I hope to provide a philosophical framework and an array of conceptual tools to help 
adjudicate the heated political debate within ASCs communities. My own adjudication 
will be that the autistic life-worlds should be accepted as valid modes of being and have a 
privileged position in orienting the course of ASCs treatment. 
The above issue is not only of political and humanitarian interest; it cuts at the heart 
of the plan that this dissertation has for the scientific realism debate. My related 
recommendation, in chapter seven, will be to move beyond issues of capital-t Truth, 
radical scepticism, and other related big metaphysical questions, to focus instead on how 
what we take to be true shapes lives. What follows demonstrates that this question indeed 
 180 
matters: that human lives are indeed severely affected by what we think of others’ validity 
of experience, especially in matters scientific, double in matters of mental health.  
The present chapter is structured as follows. In section 6.1 I first provide a historical 
overview of treatment approaches to ASCs. Following, I explore what the current picture 
of the treatment field is and point out certain connections to its past as pervading tropes 
which are important for the discussion. In section 6.2 I summarize the political history of 
neurodiversity, the activist movement which proclaims that ASCs should be considered 
different, legitimate, non-defective modes of being, and calls for very specific or little to no 
intervention. In section 6.3 I conduct a more thorough presentation of the movements, 
how they articulate their political goals and contemporarily operate through characteristic 
examples. In section 6.4 I go into the specifics of the contemporary ‘gold therapeutic 
standard’ in ASCs, Applied Behaviour Analysis (ABA). I explain what methods ABA uses 
and investigate findings of a meta-study of ABA’s evidential basis compared to that of 
other methods, which will be used in the comparative evaluation of methods to follow. 
In section 6.5 I turn to what I call the ‘anti-ABA’ front, which accuses ABA of 
breaching human rights and consent in ASCs treatment, not respecting its patients’ mode 
of being, thinking, and feeling. In section 6.6 I attempt to provide a general arbitration of 
the debate, offering some tentative suggestions about how the anti-ABA versus ABA 
controversy is to be resolved. I do this by showing how the debate can be best understood 
in terms of the autistic life-worlds and divergent approaches to it. I grant the activists’ 
argument that the autistic life-worlds are to be respected and propose a general method 
regarding ASCs treatment: filtering ABA according to the autistic life-worlds and taking 
other, phenomenologically-oriented treatment methods seriously. In section 6.7 I close by 
providing some general limitations to this method and by consequence to how deeply 
science can intervene in a life-world that is decidedly different to the one from which it is 
launched. 
Seeing as this chapter is unusual within the dissertation, I would now like to address 
several methodological considerations. First, this is the only chapter in the present 
dissertation that covers speech and action which are directly political – those from the 
ASCs-related activism and movements. This calls for a handling of a particular 
bibliography, which extends in some ways beyond standard academic sources used in 
other chapters. For these reasons about half the literature cited in this chapter will consist 
of first-hand accounts from people with (and without) ASCs diagnoses, who take part in 
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relevant political movements, and related articles in acknowledged media. Second, this 
bibliography is vast and is impossible to keep track of all of it here. Instead of glossing over 
a large number of testimonies I have chosen to rather go in depth with some that are either 
the most influential and/or the most characteristic on the issue they examine. Third, the 
issues discussed in this chapter raise two difficulties regarding their examination in the 
present dissertation: a) they often fall under the scope of disciplines like therapy ethics, 
handling of difference within mental health practices, and even political philosophy, and 
thus off the scope of my own field strictly speaking, and b) they are vastly complex, and 
would take a doctoral dissertation in its own right to comprehensively discuss and evaluate 
them in their entirety. To overcome these issues, I narrow the questions I ask and the 
answers I give accordingly: what I claim is that, with conceptual aid from the life-world, 
we can understand the political debate around ASCs in a richer light, and draw some 
suggestions and directions of thought about how to navigate the discrepancy – I do not, 
say, purport to solve the issue of difference, widely construed, within the mental health 
sciences. 
 
6.1 Treatment Overview 
Medically speaking, falling within the autism spectrum is considered being ill, both 
physically and mentally (Klin 2006, 4; American Psychiatric Association 2013), and this 
has been so since the advent of the concept of autism. Therefore, since 1920, specialized 
branches of various professions have sought to find out treatments or cures for ASCs. In 
its early days, treatment was almost perfectly mapped to theories of ASCs. This one-to-
one relationship seems now to be decidedly a trend of the past. This is because theories of 
ASCs were initially much more ambitious, purporting to explain the whole spectrum in 
one go and to encompass all its social, non-social, physical, mental, and cognitive 
dimensions. As was mentioned in the last chapter and demonstrated through the 
presentation of cognitive theories of ASCs, this is no longer the case: it is generally 
accepted not only that ASCs do not constitute a unitary category (‘autism’) but also that, 
however useful, any and every theory of ASCs can provide only a piecemeal picture of the 
spectrum. Therefore, a fusion of a number of theories of ASCs is usually what explains a 
given instantiation of the spectrum most convincingly. 
In large part, the shift in treatment approach has mirrored the above transition in the 
conjectured reasons and theories behind the spectrum. ASCs are now understood to form 
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a continuum with overlapping symptomatology behind which lies a complex web of 
genetic and environmental factors. This was not always the case; as discussed in the 
previous chapter, understanding of ASCs has ranged quite a bit since their early attribution 
to unemotional mothers from psychoanalytic theories before settling on the current multi-
layered situation. Below follows a short timeline and narration of ASCs treatment (as 
synthesized by referring to Bender et al. 1962; Elder et al. 2006; Lichstein & Schreibman 
1976; Masi et al. 2006). This timeline will be instrumental in seeing how the debates 
around ASCs treatment today are vitally connected to its past. 
 
Timeline: Major Historical Developments in the Treatment of Autism 
1920s: Electroconvulsive therapy and dietary restrictions emerge as the first mainstream 
treatment methods for autism61. 
1940s-1950s: Autism is considered chiefly an emotional disorder owed to unemotional 
mothers. Parentectomy, the approach of cutting children away from their parents, is 
employed as a treatment method. 
1970s: Shock therapy and aversive punishment emerge and become the mainstream 
treatment approach. 
1987: Ivar Lovaas, from the University of California, Los Angeles, develops what is still 
considered the gold standard for autism treatment: the Applied Behaviour Analysis (ABA) 
method, which has become the subject of great controversy. 
1997: Special education programs for children with autism emerge. 
2013: Autism becomes the Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) spectrum in definition 
(what I call ASCs throughout the present dissertation to observe activists’ anti-disorder 
claims). 
 
Below follows a short summary of the main treatment methods sketched in the 
timeline. 
 
Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT) 
 
61 In this chapter, when speaking historically, I will be switching back to ‘autism’ from the 
term ‘ASCs’. This is to indicate the given period’s understanding of the spectrum in order 
to be more historically accurate. 
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The observant reader will have noticed that treatment methods date before the concept 
of autism made its appearance by Leo Kanner and Hans Asperger. This is because a 
diagnostic category for children with autism (who were subsequently diagnosed with 
autism) existed then, only it, as we saw in the last chapter, was labelled childhood 
schizophrenia until the 1940s. Therefore, it is no surprise that the main treatment method 
for it was the main treatment62 method for schizophrenia, ECT. The main idea behind 
ECT is that the brain receives brief seizures via electricity, which are hypothesized to 
change its chemistry in a way that alleviates ASCs symptomatology. ECT is now largely 
obsolete and thought to be surpassed in efficacy by behavioural methods, though there are 
some who still examine its potential efficacy (for more see Dhosse & Stanfill 2004). 
 
Dietary Restrictions 
This treatment method emerged around the same period as ECT (1920s), and the main 
idea behind it was that one could treat or even ‘cure’ ASCs by removing certain toxins 
from a dietary routine. No substantial evidence has come to the fore in favour of this 
treatment method, which is today thought to be largely ineffective (Hyman et al. 2016). 
 
Aversive Punishment 
The idea behind aversive punishment is the same as in every ‘negative’ behavioural 
modification, including the infamous dog training method by Ivan Pavlov: punish a 
subject after displaying behaviour you want to see gone and you will see this behaviour 
gone. In the 1970s, when this approach was at its historical peak, no genetic factors were 
thought to facilitate ASCs. ASCs were instead seen as centrally behavioural – as a 
collection of symptoms. Therefore, children with an ASCs diagnosis received, for 
example, electric shocks when displaying ASCs-related behaviour (this time not to change 
the brain chemistry but as punishment). While this method seemed to be effective in terms 
of stopping children from displaying ASCs-related behaviour it is now largely forbidden 
from practice. An example is the U.S. Federal Drug Administration, which proposed and 
passed a ban of this treatment method in 2016 because of ethical reasons (Department of 
Health and Human Services 2016). Indeed, there is much controversy around how 
 
62 The history of ECT is well known and notoriously controversial (for a detailed account 
see, for example, Shorter & Healy 2007). 
 184 
efficiency should be measured in terms of mental health improvement, and whether 
getting a child to stop displaying a certain behaviour can be taken as a measure of 
treatment success, or as an ethical measure of treatment success. 
 
Pharmacological Therapies 
After shifting the focus to genetics, mainly via twins and siblings studies, it was 
believed that ASCs are better treated with medications. Psychotropic substances such as 
lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), which were trending in recreational and countercultural 
use and psychotherapy during the 1970s, were employed in ASCs treatment (DeFilippis 
& Wagner 2016). These therapies, however, ceased to take place since psychotropic 
substances were ruled out of therapy soon thereafter. There are, however, FDA-approved 
medications that are provided to people with ASCs today to alleviate some of their 
symptoms. These are mainly neurotransmitters that are antagonists to serotonin and 
dopamine receptors (they increase the concentration of serotonin and dopamine in the 
brain) and typical and atypical (second generation) antipsychotics such as Risperidone, 
Aripiprazole, Clozapine, and Haloperidol (Masi et al. 2017). It is very important to note 
here that in no way do these medications address the core causes of autism: they just keep the 
symptoms at bay. The counter to this treatment method is that these medications often 
have serious side effects (as seen, for example, in Üçok & Gaebel 2008). 
 
Applied Behaviour Analysis (ABA) 
In 1980, infantile autism was separated from childhood schizophrenia for the first time, 
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders III (DSM III – American 
Psychiatric Association 1987). This change was accompanied by a move beyond 
pharmacological intervention backed up by the increasing emphasis on the genetic basis 
of ASCs (Wolff 2004). This marked the start of a cognitive-behavioural era for ASCs and 
ushered in the establishment of special education programmes complemented, among 
others, by speech and language therapy, psychotherapy, and occupational and physical 
therapy (ibid.). Moreover, the admittance of a spectrum meant that, to a significant degree, 
therapy had to be individualized. 
Applied Behaviour Analysis (ABA) was established by Lovaas. The basic idea behind 
ABA was the same one behind most behavioural approaches: reinforce positive and 
discourage ‘negative’ behaviour, and teach children important new skills with these 
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means. In his 1987 paper, Behavioural Treatment and Normal Educational and Intellectual 
Functioning in Young Autistic Children, Lovaas presented a study in which a group of 
children received 40 hours a week intensive behavioural therapy for two to six years. The 
results were reportedly striking, with more than 90% of the children showing significant 
improvements in symptoms and, allegedly, in social and cognitive competence. 
Having this overview in mind, let us now turn to how the ASCs community and related 
political movements have reacted to issues around therapy. 
 
6.2 The Ransom Notes Controversy and Early Neurodiversity 
On December of 2007 people around New York were met with ‘ransom notes’ of 
several kinds, posted on large billboards and construction sites. The aim of these notes was 
to raise awareness about various childhood mental disorders, in which ASCs were 
included (Kras 2010). The notes were also posted in influential American magazines like 
Newsweek and New York Magazine. The ones regarding ASCs read: 
 
Autism 
 We have your son. 
we will make sure he will 
not be able to care for 
himself or interact socially 
as long as he lives. 
 
This is only the beginning. 
 
Asperger’s Syndrome 
 We have your son. We are destroying his ability for 
 social interaction and driving him into a life of complete isolation. 
 It’s up to you now. 
 
These notes were posted by the New York University Child Study Center (NYU CSC) 
in the frame of a pro bono public service campaign. The campaign, however, was not to be 
long-lived: it was soon met with an avalanche of reactions from ad hoc huge grassroots 
internet protests, and was eventually shut down. One of the key figures behind this 
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movement was Ari Ne’eman, then 20 years old and with an Asperger Syndrome diagnosis, 
now president of the Autistic Self Advocacy Network (ASAN). As described by Joseph 
Kras in his 2010 article The ‘Ransom Notes’ Affair: When the Neurodiversity Movement Came of 
Age, ASAN’s complaints were threefold and related to these points: 
 
(a) The stigmatization of people with disabilities. 
(b) The conveying of inaccurate information about disabilities and the potential 
strengths that accompany them. 
(c) The discouragement of ‘doomed’ disabled children and of their caretakers. 
 
As one can find out in Kras’ article and in numerous other sources, including a feature 
article by the New York magazine (Solomon 2008), this was the incident that solidified the 
cause of neurodiversity, and which gave it the shape of a massive, organised movement. 
The spirit of the movement, acceptance of mental ‘illness’ as legitimate difference, 
definitely had predecessors, both in the general realm of mental illness63, and in (what was 
then called) autism specifically. The oldest out of the most central points of reference 
specifically for ASCs is Jim Sinclair’s 1993 Don’t Mourn for Us. In this article, Sinclair 
argues that the grief associated with ASCs is not a produce of the condition itself but of 
various socially relevant factors, like how society sees people with ASCs, and the parents’ 
mourning over the loss of a ‘normal’ child. Contrary to NYU CSC’s ransom note message 
Sinclair argues that people with ASCs diagnoses not only find themselves in an irreversible 
condition but also that purporting to change it is a cruel act of rejection. 
 
Autism is a way of being. It is not possible to separate the person from the autism. 
Therefore, when parents say, “I wish my child did not have autism”, what they're 
really saying is, “I wish the autistic child I have did not exist, and I had a different 
(non-autistic) child instead.” 
Read that again. This is what we hear when you mourn over our existence. This is 
what we hear when you pray for a cure. This is what we know, when you tell us of 
your fondest hopes and dreams for us: that your greatest wish is that one day we will 
 
63 See, for example, Mad Pride (Reid 2009). 
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cease to be, and strangers you can love will move in behind our faces. (Sinclair 1993, 
n.p.) 
 
What is necessary for a neurotypical to connect with a person with an ASC diagnosis, 
Sinclair continues, is to modify their own intuitions and preconceptions about how 
relationships and bonding work. When a neurotypical parent tries to communicate with a 
child with an ASC diagnosis they do not get back a response they would consider 
appropriate. However: 
 
That does not mean the child is incapable of relating at all. It only means you're 
assuming a shared system, a shared understanding of signals and meanings, that the 
child in fact does not share. It's as if you tried to have an intimate conversation with 
someone who has no comprehension of your language. Of course the person won't 
understand what you're talking about, won't respond in the way you expect, and may 
well find the whole interaction confusing and unpleasant. (Sinclair 1993, n.p.) 
 
What is Sinclair’s proposed remedy to this? It is a recommendation to the 
neurotypicals: to do some work of translation and reconceptualization, to try and observe 
the world through the eyes of one who is fundamentally different and relates 
fundamentally differently, and to try to enact relationships that make sense in their [life-
]worlds. 
 
It takes more work to communicate with someone whose native language isn't the 
same as yours. And autism goes deeper than language and culture; autistic people are 
‘foreigners’ in any society. You're going to have to give up your assumptions about 
shared meanings. You're going to have to learn to back up to levels more basic than 
you've probably thought about before, to translate, and to check to make sure your 
translations are understood. (Sinclair 1993, n.p.) 
 
Still, however, the result will not be an imagined ideal. It will be cashed out in terms 
in-between: in-between two different systems of meanings, concepts, beliefs. This is 
Sinclair’s submission, followed by a wish for inclusiveness. 
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And the outcome, if you succeed, still will not be a normal parent-child relationship. 
... The ways we relate are different. ... Yes, that takes more work than relating to a non-
autistic person. But it can be done--unless non-autistic people are far more limited than 
we are in their capacity to relate. We spend our entire lives doing it. Each of us who 
does learn to talk to you, each of us who manages to function at all in your society, 
each of us who manages to reach out and make a connection with you, is operating in 
alien territory, making contact with alien beings. We spend our entire lives doing this. 
And then you tell us that we can't relate. 
... This is what I think autism societies should be about: not mourning for what never 
was, but exploration of what is. We need you. We need your help and your 
understanding. Your world is not very open to us, and we won't make it without your 
strong support. ... The tragedy is not that we're here, but that your world has no place 
for us to be. (Sinclair 1993, n.p.) 
 
Before I conclude this section, I would like to offer a disclaimer about the way I use 
the ‘neuro-’ terms here, such as neurotypicality, neurodiversity, and their derivatives. As 
some scholars have convincingly argued (e.g. Verhoeff 2014), the received over-focusing 
on the ‘neuro-’ side of things in ASCs, bypassing elements of the conditions that seem to 
be lodged in aspects of the self beyond the brain, is problematic. Moreover, in lack of 
empirical evidence, one should avoid essentializing ASCs to simply alterations in the 
neural circuit based on the blank check that ASCs will one day be fully reduced to the 
brain and its functions. While these are points I am sympathetic towards, I have decided 
to maintain the binary, neuro-focused language. This is for two reasons. First, visibly 
everyone involved in the neurodiversity debate, including the activists themselves, 
employs the binary neuro-language. I thought it vacuous to deconstruct the debate’s basic 
terminology when approaching it with a new point, creating an additional distance 
between potential professional ASCs readers and my own, philosophical work. Second, 
and equally importantly, I felt that such a potential life-world critique of the neuro-
discourse does not bare directly on the argument I want to make. Briefly put, I want to 
argue that ASCs are characterised by different, here-to-stay life-worlds, and that this 
should matter for and inform treatment. Whether this deep difference is lodged in the 
‘neuro-’ is a secondary consideration. In summary then, trying to deconstruct the neuro-
discourse here would take up sizeable and valuable space, would create distance between 
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some of the readers and myself, while at the same time not conferring a discernible 
important gain. 
In summary, the ASCs branch of the neurodiversity movement claims that ASCs 
consist their own mode of being, which should be considered valid and legitimate, and not 
a product of dysfunction. This mode of being, it is argued, is hard-wired and not separable 
from its bearers. For neurotypicals and people with ASCs diagnoses to exist in harmony, 
what should be done, Sinclair argues, is to bring about an understanding of this deep-
seated difference and try to communicate with it in its terms. Let us now move to survey 
contemporary forms of the ASCs branch of the neurodiversity movement, as well as to 
explore the claims of those who oppose it. 
 
6.3 The ASCs Neurodiversity Movement in Its Current Form, and Its 
Critics 
More than 25 years have passed since Sinclair’s powerful reflection on ASCs-mediated 
relationships and it has now been more than a decade since the ransom notes incident. 
Opposite camps have been formed, issue-specific slang has been established and several 
contemporary approaches to ASCs have been filtered through the debate. Nevertheless, 
Sinclair’s original spirit has remained largely intact. The term neurodiversity was put 
forward as a label for the movement by Judy Singer, who has a mother and brother with 
an Asperger Syndrome diagnosis, and is on the spectrum herself. “I was interested in the 
liberatory, activist aspects of it — to do for neurologically different people what feminism 
and gay rights had done for their constituencies”, she tells the New York Magazine 
(Solomon 2008, 1), and indeed one can find several such analogies being made by 
neurodiversity activists. These people want to establish that ASCs are simply alternative 
(to ‘normal’) ways of being, that should be respected and not considered things to ‘fix’64. 
Kathleen Seidel, who owns and operates the website neurodiversity.com, has a 
spectrum diagnosis herself, as do her father and child. She agrees with Sinclair on what 
reminds us of the incorrigibility of the autistic mode of being. “There’s a kind of polish 
that I’ll never have, and that’s just built into the wiring” she tells the New York Magazine 
(Solomon 2008, 2). She has found neurodiversity helpful and liberating: “I encountered 
the word neurodiversity, and it just sang to me. I thought, what a beautiful word, that 
 
64 For a more elaborate official summary see The Autism Rights Movement (n.d.). 
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encompasses the reality that God has many different ways to build a brain” (Solomon 
2008, 2). Not that there is no challenge wedded to this different mode of being. However, 
in her view, the challenges are there to stay. The point, however, is to move past that. “I 
wanted to figure out what my child needed. I wanted to figure out what my child needed 
to thrive, for fulfilment.” (Solomon 2008, 2). 
The list of known people with ASCs diagnoses (and without) that stand on 
neurodiversity’s side goes on and on. One of the most outspoken and influential stars on 
the issue is a 37-year-old woman with an ASC diagnosis, Amanda Baggs. Baggs has made 
an 8-minute long video called In My Language (Baggs 2007), which provides an insight into 
her life and aims to shatter the view that people with ASCs diagnoses are locked into a 
world unreachable and full of suffering. Emine Saner, a The Guardian reporter writes 
(2007, n.p.): “Although she [Baggs] finds it impossible to communicate verbally, she is 
able to type very quickly and her blog shows that she is articulate and fun”. However, this 
endeavour is not without difficulty in being heard and breaking through stereotypes 
around ASCs. In another interview, this time for Wired, Baggs claims she is often 
misheard: "I've said a million times that I'm not trapped in my own world ... Yet what do 
most of these news stories lead with? Saying exactly that” (Wolman 2008, n.p.) 
The neurodiversity approach is also gaining institutional foothold. As we saw in the 
last chapter, Valerie Paradiz (Asperger Syndrome diagnosis), has founded the School for 
Autistic Strength, Purpose and Independence in Education (Aspie). Let us recall her 
claiming that:  
 
In most schools, kids with Asperger syndrome are placed in settings that are either 
overwhelming in a social or sensory way, or underwhelming in an intellectual way and 
many adolescents end up struggling with profound isolation and depression ... I 
actually see educational access issues for these kids as something very similar to 
wheelchair access ... Autism is not a pathological condition or a disease, but a way of 
life that possesses a culture and history all its own. (Saner 2007, n.p.) 
 
Academics working around ASCs are neither strangers to nor (by and large) hostile 
towards the movement. Saner, The Guardian’s reporter, got the following statement from 
Simon Baron-Cohen, one of the most acknowledged researchers of ASCs working at the 
Autism Research Centre at the University of Cambridge. 
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I do think there is a benefit in trying to help people with autism-spectrum conditions 
with areas of difficulty such as emotion recognition ... Nobody would dispute the place 
for interventions that alleviate areas of difficulty, while leaving the areas of strength 
untouched. But to talk about a 'cure for autism' is a sledge-hammer approach and the 
fear would be that in the process of alleviating the areas of difficulty, the qualities that 
are special - such as the remarkable attention to detail, and the ability to concentrate 
for long periods on a small topic in depth would be lost. Autism is both a disability and 
a difference. We need to find ways of alleviating the disability while respecting and 
valuing the difference. (Saner 2007, n.p.) 
 
There are many others, and they often tackle the same issue from different angles. 
Notably, these authors, like those cited above, are not marginal but very often (like Baron-
Cohen) well-versed in the mainstream and well-funded research into ASCs. Meredyth 
Goldberg Edelson (2006), a professor of psychology at Willamette University, reviewed 
215 articles linking ASCs to low IQ (the term used in the scientific literature is ‘in the 
mentally retarded range’) published since the advent of the concept of autism. She found 
that most of them (74%) did not have the data to back up their own assertions. As much 
as 39% of the articles were not based on any data and those who did were using 
questionable, per Goldberg Edelson, measures of intelligence. We practically do not know 
if the majority of people with ASCs diagnoses are ‘mentally retarded’, she claims. Mike 
Merzenich, a professor of neuroscience at UC San Francisco, says that the notion that 
75% of autistic people are mentally retarded is "incredibly wrong and destructive” (Herbert 
& Weintraub 2012, 150). 
How is this relevant to the current discussion? As Merzenich claims, inquiry into 
difference (and its potential uses) is far outweighed by inquiry into treatment and cure 
when it comes to ASCs – and low intelligence is a ‘problem’ framed for a cure. One 
researcher told him, he says (Wolman 2008, n.p.), that “there's no money in the field for 
looking at differences in the autistic brain. But if you talk about trying to fix a problem — 
then the funding comes”. A last comment on this, from someone who we will get to know 
thoroughly in the next section of the present chapter. In 2007, the peer-reviewed journal 
Psychological Science published an article called The Level and Nature of Autistic Intelligence, 
lead authored by Michelle Dawson. Therein, Dawson argues that autistic intelligence has 
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been severely underestimated because the tools for assessing it are ill-suited to people with 
ASCs diagnoses. Dawson argues that, in fact, controlling for IQ should be a precondition 
for good research. This adds to the wave of criticism of the standardized measure of 
intelligence, IQ (see for example Hampshire et al. 2012). 
As one would probably expect, the ASCs neurodiversity movement has faced severe 
criticism, both as part of the wider neurodiversity movement and in its own right. As a 
matter of fact, in the above cited New York Magazine article Andrew Solomon reports that 
it was not since his early days reporting in the Soviet Union that he found himself so 
bullied about what he should and should not be mentioning (Solomon 2008, 4). The critics 
are, however, not characterised by a uniform degree of intensity, and often do not criticise 
the same facet of the movement. First, there are the vaccine activists, who believe that 
ASCs are a result of vaccine poisoning65. They therefore believe that by removing the 
agents of poisoning from the environment, ASCs, that are, as the result of poisoning, clear 
deficits in an organism, will vanish. Solomon got in touch with Lenny Schafer, editor of 
the prominent Schafer Autism Report, adoptive father of a child with an ASC diagnosis, 
and a vaccine activist, and obtained this quote from him: 
 
Please don’t write about them … It’s a handful of noisy people who get a lot of media 
attention but do not represent a broad swath of the autism community. Best for them 
to be ignored. They want to redefine autism as something nice that Einstein and Bill 
Gates had. They’re trivializing what autism really is. It’s like stealing money from the 
tin cup of a blind man when you say that it’s not an illness. (Solomon 2008, 4) 
 
There are more sober critics of the neurodiversity movement, albeit they often do not 
target its general goals per se but what they see as extreme positions against treatment and 
pursuing a cure. Larry Arnold, the first person with an ASC diagnosis to join the board of 
the National Autistic Society (NAS), thinks the Aspies For Freedom’s66 campaign against 
looking for a cure is naïve (Saner 2007, n.p.). He does, however, subscribe to the idea that 
 
65 I mentioned this theory in the previous chapter, along with satisfactory evidence that it 
is, by all measures, a debunked and by now conspiracy theory. 
66 AFF is a twenty thousand-member organisation about Asperger Syndrome in the United 
Kingdom. 
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autism, as he calls it, should be a part of neurodiversity and attributes many of the 
difficulties that people with ASCs diagnoses face to society rather than the condition itself. 
Here is what he said to The Guardian’s Saner: 
 
It's all part of the societal construction of disability, it's seen in negative terms and is 
portrayed in negative, pitying advertising by organisations raising funds for research 
which wants to eliminate us from the planet. That's a very American style of 
campaigning and I'm seeing it coming over here. I would like us to have a greater say 
in organisations that purport to speak on our behalf. People say 'it's all right for you, 
you can talk and you were able to get a university degree, whereas our children can't 
do this, that or the other'. But I'm for valuing every level on the autistic spectrum, it 
doesn't matter how able or unable you are to carry out 'normal' functions that are 
dictated by society. I think there is something of an autistic culture developing in this 
country and worldwide.  (Saner 2007, n.p.) 
 
The aforementioned David Wolman (2008) of Wired reports concerns from an 
academic standpoint. After all, being able to plan your meals for the week or ask for 
directions bespeak important forms of intelligence, he says. He goes on to quote Fred 
Volkmar, director of Yale’s Child Study Center (quoted in Wolman 2008, n.p.): "If you 
pretend the areas that are troubled aren't there, you miss important aspects of the person”. 
The autistic brain is perhaps reasonably characterised as flawed, Wolman says, in a level-
headed and well cited article. He quotes the aforementioned University of California San 
Francisco’s Merzenich, who, despite articulating a critique of intelligence measuring tools, 
still thinks that severe ASCs are characterised by ‘grossly abnormal’ brain development, 
which oftentimes lead to a ‘catastrophic end state’ (I presume that Merzenich is referring 
to inclinations towards self-harm and violent tantrums here). Wolman writes that Yale’s 
Volkmar goes as far as to liken extreme neurodiversity activists’ prerogatives to urging a 
physically disabled person to walk without a wheelchair. “Meanwhile parents, educators, 
and autism advocates worry that focusing on the latent abilities and intelligence of autistic 
people may eventually lead to cuts in funding both for research into a cure and services 
provided by government. “As one mother of an autistic boy told me, there's no question 
that my son needs treatment and a cure”, Wolman (2008, n.p.) writes. 
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We have now concluded surveying the overarching tendencies in favour and against 
the ASCs-related neurodiversity movement. In the next section, we will start exploring 
ASCs treatment, chiefly the mainstream method, Applied Behaviour Analysis. In so 
doing, we will see that the claims in favour and against neurodiversity have a direct bearing 
on what different groups of people think of ABA: the pro-neurodiversity claims will be 
translated into criticisms towards ABA, while the against-neurodiversity claims will 
highlight its efficacy. This conflict will be shown to make for a heated ethico-political 
debate within ASCs communities. In section 6.6 I will try to adjudicate this debate using 
the life-world toolkit. 
 
6.4 Applied Behaviour Analysis (ABA) and Its Evidential Basis 
Let us now turn our attention to ABA, the sovereign treatment method for ASCs, 
rapidly gaining popularity67. I will first reiterate what ABA is and go briefly back to its 
origins, elaborating on my initial presentation of it in the first section of this chapter. I am 
going to show that, faithful to its name, ABA approaches ASCs solely behaviourally and, 
in this spirit, tries to modify behaviours related to ASCs. Following, I am going to examine 
ABA evidentially so as to have in hand the material necessary to adjudicate the ABA 
versus anti-ABA debate in section 6.6. 
In 1987 Lovaas published results of the application of a (then) new, behaviourally 
based treatment method for ASCs. A follow-up study by Lovaas and colleagues came in 
1993. These two articles reported recovery of almost half of the experimental group (very 
young children with ASCs diagnoses) using Lovaas’ method. This development marked a 
potentially huge change in thinking about ASCs: effectively, it was suggested that ASCs 
are behaviourally based, and thus more ‘plastic’ than initially thought. With the 
appropriate intervention, they could even be ‘gone’, or so Lovaas and colleagues put 
forward (Rogers & Vismara 2008, 8). The articles and their promoted doctrines did not 
stay at the academic level. On the contrary, they had tremendous impact on how ASCs 
 
67 In the U.S. in particular, the situation is largely that the health system funds only ABA 
therapy for people with ASCs. If you want to go another way, you must provide the funds 
from your own pocket (National Conference of State Legislatures 2017). Considering the 
costs of ASCs related therapy, this makes ABA effectively the only option for all but the 
wealthy. 
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were handled on the social and individual level, ushering in an era of treatment markedly 
different to treatments of other developmental disorders. This development put more coal 
to the fire of parents who hoped for a cure for their children with ASCs diagnoses and 
prompted many of them to spend hundreds of millions of dollars and pounds and 
hundreds of thousands of hours to follow ABA, which is a time-intensive, time-extended 
and extremely expensive therapy (Rogers & Vismara 2008, 8). 
Let us take a closer look. What does one do when one does ABA? As mentioned above, 
the main underlying principle is the reinforcement-discouragement duo. ABA sessions 
focus either on skills to be acquired or on behaviours to be eradicated. Let us hypothesize, 
for example, that I am an ABA therapist and that I want a certain child with an ASC 
diagnosis to reply with their actual name when asked what their name is and to stop 
rocking back and forth every so often. I then proceed to reward the child’s answering their 
name to my repeated questions (possibly with candy or whatever else the child may find 
pleasing) and to withhold reward when they start rocking back and forth68. Note that the 
near abolishment of punishment is a contemporary evolution of the original Lovaas 
method, which included, among other things, hitting the children. Whether the results of 
this method are substantially beneficial, and whether these results remain when the hitting 
ceases, much more to the point of ‘curing’ ASCs, is a matter of great contention to be 
explored soon below. 
Before this, let us take a broader evidential look on ABA. In 2008 Sally Rogers and 
Laurie Vismara returned to the ever-important question of what empirical evidence there 
is supporting the efficacy of early intervention for young children with ASCs diagnoses. 
They conducted a meta-study, collecting and evaluating studies on treatments that 
targeted children ages five or younger, which had to be comprehensive – here defined as 
targeting all the core deficits of ASCs: the language, social, cognition, and play 
dimensions. They did not include studies that did not say which specific factor they were 
targeting and they also eliminated studies that were not published in peer-reviewed 
journals. They looked into various kinds of studies. Of interest to us at this moment are 
studies that partially or fully replicated Lovaas’ treatment approach (that is, those that 
 
68 For a description of ABA from official sources see Applied Behavior Analysis on the 
Autism Speaks (n.d.) website; for an example of a therapy session see the online video 
Autism Therapy – ABA (Myrtle Beach International 2008). 
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aimed to test the efficacy of ABA69), ranging from 1998 to 2005. What they found is of 
particular interest to treatment connected to ASCs in general and to the subject matter of 
this chapter (Rogers & Vismara 2008, 30-32).  
First, there were very few Nathan and Gorman Type 1 studies, and randomised control 
trial (RCT) studies. This means that there are still ways to go before any claims relating to 
a sturdy evidential basis for ABA can be substantiated. However, RCT studies show that 
young children with ASCs diagnoses demonstrated accelerated developmental gains in 
response to focused daily interventions, chiefly regarding an increase in language and 
communication abilities, an increase in IQ, and a reduction in the severity of ASCs 
symptoms. Second, contra the original spirit of Lovaas, there is no evidence thus far from 
a Type 1 study that recovery can come about by means of treatment. There are two Type 
2 and Type 3 studies70 (Howard et al., 2005; McEachin et al., 1993; Sallows & Graupner, 
2005) that report recovery on a significant proportion of the treated subjects. However, we 
will not know how often recovery occurs until multisite studies with an adequate number 
of subjects emerge. Third, all substitutes to ABA are under-examined: there is a lack of 
strong designs and independent replications, and no peer-reviewed published data at all 
regarding other well-known and applied ASCs treatments. There is also a lack of 
comparative studies, which leaves us in the dark concerning which treatment approach is 
the best for young children with ASCs diagnoses. 
It is important to keep this meta-study in mind, for it will now be shown to corroborate 
the neurodiversity (and specifically autism rights activism) proponents’ claims in two 
ways: first, even in a strictly behavioural sense, evidential support for ABA is limited. 
Second, all alternatives to ABA are severely under-discussed and under-researched. After 
 
69 These are: Jocelyn et al. 1998; Drew et al. 2002; Aldred et al. 2004; Smith et al. 2000; 
Sallows & Graupner 2005; Eikeseth et al. 2002. 
70 Nathan and Gorman Type 1 studies are studies that utilise state of the art investigative 
methods such as clear inclusion and exclusion criteria; blinded assessments; adequate 
sample size; statistical methods. Nathan and Gorman Type 2 studies are studies like Type 
1 but lacking some of Type 1’s elements, and Type 3 studies have different aims than Type 
1 and Type 2 studies such as providing pilot data and retrospective data collections 
(Herschell et al. 2010; Nathan and Gorman 2007). 
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reviewing ABA’s critics and critiques momentarily, I will proceed to investigate the 
treatment debate via the life-world. 
 
6.5 ABA’s Critics and Critiques 
ABA has faced severe criticism over the years, most of which is in keeping with the 
neurodiversity spirit. The most influential relevant piece, and one that most accurately 
encapsulates people’s problems with ABA, is perhaps the aforementioned Dawson’s 2004 
article The Misbehaviour of Behaviourists. Dawson is an ASCs researcher, and she has had a 
diagnosis herself since 1993. Dawson has also opposed ABA in court, taking legal action 
challenging its medical necessity for people with ASCs diagnoses in the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Auton Versus British Columbia (Judgements of the Supreme Court of Canada 
2004). She is affiliated with the Autism Specialized Clinic of Hôpital Rivière-des-Prairies 
in Montreal, Canada, working on the team of Laurent Mottron, a full professor at the 
University of Montreal. Mottron himself is a quite acclaimed ASCs researcher, holding 
the Marcel and Rolande Gosselin research chair on cognitive neuroscience in autism at 
his university, and having his research funded by the Canadian Institutes of Health 
Research since 1997, publishing some hundred articles on ASCs and cognitive 
neuroscience. 
In her famous and well-cited article Dawson claims that ABA was born out of the 
parents’ and society’s desire to reduce ASCs related behaviours that are stressful to them – 
not to people with ASCs diagnoses. In the discrepancy between society and a person with 
an ASC diagnosis, she says, Lovaas and colleagues thought it would be impossible to 
change society but possible and desired to change the person, even if that involved 
spanking and hitting said person (Dawson 2004, n.p.). Fortunately for Dawson, nowadays 
more and more people notice that presuming to transform the nature of non-consenting 
(e.g. because they are children or adults who actively resist such transformation) people 
through behaviour interventions must be challenged from an ethical point of view. For 
example, this is especially so in areas other than ASCs: trans- and homosexual people’s 
consent and participation in whatever decision is made that pertains to their gender and 
sexuality’s recognition and related intervention is now thought to be essential. 
Dawson further argues that behaviourists base their program on entirely false 
assumptions: that people with ASCs cannot communicate, that they are incapable of 
learning and that their behaviours are almost unanimously useless and harmful to them. 
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While there have been radical changes in the understanding of ASCs, which encompass 
cases of normal to high intelligence and ample communication, there have been no 
commensurate adjustments to how the mainstream treatment, ABA, approaches ASCs, 
she says. ABA therapists do not seek to understand how a person with an ASC diagnosis 
functions and what purpose each of their behaviours serve: instead they want to eradicate 
every autistic trait invariantly. What is interesting to note here, a claim which I will 
elaborate in the upcoming section, is that Dawson’s accusation sounds a lot like stating 
that ABA does not take into account the life-worlds of people with ASCs diagnoses. ABA 
is held to fail to recognise what the immediate intake of the world is for people with ASCs 
diagnoses, how they navigate the world and what importance and purpose certain 
conditions and behaviours hold for them.  
Unfortunately, Dawson (2004, n.p.) says, this is much the same for most of the well-
known opposition to ABA. The medical opposition to ABA has attacked Lovaas’ 1987 
study and 1993 follow-up on grounds of external validity; selection bias; statistical 
regression; outcomes measures; the problem of replication and others, but they have failed 
to concern themselves with ethics. Frank Gresham, a major critic of Lovaas, a doctor and, 
like Dawson, a witness in the Auton trial, has claimed that he himself is the biggest supporter 
of ABA anywhere. “He is just locking horns with Dr. Lovaas over who is the better 
scientist”, Dawson (2004, n.p.) says. “Dr. Gresham also found the idea of autistics being 
involved or consulted in legal, research, or treatment decision absurd – like consulting the 
mentally retarded, he said” (ibid.). 
It is only a short step from ignorance to unjustified aggressive intervention, Dawson 
argues. ABA would not have become such a successful industry in the absence of Lovaas’ 
‘cured’ 47%. Since Lovaas’ initial study, however, Dawson argues, it has been found that 
in the absence of aversives, improvements in behaviour are rather insignificant. Lovaas, 
Dawson writes, has been the first to admit this himself: 
 
In a confluence of poor ethics and dishonest science, the autism-ABA industry has 
downplayed and even denied the importance of aversives in achieving the famous 47%. 
Dr Lovaas' 1987 study in fact emphasizes the importance and effectiveness of aversives 
… Lovaas' own position remains the same as in the 1987 study. In the Clarifying 
Comments paper, the recent illegality of aversives (in many jurisdictions, including 
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California) and their consequent withdrawal from ABA are cited as reasons his 1987 
results have not been replicated. (Dawson 2004, n.p.) 
 
Why this is a problem should be readily evident: even if ABA ‘worked’ (I will return 
shortly to what ‘worked’ should be taken to mean here), it seems that the component 
which made it work is the one now forbidden by law. What is the appropriate course of 
action in the face of this? Dawson argues that there is only one ethical choice: stop using 
the 47% to promote ABA and base its promotion on other studies, which test the results 
of practices that are now used legally. This, however, should only be the beginning, merely 
a step towards stopping ‘cheating on the benchmarks’, so to speak. Dawson’s deeper 
problem is with what these benchmarks actually measure, and with which goals should be 
considered ethically and reliably as ASCs treatment goals. She admits, however, that, as 
intensive intervention, ABA is agreed to be efficacious (Dawson 2004, n.p.). Dawson 
concedes that there is certainly evidence that people with ASCs diagnoses can acquire new 
skills through it, skills that may be crucial to their happiness and independence (ibid.). 
Where ABA needs scrutiny is the part where it is used to remove odd, ASCs-related 
behaviours, which may actually be useful and necessary to people with ASCs (beneficial in 
their life-world’s terms, I will argue), and to replace them with predictable behaviours, 
which may be detrimental to a person with ASC’s physical and mental well-being. 
Dawson makes special mention of the ‘terrible ruckus’ typically following the first weeks 
of ABA therapy: 
 
The terrible ruckus of the first weeks of ABA is not credibly the result of autistics being 
dragged out of our supposed private worlds. All the crying and screaming and running 
away are more plausibly the noise and uproar of a child repeatedly forced to give up 
her strengths. (Dawson 2004, n.p.) 
 
Dawson concludes her article by urging for people with ASCs to get ethical 
consideration in science and society. ABA supporters’ claim that good ethics and good 
science are incompatible in the case of ASCs71 is entirely unfounded, she says. 
 
71 Here Dawson refers to a 1999 report by the Association for Science in Autism 
Treatment’s (ASAT – a non-profit ASCs organisation). 
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There is no way to know what would happen if autistics were treated ethically in the 
area of consent, because, in the ABA research and treatment ASAT promotes, this has 
not happened yet … The autism-ABA industry has never come to grips with the serious 
ethical issues that arise whenever powerful behaviour therapies are imposed on clients 
who can't consent. Until this happens, it remains equally valid to propose that ethical 
standards might improve not only the outcome for autistics, but the state of the science. 
(Dawson 2004, n.p.) 
 
For Dawson, it is a matter of fact that people with ASCs diagnoses have not been 
considered human beings with human rights within the ABA practice, mainly due to issues 
of breaching consent. People with ASCs diagnoses, she says, should not have to prove that 
they are human. Standing by her, Mottron, her superior at the University of Montreal, 
says that the dominant view is that people with ASCs diagnoses must be reeled back to 
normalcy (Wolman 2008). After his first few weeks on the job, he decided that such 
theories were, in his words, ‘crap’. "These children were just of another kind," he says, 
echoing the autistic life-world contentions of the previous chapter. "You couldn't turn 
someone autistic or make someone not autistic. It was hardwired” (Wolman 2008, n.p.). 
Instead, he set out to exploit the different cognitive (and other) styles of people with ASCs 
diagnoses he worked with, with remarkable results. In 1986, he began working with a man 
who would later become known in the scientific literature as ‘E.C.’. ‘E.C.’ could rotate 
objects in his mind and make technical drawings without the need for a single reversion, 
and thus could do related work that neurotypicals could not. This, of course, is not here 
to imply that exceptional ability should be a precursor to granting one’s human rights, but 
rather to show that people with ASCs’ skills can be employed in many ways if not 
approached as apples in a wholly rotten basket. 
Dawson and Mottron are among the most influential and academically-oriented of 
such advocates but they are certainly not the only ones. Anti-ABA campaigning has 
assumed similar measure to that of the neurodiversity movement with major American 
and European press covering related issues. Elizabeth Devita-Raeburn (2016) of The 
Atlantic recently wrote a piece on the issue, citing the story of a child whose family decided 
to stop ABA because of both its cruelty and dubious generalisation of skills acquired 
through it. Heidi LoStracco (2014), a speech language pathologist, augmentative and 
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alternative communication consultant, and co-owner of Speak for Yourself72, also makes 
the case for ABA being a mechanism that enforces compliance over independence, 
“drilling programs into heads that don’t want it” (LoStracco 2014, n.p.). Again, the life-
world connection is strong; the programs do not make sense in the people with ASCs 
diagnoses life-world. She makes the point that, in her experience, it is often the case that 
standard sets of words and expressions acquired through ABA have no function in the 
patient’s life, or feel insubstantial (ibid.). 
On the parent front, a telling tale regarding the ‘against ABA’ front is that of Court 
Alice Thatcher (2015). Thatcher argues for her stopping most of her ASC-diagnosed son’s 
therapies. She cites the story of an ABA therapist visiting her home, an instance which she 
found particularly infuriating: 
 
[W]hen she arrived, A. was happily playing with a whisk he carried everywhere with 
him. He was flipping the light switches on and off quickly and laughing. It was one of 
his favourite games. The therapist frowned and took out her notebook then began to 
write.  She said to me “We can get rid of that”. I was floored and quite honestly 
offended. I told her I didn’t want to “get rid of” something my child found fun that 
was hurting absolutely no one. (Thatcher 2015, n.p.) 
 
In Thatcher’s (ibid.) view, ABA is just a process to make people with ASCs diagnoses 
“like everyone else”.  
Overall, we now know that there are people who attack ABA in two ways: one that 
pertains to what the attackers consider a weak evidential basis, and one that pertains to 
purported meaningless of its affected changes to people with ASCs diagnoses. On the other 
hand, we have the pro-ABA camp, which supports that ABA provides people with ASCs 
diagnoses with life-changing, necessary skills. Thus, we now have in hand all we need to 
proceed to reviewing the political debate at the heart of ASCs via the life-world lens. 
 
6.6 Framing the Debate Through the Life-World 
 
72 Speak for Yourself (SfY) is an Augmentative and Alternative Communication (AAC) 
application that was created by speech-language pathologists. 
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In the last chapter (section 5.3) I showcased the differences of the autistic life-worlds 
to the neurotypical ones. In this section I argue that the political claims of ASCs-involved 
activists are best understood as arguments for taking the autistic life-worlds to be legitimate 
modes of being – not defective conditions – and, further, to adjust treatment to these life-
worlds’ terms. I side with these activists’ claims and argue that adjusting ASCs treatment 
to the autistic life-world necessitates both filtering ABA to leave profitable – in the autistic 
life-worlds’ terms – ASCs-related behaviours be and looking towards other, 
phenomenologically oriented and alternative to ABA, treatment methods. I provide an 
example of a phenomenologically oriented treatment approach to ASCs via examining 
one of Oliver Sacks’ recorded cases 
We now have in our hands even more testimony from people with ASCs diagnoses, 
their peers, and ASCs-involved activists, not only further corroborating the suggested life-
world difference of the last chapter, but also arguing against ASCs’ mainstream treatment, 
ABA. I submit that we may legitimately construe these claims as arguing for the 
significance that the autistic life-worlds should have in ASCs treatment. Let us take a few 
examples. Recall Paradiz’s (in Saner 2007, n.p.), statement that, in most schools, children 
with ASCs diagnoses are placed in settings that are either sensory and socially 
overwhelming or intellectually underwhelming for them, thus resulting in profound 
isolation and depression. She recommends adjusting the school settings people with ASCs 
diagnoses are put in based on what intellectual and emotional effects such settings have 
on them, adding that autism, as she calls it, is not a pathological condition to be done 
away with but a way of life that possesses a culture and history all its own. In the previous 
chapter, I argued extensively that the overwhelming sensory and social experiences that 
people with ASCs diagnoses display may be construed as metaphysical and emotional life-
world differences respectively. What Paradiz is arguing for, in my analysis, is taking this 
life-world into account in people with ASCs’ education, not simply seeking to normalise such 
people by placing them in ‘normal’ settings that they find overbearing on the off-chance 
that they become ‘like everybody else’. 
Something analogous may said for every person and argument we recounted in this 
chapter, such as Baron-Cohen (in Saner 2007, n.p.) worrying that “the remarkable 
attention to detail, and the ability to concentrate for long periods on a small topic in depth” 
– i.e. the autistic-particular life-world semiotics – “would be lost” in a sledge-hammer 
approach that would seek a cure for ASCs. This line of criticism culminates, as we saw, in 
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Dawson (2004), heralding an attack on those who seek to eradicate every autistic trait 
invariantly. Behaviourists, she tells us, understand ASCs as surface conditions, as 
collections of symptoms. They do not understand that under the symptoms’ surface lie 
whole worlds with their own ‘organizing ideas’ and that autistic behaviours often 
correspond to these worlds exactly: the ‘terrible ruckus’ often following the first weeks of 
ABA treatment is plausibly, Dawson says (2004, n.p.), the noise and uproar of a child 
repeatedly forced to give up her strengths. Thatcher (2015) also blamed ABA for, in her 
view, attempting to make people with ASCs diagnoses ‘like everyone else’, ignoring that, 
e.g. unusual games – like her son’s quickly turning the lights on and off – may resonate 
very well for them. Thatcher’s story prompts us to think about the emotional axis in life-
world difference proffered in section 5.3; her son’s preference for the game points to a non-
typical emotional reaction to a given situation. In this example, ABA seems to either 
ignore this, in my terms, life-world difference or not much care for it, bundling it up with 
the rest of the ASCs-related characteristics to be done away with during treatment. 
We now understand that ASCs-involved activists are blaming ABA for trying to 
normalise people with ASCs diagnoses. We also get a first sense, to find further 
confirmation below, that these accusations are best understood in terms of the life-world: 
ABA, the general claim seems to be, either does not capture the deep-seated differences in 
how people with ASCs diagnoses perceive the world and themselves, or does not care for 
such differences. We may now ask: how, in this frame of thinking, is treatment to be 
adjusted? As I have noted above, with the life-world I approach I recommend two things: 
leaving beneficial behaviours be and look towards more phenomenologically, ASCs-
lifeworlds oriented methods of treatment. Let us take the first point. 
Above, Dawson (n.p.) mentioned that ABA wrongfully makes people with ASCs 
diagnoses give up their strengths. What strengths may these be? We recall, as an example, 
her supervisor’s (Laurent Mottron) approach. Realising that “these children were just of 
another kind” and that “you couldn’t turn someone autistic or make someone not autistic” 
(Mottron cited in Wolman 2008, n.p.), Mottron set out to understand his patients’ different 
cognitive styles – plausibly a difference in life-world metaphysics, I argued in section 5.3 
– and put them to appropriate use. We saw just above that, while working with patient 
‘E.C.’, who could rotate objects in his mind and make technical drawings much easier 
than a neurotypical person could, Mottron assigned ‘E.C.’ with work related to this 
exceptional ability.  
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We should not, however, look for beneficial ASCs-related behaviours only in the realm 
of what the neurotypicals consider exceptional abilities. ASC-related behaviours may be 
beneficial simply in the sense of helping people with ASCs diagnoses navigate a world that 
is anything but tailored to the autistic life-worlds. An example of such a behaviour may be 
as simple as rocking back and forth to self-regulate and manage stress. Lisa Jo Rudy, 
mother of a young adult with an ASC diagnosis, recently published an article on the health 
website verywellhealth.com, reviewed by Joel Foreman, M.D., associate professor of 
paediatrics and environmental medicine and public health at Mount Sinai School of 
Medicine, New York. The topic of her article is autistic ‘stimming’. Rudy writes: 
 
The term ‘stimming’ is short for self-stimulatory behavior and is sometimes also called 
‘stereotypic’ behavior. In a person with autism, stimming usually refers to specific 
behaviors that include hand-flapping, rocking, spinning, or repetition of words and 
phrases. ... 
People with autism stim to help themselves to manage anxiety, fear, anger, excitement, 
anticipation, and other strong emotions. They also stim to help themselves handle 
overwhelming sensory input (too much noise, light, heat, etc.). There are also times 
when people stim out of habit, just as neurotypical people bite their nails, twirl their 
hair, or tap their feet out of habit. (Rudy 2018, n.p.) 
 
Rudy  is in principle sympathetic to stimming, with some qualifications. She continues 
below: 
 
There's really no good reason why flapping should be less acceptable than nail-biting 
(it's certainly more hygienic!). But in our world, the hand flappers receive negative 
attention while the nail-biters (at least to a certain degree) are tolerated.  
Some stims can be quite extreme and are legitimately upsetting or even frightening to 
typical people. For example, some autistic people stim by making loud noises that can 
sound threatening or scary. Some hit themselves with their hands, or even bang their 
heads against the wall. These types of stims are obviously problematic for a variety of 
reasons. (Rudy 2018, n.p.) 
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 We should note here that how compensatory strategies by people with ASCs 
diagnoses work is itself an understudied and poorly understood topic. A recent study by 
Lucy Anne Livingston and Francesca Happé (2017) tries to shed light on the issue, 
claiming, among other things that “the construct of compensation is poorly understood 
and has no agreed definition” (Livingston & Happé 2017, highlights). 
Again, my claim here is that, save for harm-conducive behaviours such as those that 
Rudy talks about above, ABA should leave alone those that prove to be helpful to people 
with ASCs diagnoses and make sense in their life-worlds. We should, I submit, look more 
towards adjusting the environment to their life-worlds rather than eradicating their 
compensatory strategies altogether. An example of such an attempt may be found in the 
case of Sesame Place. Sesame Place in Pennsylvania, United States, is the world’s first 
autism-certified theme park (Sesame Place n.d.). The park’s staff have received specialized 
training regarding how to interact with people with ASCs diagnoses, meaning that they 
have become aware of the children’s sensory and emotional awareness (we are again 
reminded of the life-world’s metaphysical and emotional axes). Moreover, the park has 
been structurally tailored to accommodate people with ASCs diagnoses. For example, 
since many people with ASCs diagnoses are overwhelmed by noisy theme parks, Sesame 
Place offers noise-cancelling headphones and calmer areas for children who want to relax 
by themselves. 
Recall that my life-world oriented contention is not simply that people with ASCs 
diagnoses perceive stimuli and the relations between things differently or that they feel 
differently to the neurotypicals towards stuff and take them to mean different things. In 
and of itself, this would not amount to much of a directive for ASCs treatment. Someone 
with arachnophobia or a pathological fear of getting into media of massive transportation 
also feels differently to most towards things, but it is generally the case that these phobias 
become the object of psychological treatment, largely behavioural at that – see cognitive 
behavioural treatment (e.g. Cognitive Behavioral Therapy Los Angeles n.d.) – and 
effectively without any political controversy involved. What the different life-world notion 
introduces is the idea that this state of affairs is inalterable for people with ASCs diagnoses. 
The life-world analytical tool is so gloriously applicable here because it reflects 
philosophically what is so persistently present throughout the people with ASCs 
diagnoses’ and the neurodiversity activists’ testimony: that the conditions are ‘built into 
the wiring’; that ‘there is no normal person behind the autism’; that this state of affairs is 
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‘home to you’73; that what the neurotypicals perceive as meaningful and functional people 
with ASCs diagnoses often can only mimic in a mechanistic and complying way in order 
to fit in. Not that this is always a successful endeavour: we recall the unanimous 
admittance that ASCs are incurable – even assuming the conditions call out for a cure and 
even if this cure pertains only to symptomatology – and the critiques of the evidential basis 
of ABA, seriously challenging the confidence we may have in it, even in its own terms of 
apparent behavioural change.  
The point is: the autistic life-worlds are here to stay. The best analogy, then, between 
a condition typically behaviourally treated, say arachnophobia, and ASCs, would be the 
case in which behavioural treatment did not make the fear of spiders go away and just 
partly managed to effect a fear camouflaging in the treatment recipient. Due to the delicate 
nature of the issue, I would now like to stress once more that the suggestion here is not 
that ABA should be abolished. Evidently, it is hard not to sympathise with a parent who 
wishes to be able to take their child through the necessary daily routines without this 
needing an exhausting effort and even more so in the case of parents who wish to stop 
their child from repeatedly harming themselves. The topic, of course, of whether this result 
can be brought about by means other than ABA, will remain a mystery or a private issue 
until the now understudied alternatives to ABA are properly studied and the results 
available to the public. To conclude the life-world-ABA dialectic then, the life-world 
approach calls for everyone involved in ASCs treatment (doctors, therapists, caretakers, 
families) and the wider society to engage in better understanding the autistic life-world and 
to become comfortable with the harmless coping that people with ASCs diagnoses conduct as well as 
their different ways of being, feeling, and relating. Consistently and carefully mapping 
how people with ASCs diagnoses perceive the world – such an attempt was made in 
general terms in section 5.3 of the last chapter – is obviously a necessary step towards 
realising this goal. 
We have now seen how the debate around ASCs treatment may be seen as life-world 
based and how my life-world approach criticises and suggests a filtering of ABA, but we 
have not seen the new elements it calls for in the field of ASCs treatment. Although it may 
be a crucial function, we should not restrict the life-world analysis’ role to filtering ABA. 
 
73 The particular expressions, it is reminded, are from David Mitchell’s introduction to 
Naoki Higashida’s (2013, introduction) book from the last chapter, section 5.3. 
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After all, ABA is a behavioural, third-person method and the life-world is a 
phenomenological tool of approaching perceptual and experiential difference if there ever 
was any. The life-world prompts us to examine new directions of ASCs treatment that are 
phenomenologically based. Sadly, again, as we took occasion to see above, treatments 
alternative to ABA are seldom funded and tested. This is not without exception. I would 
now like to present the case of Sacks’ ‘twin savants’, a case in which, I will claim, a life-
world oriented treatment was starting to materialise, later unfortunately interrupted. Many 
of Sacks’ claims remain speculative and thus this case consists in its entirety far from sturdy 
evidence which we should base treatment directions on. However, there is also a strong 
empirical component, mainly pertaining to the intricate ways people with ASCs diagnoses 
may relate to one another and to the neurotypicals. At any rate my purpose here is not to 
proffer a specific method of treatment, but to paint the picture of what a life-world oriented 
treatment would look like. 
In his 1985 book The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat, Oliver Sacks, one of the most 
famous neurologists in the world, dedicates his twenty third chapter to Charles and 
George, a pair of twin autistic ‘idiot savants’ (an academic presentation of the case can be 
found in Horwitz et al. 1965). ‘Idiot savants’ was at the time the medical term for people 
with an otherwise low IQ score but with exceptional ability in some respect, here regarding 
calendar related calculations. Sacks notes that, despite there having been detailed reports 
of the twins’ state both in scientific and literary form, close to none of these reports 
bothered to disentangle itself from the obvious, testable surface of events from the point of 
view of neurotypical scientists and doctors. Charles and George were people of a low IQ 
score who could have told you when Easter is in forty thousand years from now and that 
was it. Sacks writes (italics mine): 
 
One indeed gets no hint of any depths unless one ceases to test the twins, to regard 
them as ‘subjects’. One must lay aside the urge to limit and test, and get to know the 
twins – observe them, openly, quietly, without presuppositions, but with a full and 
sympathetic phenomenological openness, as they live and think and interact quietly, 




Trying to go below this mysterious surface, Sacks tried ‘simply living’ with the twins 
for a period, during which he observed their peculiar obsession with numbers: they would 
often sit in a corner all by themselves, saying numbers to one another for hours on end. Of 
the second time he did that, he writes: 
 
This second time they were seated in a corner together, with a mysterious, secret smile 
on their faces, a smile I had never seen before, enjoying the strange pleasure and peace 
they now seemed to have. I crept up quietly, so as not to disturb them. They seemed 
to be locked in a singular, purely numerical, converse. John would say a number – a 
six-figure number. Michael would catch the number, nod, smile and seem to savor it. 
Then he, in turn, would say another six-figure number, and now it was John who 
received, and appreciated it richly. They looked, at first, like two connoisseurs wine-
tasting, sharing rare tastes, rare appreciations. I sat still, unseen by them, mesmerized, 
bewildered. What were they doing? (Sacks 1985/2011, 211): 
 
Sacks started noting these six-figure numbers and, over a period, figured out that they 
were all prime numbers. He decided to take his experiment one step further and to join 
them with a book of recorded primes in hand the next time they played this game – and 
even chime in a prime himself. Here is what happened next: 
 
There was a long pause – the longest I had ever known them to make, it must have 
lasted a half-minute or more – and then suddenly, simultaneously, they both broke into 
smiles. ... They drew apart slightly, making room for me, a new number playmate, a 
third in their world. Then John, who always took the lead, thought for a very long time 
– it must have been at least five minutes, though I dared not move, and scarcely 
breathed – and brought out a nine-figure number; and after a similar time his twin, 
Michael, responded with a similar one. And then I, in my turn, after a surreptitious 
look in my book, added my own rather dishonest contribution, a ten-figure prime I 
found in my book. (Sacks 1985/2011, 212-213): 
 
Based on more clinical observation and dialogue with the twins, Sacks went on to 
conjecture what the twins’ relationship to numbers may be. The below passage makes it 
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evident that Sacks is into business of trying to recreate their life-world while engaging with 
them. 
 
I believe the twins, seemingly so isolated, live in a world full of friends, that they have 
millions, billions, of numbers to which they say ‘Hi!’ and which, I am sure, say ‘Hi!’ 
back. But none of the numbers is arbitrary – like 62 squared – nor (and this is the 
mystery) is it arrived at by any of the usual methods, or any method so far as I can 
make out. The twins seem to employ a direct cognition – like angels. They see, directly, 
a universe and heaven of numbers. And this, however singular, however bizarre – but 
what right have we to call it ‘pathological’? – provides a singular self-sufficiency and 
serenity to their lives, and one which it might be tragic to interfere with, or break. 
(Sacks 1985/2011, 219) 
 
This is fascinating to read but, especially since it is, as admitted by Sacks, speculation, 
it is not of weighted importance here: what is of such importance is that, through trying to 
understand their perception ‘from within’ like no one else had done before, Sacks 
succeeded in establishing an accommodating relationship with the twins who were 
thought about as being beyond any attempt at therapy, locked off in their far-away world. 
Much to his own dissatisfaction, however, he found out, ten years later, that the twins had 
been separated because it was opined that “for their own good”, their ‘unhealthy 
communication together’ should be interrupted, and they should “face the world ... in a 
socially appropriate way” (Sacks 1985/2011, 219-220). The serenity mentioned above 
went with that separation. Sacks writes: 
 
Both have been moved now into ‘halfway houses’, and do menial jobs, for pocket 
money, under close supervision. They are able to take buses, if carefully directed and 
given a token, and to keep themselves moderately presentable and clean, though their 
moronic and psychotic character [sic] is still recognizable at a glance. ... This is the 
positive side – but there is a negative side too (not mentioned in their charts, because 
it was never recognized in the first place). Deprived of their numerical ‘communion’ 
with each other, and of time and opportunity for any ‘contemplation’ or ‘communion’ 
at all –  they are always being hurried and jostled from one job to another – they seem 
to have lost their strange numerical power, and with this the chief joy and sense of their 
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lives. But this is considered a small price to pay, no doubt, for their having become 
quasi-independent and ‘socially acceptable’ ... [On a similar case] Nigel Dennis 
comments: ‘We are left with a genius who has had her genius removed, leaving 
nothing behind but a general defectiveness. What are we supposed to think about such 
a curious cure?’ (Sacks 1985/2011, 219-220) 
 
What are we to learn from this story in a life-world sense? The fruit, I think, is ripe for 
the taking. It is abundantly clear that Sacks’ difference to that of the other therapists was 
that he tried to recreate the twins’ life-world, to get a sense of their emotional state, their 
relation to numbers, which he understood was totally different to that of his – and more 
generally to a neurotypical one. The peculiar characteristics of the twins that he mentions 
and conjectures – their ‘direct cognition’, their emotional relationship with numbers; the 
ways in which they communicate with one another via numeric mediation – may easily 
be mapped onto categories of the life-world: cognition to metaphysics, the meaning they 
ascribed to the numbers to semiotics, how numeric communion made them feel to 
emotions. 
Sacks, is my point, did not suppose that their autistic traits and practice were de facto 
a bad thing to do away with, and in so doing he managed to establish an interactive 
relationship with them where others failed. It is a pity that chance did not permit for his 
therapeutic way to come through and see what would have become if it came to maturity 
but his last conclusion is too tempting to resist: if the twins indeed lived in this world of 
numbers, and if they had found a way to gain serenity through their and their “imaginary 
friends’” community, is that all worth giving up for the skill to take the bus and do menial 
jobs under close supervision?  I do not claim to be able to answer this resolutely. The most 
important thing that this case shows, however, I submit, is that these are the right kind of 
questions to ask in the frame of ASCs treatment: how much should a person be stressed 
to fit in society? More structurally and importantly than this: before prescribing treatment, 
are we sure we have understood what treatment (and life) means to people with ASCs 
diagnoses, how it is cashed out in their terms? 
In this section, with the initial theoretical considerations and the subsequent example 
of the calendar savant twins, I aimed to outline how the life-world prism can provide a 
philosophical framework for navigating ASCs treatment. By realising that people with 
ASCs diagnoses occupy a different life-world to that of the neurotypicals, which is 
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characterised by an incorrigibly altered structure and function, we can simultaneously 
understand that any related treatment should be adjusted to this life-world’s needs. This 
does not by any measure imply tout court that things should be left as they are. The 
conclusive point is that there should be a differentiation of targeted autistic traits between 
those that facilitate dependability and exclusion to an unacceptable extent and those that 
are relatively ‘innocent’, and which help people with ASCs diagnoses navigate the world 
while maintaining a certain quality of life. Last, I turned to, besides ABA, an extant 
phenomenologically oriented process of treatment. Let us now turn to certain limits of 
applicability that we should admit regarding these life-world directions. 
 
6.7 Limits of General Applicability 
Before I draw this chapter to a close I would like to zoom the picture out a bit and 
consider some limits of applicability regarding the method proposed herein. Is there 
perhaps a limit to the life-world oriented process, regarding the projections from our own 
life-world that we must unavoidably and invariantly make to recreate that of the other’s? 
In chapter four we defended the theoretical possibility of alternative conceptual schemes. 
We did so by shooting down Davidson’s arguments and by transcending the linguistic 
turn’s obsession with language and translation when evincing conceptual differences. In 
chapter five we saw that people with ASCs diagnoses may be validly construed as people 
of different life-worlds to the neurotypical ones. In this chapter, we saw that people with 
ASCs diagnoses should be understood as people of different life-worlds – and that those 
life-worlds should be respected and taken seriously in ASCs treatment orientation. Now 
we may ask: how far away are our case study’s life-worlds from the neurotypical life-worlds? 
Generalising from and extending this question: is there a limit after which the distance of 
a life-world from another makes it impossible for the two to be in creative communion? 
We have demonstrated that the life-world concept is meaningful, helpful, purportedly even 
necessary in the neurotypical-autistic communication, especially in the frame of treatment. 
How much of a role does the potential neighbourliness of the neurotypical-autistic life-
worlds play in this? Is it perhaps a necessary condition? In the remainder of this section, I 
will address this question. I will claim that, while the theoretical possibility of close to no 
overlap between life-worlds and conceptual schemes is open, we need to make impositions 
and projections from our ‘home’ life-world if we seek to communicate with alien life-
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worlds. The communication between the life-worlds of neurotypical scientists and people 
with ASCs diagnoses is no exception to this rule. 
Recall now Sacks’ (1985/2011, 205) statement that one should approach the twins 
‘without presupposition’. Despite my sympathy towards Sacks’ approach, I find this claim 
entirely inadmissible. Sacks himself did approach the twins with a whole lot of 
presuppositions. Take an example: he took their smiles and laughter to mean that they 
were happy, as signs that he was beginning to establish a meaningful relationship with 
them. Sacks needed this assumption, as he did many others, such as: that the twins had a 
sense of their self as separate entities from the rest of the world; that they recognised 
numbers and one another; that they were less happy when placed in halfway houses. He 
needed these assumptions το evaluate his method of treatment comparatively to the 
previous one and to suggest that the phenomenological way of approaching the twins 
would have been better. These assumptions evidently stem from Sacks’ life-world and, 
more generally, from the intersubjective neurotypical life-world, whereupon it is admitted 
that e.g. certain reactions as smiles and laughter are translated into a subject’s happy 
condition. 
In chapter four we pushed the limit of conceptual scheme difference. We did so rightly: 
had we gone in to investigate the ASCs case adopting the Davidsonian, language-focused 
line and with only the weapon of translation in hand, we would have crucially failed to 
grasp the depths of the autistic differences. However, at this point we must also recognise 
that the life-worlds we seek to understand from our (given) own must also display some 
conceptual neighbourliness to our own – or rather we must suppose they do. Theoretically, 
the possibility is always open that, for example, in the twins’ case, their smiles and 
reactions when Sacks communicated his primes to them did not mean that they were 
happy. In section 4.4 I argued extensively for deep conceptual differences. The only thing 
that stood as potentially unrelativizable was the outside world at large – therefore a smile 
and laughter are completely in the range of relativizable concepts. Thus, a particular kind 
of Cartesian angst looms in every interpretation of the other’s life-world: have I 
constructed it faithfully or am I imposing the categories of my own life-world on it? How 
do I know which one it is? Here, we are reminded of Richard Rorty and his pragmatic 
criterion for the dependability of translation: a translation is dependable, Rorty put it, if 
we can do things with it. Sacks argued that he could do things with his own, deeper, 
phenomenological recreation of, in my terms, the twins’ life-world. Was he correct? We 
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may not know. We may know only that, always from within a certain life-world (here the 
neurotypical), Sacks’ approach to the twins plausibly made more sense compared to 
previous and antecedent approaches. 
The moral from this is that we always impose in seeking to communicate with the 
other, and that we are never warranted absolute confidence in our interpretations. Sacks 
sought to maximize the twins’ happiness. Perhaps ‘happiness’ made no sense whatsoever 
in their life-worlds. However, if our goal is to maximize the other’s happiness there seems 
to be no other way to achieve this goal but to assume they have some sense of happiness. 
In the work conducted in this chapter and in the previous two, I have tried to show that 
we may, by overcoming the linguistic-behavioural obsession expand, from the neurotypical 
life-world, the ways in which we understand the how of happiness: understand that a 
person with an ASC diagnosis may be happy switching the lights on and off, rocking back 
and forth, secluding themselves from social contact and certain stimuli the neurotypicals 
may find pleasurable. Surely, we established that, theoretically, conceptual difference and 
life-world difference does not warrant such a supposition. However, theoretically 
pondering potential conceptual scheme and life-world difference is one thing, and being 
in creative and treatment-oriented communication with others’ conceptual schemes and 
life-worlds is another. We may keep the theoretical interest of our conclusions and admit 
humbly that, to ‘build’ something with another we must admit a series of necessary, 
Davidsonian-flavoured assumptions on behalf of the other. Nay, we must even admit such 
sanctions in knowing that the other is another. 
It is therefore essential for meaningful science to progress that a commonality of goals 
is established in terms that can be followed to also work towards this goal: a doctor must 
understand what it is like to be another (a patient), and what the patient would want to be 
like and how they should feel, but this should – can only – be done in terms able to also 
produce science, if science is to be the medium to work towards these goals. Again, I do 
not wish to state that neurotypical science as we know it today is or can be the only such 
medium. The focus here is not so much on science as we know it today, but on the method 
of inquiry and goal-pursuing: to change something, we must understand it in a way that, 
first of all, allows us to recognise it, and also that allows us to change it. This is little more 
than tautology. 
A last note: ascertainment of commonality does not necessitate commonality of 
language and at no rate do I want to support this here. It was argued in the last chapter 
 214 
that a life-world is more than a linguistic entity and we do not need to stray far from the 
path of everyday neurotypical life to see this. A toddler cries and we interpret this sign as 
wanting water or food. In saying that meaningfulness requires commonality I do not say 
that meaningfulness requires (shared) language. Regarding the ASCs case, we interpret 
e.g. the distress of nonverbal people finding themselves in overbearing stimuli as giving 
out a different kind of life-world, and Davidson and the linguistic turn approach would 
presumably miss it supposing that they would be on the hunt for statements to evince 
difference. What is unavoidably needed is some kind of interpretation (hopefully the 
correct one), and this is a problem we must humbly accept, leaving universal aspirations 




Let us now zoom out and summarily take stock of what has happened over the span 
of the whole discussion on ASCs. In chapter five I presented ASCs in their historical and 
conceptual environment and, based on this presentation, argued that people with ASCs 
diagnoses must be seen as people operating in a kind of life-world importantly different to 
the neurotypical one. I made this argument juxtaposing scientific discourse around ASCs 
(mainly from cognitive theories) with the definition of the life-world. This, I will argue, is 
an excellent point from which to survey the scientific realism debate in a new light, 
concerning this time the observable aspects of the world, the many alternative ways of 
accessing them, and the immense consequences of what we take to be true for human lives. 
The examination of this issue will take up the better part of the final chapter. By this point, 
and if my argumentation is correct, I have shown that not only are importantly different 
life-worlds a theoretical possibility but also that there is a real-life situation to which this 
applies. 
Before moving on to this task, a note about chapter six’s importance. I believe that 
chapter six is possibly the most important of the present dissertation. This is because it 
moves beyond the theoretical discussion of truth and how we may think of truth by looking 
at different people and takes a step into why this is important for the quality of treatment and 
overall quality of life of real people. In the present chapter I tried to show that the issue of a 
different life-world, and what credence we give to this difference, is not only of interest to 
those seeking to bolster or deconstruct science’s status as the divine holder of sacred truths. 
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How we treat at first the possible reality of a different view and function, and subsequently 
their validity seems to be all that the political debate around ASCs treatment revolves. It is 
important to note here that one does not even need to have a deeply thought out position 
on the ‘real’ ontology of the world to reasonably situate themselves towards this ongoing 
debate: that a certain view of the world, and a certain function that goes with it appear to 
be incorrigible and hardwired, is a point of much more importance, and reference to the 
‘real’ ilk of the world and its joints seems to be redundant for the case in point. This 
highlights something that I have pointed out throughout this dissertation and will continue 
to discuss in the chapter to come: that, oftentimes, the question of whether something 
appears to the best of our knowledge and feeling to be incorrigibly, for the foreseeable 
future unavoidably, so and so is oftentimes a question far more crucial than whether it is 
Real. 
To arrive at the above conclusions, I followed the trajectory below. In section 6.1 I 
provided a historical overview of ASCs treatment, mainly to show how some patterns of 
the present are intimately connected to the past and the criticisms this past raised. In 
section 6.2 I presented the early neurodiversity movement along with commentary from 
its main proponents and influential neurodifferent people, as well as the argument they 
converge on: claiming neurological difference to be a valid form of life. In sections 6.3 to 
6.5 I followed contemporary proponents of neurodiversity and anti-ABA activists in 
particular, and juxtaposed a characteristic collection of their opinions with the scientific 
discourse around what ABA is, what it aims and seems to achieve, and how. Having 
provided an evidential check of related claims through a meta-study on early intervention, 
in section 6.6 I tried to provide a general arbitration of the debate as it is seen through the 
life-world prism, and I tentatively suggested that at least the most central activist points on 
therapy should be granted. I closed with a note of limitation regarding what we can hope 












7. Pluralistic Incorrigible Realism 
 
Introduction 
In the beginning of this dissertation I argued against taking science and truth to be 
wedded until a historical counter-example prompts us to think otherwise. I called for a 
deeper investigation of what kind of truth science may bring us, and I claimed that this 
investigation is best carried out by way of the observables. Following, I submitted that the 
best definition of the observables is the life-world. As I demonstrated, the life-world is the 
product of a synergy between the perceiving agent and the world, and plural and 
conditioned by a given perceiving agent’s faculties and capacities. In the last two chapters 
I engaged with the autism spectrum conditions (ASCs) case and I argued for two things. 
First, that people with ASCs diagnoses are best understood as operators of different life-
worlds to the neurologically typical ones. Second, that how we treat these life-worlds in 
scientific practice matters for the well-being of people with ASCs diagnoses, and that 
employing the life-world toolkit to prioritize people with ASCs’ perception of the world in 
treatment would make for better treatment. 
In this chapter I will tie the whole discussion on life-worlds’ plurality and ASCs back 
to where it all began from: the scientific realism versus scientific antirealism debate. First, 
I hereby name my thesis pluralistic incorrigible realism (PIR). Second, I will explicate the 
limits my thesis puts upon the notions of truth and reality, allowing that a statement be 
intersubjectively (versus universally) incorrigibly true, and an entity intersubjectively 
incorrigibly real, at most. Third, I will explain what my thesis contributes to the scientific 
realism debate. Pluralistic incorrigible realism’s contributions will be organised under two 
main motivations regarding the debate: the call to go beyond the linguistic analysis of 
science and the call to pay more attention to scientific practice. I will argue that 
philosophers of science should set aside metaphysical questions pertinent to truth and 
reality tout court74, which are largely owed to approaching science plainly as a linguistic set 
of theories, and pay more attention to how insights from the scientific realism debate may 
be utilised in science’s humanitarian orientation. Last, I will address some issues of self-
reflexivity and of how pluralistic incorrigible realism grounds meaning. 
 
74 Henceforth universal, unconditional, tout court truth/reality will be referred to as 
Truth/Reality. 
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The present chapter is structured as follows. In section 7.1 I provide an overview of 
PIR as the sum of theses formed over the course of this dissertation. PIR is effectively the 
sum of three theses: that science crucially depends on the life-world, that the life-world is 
a construction owed to the world and the subject and that it can be intersubjectively shared, 
and that there are many and importantly different life-worlds which are characterised by 
different ontologies, metaphysics, emotions, and semiotics. PIR’s main claim is that a 
given science’s truth-claim and description of reality are contingent on the life-worlds it is 
articulated from. 
After I have my thesis and its main claim in view, in sections 7.2 and 7.3 I will outline 
PIR’s contributions to the traditional analytic scientific realism debate. These 
contributions I will organise along two axes: the move beyond language and the move into 
practice. The move beyond language demonstrates the richer understanding of science that 
we achieved when considering extra-linguistic elements that pertain to science’s 
situatedness upon given life-worlds. Moreover, the move beyond language highlights that 
we should likewise go beyond language when looking for life-worlds that may be divergent 
from the typical, in the way that we did in the ASCs case study. 
The move into practice explains how PIR alters the traditional orientation of the 
scientific realism debate. By conditioning science’s claim to truth and reality to given life-
worlds, PIR side-lines the debate’s focus on truth and reality as viewed from nowhere, 
conducted via the unobservables. Instead, through PIR’s highlighting of the importance 
of the observables for science, the move into practice proffers that we should focus on how 
what we take to be real shapes scientific practice. For example, the ASCs case study 
demonstrates that when we take the autistic life-world to be real we end up carrying out a 
different, arguably better, ASCs-related science. 
In sections 7.4 and 7.5 I address PIR as realism and antirealism; examining what kind 
of belief in truth and reality it warrants and what it forbids. First, I argue that any notions 
of Truth and Reality should go. Second, I submit that the notions of ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ 
should be taken to denote statements that appear to be incorrigibly true in given life-
worlds, and entities and relations that appear to be incorrigibly real in given life-worlds 
respectively. I naturally allow apportioning our belief in corrigible entities and relations’ 
existence to the evidence we have for them – but always conditioning them to certain life-
worlds. I also comment on how PIR connects with contemporary forms of scientific 
realism. I find that PIR has a lot in common with entity realism and with perspectival 
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realism –  and that it also does justice to many of the analytic writers’ maxims we reviewed 
in chapter two. 
Finally, section 7.6 addresses issues of self-reflexivity and meaning grounding on 
behalf of PIR. I admit that what I have written herein also stems from a certain life-world 
(mine, which happens to be close to the typical), and I also submit that my work in this 
dissertation may be construed not as evincing different life-worlds per se, but as showing 
the capacity of the typical life-world to interpret alien life-worlds qua alien life-worlds. Last, 
I note that while the way PIR grounds meaning – via phenomenological intentions – leaves 
open Hilary Putnam’s feared scenario of sliding into solipsism and subjective idealism, we 
should not worry too much about such a possibility. 
 
7.1 Thesis Overview 
In this section I provide an overview of pluralistic incorrigible realism as the sum of 
theses developed throughout this dissertation. I also articulate and develop its main claim: 
that scientific truth and description of reality are contingent on the life-worlds from within 
which they are articulated. 
The first thesis of PIR is that science crucially depends on the life-world. We recall the 
arguments for this from section 3.5 demonstrating that science does not begin from and is 
conducted and justified in a vacuum – it is always theorizing about and acting based on 
phenomena given to it by the life-world. Incorrigible perception provides the individuated 
phenomena which science studies; bodily, cognitive, and other human tropes dictate how 
it may be carried out; evidence for its justification is found back in the world of incorrigible 
perception. In the cloud chamber case of chapter three we took occasion to argue for these 
claims. Perceiving the sealed glass container and the radioactive material as separate 
entities (individuation); ‘holding’ the sequence of experimental events in the ‘fore’ of our 
mind and synthesizing them towards the conclusion that an electron has been observed 
(cognition); perceiving the white tracks incorrigibly (justification), all these are life-world 
elements that are sine qua non conditions of possibility for the cloud chamber experiment 
as we know and understand it. 
The second thesis of PIR is that the life-world is not plainly a construction of the 
perceiving subject or of the world but the product of a synergy between them. We recall 
from section 3.1 that Edmund Husserl was, in modern analytic philosophy terms, 
doubtlessly a metaphysical realist and that he defined the life-world exactly as the mind-
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independent world filtered through each subject’s perceiving capacities. Since this is not a 
Husserl studies dissertation, however, and Husserl’s definitions may not be enough, I will 
also provide my own arguments in favour of metaphysical realism in the life-world context 
in section five of the present chapter.  
The third thesis of PIR is that we should not speak of the life-world singular but of life-
worlds plural: each subject has their own life-world. It is also true that life-worlds may be 
shared; they have an intersubjective dimension, which obtains when incorrigible 
experience is the same for two or more subjects. Fighting the Davidsonians forbidding any 
conceptual scheme difference and then applying the pro-variation arguments to life-worlds 
in chapter four gave us the theoretical confidence that different life-worlds may exist. 
Chapters five and six convinced us that not only is life-world divergence a theoretical 
possibility but that an important percent of the extant human population – roughly one 
percent are diagnosed with ASCs – can be said to operate in life-worlds importantly 
different to the typical ones. Moreover, we showcased that this life-world divergence is 
very significant for the quality of human lives. In the ASCs case, we may either take the 
autistic life-world to be a valid experiential state and work alongside its terms trying to 
provide meaningful treatment or view ASCs at large as a defective behavioural diversion 
and seek to correct it. 
In summary, chapter three defined the life-world and established its crucial role for 
science; chapter four demonstrated the theoretical possibility of different life-worlds; 
chapters five and six showed us that different life-worlds exist, and that how we treat this 
difference in scientific practice matters for human well-being. As noted in the introduction, 
the main claim of PIR is that scientific truth and description of reality is contingent on the 
life-world from within which it is articulated. I will now develop this claim. 
Taken in conjunction, the statements that the life-world is crucially involved in science 
and that a life-world is crucially contingent on a perceiving subject prompt us to think that 
a different life-world would make for a different science. This is indeed my claim here, but 
with qualifications. Imagine any two modern physicists conducting the cloud chamber 
experiment we reviewed in chapter three. No matter how much they are alike, one out of 
our imagined pair is bound to react emotionally differently to the other upon encounters 
with certain things, and likewise synthesize meaning differently when faced with certain 
signifiers. Nevertheless, the way they will conduct the experiment and the scientific 
conclusions that they will extract from it will presumably be the same. This scenario 
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highlights that not all life-world differences are science-important. One’s e.g. general fear 
of bees will have no impact on the cloud chamber experiment’s outcome. What is crucial 
for a given science’s sameness across scientists is that the part of the life-world that is 
important for that given science is similar enough across scientists. 
This applies, too, across communities: if we have a community of scientists with their 
own, science-important, intersubjective life-world, and another community with a 
counter-part intersubjective life-world that is different, then the sciences the two 
communities will produce will be different. In fact, addressing the scientific communities’ 
life-worlds allows us to see that sometimes the intersubjective life-world may override the 
personal in the frame of science. This is elegantly brought out by the case of the 18th century 
case of Nicholas Saunderson, a blind professor of optics. For Saunderson, even his 
primary phenomenon of investigation, light, was not incorrigibly present in his life-world. 
He was, nevertheless, able to become a world-renowned expert in optics. This should 
highlight the life-world’s intersubjectivity, but it should under no circumstances lead us to 
think we can do away with incorrigible admittances. First, because Saunderson employed 
other types of incorrigible admittances (plausibly mainly cognitive) in order to 
comprehend and ‘borrow’ the others’ life-world. Second, because we are here talking 
exactly about the others’ life-world; luminous situations were incorrigible admittances of, 
again, someone else’s life-world. What matters mostly in science, therefore, is the 
intersubjective life-world: those entities, qualities, cognitive tropes et cetera, that act as the 
incorrigible substratum of the ‘collective body and mind’ if you will, of a scientific group. 
Here is then why intersubjectivity matters so much for science; the community’s collective 
incorrigible assumptions shape the ground for science’s departure, conduction, and 
justification. Even though the white tracks are not a part of the blind physicist’s life-world, 
being convinced by others – presuming of course they can communicate with others – that 
they exist makes the blind physicist act and conduct science as if the white tracks were an 
incorrigible item of perception for them as well. 
Thus, different life-worlds make for different science, all the above provisos included: 
if physics was not related to a life-world that would prompt physicists to ontologically 
individuate the equipment necessary to set up the cloud chamber experiment, or lacked 
capacities with which to see the white tracks of electrons, or lacked the cognitive capacities 
to process meaning from the related events to extract the conclusion that electrons have 
been observed, then the related experiment would not even have been able to get off the 
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ground. There is always the possibility, of course, that these capacities could be developed 
with theoretical and technical means. This, however, does not take away the importance 
of the life-world for science: if these capacities attained the status of incorrigible tools of 
perception (as, we recall from section 3.2, with the case of eyeglasses, that we incorrigibly 
take to correct sight) then they would themselves be part of the life-world. If not, our reasons 
for believing in their reliability would be able to be traced back to the life-world. In section 
3.3 we unpacked the scientific notions involved in electron observation, like radioactivity 
and electricity, and we were able to trace them back to life-world elements.  
To be sure, the above does not preclude wild life-world difference within science. The 
‘stabilisation’ of an intersubjective life-world in science is an ordinary phenomenon, but it 
is not conceptually necessary. As I develop it, pluralistic incorrigible realism is absolutely 
open to the possibility that beings with totally different life-worlds from our ordinary ones 
construct their own physics in their life-worlds’ terms. My position is at no rate a monistic 
realist one. To put it simply, the realism in PIR is meant to encapsulate simply that a lot 
of people seem to be stuck with the same specific perceptions and systems to process these 
perceptions, and that we necessarily base our science on some such perceptions and means 
(usually the most common ones). Last, it is certainly not the case that the intersubjective 
life-world stabilisation in science is always a good thing. I think the autism spectrum 
conditions case speaks for itself, as a case of science intended for people with different life-
worlds. It is no problem to assume a life-world with light featuring in it when one 
constructs a physics for the many, but it is a problem to construct a life-world with 
universal meanings for all behaviour when one constructs treatment for the few. 
So far, we have established that life-worlds that are importantly different in the right 
way would make for different science. Sciences stemming from a very different parsing of 
reality than the typical, sciences conducted via different cognitive tropes or life-worlds 
synthesizing the meaning of events and signifiers in the environment differently, would 
well deliver a different picture of the world to those who operated in them. If my remarks 
about how crucial the life-world is for the sciences throughout this dissertation are correct, 
then we could even make a speculation, a conjecture towards a pessimistic meta-induction 
on the level of species: our evolutionary progenies, equipped with a wholly different 
perception, will possibly not even recognise the same things in the world that we do and 
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would not think in the way that we do, thus arriving at wholly different scientific 
descriptions75 (I will expand on this point in section 7.3 below). 
This, however, does not readily amount to the relativization of what current science 
claims to be real and true. The argument could be made that some life-worlds are more fit 
to the cause of producing true statements and of describing reality than others. That 
importantly different life-worlds in the right way amount to different sciences may be true, 
a hypothetical thinker may now say, but perhaps the typical life-world is somehow 
superior and can make a case for deserving truth for its statements and an ‘as is’ clause for 
the reality it presents. Or perhaps good old science can pierce through the ‘veil’ of the life-
world and deliver to us the world’s contents and relations as they are, no matter which 
incorrigible admittances we may start from, which incorrigible admittances may in turn 
be just a façade of a deep-seated reality. To the first objection, my reply is that the burden 
of proof lies with the interjector, who, it seems to me, would have a very difficult job 
proving that one life-world is somehow better to do science from than the other. For, from 
which life-world would this judgement be articulated? The way in which we have defined the 
life-world it is obvious that it is the life-world that provides the materials with which to 
articulate judgements – categories of the world and of thought. A judgement presupposes a 
given life-world’s validity; there is no pre-life-world judgement in any sense. To make a 
loose analogy, to discard a life-world from within another would be like trying to discard 
a system of geometry with certain axioms from within another system with incompatible 
axioms; it would be like trying to defeat the geometry of Euclid with Nikolai 
Lobachevsky’s non-Euclidean geometry. Recall the autism spectrum conditions case: 
what would legitimize the neurotypical in telling one with an ASC diagnosis that their 
own life-world is somehow superior for inquiry? Seemingly, nothing. The second, 
objection pertaining to science ‘piercing through’ the veil of observables, I have already 
answered in section 3.5: the life-world is so, in the ways we saw above, ‘built into’ science 
that rejecting it in favour of some more deep-seated description of the world would 
automatically take away exactly our reasons for believing in this ‘deeper’, ‘truer’ 
description of reality, thus pulling the rag under the objector’s feet. In Husserl’s (1905-
20/1973, section 196, 22-34) words, nothing may offend against the life-world sense. 
 
75 We could even conjecture that ‘science’ as we understand it is bound to be importantly 
changed or replaced as a category of inquiry – and so for even the notion of inquiry itself. 
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These are, in summary, PIR’s main theses about science and its claim about scientific 
truth. In the remainder of the present chapter, I am going to tie PIR to the scientific realism 
debate. In so doing, I am going to argue more extensively for the above and address the 
following questions. First, what does PIR contribute to the scientific realism debate as it 
is typically conducted and how does it reframe the debate? Second, what does PIR make 
of reality – should we think of the incorrigible as somehow real, and how should we think 
of the incorrigible?  An analogous question will be asked about truth. Third, what are the 
philosophical limits of PIR-proffered plurality, mainly regarding truth and reality? Fourth, 
are there any self-reflexive and meaning grounding issues with PIR? 
 
7.2 Moving Beyond Language 
This and the next section are devoted to explaining how PIR challenges and aspires to 
re-orientate the way the analytic scientific realism debate is typically conducted. I organise 
my contribution to the debate along two axes: the move beyond language and the move 
into practice. 
The first place where the move beyond language took effect in this dissertation is my 
suggestion on how we should treat the observables as put forward in chapter three. 
Therein, I tried to show that the observable level, construed not as a static image captured 
by vision but as a set of incorrigible admittances, extends far beyond a mere sum of 
observation statements. First, as Husserl’s original insights compelled us to see, it is not 
that we take what see, hear, smell, feel et cetera to exist tout court: things must appear under 
a certain perceptual profile to be admitted as extant. Second, there are not only starting 
visual, auditory, et cetera points that science departs from and returns to for validation but 
also guiding ways, we may put it, that science crucially depends upon, and which are owed 
to the subject conducting science. Examples of such ways are cognition and 
proprioception. This duo shapes our life-world not, of course, by virtue of its members 
being properties of the external world, but as faculties of the perceiving subject. While 
conducting a cloud chamber experiment, for example, a neurotypical physicist may 
synthesize complicated information on a large scale to extract the conclusion that electrons 
have carved a path within the chamber. This process typically involves, for example, the 
utilisation of the physicist’s meaning ascription to certain events (radioactive decay), 
ontological individuation of certain objects (radioactive materials), and so on. As a general 
classification, the life-world’s contents were arranged along four categories: the 
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ontological (what there is); the metaphysical (how it is and relates); the semiotic (what it 
means); the emotional (how it feels). This is of course not to imply that we may understand 
the four elements necessarily in this order. As we saw in section 5.3 the elements of the 
life-world are entangled and not separately parsed in perception. For example, an 
experience of an event’s ‘how-ness’ often fires up emotions in us, as we took occasion to 
see in the case of autism spectrum conditions, with e.g. the bombardment of thoughts 
giving rise to undesired emotions. 
Thus, the analysis of science merely as a theoretical language unfairly turns a blind eye 
to the multifarious non-linguistic elements pertinent to its situatedness. The linguistic turn, 
for which scholars like Rudolf Carnap and Willard van Orman Quine are responsible in 
the analytic tradition, made a lot of sense at its time of articulation as it established a 
publically testable, easily shareable locus for science. The pursuit of unification and public 
testability, however, runs the risk of making for an unfairly monistic idea of the perceiving 
subject and ignores the life-world plurality. We saw how analytic giants of the field such 
as Bas van Fraassen (1980, 72) took it for nothing to claim that science is self-evidently 
true about the observables, claiming that “When the hypothesis is solely about what is 
observable ... empirical adequacy coincides with truth”. Others did not really address the 
issues of the observables, likely exposing a similar thesis as an underlying assumption: in 
Grover Maxwell, Alan Musgrave, Peter Lipton and Paul Dicken, and with the occasional 
exception of Putnam, who defends conceptual pluralism in the abstract, it is rarely the case 
that the perceiving subject is interrogated in the context of the observables. What we 
usually find is a picture of statements organising the world and seeking to correspond with 
it, presumably launched on behalf of the same subject always – the One True Man. In this 
picture, the stake is most often the unobservables, thus the modern scientific realism 
debate, which pretty much assumes that everyone everywhere shares an ontology, 
metaphysics, semiotics, and probably considers emotions irrelevant. 
We have by now amply seen that this assumption is unfounded; it is not the case that 
everyone operates in the same life-world. This brings us to the second place of application 
for the move beyond language: examining extra-linguistic elements was one of the most 
crucial parts of evincing life-world difference. We saw that people with ASCs diagnoses 
do not just use a different language – oftentimes they do not use a language at all – or 
necessarily adopt different systems of beliefs and different statements compared to the 
neurotypicals. People with ASCs diagnoses are plausibly different subjects in a wider sense, 
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with different world perceptions incorrigibly bestowed upon them. Take the example we 
have been over a few times now: that of children with ASCs diagnoses being distressed in 
environments of overbearing stimuli and calming down when given, for example, noise-
cancelling headphones. There, the emotions relating to distress are often expressed in non-
linguistic terms – unavoidably so in the case of nonverbal people. The Quine-Davidson 
conception of schemes faces some serious challenges here, for it would probably render 
our catering to the needs of people with ASCs diagnoses in such situations 
incomprehensible. As we saw in section 4.1 the Quine-Davidson line finds that 
understanding the other is strictly rooted in language, and in the case of different 
languages, translation. Thus, if we are to be strict Quineans-Davidsonians we might be 
compelled to think that since there is no language and translation involved in the case of 
distressed children then there can also be no understanding of what they are expressing. 
Since people with ASCs diagnoses often do not use language or use it very differently, the 
linguistic line would plausibly be that, in such cases, we are to throw our hands in the air 
and exclaim total ignorance regarding what claims, needs, desires, states of emotions they 
are expressing. This would be therapeutically and ethically catastrophic, a humanitarianly 
unacceptable corollary of the confinement to language. The post-linguistic fixation life-
world circumvents this impairment. 
In summary, when the current linguistic focus prevents us from asking: “Who is 
perceiving?” we cannot completely grasp cases such as the ASCs-related, and then the 
focus becomes an obsession. Such obsessions obscure the variety of elements that situate 
a knowledge project such as science and, for that matter, obscure its contingencies. Getting 
a better grip on such contingencies allows us both to be more humanitarianly apt in 
approaching people of divergent life-worlds, and to see science’s relation to truth and 
reality more adequately. This is PIR’s contention. 
 
7.3 Moving into Practice 
PIR, I showed in the above section through the move beyond language, shows us that 
the observables should not be construed as purely linguistic observation statements, and 
that evincing different life-worlds necessitates likewise removing language from its 
analytic pedestal. In this section, I claim that PIR’s demoting language from being the sole 
item of interest in the analysis of science also prompts us to re-orientate scientific practice. 
Below, through the move into practice, I, through PIR, demonstrate my second major 
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contribution to the scientific realism debate: showing that new questions related to the 
scientific realism debate should replace the old, and somewhat stale, big metaphysical 
questions about Truth and Reality. I claim that these questions should pertain to how what 
we take to be real when conducting science affects human lives. 
To start appreciating this point, let us first pull up the three theses the scientific realism 
debate revolves around from section 1.1: 
 
• The Metaphysical Thesis: There is a mind-independent world, which has a mind-
independent structure. 
• The Semantic Thesis: Scientific theories should be interpreted literally and have a 
truth-value76. If a scientific theory is (approximately) true then the terms regarding 
unobservables in it refer to actual things in the world. 
• The Epistemological Thesis: Mature (in some way predictively successful) 
scientific theories provide descriptions of the world that are at least approximately 
true. 
 
These are the central theses of the scientific realist77. The scientific anti-realist, it is 
reminded, is one who denies these theses78. What is important for us here is that the debate 
leaves without mention the situatedness and conditioning of the perceiving subject, and 
that the focus on theories is very much in accord with the focus on language when 
analyzing science (theories are solely expressed through language). Take the 
epistemological thesis: mature scientific theories provide descriptions of the world that are 
at least approximately true for whom? No subjective or intersubjective agent is ever 
mentioned along the traditional scientific realism debate; whatever conclusions are 
extracted from it, it seems, may apply to all. Thus, we see that the debate concerns itself 
with Truth and the Real tout court; with whether scientific statements are true in the 
 
76 At least for the most part – see below for scientific theories as ‘approximately true’ 
according to scientific realism. 
77 As we saw in sections 1.1 and 1.4, a scientific realist may hold only one or two of these 
theses and/or for some certain parts of science – not necessarily whole theories. 
78 As we saw in section 1.1, a scientific antirealist may deny only certain combinations of 
these theses. 
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absolute and whether scientific theories provide an ‘as is’ picture of reality with all its 
entities and relations. Further, this investigation is carried out solely via the unobservables: 
if they exist as science describes them then science is thought to deliver this 
(approximately) faithful to reality picture of the world. In a nutshell, the main questions 
of the analytic scientific realism debate are “Are (certain) scientific claims true simpliciter?” 
and “Are (certain) unobservable entities science describes real simpliciter?”. A positive 
answer to the second question is taken to imply a positive answer to the first. 
On the contrary, we saw above, in the life-world-PIR view, an entity or a relation can 
only be real-for-a-given-life-world, and a statement can only be true-within-a-given-life-
world. Thus, seeking the transcendental Reality of things and Truth of statements makes 
no sense within the life-world picture – a different parsing of reality; a different trope of 
thinking; a different categorisation of the world’s relations; a different life-world make for 
an environment where previous statements are simply inapplicable. How can a statement 
like “Thing A will fall off this table if I push it.” be true or thing A be real in a life-world 
that does not include the concept of thing A or falling? As we saw above, we cannot pose 
the typical life-world as superior to the one that does not recognise ‘falling’; ‘things’; the 
linear passage of time; meaning in long-winded statements – the argument in favour of 
any life-world’s primacy showed us this. Further, even if we did recognise the typical life-
world as superior, I will claim in this chapter’s section five, we would still not be warranted 
realist conclusions. 
Thus, PIR makes the following comments on the central theses of the traditional 
scientific realism debate: 
 
• Comment on Metaphysical Thesis: There is no mind-independent perception of 
the world by any given subject. The world and its structures are always-already 
observed through one’s life-world. 
• Comment on Semantic Thesis: Scientific theories and other scientific claims 
should be interpreted as articulated from within a life-world. 
• Comment on Epistemological Thesis: Mature (in some way predictively 
successful) scientific theories and other scientific claims provide descriptions of the 
world that can at best be ‘true for that given life-world’. 
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Theoretically, these comments imply that science should aim to and can at best 
describe things as they appear incorrigibly to and corrigibly from given life-worlds. The 
next two sections will explore what this means in detail. Beyond, however, the 
situatedness of truth and reality claims as I have described them above, the highlighted 
importance of the observables on behalf of PIR brings to the fore additional focal points 
for the scientific realism debate. Specifically, the ASCs case showed us that philosophical 
forays into the peculiar connection between science and truth can and should be utilised to 
address thorny and, beyond epistemological, ethico-political issues arising in the frame of 
science in practice. The related material I presented demonstrates the importance of the 
position we take regarding issues of truth and reality in the ASCs case via an important 
fork in treatment approach. The overarching comment was that if we take the autistic life-
world to be equally real and legitimate to its neurotypical counterpart from within which 
science is conducted we should also move, to put it simply, more towards increasing well-
being and less towards normalising. Let us recall a quote from Oliver Sacks (italics mine) 
on his twin patients. 
 
One indeed gets no hint of any depths unless one ceases to test the twins, to regard 
them as ‘subjects’. One must lay aside the urge to limit and test, and get to know the 
twins—observe them, openly, quietly, without presuppositions, but with a full and 
sympathetic phenomenological openness, as they live and think and interact quietly, 
pursuing their own lives, spontaneously, in their singular way. (Sacks 1985/2011, 205) 
 
In the story we were familiarised with at the end of the last chapter, Sacks’ method, 
reportedly successful in establishing a meaningful relationship with his patients, was that 
of attempting to work treatment out bearing in mind their own points of importance, 
namely their special relation to numbers and to each other. This method sits well with the 
calls of ASCs-involved activists, especially the more modest anti-ABA ones. We recall 
Kathleen Seidel, parent of a person with an ASC diagnosis saying to the New York 
Magazine: “I wanted to figure out what my child needed. I wanted to figure out what my 
child needed to thrive, for fulfilment” (Solomon 2008, n.p.). We recall testimony from 
people with ASCs diagnoses themselves: “This is what I think autism societies should be 
about: not mourning for what never was, but exploration of what is.” (Sinclair 1993, n.p.), 
and neuroscience specialists like Merzenich, who articulated to Wired’s David Wolman 
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(2008, n.p.) complaints with the fact that no money goes the way of ASC-related difference 
exploration while ‘fix the problem’ approaches get every penny. This camp strikes a prime 
conflict with a more ‘third-person’, God’s eye point of view approach, which, as we saw, 
would evaluate the twins’ behaviours from the outside and not ‘from within’, as if they do 
not occupy a different life-world in which their treatment should make sense. We recount 
that when Sacks found out, ten years after his interaction with the twins, that they had 
been separated, it was much to his dissatisfaction. Their serenity and skill had gone away 
and was replaced with anxiety of separation, Sacks wrote. All this for facing the world in 
a socially appropriate way. “What are we to think of such a curious cure?” to echo his 
closing remarks (Sacks 1985/2011, 219-220).  
My point here is not so much to defend Sacks’ particular approach as much as it is to 
state that these are issues of realism and antirealism arising in scientific practice and that 
they have crucial implications for human lives, here pertaining to the trajectory one’s 
treatment and one’s well-being, is to take. Generalising to ASCs, if we adopt the analytic 
scientific realism debate’s typical agonising we will start to occupy ourselves with the 
question of whether the ASCs-related or the neurotypical life-worlds are real: are things in 
the world like the neurotypicals perceive them, do they relate to one another how the 
neurotypicals take them to relate and do they mean what the neurotypicals take them to 
mean? Or is the autistic description of the world the true state of affairs? Which reality 
should have primacy? PIR’s invaluable contribution to this stalemate is to interject by 
insisting: we do not need to decide. The world is filtered through subjects and perceived 
incorrigibly as the life-world. When subjects are different, we get different life-worlds. 
Depending on who you ask, both the neurotypical and autistic perceptions of the world are 
real – I will expand on the sense of the ‘real’ here below. PIR maintains that we should 
maintain both life-worlds in parallel.  
Since we typically conduct science from the neurotypical life-world, the point is to 
build bridges across to the autistic one. It is to stop seeking the one true version of human 
affairs and put emphasis not on adjudicating whether truth of beliefs and correct picture 
of reality lies with one life-world or the other but on maximizing the well-being for those 
whom science regards. This is quite the opposite of what the purely behavioural approach 
does in the ASCs case, looking past life-worlds and locating difference in behaviour only. 
By unwittingly maintaining a monistic life-world picture, ABA often fails to regard the 
autistic life-world as real and naively tries to calibrate what is already perfectly calibrated 
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to its frame of reference. The benefits of this approach shine in the example of the Sesame 
Place of section 6.6. As we saw, the park’s staff have received specialized training 
regarding how to interact with people with ASCs diagnoses. Such places are structurally 
tailored to accommodate their needs: the people with ASCs diagnoses visiting Sesame 
Place are given noise-cancelling headphones to counter-act the environment’s 
unbearability when/if it arises. Nonverbal people with ASCs diagnoses are no exception 
to this. This service may plausibly be attributed to an implicit life-world reconstructing 
process of which there should be more: one sees people with ASCs diagnoses as expressing 
emotions of suffering in noisy environments (if they do) and one proceeds to counter-act 
this predicament. 
PIR’s situated perception-focused approach amounts to a re-characterisation of the 
scientific realist’s traditional theses and is quite antithetical to some of them in spirit. 
Regarding the metaphysical thesis, a mind-independent world may exist (we will see 
below why and how) but it surely has no mind-independent structure. In the course of the 
preceding chapters we saw that different perceiving subjects may and do perceive quite 
different structures in the world, and that the means by which to investigate the structure 
of the world further – science – are, too, unavoidably based on and shaped by the situated 
perception of a given subject. Thus, the structure of the world is always filtered by one’s 
life-world and derived by methods wedded to one’s life-world. Regarding the semantic 
thesis, scientific theories and scientific statements may only have a truth-value for given 
life-worlds since, given arguments for conceptual scheme and life-world variation from 
previous chapters, there are no statements which make sense in all life-worlds. This holds 
the same for the epistemological thesis; scientific theories and other claims may deliver a 
picture of reality as it is only for certain life-worlds at best. I will expand on what PIR makes 
of truth and reality in the sections below. 
This approach described above opens a whole new field of study for scientific realism, 
ushered in mainly by two questions: “What should we take to be true and real in scientific 
practice?” and “How are we to reconstruct divergent life-worlds?”. Thus, contrary to the 
picture of the scientific realism debate we surveyed in chapter one holding the observables 
to a secondary role, we see that the observables present ample theoretical interest but 
mostly urgent practical interest for science in practice. This connects well with recent moves 
within philosophy of science, which seek to re-establish a connection with scientific 
practice (see as a representative sample the recent philosophy of science in practice as 
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represented in Ankeny et al. 2011). I wholeheartedly ascribe myself to this movement in 
declaring: less about theory and unobservables, more about practice and the observables. 
Or plainly just more about practice and the observables. Last, as a methodological 
limitation to my project, I must here admit that I have fallen short of offering an exhaustive 
method for reconstructing a life-world. 
Before I close this section, I must say that I hope my recommendations are received in 
a renewing spirit for the analytic scientific realism debate, one which is admittedly urgently 
needed. As Anjan Chakravartty (2011, section 4.5), one of the most informed scholars 
about the debate, notes, the debate is more and more thought to be in a state of ‘dialectical 
paralysis’, whereby nothing more sensible or substantial may be said about it. Alison 
Wylie cited in Chakravartty notes that: 
 
[T]he most sophisticated positions on either side now incorporate self-justifying 
conceptions of the aim of philosophy and of the standards of adequacy appropriate for 
judging philosophical theories of science. (Wylie 1986, 287 cited in Chakravartty 2011, 
section 4.5) 
 
This dialectical paralysis, it seems to me, could be lifted not by solving the gargantuan 
issues of science’s relation to Truth and Reality, but by realising the absurdity of such 
notions as disembodied and universal and of side-lining them in favour of a more practical 
approach. 
This is, in summary, my PIR’s contribution to the scientific realism debate, organised 
under two axes. One, leaving the obsession with language to one side to look to real and 
rich life-worlds and subjects for real and rich differences in world experience and 
conceptualization. This broadens out the debate and facilitates a more nuanced treatment 
of the notions of truth and reality as relevant to given life-worlds. Two, of looking for 
repercussions of truth and reality claims in actual scientific practices, orientating such 
practices towards purposeful ends, often, hopefully, benefitting human lives. Moreover, 
of, while so doing, resting content with the non-answerability of the Big Metaphysical 
Questions such as what there Really Truly exists and paying more attention to the 
existence of what there appears incorrigibly to be, to us as well as to others we aspire to be 
in creative and therapeutic communion with.  
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Over the remainder of the present chapter, I will provide a more specific and in-depth 
analysis of pluralistic incorrigible realism qua realism and antirealism. I will be occupying 
myself with questions such as: what kind of beliefs in truth and reality does PIR facilitate 
and what does it forbid? Especially pertaining to alien life-world reconstruction: when are 
we, if ever, legitimized in saying we have arrived at its ‘true’ reconstruction? How does 
our own life-world, our home conceptual scheme, arrest such interpretations? How is 
meaning ascribed to things in the frame of the life-world? 
 
7.4 Pluralistic Incorrigible Realism Qua Realism: The Incorrigible 
Above, we saw that any notion of truth that may arise in pluralistic incorrigible realism 
is internal to certain life-worlds, and that all descriptions of reality are contingent on 
certain life-worlds. Thus, in PIR I adopt an overarching relativist attitude towards any 
proffered specific picture of the world as True and of its contents as they Really are. This 
section and the next expand on the weaker notions of truth and reality that PIR adopts, as 
we saw briefly above. We may not say that a statement is True and that a given description 
captures Reality, but could we maybe consider the contents of our incorrigible and 
corrigible perception to be, their unavoidable situatedness granted, somehow real? Could 
the statements systematically organising this content be somehow conditionally true? I 
will address these questions in the context of PIR and I will conclude that, once we get 
clear on the philosophical content of PIR, how we answer the above questions is mostly a 
matter of semantics. In this process, I will deny several antirealist and relativist claims, 
with the degree of their extremity mostly being proportionate to their degree of rejection. 
Let us first take the issue of the external world at large. In section one above we recalled 
that Husserl articulated the concept of the life-world as subscribing to metaphysical 
realism. His precise words (as quoted in Føllesdal) are: 
 
[P]henomenological idealism does not deny the factual existence of the real world (and 
in the first instance nature) as if it deemed it an illusion … Its only task and 
accomplishment is to clarify the sense of this world, just that sense in which we all 
regard it as really existing and as really valid. That the world exists … is quite 
indubitable. Another matter is to understand this indubitability which is the basis for 
life and science and clarify the basis for its claim. (Føllesdal 2010, 32-33) 
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Scientific metaphysical realism, as we saw in the above section, maintains that the 
world exists and that it has a subject-independent structure. PIR, through life-world 
pluralism, certainly denies the latter statement. The former, however, in agreement with 
Husserl, is not denied. Thus, my comment on the metaphysically realist thesis that there 
is no mind-independent perception of the world by any given subject. For plural life-worlds 
to exist, they must be plural versions of the same thing – the world. Notice here that this 
does not mean that the concept of the world is included in every possible life-world. It only 
means that, from PIR’s standpoint, we cannot but admit the world as existing tout court. 
The life-world from within which PIR is articulated, we may put it, incorrigibly admits 
the world. The alternative is nonsensical; we cannot have plural versions of something 
that may not exist (I will expand further on self-reflexivity issues in section 7.7). 
We may find powerful analytic arguments to this effect easily. We recall from sections 
2.6 and 4.1 Putnam’s (and sometimes Tim Button’s) arguments against relativizing the 
world. First, the infamous brain in a vat argument: that, were I a brain in a vat, my causal 
relationship to the world would be too messed up to articulate my predicament and, since 
I can articulate my potential predicament, I am not a brain in a vat. Thus, what I see 
around me may not be radically fooling me; I somehow am in genuine causal contact with 
the world. This wards off extreme scepticism but does not defend any specific 
categorization of the world as non-relativizable and it does not show what kind of access I 
have to the world (e.g. via sense-data; qualia; phenomena et cetera)79 as we also recall. 
Second, the behind-the-schemes argument. The argument, recall, starts by offering a line 
as a metaphor for the world. No matter how we cut the line, the parts we end up with are 
always part of that same line/world80. Thus, the cutting up the line, here a metaphor for 
the multifarious ways in which one may parse the world, may not relativize the world – 
the world is a stable notion across all possible categorizations for them to acquire their 
very sensibility. Again, this argument precludes only extreme relativism: is shows that the 
world at large is necessary for every conceptual scheme pluralism argument but, crucially, 
not that any of its systems of categorization may not be relativized as e.g. Davidson 
argued. In the same manner, applied to life-worlds as we saw above, PIR needs the concept 
 
79 For a comprehensive study of the argument, it is reminded, the reader may look to 
Button 2013, 115-178. 
80 See Button 2013, 197-208 for more. 
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of the world at large for life-world pluralism. This may be seen as a fortunate coincidence: 
Husserl provides the historical motivation and Putnam-Button provide the analytic 
arguments for why the life-world based PIR owes it to good metaphysics to adopt a 
realist’s attitude about the world. 
Therefore, the world appears now to be safe from the relativist’s claws. Is everything 
else up for grabs? This would sound rather like a heady relativist doctrine. While I do not 
believe this should be considered philosophical anathema in and of itself, I must here 
examine whether the incorrigibility of one’s life-world harbours anti-relativist tendencies. 
Incorrigible admittances, we know well by now, were defined to be those that we cannot 
do without, in the sense of the admittances’ foreseeable impossibility to be cast away. We 
have reached the life-world when we can no longer perform the Husserlian rückfragen – the 
inquiring-back from. Incorrigible admittances are not amenable to change; they may not 
be altered by discursive, social training, and other training that may push towards their 
lifting. 
Let us take some examples. I would normally claim that there is a brown table and a 
silver laptop in front of me right now. The table feels rather sturdy against my skin, while 
the laptop’s keys feel softer. I am reading and editing my dissertation, and I combine the 
signifiers on the page extracting several meanings. Now imagine one with an ASC 
diagnosis in my situation. They also recognise the table and the laptop as real, their colours 
and the way they feel too. They also happen to be cognitively otherwise disposed and will 
not, for all the training in the world, extract the meaning out of the screen’s pages that I 
do. Moreover, suppose that our senses of how time passes are very different: mine is linear, 
theirs nonlinear. We will both, for all the social training and peer pressure in the world, 
not acquire a different sense of time or be convinced that the table and the laptop do not 
exist, and similarly we will not be made to adopt each other’s meaning extraction 
processes – that is, each other’s semiotics. 
We may now perhaps put it that the table and the laptop are real (not Real) for the both 
of us, their colours too. We share an incorrigible ontology. Moreover, we seem to share 
the same metaphysics: the relation of the keys to our own self is sensually the same. 
However, our metaphysics and semiotics diverge. For me it is true that time passes in a 
linear manner, and it is true that my dissertation means what I intended it to mean. Our 
hypothetical person with ASCs diagnoses, however, will find, for themselves, other 
statements to be true of time and my dissertation’s meaning. Our life-worlds, we now see, 
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are similarly oriented in some senses and differently in others. Thus, plausibly, if we want 
to reflect this state of affairs within PIR, we may be compelled to define: the real denotes 
all these entities and relations that are incorrigibly present in one’s life-world. The true 
denotes these statements that are incorrigibly correct in describing one’s life-world. Both 
notions are obviously situated to this life-world. 
We are here at a rather semantic crossroads: are we meant to say that certain things 
are thus and so (versus real and true) for some, e.g. neurotypicals’ life-worlds, or are we 
meant to rework the notions of truth and reality and say: that these are the things that are 
real in these neurotypicals’ life-worlds and these are the statements that are true for them? 
Or even perhaps true simpliciter by proposing a re-working of the notions of truth and 
reality to accommodate a sine qua non relational element? I do not have very strong 
inclinations towards any of these solutions since they stem from the same philosophical 
substance, however I think that the most elegant is the last one. Even within PIR and its 
anti-ecumenical maxims, the notions of truth and reality are probably worth preserving. 
They have not been with us since ancient philosophy by accident; they encapsulate a 
strong phenomenological experience, which is, I opine, that of the incorrigible truth of a 
statement and the incorrigible presence of an entity or relation. Or if we take the opposites 
of being true and real – being false and fake respectively – they denote a state of affairs that 
is not/has not been thus and so incorrigibly (regarding statements) or e.g. illusions 
(regarding entities). These are distinct and important phenomenological situations – 
finding thing A to be incorrigibly real or fake or finding statement B to be incorrigibly true 
or false – that should plausibly be captured by philosophical terminology. Thus, 
henceforth I will adopt the view that the statements describing how the incorrigible is for 
given life-worlds are true for those life-worlds and that the entities and relations these 
statements denote are real, again, for those life-worlds. An important note follows: this is 
not to say that the true and the real are only relevant to the incorrigible, for they also have 
a role to play within the corrigible. We will see how in the next section. 
This is how I propose, through PIR, not to answer the long-standing questions of 
realism versus antirealism, but to transform the debate by virtue of these situated, more 
modest notions of truth and reality. Our hands are then free not only to ask more practical 
questions, but also to accommodate important differences across life-worlds 
philosophically. Reflection, communicating with others in different situations – and life-
worlds – and sustained analysis prompt us to see a theoretical, practical, and even 
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humanitarian need to recognize that others may find themselves admitting different things 
incorrigibly; this much has been demonstrated above and in the two preceding chapters. 
Yet, the strong presence of things in the world makes our life manageable – imagine how 
unliveable our life would be if the certainty of basic things was not forced upon us without 
debate and discourse most of the time81. Imagine how difficult communication would be 
without these shared strong impositions – just recall at what pains one must go to 
reconstruct other life-worlds and throw bridges across them – the case of ASCs not being, 
of course, an exception. Communication between the neurotypicals and the 
neuroatypicals is often the hardest thing involved in their interaction – we read testimony 
and examined evidence about this in chapters five and six. I think we should capture the 
spirit of this state of affairs with words and I do not see a reason why ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ 
should not be these words. 
Will the above sound inadequate as a realist position to the camp of realists? Perhaps 
so. If so, I think this would be for the wrong reason – why should we be hung up with 
notions of Truth and Reality, of ecumenical and universal correct views of the ways things 
are as seen from nowhere? Is relativism that seeks to free ourselves of such restrictions 
unreasonable or is rather this pursuit of a disembodied Truth and Reality eerily 
reminiscent of dogma? PIR is realism that abides by the second view; it is realism in that 
it seeks to maintain the notions of truth and reality as outlining the incorrigible and, as we 
will see below, a sort of ‘measure’ of how corrigible the corrigible is, in the form ‘true and 
real for us and for all that matters’ as we saw above. 
Bearing in mind the above delineation of the true and the real (always lowercase except 
for the world) in relation to the incorrigible, an important question is in order: how does 
PIR connect with forms of contemporary scientific realism? More than any other doctrine 
presented in chapter one, it flirts with Ian Hacking’s entity realism. In entity realism’s 
spirit, PIR contends that incorrigible admittances are not simply a matter of theorizing. 
PIR demands of a certain something to provide a consistent and persistent profile in a 
number of senses; tables must, for example, generate a number of images and senses in a 
particular way as we move around them and interact with them to be given ontological 
 
81 A similar point is raised by Martin Heidegger in connection not only with practical 
convenience but also with abolishing the fear of death (see Shariatinia 2015 for more on 
the issue). 
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legitimacy (see section 3.1 for more). Entity realism largely privileges causality; PIR 
considers causality an important factor in evincing incorrigibility: I try to walk through a 
table and my causal interaction with it reassures me that the table is incorrigibly present 
to me. 
In section 1.4 we saw entity realism’s insistence that the entities science purportedly 
manipulates should be admitted not only as extant, but also delivered to us by experiment 
rather than theory. Therein, I sided with arguments claiming that any conceptualization 
of an entity as untangled from theory is decisively hopeless: any description or definition 
of an entity unavoidably contains parts relating to larger theoretical wholes. Further, in 
section 3.2 I recalled and demonstrated why the life-world and its contents may not at all 
be non-theoretical and composed of ‘pure’ data, one reason being the theory-ladenness of 
observation, the other Husserl’s noematic synthesis of perception on behalf of every given 
subject. Thus, PIR decisively breaks with entity realism’s non-theoretical tenet. 
Beyond issues of theory contamination, we should now ask: does PIR admit entity 
realism’s causally active entities as extant? For that matter, does it admit structural 
realism’s predictive structures of preservative realism’s predictively active ingredients as 
real, or certain scientific statements as true? Since these entities, structures and statements 
pertain to the corrigible, I will address this question in the upcoming section. To expect 
what will be developed therein, however, PIR apportions belief to these entities’ and 
structures’ real existence to the available evidence but it does separate them from 
incorrigible admittances of perception. Something analogous holds for evaluating the truth 
of statements. 
What about the rest of the analytics? As we saw in section 3.4, plausibly they would 
not be too disappointed with PIR: logical empiricism’s primacy of experience is 
maintained, though experience is cashed out in a much more sophisticated way than 
observation statements. Van Fraassen would be happy with the primacy of experience, 
though PIR breaks decisively with his supposed simplicity of the observables. Hasok 
Chang would also be happy with the sophistication with which PIR treats the observables: 
vision should not by any means be the ultimate perceptual sense, we recall him stating. 
Most importantly, I have wholeheartedly embraced his notion of incorrigibility, being, I 
believe, faithful to the spirit in which it was meant. Last, regarding Grover Maxwell, we 
may have retained the observable level contrary to his likings, however the life-world can 
be seen as an explication of his and Paul Feyerabend’s ‘quickly decidable sentences’ – 
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although far be it from me to fall back to sentences per se. We even left a window for 
technology to sneak into the incorrigible as in the case, for example, of eyeglasses, though 
this window is not nearly as big as he and Chang would have it. What is incorrigibly 
observable when I drink coffee is not caffeine; wakedness is. In chapter three and via the 
cloud chamber example I was at pains to delineate incorrigibility’s limits – despite it being 
a vague predicate. 
 
7.5 Pluralistic Incorrigible Realism Qua Realism: The Corrigible 
We have just been through an argument for how we should treat the incorrigible in 
relation to truth and reality. This dissertation began with the question of whether things 
like electrons exist: the central issue that circumscribes the contemporary scientific realism 
debate. We certainly cannot afford to leave the central question of the debate without 
mention and, since electrons were argued to be rather corrigible admittances, a comment 
on what pluralistic incorrigible realism makes of the corrigible and its part in reality and 
truth is in order. Do electrons, then, really exist? Minimally, thus far we have established 
that electrons may not Really exist. In fact, we have established thus far that nothing, save 
for the world, may Really exist from PIR’s standpoint. We are by now agnostics of the 
Real. Towards the structure of the mind independent-world, we may put it as we did 
above, we shall remain agnostics. 
A traditional scientific realist would have it that electrons exist because we may 
theoretically infer them from the available evidence. In the cloud chamber case of section 
2.3 we saw how: we see the white spots and we infer that they are tracks that electrons 
have left behind while being emanated from a radioactive material placed in the chamber. 
How do we know that radioactivity exists? Because the Curies used it to isolate a new 
element. How do we know it was a new element they isolated? By recording the number 
of protons in its atomic nucleus. Finally, how do we know what the atom is? Via Brown’s 
‘pollen grain dance’, and observing through the microscope – the dependability of which 
we establish by the relation of the images it delivers to our eyes with the products of our 
sense of sight. So the story goes, all the way up (or down) to some first link of the inferential 
chain. We may ask more questions, as we did in section 2.3 with e.g. the atomic structure, 
and saw a story similar to the above leading back to the inference of electricity. 
Now let us consider the same story but from a PIR, life-world based approach. It is 
basically the same story as the above paragraph’s, but with two crucial notes. The first 
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note is that life-world elements abound both in the beginning (e.g. microscope) and along 
every link (e.g. radioactivity, cloud chamber experiment) of the experimental-inferential 
chains. We saw this amply in section 2.3: from the sense of the self and the sequence of 
events to being able to observe ‘white here now’ that is plausibly electron tracks and to 
having the cognitive capacities to synthesize observation into an inferential statement, the 
experimenter’s life-world plays a crucial role in setting up, carrying out, understanding the 
experiment, and communicating it to others. The second note is that, as we have seen 
many times by now, these life-world elements, via which some conclude that “Electrons 
have been observed” have very many, importantly different alternatives; alternatives that 
would not allow for the inference of the electron’s existence as we understand it today 
from the neurotypical life-world. What is more, above we argued that we may not 
prioritize this electron-seeing life-world against any other that is unable to admit the 
existence of electrons. Thus, in the PIR version of the story, electrons have not been 
observed simpliciter; they have been inferred via a very specific set of life-worlds elements 
that make that inference possible. 
“Fine, fine. But do electrons really (versus Really) exist, in your terms?” we hear the 
parties fascinated with the classic form of the debate asking. Let me ask first: what does 
this question mean? We have already defined the real as cashing out the incorrigible. So 
we may take this question to mean whether or not electrons could ever attain the status of 
the incorrigible. This I evidently do not know but, should they somehow do, then they 
certainly would be part of the real. We know that for the moment they do not have a 
suchlike status. We also know that the notion of the entities has been very useful to various 
ends. There may be some historical weight pointing to the opposite conclusion à la Larry 
Laudan’s pessimistic meta-induction. I rest content with running all these statements in 
parallel; I do not feel the pressure to go any further. The more evidence surfaces to 
electrons’ defence and the more useful they become to ends we deem worth pursuing, the 
more reasons I see for using the notion. Is this stance agnostic instrumentalism pure and 
simple? It may be. But I am ready to, if electrons ever attain the status of the incorrigible, 
admit them as real for some given life-worlds, namely those to which they appear incorrigible. 
There is however a very crucial point to follow. If we leave the discussion at this point, 
stating that the incorrigible is real(-for-given-life-worlds) and that the corrigible is not, 
stating no further comment, we run a serious risk – that of not doing justice to the rigorous 
scientific methods, being at pains to map e.g. micro-reality. We have reserved the world 
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‘real’ to denote what is incorrigibly present in one’s life-world, but we should obviously be 
careful not to maintain that the entities that scientific theories map, even if conditioned to 
these theories’ life-worlds, have the same claim to real existence such as utterly 
unsubstantiated proffered entities, which we would call ‘utterly metaphysical’ in the bad 
sense of the word (see: astrological entities). At the same time, we do not want to include 
these corrigible scientific entities in the real per se, seeing as we want to maintain a separate 
realm of the empirical as real – recall the whole of chapter three on the ‘core empirical’ 
level’s importance. We might then strike a middle solution within this dialectic and say 
that we should apportion our belief to such entities’ – e.g. electrons’ – existence to the 
available evidence. We might say that, the stronger and more independent evidence we 
have for an entity’s existence (still, always, from within a life-world), the more it tends 
towards attaining the status of the incorrigible. We still, certainly, maintain a hard – but not 
diachronically immutable – limit between those admittances we may do without and those 
which we may not. We are thus put back in a Maxwell-flavoured continuum, still 
maintaining the life-world’s incorrigibility border. 
We saw what PIR makes of corrigible reality. What about corrigible truth? In the 
previous section, we saw that e.g. the statement “Time passes linearly” is true for me, a 
neurotypical person who shares the same relation to time as most. Are statements 
pertaining to the corrigible equally true? We may extrapolate from what has been said just 
above to similar conclusions regarding truth. A statement pertaining to corrigible entities 
and relations, providing descriptions that are non-purely life-world descriptions denoting 
the incorrigible, may be said to be as true as the evidence supporting it allows for. We 
may, that is, apportion our belief to e.g. the statement “Electrons exist” to the same degree 
that we apportion our belief to electrons themselves (seeing as here, the evidence is 
obviously the same for both entity and statement). The more we cannot but admit the truth 
of a statement, the more it attains the status of the incorrigible, the more we believe in its 
truth (always true-for-given-life-worlds). Let me here note that evidence is also 
unavoidably extracted from within a life-world. The same kind of evidence does not obtain 
across all life-worlds, which is even more reason to condition the belief in the truth and 
reality of the corrigible to given life-worlds.  
Before I close this section, a last note on pragmatism and pluralism as issues pertinent 
to realism and antirealism. Evidently, in my own position elements of pluralism abound: 
that life-worlds differ, is plain and simple, life-world pluralism. As for pragmatism, there 
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is a philosophical tendency trending currently regarding issues of realism, and this is that 
we should choose our conceptions of things that is best fitting to given purposes. I take no 
issue with this stance. However, it is true that this cannot be our approach to reality all the 
way down. To articulate aims – our first aims – we need to be able to recognise things 
around us, to have a life-world within which aims obtains their significance. This is decidedly 
the life-world’s business, for there can be no prior aims to which our ‘bootstrap’ ontology 
may be adjusted. 
 
7.6 Wrapping Up: Issues of Self-Reflexivity and Meaning Ascription 
I have always wanted to close a major work with a Wittgensteinian pirouette. Thus 
this one begins: what I have written here is also contingent on the typical life-world. Every 
conclusion, whether scientific, philosophical, or quotidian, is unavoidably the child of a 
state of affairs that could have been different. The preceding sentence is too. The preceding 
and this one are as well. So it goes, to infinite regress. What do I have to bring in my 
defence against the regress that is claimed to be the omnipresent bane of any relativism? 
This: I have not tried to pull away from my conceptual scheme and life-world and to 
proffer universal conclusions. I gladly bite the bullet of my limits: I partake of the typical 
human life-world of our times, of the ontology, metaphysics, emotions, and semiotics 
associated with it. I am neurotypical and sober while writing this dissertation and this is 
unavoidably reflected in the outcome. To read this dissertation as intended is impossible 
for one operating under, for example, weak central coherence; the cognitive trope required 
dictates that one synthesizes meaning quite globally, across long sentences, and then holds 
these meanings in mind across chapters.  
How can I, while unavoidably speaking from within a life-world, defend life-world 
pluralism? Certainly, I cannot pull away from all life-worlds and evince the existence of 
many. What I can do, what I have attempted to do in the course of this dissertation, is to 
show that, still from within a life-world, the extent to which we can recognise the existence 
of other, importantly different life-worlds, is significant. Indeed, good pluralism owes it to 
itself to recognise that the point from which one evinces plurality is just one point among 
many – what we believe or do is always based on our interpretative, conceptual scheme 
and on our home life-world. What I have been doing in the course of the whole dissertation 
may then be viewed, if you will, not strictu sensu as proving that other life-worlds exist but 
defending that, upon philosophical reflection, my home life-world and conceptual scheme 
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(which are the typical) force me to grant the existence of other life-worlds and other 
conceptual schemes. The benefit of this, I have claimed, is that once we realise the 
existence of other life-worlds we can free ourselves of ascetic, metaphysical attempts at 
discovering what is Real and True tout court and attempt to work fruitfully across other 
life-worlds towards the betterment of the others’ lives and ours (see the ASCs case). The 
means of evaluating this fruitfulness are, unavoidably, still ours. Yet we can, we are 
obliged to in the senses elaborated above, refer to others when using these means. 
In the beginning of section 7.4 we saw that the external world may not be relativized 
from a conceptual relativism standpoint; PIR is prohibited from claiming that the world – 
not any of its specific pictures – may not exist. To evince that two people looking at 
something organise it differently, this something must be the same across not the conceptual 
schemes of the two as Davidson would have it but across the metaphysician’s scheme – the 
one who evinces they are using different schemes. Thus, the world must not be relativized 
in the frame of a scheme proffering many valid categorisations of it – else what would they 
be different categorisations of? To ground this issue to the ASCs case, when we evince that 
a certain string of words has one meaning for the neurotypical and another for one with 
an ASC diagnosis, the ‘string of words’ is necessary to our interpretative scheme. 
Moreover, it is not the only thing necessary to our scheme. For example, recognising the 
two people as two distinct subjects is also necessary to evince their meaning synthesis 
difference. The whole point of this dissertation has been to demonstrate that, still from 
within the typical life-world and while necessarily based on a life-world and a conceptual 
scheme, we may find a world of difference much richer than the linguistic line has it. In 
the ASCs case, and still obviously talking from within the neurotypical life-world, we took 
occasion to see how deeply and extra-linguistically autistic differences run: the people’s 
with ASCs diagnoses emotional reactions to auditory and visual stimuli are often different 
to that of the neurotypicals; they often have a different sense of how time passes; in many 
cases they derive meaning in physical rather than in literary and metaphorical terms. We 
can recognise this difference so if we go beyond the linguistic line, and there are compelling 
theoretical and humanitarian reasons for why we should do so. 
One may now ask: “Since PIR adopts the metaphysical realist’s position about the 
world, and remains agnostic about the Real, does this mean that the world ‘as is’ is 
ineffable?”. Yes, it does, though not ineffable in the sense that we cannot say anything 
about it but ineffable in the sense that we can say too many, often incompatible things about 
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it. In chapter four I attempted to give an empirical sense to the ineffable so that Button’s 
anxieties towards the potential void of the notion could be soothed. This was the over-
determined sense: I defended the notion of a variety of perspectives, all equally valid, which 
prohibit us from describing an object or an event tout court. More empirical and theoretical 
work is currently being conducted on realism which is yet perspectival – see the 
philosophical school inspired by Ronald Giere (2006) and proliferated by Michela 
Massimi’s (2018) team in Edinburgh. 
A last issue is in line before we conclude, that of how meaning is grounded in PIR. 
Seemingly, PIR grounds meaning phenomenologically; meaning is synthesized in the 
subject’s life-world – the analytic philosophy of language would call this grounding 
meaning in phenomenological intentions. We recall, however, from section 2.5 that the 
Putnam-Button camp would vehemently argue against this. In the Putnam-Button line, 
hiding the world behind a veil of phenomena – which is pretty much what PIR is doing, 
posing the world as the ineffable delivered to us by subject-filtered phenomena – leads to 
the perils of subjective idealism and solipsism. To this objection, my reply is: sure enough, 
the idea of grounding meaning in phenomenological intentions does not preclude subjective 
idealism and solipsism. However, for all I perceive and understand, I share conceptual 
schemes and life-worlds with so many others around me, and these life-worlds and 
schemes often outrun my subjective will: the world resists and is seemingly comprised of 
rules (rules with exceptions). I and so many others, we see the same things, we act towards 
certain purposes, we help each other out, we perceive ourselves as part of a world that is, 
through our own filter, characterised by such and such independence. We communicate, and 
this is a point that, following Husserl, I took careful notice to underline when talking about 
the intersubjective dimension of the life-world. Certainly, the world can be seen in almost 
radically alternative ways. Sure, what I perceive may all be in my head, and what 
precludes scepticism from taking my own head too is René Descartes’ cogito ergo sum. 
Other people may products of my own imaginations and subjective experiences and so 
can the world and its phenomenal independence from my own thought, which can be the 
creation of my own thought. To which I again reply: so what? I see no way to check this 
idea and I have no use for it. Returning to Husserl’s phenomenological naiveté from 
chapter three: this is all we have. The naiveté I recommend here, then, is about our 
phenomenological experiences, not about direct objects of perception (per later Putnam’s 
natural realism). That is, tables and chairs and whatever else are not directly given to us 
 244 
as they are, as Putnam’s naivete would have it, but it is our filtering of the world through 
perception – one of many – that delivers these incorrigible admittances to our 
consciousness. We should thus naively believe, per our phenomenological experiences, 
that ourselves, and others and tables and chairs, and whatever else is incorrigibly received 
in our consciousness, exists – with the proviso of its situatedness in our life-worlds. If we 
are radically deceived, then so be it. 
Thus, PIR stands in opposition both to the Truth-Reality duo, and to radical scepticism 
pertaining to solipsism. Not because PIR can and cannot decide what is and is not True 
and Real or is certain that we are not radically deceived or alone in this world but simply 
because it sees no use for hunting after these notions. On the contrary, leaving these Big 
Metaphysical Issues to one side, PIR suggests putting the focus of examination of truth 
and reality to how what we take to be real and true shapes scientific practice, and affects 
human lives associated with it. 
 
Conclusion 
The original work of this dissertation is now complete. In this final chapter I have 
provided an outline of pluralistic incorrigible realism and summarised my position’s 
contributions to the scientific realism debate. I have urged for a move beyond the obsession 
with the analysis of language in science and scientific realism approach and called for a 
richer understanding of the debate, as well as for its application to actual scientific practice. 
Moreover, I specified the kind of claim to the truth pluralistic incorrigible realism warrants 
for us: not Truth but truth-for-us, which is understood to mean things that are, to the best 
of our understanding, indispensable within our parsing of reality. Last, I addressed a 













Over the course of this dissertation, I argued that scientific theory and practice are 
always conditioned on a realm of subjective, potentially intersubjective, incorrigible 
admittances; on the life-world. This state of affairs, I claimed, conditions science’s claim 
to truth and reality to a life-world as well. I recommended that philosophers of science 
should be less occupied with whether science captures any ecumenical notions of Truth 
and Reality, which are, per the life-world approach, devoid of content. Instead, as I 
demonstrated through the investigation of the autism spectrum conditions (ASCs) case 
study, philosophical analysis of science’s truth and reality claim is set to better use in 
investigating how what we take to be real and true within a scientific practice shapes the lives 
of those who this practice aspires to benefit. 
I argued for the above in the following order. In chapter one, I surveyed the 
contemporary analytic scientific realism debate and found that it is unduly fixated with 
the unobservable aspects of the world. I claimed that an in-depth philosophical analysis of 
science’s claim to truth and reality should pay attention to science’s situatedness as it is 
brought to the fore via an analysis of the observables. Following, in chapters two and three, 
I set out to conduct this analysis, starting from pondering the best construal of the 
observables. After surveying the main analytic insights pertinent to the issue, I concluded 
that there is indeed a legitimate dichotomy to be made between the observables and the 
unobservables. To best capture the significance that the observables hold for the scientific 
endeavour, I offered Edmund Husserl’s life-world-cum-analytic-tweaks as an 
encapsulation of the observable level. The life-world’s categorisation system that I 
proffered included four axes: ontological; metaphysical; semiotic; emotional. 
Chapters four and through to six engaged with life-world pluralism in theory and in 
practice. First, I defended theoretical life-world pluralism by resisting Donald Davidson’s 
attack on conceptual scheme pluralism, and then applying the arguments to the life-worlds 
– henceforth plural. I did this mainly by arguing against Davidson’s fixation with language 
and translation when looking for conceptual difference. Rather, I proposed that looking at 
conceptual schemes users rather than language often allows us to detect rich, extant 
conceptual differences between subjects. Following, I turned to the case study of autism 
spectrum conditions. I argued for two main points. First, after examining the cognitive 
theories of ASCs and testimony from people with ASCs diagnoses and their peers, I 
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posited that people with ASCs diagnoses are best understood as operators of life-worlds 
different to the neurotypical ones. Second, that the heated ethico-political treatment extant 
within the ASCs communities is best understood as a debate about the autistic life-world. 
Two camps were formed, mainly concerning ASCs mainstream behavioural treatment, 
Applied Behaviour Analysis (ABA). On the one hand, there are the neurodiversity 
activists, often critical of ABA, who argue that ASCs should be considered a legitimate 
mode of being and not a product of a defective condition. Further, ABA should not look 
to behaviourally normalise people with ASCs diagnoses, seeing as they are at their core 
different people, for whom adopting neurotypical behaviours often makes no sense. On 
the other hand, the pro-ABA camp defended that ABA helps people with ASCs diagnoses 
acquire useful skills and maximize their autonomy. 
Utilising the life-world concept, I sided mainly with the neurodiversity activists: ASCs 
seem to indeed be deep-seated conditions, incorrigible, among others, states of perception. 
Thus, I argued, the claim that ASCs treatment should be tailored to the autistic life-worlds, 
seeking to maximize the well-being of people with ASCs diagnoses in their own terms, 
makes sense. Accordingly, I argued that ABA should be ‘filtered’ through the life-world, 
aiming to still provide the benefit of useful skills and of increasing autonomy, but leaving 
behaviours that make sense in the autistic life-worlds be unaltered. Further, I offered that 
more phenomenologically-oriented approaches to ASCs treatment – which I showed in 
chapter five to be unfairly understudied – should be advanced. Last but very crucially 
regarding the ASCs case, I demonstrated the life-world concept’s superiority in 
approaching ASCs. The depth of the concept, incorporating elements beyond language in 
investigating difference in experience and function, allows us to capture the depth of 
difference running between people with ASCs diagnoses and the neurotypicals. Had we 
gone looking for this difference only, as Davidson did, with the tools of language and 
translation in hand, we would have glossed over issues that are not only of vast theoretical, 
but also of crucially humanitarian importance. 
In chapter seven I summarised the overall philosophical position advanced in this 
dissertation and coined it pluralistic incorrigible realism (PIR). Summarily, PIR contends 
the following. First, that science crucially depends on the life-world in the sense that it 
departs from, is conducted via, and returns to it for validation. Second, that the life-world 
is not plainly a construction of the subject or of the world but a product of their synergy; 
the world as incorrigibly delivered to a subject via its perceiving capacities. The life-world 
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may also be shared, and thus has an intersubjective dimension. Third, that the life-world 
is not singular but plural, as evinced both by the theoretical anti-anti-conceptual scheme 
variation arguments and the positive case of alternative life-worlds provided through the 
ASCs case study. Combining these theses, PIR argues that science’s claim to the true 
description of reality should, at most, mean a description of the incorrigible part of given 
life-worlds. 
The contributions of PIR to the analytic philosophy of science literature pertinent to 
the scientific realism debate may, I argued in chapter seven, be organised along two axes: 
the move beyond language and the move into practice. The move beyond language reflects 
the life-world’s adoption of extra-linguistic elements in science analysis and PIR’s 
treatment of science as an activity beyond merely a theoretical endeavour based on 
observational statements. By adopting such a rich construal of the observable level as the 
life-world, we can detect extant and important difference where we could not before: this 
was demonstrated in the conceptual scheme pluralism theoretical case and in the ASCs, 
scientific practice-related case study. I demonstrated that the language-unobservables 
focused take on the science’s claim to truth and reality misses exactly all these important 
differences that the analytic literature cannot afford to ignore any longer. With the move 
into practice I argued for settling the issues of truth and reality by, as noted above, 
identifying them with ‘incorrigible/real-for-X-in-a-given-circumstance’ and altogether 
questioning any ecumenical Truth or Reality. I argued that this allows us to move past 
certain somewhat stale metaphysical debates and the dialectical paralysis that the scientific 
realism debate is currently involved in. The space is then free to be occupied by applied 
scientific realism – the credo in employing the insights of reality’s conditioning we have 
obtained through the scientific realism debate to real cases of scientific practice, seeking to 
benefit our lives and those of others. 
With this dissertation, I have found philosophical issues of science to be enmeshed in 
urgent questions that affect peoples’ realities. Embarking from a dual perspective, that 
includes both immersion in the discipline and fieldwork seeking to map out the range of 
ACS conditions I have looked to contribute substantially both to the scientific realism 
debate, and to how people that find themselves in conditions divergent from the typical 
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